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This project provides new answers to an old question: “Why do people become 
indebted?” The challenge of this dissertation is not to explore new and undiscov-
ered subjects, but to tackle a topic that pervades discourses in the media, aca-
demic circles, and conversations of ordinary citizens alike. Credit is indeed a cru-
cial ingredient of the profound transformations experienced in Chile during the 
last decades, and most Chileans have acquired consumer debts at some point. 
After all, in Chile everyone has something to say about debts. The financialization 
of consumption has deep consequences in the everyday life of Chilean families. 
For that reason, indebtedness is a much discussed and controversial issue. Some 
argue that increasing access to credit is a sign of the “good shape” of the Chilean 
economy, irrefutable evidence of the benefits of embracing the market ideology. 
Others warn that the increasing indebtedness of Chilean families resembles the 
burden imposed by the privatization of public services. In any case, it demands 
systematic interpretations and breaking with conventional wisdom on the matter, 
largely monopolized by economists. The contribution of this dissertation does not 
lie in the sophistication of its methods. But its strength rather stems from the ef-
fort of integrating multiple approaches, and providing an empirically informed 
narrative from a predominantly sociological perspective. Unlike most research 
conducted in the field of political economy, which privileges the study of aggre-
gated data on consumption, debts, and interest rates, this research opens up the 
“black box” of households and studies “real consumers.” But unlike most ethno-
graphical research on credit and debts carried out in developing countries, it also 
accounts for the political foundations of consumer lending. Such integration re-
quires a dialog between two fields that share interests, concepts and diagnoses, 
but that remain largely disconnected: the political economy of consumer lending, 
and the sociology of consumption and finance. This dissertation is not ascribed to 
any of these disciplinary fields in particular. It is rather “in the middle.” It brings 
the structural analysis of “privatized Keynesianism” into the qualitative analysis of 
people´s everyday lives, aspirations, beliefs and practices. And vice versa, it scruti-
nizes the major assumption of “big narratives,” and goes back to them with fresh 
insights and conceptual refinement. Much research has yet to be conducted on 
this subject. This project provides a first attempt to address the financialization of 
consumption in Chile in its most fundamental and encompassing aspects.  
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indeed a crucial ingredient of the profound transformations experienced in Chile during the last decades, 
and most Chileans have acquired consumer debts at some point. After all, in Chile everyone has 
something to say about debts.  
The financialization of consumption has deep consequences in the everyday life of Chilean 
families. For that reason, indebtedness is a much discussed and controversial issue. Some argue that 
increasing access to credit is a sign of the “good shape” of the Chilean economy, irrefutable evidence of 
the benefits of embracing the market ideology. Others warn that the increasing indebtedness of Chilean 
families resembles the burden imposed by the privatization of public services. In any case, it demands 
systematic interpretations and breaking with conventional wisdom on the matter, largely monopolized by 
economists.  
The contribution of this dissertation does not lie in the sophistication of its methods. But it strength 
rather stems from the effort of integrating multiple approaches, and providing an empirically informed 
narrative from a predominantly sociological perspective.  Unlike most research conducted in the field of 
political economy, which privileges the study of aggregated data on consumption, debts, and interest rates, 
this research opens up the “black box” of households and studies “real consumers”. But unlike most 
ethnographical research on credit and debts carried out in developing countries, it also accounts for the 
political foundations of consumer lending. 
 Such integration requires a dialog between two fields that share interests, concepts and diagnoses, 
but that remain largely disconnected: the political economy of consumer lending, and the sociology of 
consumption and finance. This dissertation is not ascribed to any of these disciplinary fields in particular. 
It is rather “in the middle”. It brings the structural analysis of “privatized Keynesianism” into the 
qualitative analysis of people´s everyday lives, aspirations, beliefs and practices. And vice versa, it 
scrutinizes the major assumption of “big narratives”, and goes back to them with fresh insights and 
conceptual refinement. Much research has yet to be conducted on this subject. This project provides a first 
attempt to address the financialization of consumption in Chile in its most fundamental and encompassing 
aspects. 
Starting a research project and bringing it to an end is a collective endeavor. This project dates 
back to my work as young researcher in Chile, at the department of Sociology of the Universidad Alberto 
 
	   	  
6 
Hurtado. I want to thank Claudio Ramos, Alejandro Pelfini, Pedro Güell and Marco Moreno, whose 
support was crucial to conceive this project and pursue an academic degree. My recognition also goes to 
Prof. José Ossandón, who encouraged me to pursue a research agenda that he himself started on the 
market for consumer credit in Chile. I am very grateful to him for his support during these years. 
The Max Planck Institute and its staff provided the best possible conditions to conduct this 
research, and prompted the most enriching exchange with colleagues and scholars from different 
disciplines and cultures. I owe much to Prof. Jens Beckert, who supported and guided me throughout these 
years, and made my fieldwork in Chile possible. I am also grateful to Prof. Akos Rona-Tas, who hosted 
me as visiting student at the University of California, San Diego, engaged actively with my work, and 
helped me improve it.  
This project was also possible thanks to the collaboration of many people in Chile: families that 
shared their experiences, aspirations, frustrations and hopes; and busy experts that took the time to share 
their expertise. I want to thank Tomás de la Fuente, who guided and helped me find my way for 
investigating the financial industry in Chile.  
I also want to thank my colleagues and friends: Marcin and Markus, Matías, Aldo and Malú, for 
sharing their friendship and wisdom, and supporting me countless times throughout these years. My 
thankfulness to the inspiring discussions with the “financialization group”: Daniel, Phil, Richard and Jan. 
Gratitude also goes to my friends in Cologne, Andrés, Roberto, Waly and Orson, with whom I shared 
some of the best moments.  
This dissertation was also possible thanks to the support provided by the National Research 
Commission of Science and Technology, CONICYT. I also received financial support from the Max 
Planck Institute.  
Finally, my endless gratitude to my family, friends and loved ones in Chile. I owe to much María, 
Ramón, Pablo, Alejandra, Lorena, Leonardo, Ilich, Tomás and Yéssica; and to my nephews, Mane, 
Luciano, Lukas, Lucía and Martín; all of them gave me the strength to pursue an ambitious project far 
away from those I care the most. Special thanks to Pía, who supported me in materializing this project 
from the beginning, even under the most adverse circumstances. 
 
          
 
 
To my parents and nephews 
 
 
	   	  
7 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Number of Bank and Department Store Credit Cards in Chile ............................................... 12 
Figure 2: Financial Depth in Selected Countries of Latinamerica (percentages, total number of loans as a percentage 
of GDP) ................................................................................................................................................................ 42 
Figure 3: Average Households percapita Income by Income Decile 2011and 2013 (including transferences, USD 
November 2013) ................................................................................................................................................... 44 
Figure 4: Evolution of Percapita Social Spending, 1970-1991 (1970=0) .................................................................... 54 
Figure 5: Evolution of Different Economic Indicators, Chile 1987-2010 ................................................................... 62 
Figure 6: Perception of a Personal Situation that is Better-off than that of their Parents (percentage) ....................... 63 
Figure 7: Percentage of Variation, Autonomous Household Income, periods 1990-2006 and 1990-2009 (Chilean 
pesos, November 2009) ........................................................................................................................................ 63 
Figure 8: Evolution Gini Coefficient, 1990-2011 ........................................................................................................ 65 
Figure 9: Percentage of Real Wage Readjustments in Total Collective Contracts, 1990-2002 ................................... 67 
Figure 10: Number of Recipients of CAE by Income Quintile 2006-2013 ................................................................. 74 
Figure 11: Number of Finished Dwelling Units and Subsidies 1964-2009 ................................................................. 78 
Figure 12: Investment in Mortgage Bonds as a share of AFPs´Assets, 1981-2001 ..................................................... 80 
Figure 13: Evolution of Construction of Dwelling Units in Chile, 1960-2000 ............................................................ 81 
Figure 14: Total Number of Families with Access to Housing Credit and Subsidies, 1950-2009 .............................. 84 
Figure 15: Evolution of Bank Mortgage Stocks, 2000-2010 ....................................................................................... 85 
Figure 16: Evolution of Household with Durable Goods 1992-2010 .......................................................................... 90 
Figure 17: Variation (%) of Real Prices of Different Goods from May 1987 to May 2011 ........................................ 91 
Figure 18: Variation of Household Expenditures as a Share of Income by Income Quintiles, Gran Santiago 1996-
2013 ...................................................................................................................................................................... 92 
Figure 19: Share of Households with Incomes under $250.000 Chilean pesos (approximately US $480 in 2008), 
2006 ...................................................................................................................................................................... 93 
Figure 20: Non Bank Credit Card Issuers, Market Share December 2008. ................................................................. 96 
Figure 21: Minimum Income Required to Apply for a Credit Card, According to Different Department Stores (USD 
of March 2015) ..................................................................................................................................................... 98 
Figure 22: Total Sales Made on Credit, Different Department Stores in 2012 .......................................................... 101 
 
	   	  
8 
Figure 23: Annual Maximum Conventional Interest Rate, 2000-2013 ...................................................................... 102 
Figure 24: Evolution of Number of Department Store Credit Cards and Average Amount of Debts, 1993-2000 .... 106 
Figure 25Consumer Debt, Thousands of Million Chilean Pesos (nominal) .............................................................. 107 
Figure 26: Consumer Perception Index, 1981-2012 (quarterly average) ............................................................ 108 
Figure 27: Number of Clients that Suffered Re-arrangement of Debts ..................................................................... 112 
Figure 28: Debt to Income Ratio and Share of Households with Different types of Debts by Age Group, 2012 ..... 118 
Figure 29: Total Debt to Annual Income Ratio and Monthly Debt Dervice in Chile, 2013 ...................................... 119 
Figure 30: Evolution of Financial Burden by Income Group 2007-2011 .................................................................. 120 
Figure 31: During the Last Twelve Months, did Any Event Prevent You From Paying Your Debts? ..................... 122 
Figure 32: Average Household Percapita Monthly Income by Income Decile 2011, Excluding Government 
Transferences (average USD 2011) ................................................................................................................... 134 
Figure 33: Share of Total Income of Richest 1% ....................................................................................................... 135 
Figure 34: Distribution of Monetary Subsidies Among Households by Income Decile (2013) ................................ 144 
Figure 35: The Gap Between Property and Aspirations, 2007 .................................................................................. 147 
Figure 36: Share of Different Income Quintiles in Total Income and Total Debts, 2010 ......................................... 149 
Figure 37: For What Purposes did You Use Your Department Store Credit Card? Different income Deciles 2009 151 
Figure 38: Evolution of Relative and Absolute Poverty 1996-2006 .......................................................................... 158 
Figure 39: Evolution of Imported Goods, 2003-2013 ................................................................................................ 160 
Figure 40: Consumers Who Think that Their "Incomes allow them to meet only basic needs and nothing else", Year 
2008 (Different Socioeconomic Groups) ........................................................................................................... 161 
Figure 41: Expenditures on Advertisement Investments (Millions of US Dollars 2012) .......................................... 163 
Figure 42: Utilization of Department Store Credit Cards, Different Age Groups 2009 ............................................ 166 
Figure 43: Average Amount of Monthly Expenditure Among Youth, Different Items 2010 ................................... 167 
Figure 44: People That Think That “more than half of Chilean families earn more than me”, 2008 ........................ 168 
Figure 45: Evolution of  Number of Sold Cars, 1999-2012 ....................................................................................... 169 
Figure 46: Evolution of Imported Perfumes, 2003-2013 ........................................................................................... 179 
Figure 47: Evolution of Sold Liters of Botled Water and Sports Drinks ................................................................... 181 
Figure 48: Mauricio´s and Pamela´s “Book keeping” ............................................................................................... 188 
 
	   	  
9 
Figure 49: Market Encounters at the Department Store Work as Market Attachment Devices ................................ 203 
Figure 50: Saleswomen Wait at the Entrance of the Department Store and “Jump” onto Consumers. ..................... 205 
Figure 51: Share of Households with Department Store Debt by Number of Household Members, Different Income 
Groups ................................................................................................................................................................ 210 
Figure 52: Number of Active Non-Bank (blue) and Bank (red) Credit Cards, December 2007-2013 ...................... 211 
Figure 53: Definition of the Life-project According to socio-economic group ......................................................... 217 
Figure 54: How people cover the gap between incomes and expenses ..................................................................... 223 
Figure 55: “How did you manage to adjust your budget?” Percentage of Interviewees that Mention Each Category, 
2012 .................................................................................................................................................................... 224 
Figure 56: Considering the Last Twelve Months, Would You Say That the Expenditures of Your Household Were? 
(2009) ................................................................................................................................................................. 225 
Figure 57: Reasons for Saving and Income Group, 2009 .......................................................................................... 227 
Figure 58: Total Expenditure of Education as a Percentage of GDP, 1990-2008 ..................................................... 231 
Figure 59: Evolution of Average  Expenditures on Education As a Share of Total Expenditures ............................ 232 
Figure 60: With the Education That Your Son Currently Receives, Do You Think He/She Will Get Into College?
 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 234 
Figure 61: Average Monthly Expenditures in Pre-school, Secondary and High School by Income Quintile, 
2011/2012 (Chilean Pesos) ................................................................................................................................. 235 
Figure 62: Average Annual Expenditure per Student in all Higher Education Institutions (thousands of 2009 Chilean 
pesos) .................................................................................................................................................................. 237 
Figure 63: Evolution of Weighted Average Annual Fees in the Higher Educational System, Prices of 2010 
(converted to average USD of 2010) .................................................................................................................. 238 
Figure 64: Average Monthly Expenditures on Higher Education by Income Quintile, 2011/2012 .................. 239 
Figure 65: Perception of Protection 2011 (Net %) ................................................................................................ 242 
Figure 66: Affiliation to the Public and Private Health System by Income Decile, 2013 ......................................... 243 
Figure 67: Out-of-pocket Medical Spending as a Share of Final Household Consumption, 2011 (selected countries)
 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 244 
Figure 68: Average Monthly Expenditures in Medical Services by Income Quintile 2011/2012 ............................. 244 
Figure 69: Utilization of Different Consumer Credits by Household Heads Over 60 ............................................... 248 
Figure 70: Utilization of "Social Loan" by Income Group, Heads of Household over 60 (2009) ............................. 248 
Figure 71: What Motive is Behind the Increase in Your Debts Since 2007? ............................................................ 252 
 
	   	  
10 
Figure 72: Bicicletear and the Circulation of Debts .................................................................................................. 254 
Figure 73: Utilization of Consumer Credit and Financial Planning ........................................................................... 256 
Figure 74: Karen´s Accounting Book. ....................................................................................................................... 261 
Figure 75: Olga´s Agenda .......................................................................................................................................... 262 
Figure 76: Olga´s Visa Card Invoices ........................................................................................................................ 262 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   	  
11 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: THE FINANCIALIZATION OF CONSUMPTION IN CHILE 
  
 
Chile became a country of debtors over a span of just twenty years. Facilitated by the financial 
innovations carried out by department stores during the 1970s, the market for consumer credit in Chile 
started with a faint penetration in the late 1980s to explosively expand during the last two decades. By 
1995, one and a half million households already had consumer debt and five million credit cards were 
circulating around a country of fifteen million inhabitants (CCS 1995). Between 2000 and 2009, 
household debt grew three times faster than the entire economy,1 and the debt-to-income ratio rose from 
35.4% to 59.9%. In 2012, the Household Financial Survey carried out by the Chilean Central Bank 
reported that 68% of Chilean households have consumer debt uniformly distributed throughout the social 
structure.  
The financialization of consumption in Chile followed its own path. Unlike frequently studied 
cases such as the United States (Manning 2001; Hyman 2013), United Kingdom (Montgomerie 2006b; 
Trumbull 2008; Langley 2010), France (Trumbull 2012b; Trumbull 2010) and Eastern European countries 
(Guseva 2005; Róna-Tas/Guseva 2014; Guseva/Rona-Tas 2001), the current expansion of consumer credit 
is led not by banks or other specialized financial institutions, but by department stores. In a context where 
an important part of the population has limited banking access, Chilean department stores financialized 
low and middle income consumers by embracing risk-based classification techniques and by issuing their 
own credit cards (Ossandón 2013).2 Indeed, although the number of bank credit cards in Chile increased 
from 1.3 million in 1993 to 4.5 million in 2007 (Barros 2009), those issued by department store ballooned 
during the same period from 1.3 million to 19.3 million (Montero/Tarjizán 2010).3 These credit cards have 
evolved from within-store installment purchases to revolving credit and immediate ATM “cash 
withdraws”. Today a dense network of payments exists, complete with affiliate stores and services such as 
supermarkets, private clinics, pharmacies and gas stations. What made this expansion possible and why do 
Chilean families take on so much consumer debt? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The average annual growth of household debt was 12% (14% consumer credit and 12% mortgages), while the average annual 
growth of the economy was 3.6%. 
2 This successful business model is currently being expanded to other countries such as Perú, Argentina, Colombia and 
Ecuador. 
3 In a country of sixteen million inhabitants according to the last Population Census carried in 2012.	  
 
	   	  
12 
Figure 1: Evolution of Number of Bank and Department Store Credit Cards in Chile 
 
Source: data taken from Montero (2010) 
 
The financialization of consumption in Chile went hand in hand with several structural changes 
that took place in the Pinochet era and consolidated after the democratic transition in 1990. These changes 
were characterized by a profound transformation of the occupational structure, liberalization of trade, 
commodification of social services, increased access to education, social mobility, sustained economic 
growth and an important reduction of poverty characterized such changes. As a result, in a span of twenty-
five years Chile experienced a radical transformation in the living conditions of its citizens and families. 
Within the context of persistent and high levels of income inequality, Chilean families have seen how 
goods and services flooded supermarkets and shopping malls. An important share of the population –the 
so called “new middle class”- witnessed and increasingly participated in an unprecedented affluence, 
characteristic of societies that have reached “post-materialist” standards; that is to say, standards of 
societies that have increasingly moved away from scarcity and basic necessities, shifting their concerns 
from material security to more intangible and moral concerns of social equality and inclusion (Inglehart 
2007).  
Within this particular context, consumer credit in its different forms is now considered a crucial 
ingredient of the “Chilean modernization”, undeniably linked to the rise of shopping malls in the urban 
centers and the consolidation of new elites. These families, with a tradition in commerce dating back to 
the late nineteenth century, were favoured by the structural transformations carried during Pinochet´s 
dictatorship and saw the oportunity to expand their dominance of domestic markets to new heights.  
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Their main innovation carried out during the 1980s, the “department store credit card”, 
transformed a population with low income into an untapped consumer base consumers (Ossandón 2013). 
At the same time, it provided the new “aspirational” middle classes with the means to fulfill expectations 
of reaching standards of living that have been historically restricted to the wealthiest citizens. Turning the 
middle-class into subjects of credit first and the less privileged groups afterwards became a highly 
profitable business for companies that were previously exclusively focused on commercial activities, but 
now displace banks as the main source of credit for a sizable percentage of the population.  
The financialization of consumption is an ongoing process. As the business becomes more 
profitable and the market more competitive, companies refine their risk-based classification systems, learn 
from consumer behavior and arrange a set of organizational technologies in order to target new 
populations. New consumers’ profiles emerge in the laboratories of marketing professionals and data 
miners. The frontiers of the market have expanded throughout the 1990s to the 2000s from the middle 
class household head to the low income housewife; from the young professional to the undergraduate 
student; and from the active labor force to the retired worker whose lean but stable pensions are accessible 
to the lenders that administer them, the so-called “Cajas”. Now well into the twenty-first century, as 
Martuccelli (2012b) say, consumer credit seems to have consolidated in the Chilean society as a 
“legitimate means to acquire what are considered legitimate goods”. 
  
1.1. THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSUMER DEBTS 
As one would expect, the rise of consumer lending signified a radical change in the economic life 
of Chilean families and called the attention of several observers in the media, politics and academic 
circles. Conservatives warn that Chilean consumers entered onto escalating dynamics of conspicuous 
consumption, while critics argue that it is a consequence of putting the financial burden into the shoulders 
of households. In this respect, what explains the gap between “aspirations” and income in a country that 
experienced sustained economic growth? 
The peculiar path followed by consumer lending in Chile raises in first place a striking puzzle for 
the literature dealing with the rise of consumer debt in contemporary capitalist democracies: the 
financialization of consumption in Chile does not go hand in hand with wage stagnation and the 
deterioration of the middle-class that followed the demise of Keynesianism in the developed world. Quite 
to the contrary, the market for consumer credit in Chile expanded in the context of rising wages, sustained 
economic growth, reduction of poverty and collective improvement. Furthermore, since department store 
credit cards have been mainly attached to within-store purchases, consumer debts in Chile have served 
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less as a means to “smooth” consumption in the face of income shocks, and more to expand people´s 
purchasing power in times of prosperity.  
This challenges also the conventional wisdom of Chilean economists that reiteratively argue that 
credit "...is mainly backed by future expected incomes, allowing for consumption smoothing over 
transitory income or needs-based shocks, being more volatile as requirements and use of debt are more 
linked to income/need shocks." (Cox/Parrado/Ruiz-Tagle 2006, p. 6).  
In any case, the historical interpretation seems to be at stake: are Chilean families acquiring debts 
to participate in spirals of conspicuous consumption, or rather protecting themselves from the volatility of 
a liberal market economy. This is a very controversial issue and the complexity of its historical 
interpretation lies in the fact that the expansion of consumer credit could be considered as both the cause 
and consequence of the Chilean modernization. For some, Chilean families taking increasing credit is 
symptomatic of the democratization of finance and consumption, a sign of the increasing opportunities 
and freedoms brought about by the embracement of neoliberalism. More suspicious observers, however, 
would question the coexistence of high levels of aggregate demand with persistent inequality. In part, it 
seems that the success or failure of political and economic institutions in neoliberal Chile lie in the 
interpretation of the causes and consequences of indebtedness. But why is consumer debt so controversial? 
The ambivalent character of these discussions relates to a seemingly universal phenomenon noted 
by anthropologists: that credit/debt relations have an ubiquitous and morally contested character 
(Guérin/Morvant-Roux/Villarreal 2014; Graeber 2011). As astonishing ethnographical evidence shows, 
informants across different times and places manifest a distinction between credit and debt according to 
which the former refers to forms of power and status, while the latter is associated with imprisonment and 
weakness (Peebles 2010). Mauss (2005) himself was among the first to analyze the paradoxical nature of 
credit/debt relations, showing that debts not only contribute to the institutionalization of hierarchies, but 
are also the key to group solidarity. Following Mauss´ suggestion, scholars have addressed the practical 
effects of such distinctions, what has been called the “pragmatics of credit/debt relations” (Gregory 2012), 
noticing that relations between lenders and borrowers transcend their economic and financial character 
and “…entail emotions and feelings such as dignity, prestige and respectability, and also shame, 
humiliation, anxiety, anger, revenge or even friendship, gratitude and love” (Guérin/Morvant-
Roux/Villarreal 2014, p. 296). 
Under this perspective, historical interpretations remain open to the pragmatics of credit/debt 
relations: for some the exaltation of the “credit” side of the distinction, stemming from the latin credere 
(to believe), is a recognition of the trustiness of consumers and their entrepreneurial potential. For others, 
however, people do not take credit but “get indebted” to meet “needs” that the media have established as a 
standard of living. According to this critical view, the expansion of consumer debts could be considered as 
reproducing an “ideology” in the strict Marxist sense (Marx/Engels 2014): it provides a solution in 
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conscience (consumption equality) to an unsolved contradiction in practice (high and persisting income 
inequality). Viewed this way, the rise of consumer credit would not resemble a step towards development, 
but the incapacity of a society to distribute the benefits of the so called modernization. What version is 
closer to reality? How to theorize and explore the relation between debt and consumption in contemporary 
capitalist societies? 
1.2. RESEARCHING CONSUMER LENDING  
Debates about the causes and consequences of the financialization of consumption in Chile tend to 
lose sight of the “big picture”. Chile is certainly not the only developing country that underwent 
financialization processes. The proliferation and expansion of markets for consumer credit has been one of 
the driving forces of capitalist accumulation in the last decades, showing an explosive growth in both 
developed and developing countries (Guseva/Rona-Tas 2001; Guseva 2005; Rona-Tas 2009; Trumbull 
2010; Rhyne 2009). Against this background, scholars from several disciplines addressed the increasing 
indebtedness of households and the expansion of consumer lending (although the majority focuses on 
Anglo-American economies as the landmark of the expansion of financial markets at large). Currently, it 
is possible to discern among different multidisciplinary research agendas that attempt to make sense of 
this phenomenon.  
Market sociology has focused on the organizational foundations of consumer lending, improving 
our understanding of the structure, scope and stability of these markets from a supply side perspective 
(Guseva/Rona-Tas 2001; Rona-Tas 2009; Róna-Tas/Hiß 2010; Marron 2006; Marron 2009; Poon 2007). 
The main concern of this research is the organizational conditions that make the emergence and expansion 
of credit markets possible under different institutional settings.  
During the last decade, the social sciences witnessed an important development in the studies of 
finance from historical and macro perspectives towards the thorough description of processes, techniques 
and settings through which financialization is assembled and enacted on a daily life basis. Up to now, the 
research program under the paradigm of the Social Studies of Finance has been successful in opening the 
so called “black box” of consumer lending and we have a better picture of the imbrication of households 
and consumers with consumer credit at the market place (Langley 2013; Langley 2008), the role of 
“corporality” and affective processes in post-sale relations (Deville 2013) and the marketization of finance 
(Ossandón 2013; Marron 2013). But how and why do people increasingly consume credit? 
Anthropologists have arguably provided the most comprehensive and detailed accounts of the 
consumption of credit by informing and documenting financial practices across diverse social contexts 
(Gregory 2012; Peebles 2010). Recently, an increasing number of scholars enriched our understanding of 
the social meanings and uses of finance among those previously excluded from financial markets in 
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Argentina (Wilkis 2013; Wilkis 2014), Mexico (Villareal 2014; Villareal 2008; Angulo 2014; Zanotelli 
2014; Guzmán 2014), India (Guérin et al. 2014), Chile (Han 2012; Barros 2011) and Morocco (Morvant-
Roux et al. 2014).  These works debunked the belief that poor people lack rational competences to deal 
with modern finances, demonstrating that supposedly illiterate consumers “juggling” with money actually 
make complex calculations, compare and translate values among currencies, and exchange different types 
of debts and obligations.  
In Chile, there has been an increasing concern about the expansion of consumer lending. Ossandón 
(2011) has put forward one of the most active research agendas to unveil what until now was considered 
the “black box” of credits. His own work went in the direction of Social Studies of Science, studying the 
credit card industry with a special emphasis on the risk management techniques and financial innovations 
that underlie the extension of credit to middle and low income populations (Ossandón 2013); the 
emergence of socio-technical controversies inside the financial industry (Ossandón/González 2010b); and 
the financial ecologies that emerge from the utilization of these devices (Ossandón et al. 2011). This 
paved the way for a series of research projects carried out in different directions, which this dissertation 
contributes. 
Other research studies rather focus on consumers with a special emphasis on low-income 
households. These qualitative studies share Zelizer´s concern about the representations and social 
meanings of money. In this vein, Barros (2011) described the calculative frames and practices of sub-
prime credit card holders in Chile, showing moral and affective foundations of the uses of “credit money”. 
Han (2012) provides a similar ethnographical account and shows the lateral uses of credit by women 
struggling against the indeterminacy of family´s care relations in contexts of economic constraints and 
domestic violence.  
 van Bavel/Sell-Trujillo (2003), on the other hand, studied the representations and underlying 
rationales behind credit utilization among low and middle-high income debtors. They showed that while 
low-income consumers use credit as a means of social and personal realization that aims at demarcating 
boundaries against the stigma of poverty, middle-high income debtors mobilize rational arguments to 
justify their debts. Finally, an exception to the qualitative focus on low-income consumers is the work of 
Marambio (2011), which looks into the different profiles of middle class debtors in a quantitative fashion, 
showing the mixed character of the financialization of households.  
These studies contributed to empirically de-economizing the indebtedness of Chilean families, 
largely considered as a matter of macro-economic stability rather than a social phenomenon (Montero 
2010; BC 2010; Álvarez/Opazo 2013; Ruiz-Tagle/García/Miranda 2013).  This is very important in the 
context where the expansion of consumer credit has been systematically considered by local scholars as 
one of the most characteristic and striking features of the Chilean capitalism (Moulian 2002; Tironi 1999; 
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PNUD 2002), but little research has been actually conducted to understand how the mechanisms 
underlying these transformations operate. This dissertation aims to address this oversight 
In particular, this project seeks to contribute to the studies of credit in Chile by tackling two main 
gaps: First, as a matter of empirical focus, characterizing the financialization of the heterogeneous Chilean 
middle class in a qualitative fashion is still a pending task. This is important especially when we take into 
consideration the fact that the rising middle-class is the driving force of the expansion of consumer 
lending in Chile.  
But the most important gap relates to the analytical framework through which reality is 
approached. In particular, I maintain that in demarcating themselves from institutional-macro approaches 
and showing the material and technological foundations of markets for consumer credit, most studies on 
credit in Chile remain disconnected from their institutional and political foundations. In broad terms, this 
disconnection has to do with the fact that the relation between consumption, politics and debt remains 
under-theorized in the different perspectives utilized, especially within the field of economic sociology. 
Moreover, the emphasis on the moral underpinnings of debts and financial literacy-problems led scholars 
to neglect the crucial issue of how people actually consume with credit, and how this relates to structural 
transformations and political institutions. This omission obscures the fact that unlike micro-credits, which 
are promoted by governments and international agencies as concrete solutions to poverty and economic 
underdevelopment, consumer credit is indirectly promoted as a social entitlement that serves as a 
substitute for social spending in times of fiscal austerity (Rajan 2010; Krippner 2011; Streeck 2014). This 
makes the political dimension of financialization a nuanced affair, which requires further research on the 
relation between meaningful financial practices and broader institutional contexts.  
Finally, it is important to emphasize that with an exclusive focus on Anglo-American economies, 
current theories on political economy provide few analytical tools to understand how debts and 
consumption intersect in contexts not characterized by wage stagnation. Driven by these concerns, this 
dissertation seeks to investigate the financialization of consumption in Chile by engaging the following 
research questions. 
1.2.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
- Why and how do people in Chile increasingly take credit to finance their consumption in contexts 
of improvement, and how does this relate to the institutionalization of a liberal economic regime? 
This question can be further disaggregated into the following specific questions: 
 
- What are the social mechanisms that connect the institutionalization of neoliberal arrangements 
and household indebtedness in Chile? 
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- Where do preferences for financing consumption with credit come from, and how do they relate to 
people´s life-trajectories? 
 
- What are the financial and consumption practices that inform the utilization of consumer credit as 
a policy tool? 
 
- What are the social consequences of the financialization of consumption? 
1.3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
How should we address the political and institutional foundations of consumer lending in Chile? In 
this dissertation I take some distance from mainstream studies of consumer credit in economic sociology 
and anthropology, and follow political economists in that the financialization of consumption should be 
understood as a structural and political phenomenon of contemporary capitalism.  
Indeed, we have witnessed during the last years an emerging consensus in both political economy 
and financialization literature, according to which distributional compromises under neoliberal political 
economies prompt households to acquire consumer debts. Although with different emphasis, such 
accounts could be encompassed in an overarching narrative that in this dissertation I refer to as the  
“Privatized Keynesianism” hypothesis, a concept originally coined by Colin Crouch (Crouch 2008). 
The starting point of this narrative is the evidence that shows an inverse correlation between the 
development of the welfare state - measured as social spending- and household debt across developed 
countries (Prasad 2012b; Kus 2013).4 In line with this finding, scholars seek to show that consumer credit 
helps people meet their financial commitments in the context of rising living-costs and stagnant wages, 
showing a correlation between the financial stress of middle class families and the absence of a safety net 
left by the retrenchment of the welfare state (Sullivan 2000; Warren 2003).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Kus (2013) for example, explored the “financialization of welfare and distribution” in 20 OECD countries over the period 
1995-2007 and their impact on governmental policies towards “social welfare”.4 The results of Kus´ analysis suggest an inverse 
relation between the existence of consumption opportunities through credit and low-wage imports from China on the one hand, 
and the social welfare effort of governments, on the other. Prasad (2012a) offers a similar analysis by measuring the effects that 
the gross public social spending as a percent of the GDP (Socx) has in household debts (measured as the value of assets against 
the values of debts) in 21 OECD countries for the period 1980-2005. The regressions show that deregulations in the banking 
sector have effects on household indebtedness in less developed welfare state countries, but not in cases with higher welfare 
spending. Furthermore, in less developed welfare systems, deregulation could be associated with a higher demand for credit. 
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This evidence led political economists to reject the explanation of the rising indebtedness of 
households that rely on the life-cycle hypothesis and the falling interest rates that followed financial 
deregulations in the 1980s (Montgomerie 2009b; Trumbull 2012a; Trumbull 2014); it also provided strong 
support against the “overconsumption hypothesis” widely held in the media, according to which both 
indebtedness and financial failure are consequences of the rise of a hedonist and out of control consumer 
driven by desires of self-gratification (De Graaf/Wann/Naylor 2005). Rather, for most political 
economists, debt creation is less driven by an out-of-control consumer and more the consequence of 
redistributive policies that put the burdens on the shoulders of ordinary consumers (Trumbull 2012b; 
Prasad/Deng 2009; Logemann 2011). As Weller (2007) puts it “While the desire for instant gratification is 
probably a small contributing factor, it is far overweighed by the need of families to borrow more amid 
sluggish income growth and rising prices” (Weller 2007, p.583). 
Following this argumentative logic, the “Privatized Keynesianism” hypothesis is rooted in two 
main ideas: first, that the financialization of households could be seen as the result of concomitant 
processes and structural transformations. These were driven by the institutionalization of the idea of non-
inflationary growth as an attempt to address the crisis of the 1970s (Krippner 2011). And second, that the 
rise of both secured and unsecured debts should be understood in the context of wage stagnation and labor 
flexibility, characteristic of several advanced economies. 
In this dissertation, I use the “Privatized Keynesianism” hypothesis as the primary analytical 
framework to understand the financialization of consumption in Chile. But I also engage with it by 
problematizing some of its main assumptions and gaps. This requires a more detailed account of what 
“Privatized Keynesianism” is. 
 
1.3.1. WHAT IS PRIVATIZED KEYNESIANISM AND HOW DOES IT WORK 
At the historical and institutional level, “Privatized Keynesianism” is a particular articulation of 
distributive conflicts that result from the overall accumulation crisis and contradictions of capitalist 
democracies in the second half of the twentieth century. This articulation of the state, markets and 
households has three main pillars: the role played by a) financial innovations, b) the retrenchment of the 
welfare state, and c) political actors promoting credit access as a policy tool.  
Privatized Keynesianism and the Distributional Conflicts of Democratic Capitalism 
Paying special attention to the role of financial deregulations, the increasing reliance of the 
American economy on foreign capital flows, and a shift in the monetary policy initiated in the Volcker 
era, scholars have argued that financialization was the unintended answer of policymakers to a set of 
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political, economic and social dilemmas that they dealt with in the 1970s (Rajan 2010; Crouch 2008; 
Streeck 2011; Montgomerie 2006b; Krippner 2011; Krippner 2005).  
For Streeck (2014), rising household indebtedness could be seen as the manifestation of an 
endemic conflict that came to institutionalize instability in the post-war era, where capitalism and electoral 
democracy became interdependent phenomena within the Fordist model of mass production.  The conflict 
results from the contradictory logics of capitalist markets and democratic politics that governments have 
to deal with in democratic contexts. While the former operates under the logic of marginal productivity, 
the latter works under the logic of social rights, creating pressures to bring resources from the future in 
order to resolve the struggles over the distribution of scarce resources in the present. Under this logic, debt 
creation in different spheres stands as a temporary solution to these distributive conflicts in the post 
Keynesian era (Streeck 2014; Streeck 2011).  
Keynesianism was indeed an answer to distributive problems in advanced economies and guided 
economic policies during the thirty years after the Second World War. 5 Built on a massive production 
system established by Fordism and Taylorism, the state protected ordinary workers from the fluctuations 
of the markets by creating debts and stimulating the economy in recession times (Crouch 2009). Restoring 
the stability in workers´ lives and their consumption confidence, unemployment was reduced to very low 
levels, wages increased, and the demand for goods re-activated economic growth, ensuring the necessary 
confidence for future investments. In this sense, Keynesianism represented a temporary coincidence 
between the industrial working class and the general interest of the political and economic system in the 
global northwest (Crouch 2011).  
Endemic inflation was the result of these particular arrangements, which was tamed in the early 
1980s with the radical policies of Volcker and Thatcher. These policies led to an unprecedented rise in 
interest rates, the dismantling of trade unions and high unemployment rates that followed restrictive 
monetary policies (Streeck 2011). The decline of inflation in democratic capitalist economies went hand in 
hand with de-unionization of workers, while unemployment provoked the need for social assistance. In 
such a context, inflation was no longer an available tool to close the gap between markets´ demands to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Crouch (2008; 2009; 2010) recognizes three different solutions to this problem in advanced economies, which eventually 
mutated into the most common form of Keynesianism. On the one hand, for the new western Federal Republic of Germany, as 
well as Japan, the solution was the separation of labour and consumption into different groups. While the national workforce 
would enjoy security, exportation national capital would depend on the consumption of workers in other countries. On the other 
hand, countries that were not liberated as Germany, such as France and, into a lesser extent, Italy, the state provided security for 
employment in key industries and agriculture, and workers were included in the “national champion sectors”. Finally, the 
model of Scandinavian countries, the UK, Austria and the USA, which is more accurately above described, represented the 
Keynesian demand management 
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equate incomes to productivity and social demands. This created the need to introduce new tools to ensure 
social peace (Streeck 2011).    
The answer to this conflict thus came from two financial innovations that took place within the 
paradigm of the shareholder model. These innovations came to save the neo-liberal model from its internal 
instability: the growth of credit markets for poor and middle-income people, and derivatives and future 
markets (Crouch 2010). Altogether, these innovations became the basic elements of the unacknowledged 
policy regime of privatized Keynesianism.  
Deregulating financial markets, the public policies of Anglo-American economies grounded the 
extension of unsecured housing and consumer debt to moderate-income groups. Governments relaxed the 
terms of housing finance and took measures to keep the home prices rising, so banks were interested in 
expanding credit in assets of growing value. The expansion of credit allowed low and middle-income 
households to spend money that they did not have by purchasing consumer goods at high interest rates 
(Crouch 2010). Thus, unsecured debt fueled consumption, decoupling capitalist performance from the 
problem of stagnant wages and the retrenchment of the welfare state. Finance became the driving force of 
economic growth and “Instead of governments taking on debt to stimulate the economy, individuals did 
so.” (Crouch 2009, p. 390).  
Financial Innovations and the Retail Banking Revolution 
As demonstrated, if financial markets came to solve redistributive conflicts by bringing future 
resources to the present, it is because the conditions for lending huge amounts of money were achieved 
through a real revolution of retail banking (Erturk et al. 2008). But, where does all the lent money come 
from?  
Taking up this issue, many scholars have argued that the transformation of the American banking 
sectors is one of the main causes of the consumer credit boom of the 1980s (Langley 2008; Lapavitsas 
2011; Geisst 2009). The main feature of this process is that corporations developed skills to raise capital 
without relying on banks through the retention of own profits. The result has been a restructuration of 
banks from the seventies onwards, which shifted towards households and individuals as sources of profits. 
Workers´ revenues became the new focus of banks by borrowing and expanding financial assets such as 
insurance and pensions. Individual consumption has been privatized and mediated by financial institutions 
that extract value directly from wages, instead of surplus production (Lapavitsas 2011).6  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For Lapavitsas (2011) this relation between banks and workers is qualitatively distinct from the relation of banks and 
industrial capital, since workers acquire use values and have much less power than other institutions, fostering what has been 
called “financial expropriation”. 
 
	   	  
22 
The expansion of consumer lending that followed this transformation of retail banking practices 
from the 1980s onwards was associated with different innovations, such as asset-backed securities and 
credit default swaps. In fact, revolving credit itself was a complex and not necessarily profitable business 
at the beginning when the first credit cards were issued in the 1950s, but it became an attractive business 
with the introduction of new information technologies that lowered the administration costs (Trumbull 
2014; Geisst 2009). Following the informational revolution in the 1970s, securitization revolutionized the 
credit card market by transforming lenders into agents creating debts and packaging them to clear-off the 
books (Geisst 2009).  
Asset-backed securitization, “the practice of bundling or pooling together a stream of future 
repayments arising from everyday borrowing…” (Langley 2008, 136), was created in the 1970s within 
mortgage debt markets, and moved into an increasingly range of repayment obligations, such as car loans, 
student loans, and credit card receivables in the 1980s. In the case of the latter, the value of credit card 
markets grew explosively from 1995 to 2003 from $153.1 billion to $401.9, which is replicable in similar 
proportions to the market for cars.7. 
A crucial factor was the movement of assets off-balance sheet that enabled lenders to produce 
different kinds of new assets holding a relative small capital base, expanding the “customer funding gap”, 
i.e. the amount of customer lending not financed through customer deposits (Langley 2008). Furthermore, 
bond rating processes also led to the creation of “structure finance”, where ABS take the form of 
collateralized bond obligations (CBOs), or collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), structured through 
different levels of risk, depending on their default potential. According to Langley (2008), these 
instruments in the US reached an important share up to 14.7% of all outstanding ABS in 2006. Finally, the 
management of assets has recently stimulated derivative practices, were “…it is not the assets that are 
commodified and liquidified, but the default risks calculated for those assets…” (Langley 2008). This 
means that the expansion and growing profitability of credit card markets could be explained by the 
advent of asset-backed securities, which are used by credit issuers as a tool for the recapitalization of loan 
pools, rather than for dispersing risk.8  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Langley takes the data according to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association. In a similar vein, Montgomerie 
(2006a) shows the increasing importance of credit creation within consumer credit markets in the US -which arose from US 
$200 billion in 1995 to US $600 billion in 2002- where many of the largest consumer credit issuers depend on securitization to 
fund up to 70% of their businesses (Montgomerie 2009)	  
8 Credit supply, therefore, has increased and transformed lending patterns in such a way, that credit issuers became dependent 
on persistent indebtedness for profitability. As a consequence, the business model itself encourages further innovations in order 
to increase the span of debtor´s balances or retain customers, such as loyalty programs or minimum payment policies, which 
made possible for a consumer to apply for several credit cards, inaugurating the practice of “shuffling” among different credit 
card balances.  
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Furthermore, once the portfolio characteristics became more important than their quality, the 
conditions under which banks lent money became more relaxed, extending credit to riskier borrowers such 
as students, housewives and low-income workers. This led to aggressive marketing strategies that aim at 
capturing new customers and retaining old ones (Manning 2001). The “preapproved” card offer was 
regularly delivered to millions of households during the nineties and “easy credit” policies were at the 
basis of the “democratization of finance” (Geisst 2009).  
The Welfare State Trade-Off: Is Privatized Keynesianism an Unacknowledged Social Policy?  
The third pillar of the “Privatized Keynesianism” hypothesis is the role of the state in promoting 
access to finance. Contrary to the belief that credit expansion developed as an unintended consequence of 
the restructuration processes that took place from the 1970s onwards, some scholars have shown that the 
state itself played an active role in promoting credit access, providing incentives to consume and 
legitimating indebtedness in general. These narratives do not contradict the Privatized Keynesianism 
hypothesis, but they certainly complement it by providing a more specific account of how politics and 
national paths of development have directly shaped the behavior of consumers. In other words, if the 
welfare/debt trade-off exists, it is in part because of the active intervention of the state in promoting the 
financialization of the population through different channels. 
To a great extent, the political support to deregulate these markets is anchored in broader concerns 
about the legitimacy of indebtedness. Thus for example, Trumbull (2014) shows that French politicians 
supported strong regulations to interest rates because credit itself was conceived as a potential for social 
exclusion, an economic contract whose benefits for society were not clear. This made the development of 
revolving credit a hard business and the expansion of consumer credit was accompanied by strong 
movements towards regulations.9  
Along these lines, several scholars pointed out the role of political legitimacy in explaining the 
expansion of credit access to American families (Trumbull 2012a; Trumbull 2014; Trumbull 2010; 
Logeman 2012; Calder 1999; Geisst 2009). Unlike French politicians, for instance, North Americans have 
historically understood credit access as a solution to a wide range of problems such as overproduction, 
consumption inequality and economic growth. Following a different conception of credit, they conceived 
credit as an economic tool and a social policy, a mechanism of social inclusion, gaining the political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
9 Such as the regulation of advertisement of free interest credit of retailers, the resistance against a “white list” from banks (only 
a black list was created), and the regulation of bankruptcy (Neiertz law). 
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legitimacy required to be deregulated (Trumbull 2014). According to Prasad (2013), for example, this has 
historical roots in the problem of over-production during the first half of the twentieth century, which was 
seen in America as a problem of purchasing power that could be solved by issuing consumer credits to the 
population.  
Although the extension of credit was an important feature of the nineteenth century America, it 
was under the Roosevelt era that mass consumption policies and credit extension were embraced through a 
set of progressive consumer policies (Logeman 2012). Reinforced by Keynesian arrangements, the 
promotion of credit access in several areas such as housing, automobile industry and durable goods was a 
means to help the American middle class to have access to the standard package of the American dream 
and foster economic growth through mass purchasing power from the 1940s to the 1960s (Calder 1999). 
This is the time of the creation of the Federal Housing Administration and the Federal National Mortgage 
Association after the Great Depression that supported a sort of “mortgage Keynesianism”.  
Thus, credit in the US was understood as the “great democratizer”, actively promoted by the 
government and tenaciously defended by banks, commercial associations and economists against any form 
of regulation. Credit access institutionalized the preference for private over public consumption in a set of 
goods and services such as transportation, education and housing (Logemann 2011). However, by the end 
of the 1960s the democratization of credit access was far from universal and different government 
regulations and social movements´ pressures aimed at institutionalizing the recognition of “credit 
subjects” to all American citizens, regardless of their gender, race and residence. The bankruptcy reform 
of 1978 thus complemented this notion of democratic access by providing the possibility of a “fresh start” 
to American debtors. The post 1980s growth of household indebtedness was fostered by the revolution in 
the credit industry above mentioned, but the political conditions to materialize credit access as a universal 
tool were already there (Logemann 2011).  
Explaining the demand for Consumer Credit 
The “Privatized Keynesianism” hypothesis puts a major emphasis on the interplay between 
distributive conflicts, financial markets and the state. But what is exactly driving people to acquire debts 
in the context of Privatized Keynesianism? The answer to this question in the field of political economy is 
less obvious, and rests on a main assumption that could be summarized as follows: standards of living 
reached in the post-war period have crystalized as a sort of collective expectations that make peoples´ 
lifestyles inelastic to changing economic conditions, especially labor market volatilities and a weak safety 
net. People accordingly acquire debt in order to maintain their lifestyles, to keep pace with an increasingly 
demanding economy and to smooth consumption in a changing and hostile environment.  
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This line of reasoning is made explicit by Montgomerie (2009b), who argues that consumer debt 
provides a means for maintaining a historically constructed life style in Anglo-American societies in the 
face of wage stagnation. From a top-down perspective, says Montgomerie, structural phenomena 
grounded the emergence of household unsecured debt, such as the decimation of blue collar workers and 
their replacement for low-paid service work; the stagnation of real income growth; the replacement of full 
employment policies towards inflation control; fiscal restraints in provisions for social care; and new 
demands of the knowledge economy for continued training and education. Additionally, households were 
affected by reconfiguration in businesses practices, such as the relocation of corporations in lower cost 
jurisdictions, the constraint of non-wage labor benefits, and labor flexibility.  
On the other hand, from the perspective of households, Montgomerie (2009b) sees borrowing as a 
response to these trends which could be confirmed with different evidence, such as the importance of debt 
as a contributor for financing studies, a tool for diminishing the gap between medical coverage and the 
rising costs of medical services, or the fact that the vast majority of low and middle income households 
use debt as a safety net (Montgomerie 2009; 2011). These tendencies are characterized by what Juliet 
Schor calls “defensive consumption”, which refers to how households acquire debt to maintain the 
consumption standards of the previous decades, rather than expanding their consumption and levels of 
socioeconomic prosperity. The question that follows from this, is then, if “defensive consumption” is a 
sufficient condition to explain the rise of consumer debts under neoliberal arrangements. 
1.4. DISCUSSION 
There are two simple ways of asking whether the Privatized Keynesianism hypothesis offers a 
satisfactory explanation to the question of why people acquire so much consumer debts. The 
methodological question is if such narratives fit the basic features of the Chilean case or developing 
countries in general. The second, if such macro-perspectives account for the behavior of people in real life 
at all; in other words, if they help us fully address the issue of why people take credit in a systematic 
fashion. I see important gaps in both cases, which I seek to tackle in the following chapters.  
 
1.4.1. ON THE METHODOLOGICAL OBSTACLE 
Is it possible to extrapolate this explanation to the Chilean case? To some extent, Chile is similar to 
the paradigmatic case of the US, which has been the main subject of scholars studying the expansion of 
consumer credit: the emergence and expansion of these markets took place in parallel with deep economic 
liberalization, a progressive retrenchment of the welfare state, commodification of health and education, 
and deregulation of markets for credit and labor, among others  (Munoz 2007; Taylor 2006). In this 
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context, although household debt is still less significant than in the US in terms of the share of the GDP, 
one can argue that the unrestricted access to credit in Chile has worked as an unacknowledged policy 
(privatized Keynesianism) that smoothed household consumption and the precarious situation of workers.  
Nevertheless, two reasons make the case of Chile distinctive for exploring the research questions 
addressed here. First, I already mentioned that the expansion of credit in Chile has been mainly led by 
department stores. This expansion has been based on a particular articulation between financial services 
and commerce, which has served as a successful business model for the whole region. As it will be shown 
in Chapter 5, financial innovations carried out by local department stores were based in the 
implementation of risk classification techniques from abroad, but they were implemented in a very 
different way. More importantly, however, is that department store credit cards are mainly attached to 
within-store purchases and particular goods, so these consumer credits can barely help people to smooth 
their consumption in the face of income shocks. This means that these credit cards allow families to 
expand their incomes and consumption more than anything else, and that if debt-led consumption is 
somehow “defensive”, is should work in a rather different way than maintaining lifestyles or as a safety 
net. 
Secondly, the consolidation of consumer credit in Chile was not grounded on the cultural 
substratum of financing the “American Dream”, nor in the deterioration of the middle-class that followed 
the post-Keynesian period in many capitalist democracies. It was rather consolidated in the context of a 
significant improvement of the standards of living of large segments of the population. In fact, the 
increasing accumulation of household debt in Chile during the nineties was accompanied by sustained 
economic growth (Arellano 2011), fluid social mobility (Torche 2005), rising real wages throughout all 
income brackets, decrease in the population under the poverty line (from 38,6% in 1990 to 14,4% in 
2011), and the consolidation and integration of the middle class through consumption (Tironi 1999).10In 
this context, it will be argued that inequality is the key element that articulates the relationship between 
welfare-state retrenchment, economic improvement and debt. 
These peculiar features of the Chilean case do not invalidate the “privatized Keynesianism” 
hypothesis, rather they push us to think of different ways in which distributive conflicts and debts relate to 
each other in contexts of economic improvement. If Privatized Keynesianism explains the rise of 
household debts in Chile, it might operate through more refined and subtle mechanisms. If Chile is a story 
of “privatized Keynesianism” or not, however, will be the concern of chapter 3.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Between 1990 and 1998 Chile improved its Human Development Index from 0,803 to 0,847, the second biggest 
improvement in the world after the UK for the same period. See Human Development Report in Chile 1998.	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1.4.2. ON THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL OBSTACLE AND THE NEED OF A MICRO-FOUNDATION 
On a different level, I see some epistemological obstacles that prevent these macro-accounts from 
reaching high explanatory power regarding the increasing indebtedness of households. In particular, 
existing macro explanations encompassed under the “Privatized Keynesianism” hypothesis cannot fully 
account for the behavior of consumers and households on one main ground: insofar the demand for credit 
is not studied in itself, macro-accounts have to rely on strong assumptions at the level of actors that leave 
many open questions. Since macro-accounts rather rely on very weak understanding of consumption 
dynamics, the social dynamics of debts are obviated and important features of the financialization of 
consumption are overshadowed. This means that the financialization of consumption is better understood 
with micro-foundations.11 
The lack of explanatory autonomy of macro accounts stems in the first place from the dismissal of 
the demand for consumer credit as a matter to be directly explained. People´s expectations, meaningful 
actions, desires and collective representations have played a marginal role in the literature reviewed or 
have to be somehow assumed.  
This is problematic. As previously sketched, accounts from the field of political economy share a 
critique to the economic explanation of the rising indebtedness of households that rely on the life-cycle 
hypothesis and on the falling interest rates that followed the financial regulations of the 1980s 
(Montgomerie 2009a; Montgomerie 2006a). But they also stand as an alternative explanation to the 
“overconsumption hypothesis” that has been widely held by critics both within and outside academic 
circles. This narrative basically states that both rising indebtedness and financial failure are consequences 
of the rise of a hedonist and out of control consumer driven by never ending desires of self-gratification 
(De Graaf/Wann/Naylor 2005; Warren 2003). These dynamics triggered by aggressive advertisement 
campaigns and product differentiation within the context of over-saturated markets, have created 
escalating processes of comparison and competition over consumption-signaled status that fuels the 
demand for goods (Schor 1999b).12  
This interpretation, although not completely misguided, has been rejected under the prism of the 
strong connection between welfare state retrenchment and rising indebtedness. The over-consumption 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 I draw on philosophy of science and provide parameters to assess when a micro-foundation is required in order to provide a 
good explanation. See A. 
12 The over-consumption hypothesis is implicitly based on the classical Veblenian notion of conspicuous consumption, 
according to which consumption consists of “…the possession and display of goods and means to demonstrate superiority in a 
system of social status.” (Warde 2011: 10). This type of consumption is referred to as positional in the sense that people 
symbolize lifestyles (and their position in the social structure) along with their networks and surroundings (Beckert 2011). 
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hypothesis is rejected by arguing that the shares of income that families spend to meet “basic needs” 
(housing and education) are far more important than other forms of discretionary and “conspicuous 
consumption” that reflect aspirational and status-seeking ends (Prasad 2012a; Warren 2003). The problem 
with indebtedness, then, is that debt-oriented consumption is necessarily “defensive consumption”; it 
helps people meet some “standard needs” and maintain their lifestyles in the context of increasing health, 
housing and educational costs on the one hand, and stagnant wages, on the other (Weller 2007). But, what 
are exactly these standards of living? 
To some extent, political economists implicitly follow the substantive distinction between desires 
and necessities that authors such as Marcuse (1991) or Galbraith (1999) made when critically assessing 
the nature of the “consumer society”. But these distinctions are problematic when we consider that 
consumption levels have been steadily rising and lifestyles themselves are changing all the time. Drawing 
a dividing line between “need” and “status-oriented” consumption is tricky because, as Schor (1999b) has 
shown, what is considered a “need” or “comfort” changes across societies and time according to the 
socially constructed standards of living. Is it now for a middle class family a luxury to have as many 
computers as family members, or is it rather necessary to catch-up with the competencies that professional 
careers demand in the information era? Because “consumption standards” constantly change, consumption 
levels and the dynamics underlying the expansion of credit cannot be understood as referring to absolute 
and static conceptions of wants, necessities, wellbeing or status.13 Unraveling the relation between the 
expansion of consumption and debts will be even more puzzling in cases where families have experienced 
upward mobility and a rise in wages. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that the over-consumption hypothesis might overstate the role of 
“conspicuous consumption”, but the truth is that in the context of affluent societies and saturated markets, 
consumption has been constantly expanding through market innovations and aggressive marketing 
campaigns (Galbraith 1999; Streeck 2012). In this sense, the media have played a key role in portraying 
upscaling lifestyles that affect the aspirations of consumers (Schor 1999a). According to this view point, 
key elements to take into consideration are the role of income inequality and transformations in the social 
structure. This is evident in the proliferation of positional and even “luxury goods” at the top of income 
distribution, but it also holds true for less salient goods. The expansion of certain goods such smartphones 
or computers actually implies that people consume more, but not all this consumption is necessarily 
oriented towards signaling status. Indeed, “ordinary” forms of consumption might exert a less visible 
pressure on consumers to catch up with the standard package or customary levels of consumption. What is 
the relationship between standards of living, commodification and debts? This is paradoxically the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This is especially problematic when middle-class has reached a certain threshold of consumption standards far from material 
deprivations. 
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cornerstone of the “Privatized Keynesianism” hypothesis, but at the same time it is its most obscure and 
less explored dimension. 
The picture that emerges from what is mentioned above is that the rising indebtedness of 
households cannot be subsumed under a dominant logic, whether “conspicuous” or “defensive” 
consumption, basically because multiple dynamics are at work, and its causes and consequences are 
unevenly distributed throughout the social structure. This lack of explanatory autonomy stems ultimately 
from the fact that macro-accounts present a society devoid of culture, an economy devoid of society.  
Two Conceptual Movements 
How to overcome the aforementioned obstacles? This dissertation explores two conceptual moves 
that serve as the analytical strategy to overcome the main flaws of the “Privatized Keynesianism” 
hypothesis discussed above. 
From co-variation to mechanisms: firstly, if institutional arrangements and distributional 
conflicts create the conditions or directly prompt the indebtedness of households in a systematic fashion, it 
is necessary to provide intermediary processes that account for such causal connection. In other words, the 
Privatized Keynesianism hypothesis requires a notion of concrete social mechanisms that intermediate the 
relation between institutional arrangements and the concrete practices of households.  
From horizontal to vertical explanations: secondly, since these explanations at the macro level 
remain in many cases riddled with assumptions at the micro-level, a political economy of consumer 
lending requires a micro-foundation that opens up the “black box” of households and consumption 
dynamics. In looking for a micro-foundation at the level of households, I consider changes in the social 
structure, lifestyles, habits, emulative behavior and consumption dynamics as crucial elements shaping 
indebtedness. I suggest that these dimensions can be illuminated and informed by sociological theories of 
consumption. Ultimately, I see this interdisciplinary approach as necessary because there are no empirical 
accounts of how exactly consumer credit serves as a policy tool that makes distributive conflicts less 
salient.  
1.5. OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION  
This dissertation seeks to integrate both the macro and micro foundations of consumer lending. 
With this goal in mind, Chapter 2 prepares the analytical and conceptual grounds of this integration by 
overviewing sociological and anthropological theories of consumption. More specifically, echoing the 
epistemological obstacles of the Privatized Keynesianism hypothesis, it explores how to illuminate the 
relation between standards of living, consumption and debts. The remainder of the dissertation is divided 
into three main parts. 
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Part I provides the historical background in which Privatized Keynesianism developed in Chile. 
The main argument I put forward is that unlike the case of developed economies, financialization in Chile 
did not work as an indirect policy that helped democratic governments keep pace with already established 
standards of living, but it was rather used as an explicit policy tool to carry out and make a modernization 
project viable. Building the path to develop this argument, chapter 3 traces the origins of the 
financialization of consumption to the structural transformations brought about between 1970s and 1980s, 
which institutionalized the main pillars of Chile´s Privatized Keynesianism: growth, inequality and the 
privatization of risks. Chapter 4 argues then that the financialization of Chilean households is the corollary 
of the creation of new markets in the spheres of education, housing and consumption, serving as the means 
for materializing a modernization project. In this sense, the chapter sketches the politics and counter-
politics of debt carried by the state, corporations and debtors alike to put forward or contest the 
financialization of households. Chapter 5 deepens into the financialization of consumption and develops 
the idea that lenders in Chile benefited from the lack of supervision and progressively financialized 
Chilean consumers to sell their own goods in a context of high inequalities and low wages. In this context, 
the chapter shows that if consumer credit served as a policy tool, it was by expanding people´s purchasing 
power -rather than helping them “smooth their consumption”- which, in turn, served to make income 
inequality less visible. Finally, chapter 6 ends up providing a quantitative characterization of the debts of 
Chilean households, as well as assessing the determinants of debt levels. 
Part II tackles the issue of how credit actually works as a social policy in a context of growth and 
inequality. The key to understanding this, I argue, is to look into how the financialization of consumptions 
entangles with the socially constructed “standards of living”, for which a working hypothesis is 
developed: growth and inequality induce “status anxiety” by creating a gap between raising aspirations 
and incomes. “Status anxiety” –defined as a major concern about rank, achievement and the definition of 
one´s identity- in turn pushes consumers into bringing resources from the future in order to a) participate 
in the benefits of growth, and b) to cope with the fears of “falling behind” and “being left aside”.  
Following this idea, I start exploring the first source of “status anxiety”, the will to participate in 
the benefits of growth. In this spirit, I show in chapter 7 that the state played a crucial role in ratcheting up 
their consumption standards of poorer consumers by targeting social policies. Expanding homeownership 
and better life-conditions mainly boosted these new aspirations, but they were not met by better 
opportunities in labor markets and better incomes. In such scenario, consumer credit allowed poorer 
consumers to integrate themselves into the benefits of growth without changing the underlying distribution 
of income. In the case of the middle-class that experienced a rise of labor-income, I sketch in chapter 8 
different mechanisms that create a gap between rising incomes and aspirations in contexts of inequality, 
inducing “status anxiety” among better-off consumers that use credit as a means for expanding their 
purchasing power. In this line of reasoning, Chapter 9 provides qualitative evidence to support the idea 
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that middle class families in Chile use and mix different types of consumer debts in order to cope with 
“status anxiety” by performing their class identities (the imaginary middle class) in contexts of changing 
social boundaries. In particular, I show that middle-income consumers materialize these aspirations in the 
proximate environment of the household use credits to manage personal relations, decorate and improve 
their homes, as well as create their desired lifestyles.  
Finally, part III of the dissertation pays attention to the second source of “status anxiety”, which is 
the fear of “falling behind” and “being left aside”, assessing the role played by commodification of social 
services in fostering the financialization of consumption. Chapter 10 starts this task by outlining the 
insecurities of Chilean families, which stem from the institutionalization of meritocracy and 
heterogeneous social trajectories. It then moves on to tackle the question of why people get so indebted 
even if they feel very insecure regarding their status, for which I assess the relation between coping 
strategies, savings and debts. Chapter 11 follows up showing how the commodification of education and 
the “fear of falling behind” affect the financialization of consumption by creating “arms race” dynamics. 
These put an important burden on the shoulders of middle-class families, which although are willing to 
spend higher shares of their income on education, the returns of their investments are constantly 
devaluated in labor markets. This in turn generates a “budget gap” that leaves families with no other 
option but acquiring those goods they feel entitled to have with the help of consumer credit.  
In chapter 12 I further explore the “fear of being left aside” induced by the dualization of the 
health system and the structural failure of the private pension system. I show that while an unequal access 
to health services becomes a heavy burden that creates “budget gaps”, the lean pensions of retired workers 
prompt their indebtedness by generating a huge drop in income. In this way, I depict the financialization 
of this group in hands of emerging lenders that consolidate in the market for consumer credit, the so-called 
“Cajas”. Finally, chapter 13 ends up addressing how debts themselves become a source of risk and anxiety 
in Chile´s Privatized Keynesianism, sketching dangerous practices that lead Chilean families to get over-
indebted in the attempt of materializing their aspirations. 
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CHAPTER 2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODS  
The attempt for developing a political economy of consumer credit with strong micro-foundations 
entails at least two conceptual moves: explaining through social mechanisms and bringing in sociological 
theories of consumption. These two conceptual strategies should be differentiated. In this literature 
review, however, I will more specifically deal with the sociology and –to a lesser extent- anthropology of 
consumption to shed light into the connection between structural transformation, changing consumption 
patterns and increasing household indebtedness. 
2.1 BRINGING CONSUMPTION BACK IN 
Bringing consumption back into the study of consumer lending is a difficult task. Most consumption 
studies remain fragmented and several dimensions of consumption remain as sub-fields of specialists in 
topics such as gender, class and family (Zelizer 2005a). As Gabriel/Lang (2006) put it, there has been such 
a proliferation of coherent discourses addressing consumption, that the concept of the “consumer” itself is 
in danger of collapsing into a “meaningless cliché”. Echoing these warnings, I outline some perspectives 
that will be put to work throughout the next chapters in order to illuminate the three following issues: 
1) Dynamics of cultural differentiation are crucial to understand consumption and socially 
constructed standards of living underlying the expansion of consumer credit.  
2) The reproductions of lifestyles through ordinary consumption prove crucially important to 
understand people´s increasing indebtedness.  
3) Credit facilitates lifestyle building through consumption and different utilization of money. 
2.1.1 SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION AND CONSUMPTION DYNAMICS 
Why do people consume, expand their consumption, and why do they even take debts to do so? 
Mainstream economics has largely argued that consumer´s utility stems from individual preferences, 
independent of the assessments and possessions of others. But psychologists, anthropologists and 
sociologists have challenged the individualistic foundations of consumerism in many ways. New products 
and pleasures might be stimulating and goods appealing because they are different from what ocurred 
before (Shove 2001). But the supposedly direct connection between consumption and individual well-
being has been largely discredited (Schor 1999). Psychologists, for instance, have consistently shown that 
the embracement of “materialistic” values is related to unhappiness and dissatisfaction with one´s life 
(Tatzel 2014). Quality-of-life and “happiness economics”, on the other hand, have studied the relationship 
between subjective wellbeing and rising consumption/income, systematically showing that after certain 
threshold of material affluence, increasing income and consumption does not have a huge impact on the 
 
	   	  
33 
subjective wellbeing in both within and cross national studies (Frank 2005a; Frey/Stutzer 2002; Easterlin 
1995; Ahuvia).14 The reasons for this are strongly debated, but the “positional” character of certain goods 
-the so-called “Veblen goods”- is among the most recalled arguments (Frank 2005b; Frank 2005a; Frank 
2007). The idea is that empirically speaking, total levels of consumption and income are not necessarily 
the most determinant elements of people´s choices/happiness (or utility), because they have a tendency to 
assess certain goods and themselves against the situation and possession of others. Goods that are 
evaluated against this background are called “positional”. This is the case, for example, of houses but not 
of vacations: one might prefer to live in a world where your home is small in total terms but bigger than 
all others, instead of having a bigger home but smaller than all the rest; but one might not prefer to shorten 
one´s holidays even in a world where others´ holidays are longer than ours. This happens because, as 
Easterlin puts it, “…judgments of personal well-being are made by comparing one´s objective status with 
a subjective living level norm, which is significantly influenced by the average level of living condition as 
a whole.” (Easterlin 1995, p. 36). This provides a key element to understand why spirals of consumption 
and debts might take place in contexts of economic improvement. 
For sociologists and anthropologists this may sound trivial. We have know since Veblen (1994), 
among others, that consumption levels depend on consumption standards shared among peers and 
reproduced through the mediation of the so called “reference groups” (Bourdieu 1984; Shove 2001). The 
evaluations of goods and one´s situation, accordingly, are always contextual and depend on the 
possessions and situations of others. In this sense, goods are “positional” not only because their valuation 
depends on others´ possessions, but also because they communicate one´s position in society. This 
happens because in market economies consumption is not only segmented by socioeconomic strata, but it 
becomes itself a variable of social segmentation (Catalán 2009). These two “positional” properties of 
goods might seem similar, but they are analytically different. Certainly both uses of the word “positional” 
imply that there is a community –significant others- that is taken as a point of reference. But while the 
concept of “positional” in economics refers to how the preference of individual consumers change in 
accordance with others´ possessions, for sociology it rather refers to those goods that in a given culture 
serve people as markers of social distinction. This has nothing to do with the physicality of goods or their 
“use value”, but with the particular meanings ascribed to different goods in given contexts (Beckert 2011).  
2.1.2 POSITIONAL CONSUMPTION AND THE COMMUNICATIVE DIMENSION OF GOODS 
As it has been widely recognized since Weber, modern societies are stratified through prestige and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Subjective wellbeing is a measure of long-term state of wellbeing based on affective and cognitive judgments that people 
make about how often they have positive and negative feelings, and how well they are doing in life, respectively. 
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social honor, which differentiate groups constituted by their consumption and lifestyles. Through this lens, 
objects in modern societies are not only oriented towards the mere satisfaction of basic needs, but they 
find value beyond their functionality (use value) and exchange possibilities (exchange value) (Baudrillard 
2006). Through their consumption, goods mobilize meanings, tell stories about ourselves and thus 
communicate, establishing and demarcating social boundaries that define collective and individual 
identities (Gabriel/Lang 2006; Aguilar 2009).  
In sociology, this positional character of consumption has its roots in Veblen´s notion of 
“conspicuous consumption”. In his theory of the Leisure Class, Veblen (1994) asserts that once societies 
produce surpluses, the accumulation of property becomes a source of status. Under these conditions, 
hierarchical orders consolidate according to which honor and status stem from ownership. Therefore, 
inherited wealth confers even more status because it separates a leisure class from those that have to work 
in order to accumulate wealth. In Veblen´s terms, status comes from the recognition of others through the 
display of wealth in the form of waste of time (leisure) and goods. Nevertheless, the more societies 
differentiate socially, it becomes more difficult to use leisure activities to informing about one´s status. In 
this way, the display and waste of goods –conspicuous consumption- gain salience in the struggles for 
honor.  The key point is that “conspicuous consumption” practices set the standards for all social classes, 
which strive to emulate the practices of the elite, creating a sort of “trickle down” effect (see also 
Simmel/Levine (1971) on fashion). As a consequence, since goods become increasingly available for 
bigger shares of the population, the quest for status tends to be a never ending task and a zero sum game.  
Following this line of reasoning, Bourdieu (1984) provided a more subtle and multidirectional 
account of conspicuous consumption. Following Veblen´s and Weber´s insights, Bourdieu (1984) studied 
consumption as the manifestation of agents´ strategies to differentiate themselves in the space of social 
relations. Based in the notion of habitus, Bourdieu associates consumption practices with the dispositions 
of action, perception and appreciation that individuals incorporate throughout their socialization, and that 
correspond to certain objective material conditions (Bourdieu 2012).  While a certain position in the social 
structure –defined by the total amount of cultural and economic capital- determines the objective horizon 
of possibilities of agents and their dispositions, “position taking” strategies implicit in the consumption of 
goods create and reproduce social boundaries (Bourdieu 1997). According to this view, instead of seeing 
consumption as the sphere for the materialization of individual preferences, consumption is rather 
understood as an important space of social competition (Sassatelli 2007).  
But the mechanisms through which consumption creates and establishes symbolic boundaries are 
subtler than mere display and emulation. Bourdieu paid special attention to goods that serve as special 
markers of distinction, the so called cultural goods. Among these we find paintings or music, whose 
consumption requires the command of particular schemes of appreciation that are unevenly distributed 
along with the distribution of cultural capital. These acquired and stratified schemes of perception and 
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appropriation that we call “taste”, represent a particular form of “symbolic power” that serves to the 
naturalization of social and cultural order by those who posses the biggest stocks of economic and cultural 
capital (Bourdieu 1984). “Tastes” in this sense are used by different groups as a form of “symbolic 
capital” in order to legitimate and improve their position in the stratification system. Culture is thus seen 
as the battleground where class struggle and competition take place (Slater 2005a). 
A key point for this dissertation, however, is that dynamics of social distinction are not restricted 
only to the consumption of cultural goods. They also include all forms of consumption, such as sports, 
clothing and food. As Sassatelli (2007, 95) puts it, “Tastes are in fact structured once and forever on the 
basis of relative social position, so much so that the choices of consumption are always, even if only 
unconsciously, expressive of a positional and hierarchical logic”. Consumption, in this broad sense, is 
thus organized as a set of coherent classified and classifying practices that we call lifestyles. Thus, 
ultimately the systematic “nature” of lifestyles is seen as the result of this overarching principle behind 
social practices, the class habitus.15  
A crucial element in this analysis is the dynamic character of the social order, which is a 
consequence of the fact that agents strive to improve their social position through the mobilization of 
available capitals (Bourdieu 1985), as well to maintain their relative position in situations of structural 
changes. Under this logic, material and symbolic frontiers are constantly reshaped by agents´ attempts to 
change their positions. In Bourdieu´s terms, “…all the groups involved in the race, whatever rank they 
occupy, cannot retain their position, their rarity, their rank except by running to keep their distance from 
those immediately behind them, thus jeopardizing the difference which distinguishes the group 
immediately in the front...” (Bourdieu 1984, 157). 
The dynamism of social space reflects the constant configuration and reconfiguration of lifestyles 
in the context of markets for mass consumption. These make available a whole range of goods for bigger 
segments of the population and thus devaluate their “sign value” as markers of social distinctions.  This 
means that the cultural dynamics of social reproduction rely to a great extent on the structural changes in a 
society, which not only affect the availability of goods but also the distribution of the schemes of 
appreciation, cultural capital itself.16 This shows the paradox of social order, where the reproduction of 
social differences, distinctions and hierarchies is only possible through constant change and 
reconfiguration.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 A lifestyle would be then defined by the set of practices that agents situated under homogenous conditions producing 
homogeneous dispositions or habitus. 
16 This is what Bourdieu sought to make sense out of studying how the “scholar boom” occurred between 1954 and 1968 in 
France resulted in new relations between labor markets and qualifications, pushing several groups to implement new position 
taking and reconversion strategies in the face of a devaluation of their qualifications (Bourdieu 1984).	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2.1.3 ORDINARY FORMS OF CONSUMPTION, STANDARDS OF LIVING AND LIFESTYLES 
Bourdieu´s cultural and structural approach to consumption settled agenda in consumption studies 
for decades (Lamont 2012). Nevertheless, consumption sociologists made two crucial points in the last 
two decades that challenged some of Bourdieu´s formulations, or simply redirected the attention towards 
different phenomena. Firstly, that consumption patterns, tastes and preferences might be orderly 
distributed throughout the social structure, but they do not necessarily demarcate a clear distinction 
between high and low culture.17  
Secondly, and more importantly for this project, is that although a great deal of consumption 
signals and communicates social differences, the majority of consumption –also with bigger 
environmental consequences- represents “ordinary” forms of consumption, largely overlooked and taken 
for granted (Gronow/Warde 2013). Among these forms of “un-conspicuous” consumption we find the 
purchase of groceries, consumption of electricity, water or listening to the radio while driving a car; all of 
them foundational elements of the routinized and unreflective practices that fuel consumption and create 
lifestyles (Ilmonen 2013). As Dwyer (2009) says, this is crucial because the uninterrupted expansion of 
consumers’ demands for new products is based on the incorporation of distinctive goods into the “standard 
of living”.  
Studies trying to make sense of these forms of consumption focus accordingly on the process 
through which goods gain or lose status and are incorporated into daily life practices, explaining thus how 
“the demand is ratcheted upwards” (Warde 2011). This is a process where certain standards of 
consumption are normalized or naturalized as a socially accepted norm. In this sense, one could argue that 
groups of references are crucial not only in a competitive fashion, but as a perceived normality. Lifestyles 
are then not only a matter of positioning oneself in the social space, but also of unreflective and habitual 
consumption that reproduces one´s social position. As Longhurst/Bagnall/Savage (2013) have shown by 
studying radio consumption among middle class individuals in England, ordinary consumption is also a 
source of identity creation through which people can claim to be themselves.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Scholars in America and UK that replicated Bourdieu´s “Distinction” in different settings throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s found the striking paradox that middle class consumers were increasingly showing the existence of cultural 
“omnivorous”, individuals with the capacity of enjoying cultural goods associated with high as well as popular culture (Warde 
2011; Warde 1996; Warde/Wright/Gayo-Cal 2007; Peterson 2005; Lamont 1994; Gronow/Warde 2013).  What these studies 
showed, is that although the principles of symbolic differentiation found by Bourdieu might persist in western societies, they 
change and reshape the boundaries between social classes as goods become massive, such as access to music or information 
technologies (Peterson 2005). In the case of the cultural omnivorous, the dichotomous distinction between high and low culture 
might have changed, or it is simply no longer a foundational differentiation in other societies. 
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This type of consumption is crucial to understand why a huge range of invisible and “ordinary” 
goods that constitute lifestyles are inelastic to income shocks. Through invisible forms of “ordinary 
consumption”, people´s lifestyles become increasingly demanding through the subtle influence of habits 
and routines. The crucial question, then, is: What are these lifestyles? How do they change over time and 
across social classes defining normative standards of consumption?; and how are they related to the 
financial practices of families? This has received far less attention in the sociological studies of credit. 
2.1.4 ON LIFESTYLES AND CREDIT 
In general there has been a general tendency in consumption studies to understand the 
consolidation of the field as a break with the previous dominance of production and capitalism in the 
analysis of consumption (Slater 2005b). In this sense, the concept of “identity” has been the keystone of a 
wide range of studies on consumption, basically under the premise that people´s identities cannot be 
separated from what they consume (Rey/Ritzer 2012), and that identities are not static but continuously 
created. This concern has roots in psychology and sociology. In psychology, the idea that identity is not 
given but achieved comes from studies of soldiers that lost their senses of sameness after the Second 
World War and was largely problematized in the light of the relationship between individual versus 
collective identities (Gabriel/Lang 2006). In sociology, on the other hand, it has been strongly associated 
with social theorists accounting for the post-modern condition. This is characterized by the dissolution of 
the traditional world, where enduring positions, authority and knowledge break down and give way to a 
condition of pluralism and uncertainty under which individuals are compelled to create and recreate 
themselves (Slater 2005b). At the core of this narrative, common to authors such as Giddens, Bauman and 
Beck, is the process of creation of one´s identity through consumption and the manipulation of meanings 
attached to goods. Thus, consumption is materialized in such way, that it is conveyed in ways that our 
identity is made available to others (Warde 1994). This “reflexive narrative of the self” could be 
summarized in the cultural imperative of late modernity according to which “We have no choice but to 
choose” (Giddens 1991).  Under this imperative, our apparent capacity to choose in every instance –what 
to wear, eat, listen or do- is reflected upon a social identity that resembles the history of our decisions, 
creating an inevitably anxiety and the quest for stabilizing one´s self-identity.   
According to this view, identity creation is seen to a great extent as a matter of personal selection, 
which stems from processes of “individualization” through which biographies become more reflexive and 
individually bounded in the face of a decline of collective sources of identity (such as class and family) 
(Warde 1994). This has to do with the central role that markets increasingly play in all dimensions of 
living via commodification and the consequent proliferation of transversal lifestyles within same income 
levels. In this scenario, the definition and redefinition of lifestyles through consumption become crucial to 
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the materialization of the narratives of self-identities that are constantly open to revision. This in turn 
becomes a new source of anxiety every time market freedom implies that choices, and accordingly the 
building of the self-image, might be wrong (Bauman 2007).  
The extent to which this narrative can account for the ever expanding consumption and more 
generally, for consumption at large might be exaggerated (for a discussion see Warde (1994)). But one can 
expect that pressures for creating one´s identity increase in the context of constant commodification and 
the consolidation of free-market and sovereign consumer ideologies. Moreover, the post-modern 
consumer continuously experimenting with lifestyles presents himself/herself across different fields of 
practices in a diverse range of situations. This means that individuals engage in activities as diverse as 
cooking, photography, sports or playing music, which are attached to specialization in particular 
“packages” of goods and services, which have been considered as an important mechanism boosting the 
expansion of consumption (Warde 2011). 
But what is the relationship between identity creation and credit? This question has called the 
attention of scholars working under the paradigm of the “consumer culture theory”.18 Along these lines, 
Matthew J. Bernthal/David Crockett/Randall L. Rose (2005) have addressed the relationship between 
indebtedness and lifestyles through a qualitative study, recognizing two ways in which practices with 
credit cards help in attaining different lifestyles, determined by embodied cultural capital.  Lifestyle 
building refers in this context to the attainment of specifics lifestyle objectives and is mostly related to 
material constraints and the attainment of low cultural capital lifestyles, and to the pursuit of different 
lifestyle objectives with a focus on opportunities and valued experiences in the case of high cultural 
capital consumers. 
Lifestyle signaling is another practice, which stresses the attempt of credit card users to 
communicate one´s efforts through the act of acquisition. A low cultural capital is characterized by an 
effort to signal relative freedom from material constraints, while high cultural capital places more 
emphasis on showing purchasing power. 
2.1.5 CONSUMPTION AND CULTURE: GOODS, MONEY AND CREDIT 
A different approach to consumption that sheds light into the social dynamics boosting the 
expansion of consumer credit stands at the intersection of anthropology and sociology. According to this 
perspective, that one could term “culturalist view”, goods and more broadly materiality constitute the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This is not a unified theory, but a family of theoretical perspectives that address the relation between the market, consumers 
and cultural meanings through an empirical orientation that favors the qualitative dimensions of consumption in different socio-
historical contexts(Eric J. Arnould/Craig J. Thompson 2005).  
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foundations of social life, making the world surrounding us understandable and meaningful. The 
distinctive mark of this perspective is to move away from the communicative dimension towards a more 
ontological and ethnographical understanding of their uses and their role in society (this means that in 
many cases these theories seek to reach a scope that goes beyond the modern “consumer society” and 
account for the relationship between people and objects in a more universal sense). Ultimately, although 
some of them owe much to structuralism and semiotics in the understanding of consumption as a “system 
of meanings”, they strongly focused on the practices of consumption (Slater 2005b).  
Mary Douglas´ theory of consumption could be considered as a landmark of this culturalist 
approach to consumption. In her book written in collaboration with Baron Isherwood “The World of 
Goods” (Douglas/Isherwood 1979), a radical conception of goods and consumption as pervading social 
life is offered: “Instead of supposing that goods are primarily needed for subsistence plus competitive 
display, let us assume that they are needed for making visible and stable the categories of culture.” P59.  
Consumption is, according to Douglas (1982), the manifestation of culture and vice versa; it 
represents the “vital source of the culture of the moment”; it is the arena in which culture is shaped and 
negotiated. The basic point is that beyond their physical properties, people communicate with goods in 
more essential ways than showing status, to the extent that they rather make and maintain social relations. 
For Douglas, goods have an important ontological position for the constitution of society in so far they are 
understood as ritual adjuncts, the material foundations of those conventions that set up visible public 
definitions, making possible the construction of an intelligible universe around us, by marking or 
classifying events. More particularly, goods work as markers, grading events in more or less appropriate 
ways and demarcating the temporal dimension of the social universe, notching intervals that differentiate 
the life cycle (Douglas/Isherwood 1979). People thus need goods to give and get “marking services”, 
being thus present in others´ rituals of consumption. As such, goods as markers are recognized and judged 
by others according to the fitness of the things used to celebrate different occasions, and consumption 
turns out to be understood as a system for the exchange and control of information. It is appropriate, says 
Douglas, to send flowers to a sick person but not their value in cash; some things can be sold, bought or 
gifted, but not others. Accordingly, the demand for goods stems from the demand for marking services, 
which means at the same time a demand for personal availability.19  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 According to such view, Douglas looks into how the distribution of status interlocks with the technology of consumption, 
understanding status as personal availability, or the use of goods in a scale of consumption. While status comes from 
individuals´ capacities to mobilize an important number of fellow consumers to join in marking their occasions (Douglas 1982), 
luxuries are considered technological aids that in this process relieve the pressure on available time, space and energy. Thus, 
consumers under comparative disadvantages in the technology of consumption lose out in the struggle to control information, 
and goods remain “…luxuries until they have become part of the normal technological base from which all consumption 
activities proceed.” (Douglas and Isherwood 1979,  p. 112). 
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A similar position is held by Daniel Miller´s theories of stuff and shopping, where consumption 
and more broadly materiality play a major role in the making of society. Miller (1995) provides the 
foundations of “material culture” studies, which aim at replacing a theory of things from the point of view 
of their representation, for a theory of the process of their objectification. Like Douglas, he conceives 
objects as material settings that make us aware of the boundaries that demarcate the appropriate from the 
inappropriate. This quality of stuff is, however, not rooted on its material properties and tangibility, but 
rather on the fact that it is “unremarked upon” and taken for granted. Objects, accordingly, remain 
peripheral to our vision –what he terms the “humility” of goods- and it is the whole system of things and 
their internal order that make us what we are (Miller 2010). Miller (1998) has reflected upon the 
intertwinement of interpersonal relations with consumption by showing how shopping “…becomes one of 
the primary means by which relationships of love and care are constituted by practice.” (Miller 1998, 18); 
this is what Miller has called “making love in the supermarket”, supporting the idea that sociability and 
consumption complement each other, while withdrawal from consumption results in isolation (Zelizer 
2005a). 
Material culture studies provide a key insight. Under this integrative notion of consumption, one 
can see that material deprivation is translated into exclusion from the universe of information that goods 
represent. Deprivation or the incapacity of acquiring certain goods (markers) is translated into the 
exclusion from important social events, which might, in turn, be translated into new material 
disadvantages. This is why not reciprocating the proper gift represents a social burden, or why not wearing 
the right suit may turn a job interview into a failure.  
But this intertwinement between goods and culture has also been counter intuitively extended to 
the relationship between money and culture. This has been achieved to a great extent thanks to the works 
of Viviana Zelizer, who has offered an approach that stresses the “social meanings of money”. This 
approach does not provide a sociological theory of money (Ingham 2001; Ingham 1998). It rather helps us 
grasp the way in which the generality of money –the quintessential impersonal means of exchange in 
modernity- is curtailed and made more particular and meaningful through the active creation of 
distinctions made out by actors in many domestic situations (Carruthers 2010). These practices constitute 
what is called the “earmarking of money”, the active attempts of actors to create boundaries to 
commodification and embed the uses of money in social relations and representations (Zelizer 2002; 
Zelizer 2005b). In this vein, for example, studies on households consumption and budgeting show that 
gender ideologies and roles, family responsibilities and class identity shape altogether the way in which 
money is controlled and managed within the household unit (Stillerman 2004).  
Zelizer´s analysis could be extended to credit and debts. As anthropologists have made clear since 
Mauss (2005), debts also play a crucial role in the reproduction of society and culture. They have long 
existed and how they are organized depends on the meanings to which they are bounded in a particular 
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time and place. Along these lines, anthropologists have pointed out that the relations between lenders and 
borrowers transcend their economic and financial character and “…entail emotions and feelings such as 
dignity, prestige and respectability, and also shame, humiliation, anxiety, anger, revenge or even 
friendship, gratitude and love” (Guérin/Morvant-Roux/Villarreal 2014, p. 296) 296.  
Summing up, with authors such as Douglas, Miller and Zelizer, we could think better of those 
financial and consumption practices that are less salient and do not point towards the reaffirmation of 
one´s status, but are nevertheless equally important for the reproduction of interpersonal relations. In this 
sense, important reasons that explain why people use consumer credit are only conceivable through the 
lens of the cultural reproduction of society materialized in everyday practices, rituals such as celebrating 
birthdays, commemorating a family transition in the life-cycle, bringing flowers to a funeral or 
reciprocating the right gift. 
2.2 FIELDWORK AND METHODS  
The main goal of this dissertation is to integrate three levels of analysis: the political and 
institutional foundations of Chile´s Privatized Keynesianism, social dynamics of consumption, and the 
meaningful and everyday-life financial and consumption practices carried out by households. To 
accomplish this integration, I triangulate methods and draw on several sources of information, such as 
secondary literature, survey analyses, and two fieldwork trips to Santiago de Chile. In this section, I 
review these research methods and sources of information in a more detailed fashion. I start by adding a 
few remarks on my case selection strategy. Then, I will move on to describe the quantitative sources used 
to conduct the analyses, the classifications of socio-economic groups that are used throughout the 
chapters, and provide a more thorough account of the qualitative fieldwork.  
 
2.2.1 THE CASE OF CHILE 
Like most cases studied in the field of political economy, the embracement of neoliberal policies 
and the retrenchment of the welfare state in Chile were followed by an explosive financialization of 
consumers. Unlike these cases, however, the financialization of Chilean households did not take place in a 
context of wage stagnation but in a situation of economic growth and collective improvement. In this 
sense I already argued in the literature review that the puzzle this case raises relates to the need of 
explaining why people acquire consumer debts in contexts of improvement. Notwithstanding, there are 
still a few remarks that are worth highlighting.  
To start with, Chile represents a paradigmatic case among South American countries: it was 
pioneer in implementing commodification processes and dismantling the welfare state; its neoliberal 
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institutional arrangement has been very resilient to institutional changes (Madariaga 2013); non-bank 
financial institutions have adopted credit scoring technologies and banks have been displaced from the 
dominant position in the market for consumer lending; and it is also the South American country with the 
deepest financial penetration (see chart below). 
Figure 2: Financial Depth in Selected Countries of Latinamerica (percentages, total number of loans 
as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: From available data in Latinamerican Countries. Taken from OECD (2011) 
 
Nowadays, the “revolution of retail” –as it is known in Chile- crossed the national borders to the 
point in which the Chilean commercial firms have become one of the biggest chains in the continent. 
According to the ranking made by Delloite in 2009, three of these companies already had the first, fifth 
and ninth places in Latin America (Cencosud, Falabella and D&D, respectively).20 This is important 
because the average South American consumer is less attractive for banks, which leaves the way open for 
these emerging transnational actors to expand their business model and financialize middle and low 
income consumers. This means that if the financialization of consumers in South America deepens in the 
coming years, it will be most likely carried out by department stores that have already spread throughout 
the continent. Thus, studying the financialization of Chilean households arguably provides conceptual 
tools to understand the financialization of households in the region. 
2.2.2 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 The main source of information for quantitative analyses in this dissertation is the “Encuesta 
Financiera de Hogares” (Household Finance Survey, from now on EFH), a panel survey conducted by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 According to data from the Santiago Chamber of Commerce, 2010 was the year with the highest foreign investment, mainly 
realized by the investments of these companies in the continent, which reached US$9.800 million during the first quarter. 
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Central Bank of Chile during the period 2007-2011 in the urban zones. It is a representative survey at the 
national/urban level which, according to the Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Anuario Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe) prepared by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), represents the 87.5% of the Chilean population.21 The unit of 
analysis is the household (interviewing the head of household) and the sample for 2007 was 4.021 cases. 
The last data base available is for 2011/2012. 
The EFH data bases (2007-2011) made possible a deep characterization of the financial situation 
of Chilean households for the very first time. It includes detailed information about household assets and 
liabilities, payment conditions, default rates, number of credit cards, bank, car and educational loans, as 
well as the utilization of these debts, among others.  
 With regard to the utilization of the survey, it is important to stress that the majority of multivariate 
analyses I am interested in have been already conducted by economists, most of them from the Central 
Bank of Chile, whose main concern is to monitor the “debt at risk”. More specifically, the main goal of 
these works is to estimate the determinant of debt and default levels, and their main dependent variables 
are the “total debt to annual income ratio” and the “monthly debt to income ratio”. Nevertheless, these 
works are in general not interested in assessing why people acquire these debts in the first place. Tackling 
this issue I conduct in chapter 6 three logistic regression analyses. These seek to complement existing 
research by attending to the role of different structural factors in shaping the odds of having different types 
of consumer debts. The dependent variables in these three separate analyses are dummy variables that 
establish whether the household holds at least one debt with department stores, a bank loan or a bank 
credit card debt. As control variables, I introduce socio-demographic features of the head of household 
(gender, age group, educational level, number of household members), as well as other variables such as 
total income, expenditures in education, occupational status and homeownership. It is important to 
mention that the aim of these analyses is not to provide accurate predictions but to explore possible causal 
factors affecting the likelihood of acquiring any of these consumer debts. These quantitative analyses 
provide the overall context and serve as background knowledge to inform about both social dynamics of 
debts and financial practices in more detail. 
2.2.3 CLASSIFYING SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS IN CHILE  
 As the reader will notice, this dissertation relies on several secondary sources of information to 
characterize trends in poverty, income distribution, and public opinion, among others. This makes the task 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See http://www.cepal.org/cgi-
bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/7/45607/P45607.xml&xsl=/deype/tpl/p9f.xsl&base=/deype/tpl/top-bottom.xsl 
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of providing a standard classification of socio-economic groups very difficult. In this section I seek to 
overview the main classification systems I use throughout the chapters. 
The main source of information about household incomes in Chile is the Survey for Socioeconomic 
Characterization, CASEN. This survey is representative at the national level; it has been is conducted 
every three years since the late 1980s´, and it is currently used to develop social policies. This database 
sorts households according to income deciles or quintiles, which are normally used by researchers to study 
poverty and more broadly income distribution. That is why many parts of this dissertation sort households 
in terms of income quintiles and deciles. 
Figure 3: Average Households percapita Income by Income Decile 2011and 2013 (including 
transferences, USD November 2013) 
 
Source: Socioeconomic Survey, CASEN 2011 and 2013 
 
 By the same token, taking the unequal distribution of income into consideration, the Central Bank 
of Chile sorts households from the Household Finance Survey (EFH) into three groups: low-income group 
from deciles 1st to 5th, middle-income group from deciles 6th to 8th, and high-income group for the 9th and 
10th income deciles. This is why most references to the EFH group consumers into low, middle and high-
income.  
 Finally, another important classification in Chile used by sociologists, marketers and social 
sciences in general characterizes socioeconomic levels through consumption and educational levels. It is 
an adaptation of the categories used by the European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research 
(ESOMAR) carried out by the Association of Market Research in Chile. This classification has three main 
features: it assigns a score to the educational level of household heads and the possession of a set of 
consumer goods. These households are then placed in a continuous line according to their scores and 
divided into five groups that correspond to percentiles 10 (poor), 45 (middle-low), 70 (middle), 90 
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(middle-upper) and 100 (upper) (see Appendix A).22 Due to the changing nature of consumption 
standards, income and educational levels, marketing agencies have to update the criteria 
(Rasse/Salcedo/Pardo 2009).  
 
 Assessing the role of transformations in the social structure and linking the ESOMAR 
classification to other stratifications based on occupational status, Rasse/Salcedo/Pardo (2009) suggest 
that the ESOMAR classification in Chile could be described as follows: 
 
Table 1: ESOMAR´s Socio-economic Classification in Chile 
Socio-
economic 
Groups 
 
Description 
Upper Capitalists, executives, professionals, technicians, and the petit bourgeois, who altogether 
represent around 18%.9% of households. It is close to the share of households that have 
domestic service and travel abroad with high frequency.  
Middle-
Upper 
Close to the category of “formal non-manual worker”, representing around 16% of 
households. The main source of income of these households is their jobs, which provide 
stable remunerations according to their cultural capital. They acquire debts to buy durable 
goods and housing, and are far from the poverty threshold.   
Middle It is the emergent group that resulted from economic growth of the last decades, represented 
by formal-manual wage earners that reach around 30% of households. Their main source of 
resources is labor-income and their cultural capital is low. They have accumulated goods and 
can resist some fluctuations of the economic cycle.  
Middle-
low 
This group is vulnerable to fall under the poverty threshold and represents 25% of 
households. They have most likely moved across the poverty threshold and are exposed to 
health and employment shocks. It is mainly “informal proletariat”, eventually subjected to 
the volatilities of the economic cycle. 
Low This group represents the share households in situation of poverty. They have a low capacity 
for accumulating goods and an important part of their incomes comes from government 
subsidies. 
Source: Based on the classification made by Espinoza/Bazoret (2009) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 It is important to keep in mind that such cut points are arbitrary and do not delimit any social boundaries across socio-
economic groups. 
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2.2.4 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS AND FIELDWORK  
Finally, the research strategy of this dissertation consists of unveiling the “black box” of households in 
order to illuminate the financialization of consumption from the perspective of the everyday life of credit 
and consumption. Following consumption sociology, this entails taking micro-foundations seriously by 
conducting qualitative fieldwork, characterizing consumption and financial practices of families, as well 
as their trajectories in the “social space”.  This is why an important thread of this dissertation is 
empirically informed by qualitative fieldwork conducted in the city of Santiago de Chile. The fieldwork 
was divided in two stages. 
Firs Stage: Understanding the Financial Industry 
The first step of the fieldwork took place between the 15th October and the 24th December 2012. It was 
mainly focused on understanding the market for consumer credit from a supply side perspective. Two 
main activities were carried out:   
1) Semi-structured interviews with key actors of the consumer credit market: 21 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with key actors of the industry, who can be grouped into four different 
categories: Risk Management and Data Miners, Marketers, Department Stores´ managers, and 
Regulation Agencies. The list of interviewees is in Appendix B. 
2) Observations in department stores and shopping malls in different districts of Santiago: 
Periodic observations were conducted in four different shopping malls and department stores in the 
city of Santiago. The selection was guided by the preliminary analysis of the interviews, according 
to which there are clear spatial-geographical segmentations of consumers and credit supply in this 
market. 
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Observations conducted in different shopping malls and department stores in Santiago de Chile 
 
Source: Google maps. 
a) Shopping Mall "Plaza Vespucio". 
District: “La Florida” (middle and middle-low income population). 
b) Shopping Mall "Alto las Condes".  
District: “Las Condes” (high income population). 
c) Ripley, department store  
District: “Santiago Centro” (middle and middle-low income population). 
d) ABC DIN, department store  
District: “Estación Central” (low-income population). 
 
Second Stage: Studying the Financial Practices of Middle Class Families in Santiago 
 
The second stage of the fieldwork was conducted in Santiago de Chile between April and July 2013. 
The research design combined in-depth interviews and oral life-stories with heads of households of 26 
middle class families in Santiago de Chile.   
The main reason to focus on middle class consumers is that most qualitative approaches to the 
consumption of finances in developed countries –and in Chile- focus on low-income populations. As a 
consequence, the economic practices of increasingly financialized middle classes remain unexplored 
(Grohmann/Kouwenberg/Menkhoff 2014; Wilkis 2014; Villareal 2008; Angulo 2014; Morvant-Roux et al. 
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2014; Barros 2011; Han 2012). This is not a trivial point, basically because rising middle classes have 
been one of the main motors of the expansion of consumer credit in Chile. Moreover, these highly 
heterogeneous groups consume finances differently from low-income populations in at least three ways: 
they enjoy more discretion over their incomes; they are fully integrated to the formal financial system; and 
they use mixed sources of credit (Marambio 2011). This is not to claim that middle classes are more 
rational or that they deploy complex financial practices, but rather that due to their heterogeneity we could 
expect new and unpredicted ways of consuming finances emerging from their everyday life. By the same 
token, their indebtedness might be shaped by different sources of economic vulnerability, which means 
that although they are not necessarily in danger of falling below the poverty line, they are in many cases in 
danger of losing their social status (Frank 2005a; Frank 2007; Sullivan 2000; Warren 2003). Since these 
groups are farther from material deprivation, they provide a suitable subject to study the relationship 
between the socially constructed standards of living, consumption and debts from the perspective of 
“relative deprivation”. 
There are several ways of classifying middle classes, and they represent between 30 and 50% of the 
population according to the chosen definition. Thus for example, it is possible to use measurements 
around the median income (OECD) o in absolute terms (World Bank) (Bazoret/Fierro 2011; 
Espinoza/Bazoret 2009). In this dissertation, I use a “residual” definition of middle-class based on middle-
income deciles for two main reasons. This way of sampling households acknowledges the impossibility of 
attributing substantive properties to the so-called middle-class. Since this is a very initial exploration into 
the consumption of financial services of the Chilean middle-class, the goal is to cover a range of financial 
practices as wide as possible. In this sense, this research work follows studies in social stratification in 
Chile and considers households that, at the moment of the interview, had at least one type of consumer 
debt, and whose per capita income was between the III and VII deciles in the income distribution 
(Bazoret/Fierro 2011; Espinoza/Bazoret 2009). According to the Survey of Socioeconomic 
Characterization conducted in 2011, the average per capita income of households between the III and VII 
income deciles ranged from 315,054 to 667,302 Chilean pesos, which is equivalent to $651 and $1380 
USD, respectively.  In this group we find household heads with various educational levels and occupations 
as different as secretaries, engineers, accountants, skilled manual workers, retired pensioners, taxi drivers, 
and housewives, among others.  
Interviewees were contacted through third parties and a snowball strategy was implemented to access 
new households. The duration of the fieldwork and the reluctance of people to talk about their personal 
finances made interviews a difficult endeavor. In general terms, I obtained a saturation of information 
approximately after the twentieth interview. What remains pending and requires further interviews and 
observations, however, is a further characterization of different profiles of debtors identified in the 
interviews. 
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The interviews had two main parts. The first one consists of a short survey that gathers socio-
demographic information, as well as a characterization of household income, assets and liabilities that 
facilitate the contextualization of the households with existing surveys (see Appendix C). The second one 
-and most extensive part- aims at reconstructing the credit-story of families within the broader context of 
family relations and life-cycle transitions, as well as educational, intergenerational, individual and labor 
trajectories and consumption patterns (see Appendix D). Furthermore, the interviews explore the 
meanings and uses of debts, as well as their conenctions with consumption patterns. The majority of 
interviews were recorded, transcribed and analyzed with the software for qualitative analysis N-Vivo.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Is Chile a case of Privatized Keynesianism, and if it is, how does it work in practice? Put 
differently, does consumer credit in Chile work as a social policy that makes distributive conflicts less 
salient?  
As predicted by theories on Political Economy, neoliberal reforms carried in Chile during the 
1970s´ and early 1980s´ were followed by an explosive expansion of the market for consumer credit from 
the 1990s´ onwards. If credit cards in the early 1980s´ were only restricted to a few privileged and loyal 
department store´s customers, five years after the return to democracy (1995) one and a half million of 
households had acquired these debts. These were already distributed throughout different social strata, but 
specially concentrated in the middle and middle-bottom of the income distribution (PNUD 1998). By the 
turn of the century, the number of department store credit cards circulating rose to 7 millions, in a country 
where the population over 18 was hardly eleven millions. 
But what does it mean to say that such expansion corresponds to the institutionalization of 
Privatized Keynesianism?  Understanding the financialization of consumption under such overarching 
framework shapes the type of explanation one can offer in two ways: Firstly, the “Privatized 
Keynesianism” hypothesis forces one to think of a political economy in systemic terms. That is to say, that 
what happens in the area of consumption and households cannot be isolated from major dynamics in labor 
markets, social policy, the economic cycle and distributive politics. At the level of explanation, the 
consequence is that it is not possible to resort to single causes to explain the rising indebtedness of Chilean 
households, such as declining interest rates, a particular rationality of consumers, or spirals of conspicuous 
consumption. This leads us to the second feature, which is that one should look at the phenomenon by 
recognizing that there are no a-historical explanations, overtly implying that the specific distributive 
conflicts present in a society, as well as the means through which they are dealt with, are historically 
determined.  
Thus, this analytical framework introduces two levels of explanation: one showing how Privatized 
Keynesianism works as a system and the specific role that financialization plays in a political economy, 
and the other one making the concrete causal mechanisms explicit through which these major structural 
contexts precipitate household indebtedness. Accordingly, the outcomes of these two levels of explanation 
are also different. Although not less empirical, the first one takes as its starting point the abstraction of the 
“average household”, a portfolio conception of the household unit that consumes, saves, acquires 
liabilities and assets, and takes the form of an overarching narrative that makes sense of broader trends of 
society. The second level of explanation is rather different and implies delving into the minutiae of socio-
cultural dynamics, moving away from the portfolio view of the average household and exploring the 
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everyday life of “real households”, their practices, expectations, biographies and concrete social relations.  
This part of the dissertation provides the historical framework that serves as the entry point for 
both endeavors. In concrete terms, I show that the increasing financialization of consumption in Chile was 
the result of the institutionalization of Privatized Keynesianism that followed structural reforms in the 
1980s. Accordingly, Privatized Keynesianism in Chile should be located at the intersection of three 
historical coordinates: the privatization of risks, economic growth and inequality. These three pillars of 
Privatized Keynesianism in Chile will articulate in specific ways and shape the distributive conflicts that 
the financialization of consumption made less salient or postponed in different ways during the period 
1990-2014 under study. If the financialization of Chilean households served as a social policy, I argue, it 
was to modulate and ameliorate the destructive forces of inequality and the consequences of privatizations 
in a context of growth. The following section develops the three main pillars of Privatized Keynesianism 
in Chile.  
These points being already discussed, I will then move on to the first level of explanation in 
chapter 4 and will argue that, unlike the case of developed economies, the financialization of housing, 
education and consumption in Chile did not serve as an unintended policy that helped democratic 
governments keep pace with already established standards of living, but was rather used as a policy tool to 
carry out and make a modernization process viable. However, in chapter 5 I will develop this idea further, 
by showing that unlike the cases of education and housing, the financialization of consumption was 
carried out by department stores that exploited a situation characterized by lack of regulations and low 
wages. Once this general context is settled, I will outline the main features of the financialization of 
consumption in Chile. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PRIVATIZED KEYNESIANISM IN CHILE 
On February 17th, 1982, Margaret Thatcher wrote a letter to Friedrich Von Hayek –with whom she 
had had dinner some weeks before- remarking that “The progression from Allende´s socialism to the free 
enterprise capitalist economy of the 1980´s is a striking example of economic reform from which one can 
learn many lessons.” To what she added: “However, I am sure you will agree that, in Britain with our 
democratic institutions and the need for a high degree of consent, some of the measures adopted in Chile 
are quite unacceptable.” 
The words of one the fiercest supporters of neoliberal reforms are exemplary of the pioneer 
structural transformations underwent in Chile during the 1970s and 1980s, showing that the radical 
character of such reforms can be hardly exaggerated. On the one hand, radical economic adjustments with 
high social costs for unprotected workers could only happen in the context of a total suppression of 
democratic institutions. On the other hand, the suspension of democratic institutions and the lack of a clear 
economic and social program on the part of the military government made Chile a suitable laboratory for 
the experimentation of emerging monetarist theories and new modernization projects (Ree 2007).  
The institutionalization of Privatized Keynesianism took place in this context of deep structural 
transformations and social changes, which scholars in the late 1990´s did not hesitate to retrospectively 
understand as a capitalist modernization (for a revision of these works see Ariztía/Bernasconi (2012)). 
This transition towards a market society was not a smooth path from socialism toward a liberalized and 
open economy. It was rather an experimental process of trial and error that even questioned its own 
viability (Garretón 2012). Since the overthrow of Salvador Allende in 1973, it took almost two decades 
and tremendous social and economic costs before it stood as a clear pathway and eventually consolidated 
into a particular “growth model” during the democratic governments in the 1990´s. A series of successive 
structural reforms precipitated the “great transformation” of Chilean society towards the liberal utopia of 
self-regulated markets, fiscal austerity, entrepreneurship and individual responsibility (Taylor 2006; 
Munoz 2007). 
The first economic policies of the military government aimed at tackling the fiscal deficit through 
a cut in public spending and the introduction of a 20% consumption tax, while at the same time taxes on 
capital were substantively diminished (Ffrench-Davis 2004).23 In parallel, import tariffs were reduced and 
collective bargaining was completely suspended. This had an important impact on real wages that by 1981 
were lower than the 1970-1971 levels (Ffrench-Davis 2004; Foxley 1982). 
the military government put a Plan of Economic Recovery to work for the sake of increasing 
inflation -which after the liberalization of prices in 1973 rose from around 400 to 590%, the deterioration 
of production, and a crisis in the balance of payments between 1975 and 1976, better known in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Former expropriated lands were restituted and nationalized companies received what was considered a “fair compensation”. 
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literature as the “shock therapy” (Klein 2007). It basically consisted of a radical reduction in the monetary 
supply by restraining fiscal spending. The effects of the shock therapy were felt immediately, and by 1975 
fiscal spending had already decreased in 25%, and industrial production almost 30%. In 1976, 
unemployment rose to almost 20% and real wages fell 40% in comparison to the level of 1970 (Foxley 
1982).  
Figure 4: Evolution of Percapita Social Spending, 1970-1991 (1970=0) 
Source: data taken from Ffrench-Davis (2004). 
 
However, the shock therapy could not stop the recession and in June 1976 Pinochet announced a 
new plan to restrain costs through the regulation of exchange rates in order to precipitate a convergence 
between the national and international inflation levels. Additionally, in parallel to the demand shocks, 
long-term structural changes were implemented, such as the privatization of public companies, the 
creation of a capital market through the liberalization of interest rates and a steady tariff reduction 
(French-Davis 2004).24 By 1978, the Chilean economy was open (import tariffs were settled at 10%) and 
stabilization policies showed some results. In 1977, 1978 and 1979 the Chilean economy showed signs of 
recovery by growing at annual rates of 8,3, 7,8 and 7,1%, respectively. Unemployment decreased from 
11,8% in 1977 to 10,4% in 1980, and between 1977 and 1981 the general wage index increased in real 
terms from 100 to 136 (Foxley 1982).  
But this recovery would soon prove to be temporary. The radical liberalizations and an orthodox 
application of monetarism led to one of the deepest crises that the military regime faced. The results were 
an accumulated fall of the GDP of 17 percent between 1981 and 1983, an increase of unemployment in 
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  By 1980, out of 507 public companies that existed in 1973, only 15 remained in that condition. Public employment fell 20% 
from 1974 to 1978, especially affecting public companies and those governmental institutions that were in charge of steering 
industrial policies under the logic of the “import substitution model” implemented in the previous decades.  In 1979, nearly a 
30% of expropriated lands were given back to their former owners (Foxley 1982).	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rates closer to 20%, and a dramatic decrease of real wages (De Gregorio/Cowan/Baytelman 1999). This 
marked an important shift in the way of implementing economic policies towards a less strict application 
of monetarism. After the debt crisis, where banks had to be re-nationalized and financial markets 
regulated, the regime applied a more pragmatic version of neoliberal policies and implemented “seven 
modernizations” that aimed at breaking away with the state-developmental model of previous decades 
(Ffrench-Davis 2004). This inaugurated a new era where a clearer growth-model consolidated and gave 
birth to Privatized Keynesianism in Chile. 
Until the 1980s, the military regime in Chile followed monetarist prescriptions and carried out 
several reforms oriented to liberalizing the economy, taming inflation and reducing the fiscal deficit 
(Edwards 1991). During this period of experimentation there was also an important degree of uncertainty 
regarding the next steps of the military regime. In fact, the military government was internally divided 
with regard to the modernization project that the country was meant to follow. These fractions were 
basically represented by traditional groups that favored a strong state leading the national development, on 
the one hand, and technocrats and liberal-conservatives that favored the transition towards a less 
centralized and economically liberal society, on the other (Taylor 2006; Gárate 2012). By the early 1980s 
this controversy was already settled; the Chicago boys group composed of both technocratic neoliberal 
economists and conservative gremialistas, gained strategic position in the government and with the 
support of the dictator inclined the balance towards a more radical reformulation of the national 
modernization project based on the free-market ideology.  
In part, this had to do with the increasing prestige that this group enjoyed after the economic 
recovery of the late 1970s, which in many circles was considered as the “Chilean Miracle” (Winn 2004).25 
The result was twofold: firstly, the need of institutionalizing the regime in the wake of international 
pressure resulted in the authoritarian Constitution of 1980, which sought to create a protected democracy 
under military tutelage (Winn 2004). And secondly, with the Chicago boys occupying key positions, the 
government implemented in the early 1980s the most important and radical structural reforms that targeted 
education, health and social provision, as well as labor markets, political centralization, agrarian reform 
and judicial power. These reforms were already available since the 1960s in an extensive document called 
El Ladrillo (literally “The Brick”). El Ladrillo was written by economists working at the Catholic 
University (Universidad Católica de Chile) and contained the modernization program that aimed at 
reformulating the economic and welfare institutions in such a way that it would represent a total break 
with the statist and national developmental model of the previous decades.  
The materialization of this modernization program progressively institutionalized Privatized 
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  Although the “miracle” had more to do with the fact that the growth of the 1976-1980 period was rather a recovery from the 
recession of 1975.	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Keynesianism in Chile as a radical break with existing institutional arrangements. Such re-foundation of 
economic and social institutions created a particular articulation between the state, households and 
markets that would serve as the context where the market for consumer credit –and financialization at 
large- would expand and work as a policy tool. This process has two main structural features. Firstly, the 
commodification of education, health and pension system shifted the responsibility for the material 
reproduction of society from the state to the private sphere, putting the financial burden on the shoulders 
of families. And secondly, economic openness, labor market reforms and the privatized pension system 
created precarious conditions for active and retired workers, while at the same time facilitated the 
accumulation of capital in unprecedented ways. As a result, both economic growth and inequalities 
coexisted throughout the whole period, where the market for consumer credit expanded from the late 
1980´s until today.  
3.1 COMMODIFICATION AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF RISK 
If the embracement of neoliberal policies had any impact on the institutionalization of Privatized 
Keynesianism in Chile, one can expect it to be nowhere else more visible than through the dismantling of 
the welfare state. In this respect, one of the foundational pillars of Privatized Keynesianism in Chile was 
the privatization of health, education and pension funds. Along with transformation in labor institutions 
and the dismantling of the developmental state that would no longer subsidize prices and ensure 
employment in times of crisis, commodification put a big burden on the shoulders of households and 
expose them to the economic cycle. This process might be well termed as a privatization of risks 
(HACKER 2004; Hacker 2007), which means that several types of risks that exist in society -ranging from 
health, job loss, retirement, or even natural disasters- that were previously collectively faced with the 
support of the state and other intermediary institutions, are now the exclusive responsibility of families. 
Four reforms to the welfare and labor institutions were crucial in leaving families progressively on their 
own.    
3.1.1 Reforming the Health System 
The reform to the health system was implemented in 1979. It entailed a series of organizational 
reconfigurations that sought to decentralize the provision of public health. The reform created the National 
Health Fund (FONASA) that concentrated the administrative functions of the former Health National 
Service (SNS) and Medical National Services of Employees (SERMENA), and introduced a new 
financing mechanism (Torche 2000). In the spirit of guaranteeing the free access to health assistance 
instead of the obligation to provide it, it allowed the incorporation of private insurance companies called 
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ISAPRES that would compete with FONASA in the provision of health services.26 Under the new system, 
workers have to contribute the 7% of their income to finance a health system of their preference. As I will 
show in chapter 12, such dualization will have important effects on the budgets of Chilean families that 
spend the highest levels of out-of-pocket medical spending as a share of total consumption in the OECD 
countries. 
3.1.2 The Educational reform 
The educational reform took place in 1981 with the aim of expanding coverage (that fell 30% since 
1975) in adherence to the following principles of “freedom of choice” and subsidiarity. The reform 
decentralized the control of educational institutions down to the municipal level, which since then are in 
charge of providing and administering public schools. Chile implemented for the very first time a system 
of “vouchers” at a national scale, which consisted of a subsidy that the state would pay to private schools 
for each student they “enrolled”. The idea was to provide incentives to the private sector to enter into the 
educational business and foster competition among them. The reform created a three-tier system 
consisting of “public schools”, “privately-owned subsidized schools”, and “private schools”. Since the 
return to democracy, the Chilean state did not change its subsidiary role, but systematically tried to correct 
market failures, promote the enhancement of educational quality and expand its coverage  
(Raczynski/Muñoz 2007).27 Except for a few cases –the so-called “emblematic public schools”- the 
schooling system became a source of insecurity every time educational attainment consistently reflected 
the capacity of families to invest in the education of their children.  
Something similar occurred at the level of higher education. The educational reform created a new 
market for higher education in 1981 by authorizing the creation of private universities and new institutions 
called Professional Institutes and Centers for Technical Education28. Although between 1981 and 1987 
only five new universities were at work (and 23 professional institutes), in the last years of the military 
regime, between 1988 and 1989, the creation of 17 new universities and 34 professional institutes was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Although ISAPRES were meant to work as brokers that would connect individuals with health services, in practice they 
became a “vertically integrated” through economic groups that would progressively venture into the provision of health 
services through private clinics. 
27	  Between 1985 and 1990 spending on education decreased in 11 percent in real terms. But this situation was reversed during 
the democratic governments, growing more than 10 percent in real terms per year between 1990 and 2009. The main priorities 
of the government have been preschool, primary school and secondary school, improving their coverage considerably among 
all income quintiles. Several policies aimed at increasing coverage, from full school day to preferential per student subsidy 
(Arellano 2011).	  
28	  New Universities would be created under the political approval of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerio del Interior) 
until 1988, and a technical supervision from the Ministry of Education.  
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approved. Only three months before the new democratically elected president Patricio Aylwin took office 
in 1990, 18 universities and 23 professional institutes obtained the official approval. Such proliferation 
went hand in hand with a decrease in their quality, since the five main external accrediting universities 
absolutely exceeded and relaxed their supervisory role. As a consequence of the reform, both public and 
private institutions had to recover part of their operational costs by charging fees to their students. This 
inaugurated a new era where the access to higher education is tied to the purchasing power of families. 
3.1.3 The Privatization of Pension Funds 
One of the most important reforms carried out by Pinochet was to create a private pension system. 
Although private pension funds already existed at the time (in the US, for example), the novelty was that 
in no country was the private sector the main pillar of the pension system (Gárate 2012). Again, in 
breaking away with the collectivist approach of the previously state-owned pension funds (based on 
contributions from the state, employees and employers), José Piñera –the Harvard economist in charge of 
designing the new retirement plan- created a system of compulsory and individual savings. The basic idea 
was to substitute intergenerational solidarity for individual responsibility (PNUD 1998). Under the new 
legislation, workers were obliged to contribute 13% of their income to a personal savings account that 
would be administered by an AFP (Pension Fund Association), which would receive as gains 2% of these 
funds. AFPs administrate and invest these funds in order to make profit and augment the size of pensions. 
With the introduction of the reform, all new comers to labor markets were forced to move into the new 
system, while active workers were encouraged to move from the public to the private system.29 According 
to the underlying principles that inspired the modernizations, it transferred the responsibility from the state 
and employers exclusively to workers, and the state´s role was confined to regulating the investment 
profiles of AFPs and acting as guarantor of last resort (Taylor 2006).30  
3.1.4 Institutionalized Labor Flexibility 
Among the victims of the modernizations of the 1980s, were also those institutions that had 
previously protected and strengthened labor in relation to capital. The amount of decree-laws that aimed 
at dismantling labor institutions and transforming labor relations in Chile was called the Plan Laboral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Those who made important contributions to the old system were allowed to stay there, and self-employed workers could 
choose contributing in either of them.	  
30 Under this plan, the reform was meant to correct the distortions of the labor market and make labor cheaper for employers. 
As studies show, between the late 1960s and mid 1990s firms saw a drop from 40% of non-wage costs to a 3% (Haag 2002, 
cited in Taylor 2006). 
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(Labor Plan) (Muñoz 2008).31 As Peter Winn (2004, 31) puts it, the Plan Laboral “was intended to 
definitively shift the balance of power in labor relations in favor of business and to weaken the workers 
and unions that formed the central political base of the left.”  
The reform disarticulated the highly unionized labor movement, which never returned to the pre-
1973 levels of militancy and importance. In practice, the implementation of these new regulations 
determined that workers would no longer be able to organize themselves strongly enough to raise 
complaints over the benefits of economic growth.32  
A second feature of the Plan Laboral was to assure flexibility and reduce the costs of labor. Under 
the new context of labor institutions, employers were able to unilaterally change work contracts in order to 
change work locations and descriptions. They would be able to fire workers without cause on thirty days´ 
notice or immediately by paying one month wage, while the severance payment was reduced from one 
month´s wage for every year worked to a maximum of five month´s payment (Winn 2004). This would 
change later on to a month´s wage for each year worked up to a maximum of eleven years.33   
Due to several reasons, labor unions were unable to device a substantial labor reform after the 
return to democracy in 1990. Although some aspects of the Labor Code were modified throughout the 
nineties, crucial elements of the Plan Laboral remained untouched, such as wage decentralization, union 
competition (it allowed for competition among multiple bargaining groups inside individual firms), non-
unionized bargaining, limitations on strike activity by replacing workers, and employer flexibility in 
setting working conditions and wages. Moreover, the minimum number of workers to create a union was 
8, which excluded an important share of small enterprises, while workers with fixed-term contracts -which 
represented one fifth of wage-earners with contracts- were excluded from collective bargaining 
(Reinecke/Valenzuela 2012).  
Furthermore, the current legislation allowed companies to develop more refined strategies to make 
labor relations more flexible. Processes of rationalization of labor have been documented, which in many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 It was in part an answer to the international pressure coming from actors such as the AFL-CIO, which in the sake of the 
persecution, murder, exile and imprisonment of union leaders, seriously threatened in 1978 with boycotting Chile´s exports. 
Sergio de Castro, one of the most influential Chicago boys leading the Planning Office, held in 1978 a meeting with the 
president of the AFL-CIO George Meaney. Coming back from Washington, the message was very clear: a new labor code was 
required if Pinochet´s regime wanted to prevent an international boycott.  
32 Unionization was made voluntary and a labor union needed at least 50% of workers´ approval to be formed; collective 
bargaining was possible only at the firm level; employers were allowed to hire substitutes during strikes, and bargaining 
processes would only benefit those workers that subscribed the bargaining agreement, limiting these benefits and creating 
division among workers (Gárate 2012). 
33 Moreover, they were able to pay apprentices less than the minimum wage and force workers to work twelve hours a day if 
the weekly working time did not exceed the legal maximum.	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cases were translated into outsourcing, part-time work, subcontracting, flexible wage systems, workday 
extension and short-term contracts (Cárdenas 2012; Bravo 2003).  Subcontracting, for instance, has been 
among the most extended outsourcing practices in the domain of labor relations since the mid-nineties, 
which in 2004 reached its peak where more than 50 percent of Chilean companies were subcontracting 
services from other companies (74.8% of big companies, and 58.5%, 47.9% and 38% for medium, small 
and micro-companies) (Echeverría 2010).34   
Existing contracts also played a key role in making labor relations more flexible. Temporal 
contracts became one of the preferred formats of employers, since they were not subject to compensation 
when they expired and employers in practice renewed these contracts in order to prevent workers from 
accumulating years that could be eventually compensated for. As a result, for example, according to 
López (2008), only ten percent of workers had the right to receive compensation from the one million of 
yearly layoffs in Chile, and 65% of workers with fixed-term contracts in 2000 were fired and rehired in 
the same year. According to the last OECD Employment Outlook, Chile is the second country with 
highest proportions of employment that last less than twelve months among the OECD countries (29% 
behind the 31% of South Korea).35  In a similar vein, big conglomerates such as department stores are able 
to fragment into different legal entities administering human resources, thus forcing workers to unionize 
and negotiate with employers at local store-level, rather than with the whole company 
(Reinecke/Valenzuela 2012).  
Flexible labor and weak unions will be determinant factors in the privatization of risk by leaving 
workers´ families more exposed to the economic cycle,36 while at the same time allowing companies to 
better adapt to the changing conditions of a more open economy. The aforementioned reforms had thus an 
obvious impact on the financial burden of households, especially due to rising costs in education and 
health services, as well as the association of their outputs –success and security- with the purchasing 
power of families. Furthermore, these institutions contributed to the perpetuation of inequality in a country 
that favors the accumulation of capital but excludes the big majority from participating in the benefits of 
growth. 
3.2 CONSUMING CREDIT IN TIMES OF PROSPERITY? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 After times of turmoil, subcontracting was regulated in 2006 and subcontracting declined30.5% in 2008 (Echeverría 2010) 
35 http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/employment/oecd-employment-outlook-2014_empl_outlook-
2014-en#page1 
36 Despite the sustained economic growth during the nineties, labor market volatilities (turnovers) have been very high. As 
Palacios (2006, 67) shows, during the nineties “Only a quater of workers held a job for 10 years, and most workers changed 
jobs every three years (Dirección del Trabajo 2002: 7) 
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The second pillar of Privatized Keynesianism in Chile is economic growth and the material 
improvement that the Chilean society experienced throughout the decades where the market for consumer 
credit expanded. Growth will play a crucial role in two different ways: by creating the economic 
conditions for the market to expand, and ratcheting up the standards of living and aspirations of Chilean 
consumers. 
In Chile, although credit cards existed since 1970´s and borrowing from local shops was a 
common practice among Chilean families,37 the economic conditions that facilitated the rise of consumer 
lending in a large scale were only reached after a long period of experimentations and instability in the 
late 1980´s. As it was mentioned above, as a result of the less radical and more pragmatic approach to 
economic policies that followed the crisis of the early 1980s, 1985 inaugurated a period of growth of ten 
years. This growth was based on the utilization of idle capacity and employment recovery, reaching in 
1988 the per-capita income levels of 1981, and increasing employment and GDP between 1983 and 1989 
in 33 and 35 percent, respectively (De Gregorio/Cowan/Baytelman 1999). Moreover, the endemic 
problem of inflation was finally tamed from the 1990´s onwards with the creation of an independent 
Central Bank and the introduction of “Inflation targets”, decreasing from 27.3% in 1990 to 4.7 in 1997 
(Morandé/Noton 2004).  As the chart below shows, this whole period where the market of consumer credit 
expanded (1987-2009) was marked by high annual growth rates, as well as decreasing inflation rates; an 
unprecedented stability in comparison with the last decades.  
The stabilization of prices and interest rates played a crucial role in making consumer lending a 
viable business. Together with an improvement of the purchasing power of large segments of the 
population, rising employment levels, and better exchange conditions to import and sell goods at better 
prices, provided the basic conditions for people to acquire debts and department stores to sell their goods 
on credit (Moulian 2002).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This is the practice of “pedir fiado”, which is used to name the practice of buying groceries on credit in local shops. This way 
of selling groceries to neighbors has not been directly documented, but we can find the expression at least in the early twentieth 
century. This particular culture of borrowing to buy groceries is still something that needs further research.   
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Figure 5: Evolution of Different Economic Indicators, Chile 1987-2010 
 
Source: Unemployment rates, INE (National Insitute of Statistics). Anual Growth Rate and Annual 
Inflation Rates, Central Bank of Chile.  
 This leads us to one of the most striking features of the institutionalization of Privatized 
Keynesianism in Chile, which is that the expansion of consumer credit was not grounded on the 
deterioration of middle class that followed the post-Keynesian period in many capitalist democracies 
(Montgomerie 2009b; Streeck 2014; Frank 2007). It was rather consolidated in the context of a significant 
improvement in the standards of living of large segments of the population. 
Taken the period under study altogether (1990-2014), the financialization of consumption took 
place in a context of important improvement. Between 1988 and 2012 Chile´s Gross National Income 
grew more than four times,38 total poverty diminished from 38.6% in 1990 to 13.7% in 2006, while 
indigence (homelessness) declined from 13% to 3.2%.  
Especially during the nineties, the financialization of consumption took place in a context of 
unprecedented growth. Between 1987 and 1997 the GDP grew at an average annual rate of 7.8 and the 
per-capita product at a 6.1 annual average rate; in 1997 the GDP was 91 percent higher than in 1986, and 
unemployment reached levels close to full employment (Tironi/Ariztía 2003). This created a particular 
atmosphere throughout the nineties that scholars baptized as a sort of “collective euphoria” (Tironi 1999; 
Martuccelli 2012a). By the second half of the decade, when seven millions of credit cards were circulating 
and families from the three-bottom income deciles were spending more than their incomes (according to 
the Household Budget Survey 1996/7), the majority of people perceived that their educational 
opportunities as well as their general situation were much better off than those of their parents´ (PNUD 
1998).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 According to data from the World Bank, the increasing accumulation of household debt in Chile was accompanied by an 
increase in the percapita GNI, PPP from $3.320 in 1988 to 8.540 in 1998, and 20.450 in 2012 
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Figure 6: Perception of a Personal Situation that is Better-off than that of their Parents (percentage) 
 
Source: Calculated from data taken from PNUD 1998 
 
Of course, the increasing access to consumption that department store credit cards facilitated was 
due in part to this process, reflecting rising expectations as well as accelerating the process of material 
improvement. But leaving the role of credit aside, improvement was mainly driven by the rise in real 
wages and targeted social policies. For example, from 1990 to 2009 -with two important crises in between 
(1997 and 2007)- Chilean families increased their purchasing power considerably, to the extent that the 
average increase of real wages between the III and VII income deciles was 68,7% (Bazoret/Fierro 2011; 
León/Martínez 2007). By the same token, the minimum wage experienced an important growth between 
1990 and 2006 that reached a 94.2% (Reinecke/Valenzuela 2012).
Figure 7: Percentage of Variation, Autonomous Household Income, periods 1990-2006 and 1990-
2009 (Chilean pesos, November 2009) 
 
Source: Data taken from Bazoret/Fierro (2011) 
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Intergenerational and individual upward social mobility, on the other hand, was in part possible 
due to an important expansion of education in all levels (Nuñez/Miranda 2009; Arellano 2011). For 
example, during the whole period 1990-2014 the schooling coverage education improved in considerable 
ways, especially among the poorer income quintiles (see table below). This had an important repercussion 
in the technification of the labor force, which gravitated less towards the industrial sector and more 
towards the service economy. In a context where the proportion of the labor force with secondary and 
post-secondary education increased three times between 1960 and 2000, the occupational structure 
witnessed an important growth in middle-level technicians and professionals from 5 to around 14 percent 
(Bravo 2003). The number of mid-level salaries grew from 550,000 in 1970 to 1,400,000 in 2000, 
basically reflecting a transition from the government-employment to the new private bureaucracies 
(León/Martínez 2001).  In this sense, the financialization of consumption should be understood in the 
particular context of the emergence of new “middle classes”, more educated (Nuñez/Miranda 2009), with 
higher purchasing power and whose social mobility trajectories would no longer rely on collective action 
but on the individual strategies of families.39  
Summing up, the point that I want to make is that if Chilean families throughout these decades 
systematically used consumer credit in contexts of rising collective expectations, social mobility and rise 
in real wages, Privatized Keynesianism in Chile does not necessarily operate by replacing stagnant wages, 
but by expanding people´s consumption in times of general prosperity. To be clear, this does not 
contradict the Privatized Keynesianism hypothesis, but it means that if credit works as a social policy, it 
does it through more subtle and complex mechanisms than the defensive consumption postulated by most 
theories in political economy. The important question at this point takes some distance from traditional 
accounts in the political economy literature: If Chilean families seem to be better off than previous 
generations, what explains the gap between incomes and wants/needs that credit seems to close? So far 
evidence shows that rather than protecting lifestyles, consumer credits were mobilized as means to create 
and carry out life-projects. But if this is true, what was the role-played by the privatization of risk? To 
unravel these questions, one has to attend to the way in which the effects of growth and the privatization 
of risks are mediated by the last pillar of Privatized Keynesianism, inequality. 
3.3 STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY AND THE BENEFITS OF GROWTH 
Growth had a huge impact on the Chilean population, who saw an increase in their real wages 
during the whole period under study. Nevertheless, although families across all income deciles benefited 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  This is why these new middle classes in Chile are not necessarily coherently articulated as interests groups, but fragmented 
and highly heterogeneous. That is what Bazoret/Fierro (2011) called the transition from a society of “class struggle” to a society 
of “positioning struggles”.	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from general improvement, this was not necessarily related to an equal participation in the benefits of 
growth. As the chart below shows, the Gini coefficient in Chile presented small improvements between 
1990 and 2011, but it has been persistently high during the whole period, to the point that in 2007 Chile 
occupied the twelfth position in the ranking of inequality among 128 countries (Solimano/Torche 2008). 
This means that the improvement of economic indicators that went hand in hand with economic growth 
and an increasing social expenditure from the 1990s onwards (proximate determinants of income 
distribution) scarcely changed the structure of income distribution (Larrañaga , O./Valenzuela, J. P. 2011). 
This led scholars to consistently point out that, unlike developmental theories predicted (especially 
Kuznets theory), inequality in Chile is a structural phenomenon (Contreras 1999; Contreras 2003; 
Contreras et al. 2005; Contreras/Corbalán/Redondo 2007; Neilson et al. 2008; Larrañaga/Herrera 2008; 
Larrañaga , O./Valenzuela, J. P. 2011). 
Figure 8: Evolution Gini Coefficient, 1990-2011 
 
Source: data from the Survey of Socio-economic Characterization, CASEN. 
 
One way of understanding the structural character of the unequal distribution of incomes in Chile 
is by looking into the structure of different economic sectors and the relation between their productivity, 
incomes and employment creation. In this sense, scholars working under the paradigm developed by the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) have argued that the structural 
heterogeneity of the Chilean economy, which is characterized by high imbalances between low, middle 
and high productive businesses, explains in part the unequal distribution of growth through the distribution 
of wages in highly segmented labor markets (Infante 2009b; Infante 2009a; Sunkel/Infante 2009). These 
imbalances have their roots in the specialization of the export sector of emerging countries in goods and 
services demanded by industrialized countries, creating increasing differences between a modern and old 
sector of the economy: big companies integrated into the dynamic sectors of the global economy, 
characterized by higher wages and professionalization, on the one hand; and another sector concentrated 
on the internal demand, less developed, productive and innovative, and more informal and paying lower 
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wages, on the other (Infante 2009b; Infante 2009a).  For example, most of production and consumption of 
the Chilean economy is concentrated on highly productive sectors (financial institutions, electricity, gas, 
water, and mining sector) and big companies (79,7% of the total production in 2003), but most 
employments are provided by middle and low productivity sectors (76,8%).  
In aggregate terms, the productivity per worker in high performance sectors is fifteen times higher 
than those of low performance, which leads to wages six or five times lower among small and middle size 
businesses (Infante 2009a). The remunerations from small and middle size businesses (concentrated on the 
middle and low productivity sectors) correspond to the 20,7% and 15,% of the total amount of wages, 
which, in turn, represent a 72,5% and 63,% of their added value, respectively. This goes in line with the 
fact that most of the growth experienced in Chile favored highly-skilled workers rather than a big mass of 
employees that earn less than two minimum wages (more than half of Chilean workers according to 
Reinecke/Valenzuela (2011)). Indeed, between 1990 and 2006 high quality employments experienced an 
increase in the highly productive sectors, middle-quality employments contracted at all levels, and low 
quality increases considerably among smaller companies (Infante 2011).40 Furthermore, the structural 
heterogeneity has augmented along with economic concentration. Between 1994 and 2003, for example, 
the share of big companies in total sales increased from 73% to 82%, while the share of middle and small 
size companies decreased from 23% to 15,5%, and 4% to 2,5%, respectively. This goes in line with the 
fact that an important part of the income distribution relates to huge differences between the tenth income 
decile and the rest of the population (Solimano/Torche 2008). 
In general, the “heterogeneity” of the Chilean economy accounts for structural wage differentials 
between skilled and non-skilled workers. But another source of structural inequalities pointed out by 
scholars is represented by the imbalances between labor and capital that are reflected on the excessive 
concentration of property (especially in the banking sector, AFPs (Pension Fund Administrators), 
ISAPRES and the stock market) (Solimano/Pollack 2006),41 as well as the impediments of workers to 
raise claims over the products of growth for the wake of a rise in their productivity levels (Durán 2011; 
Durán-Palma/Wilkinson/Korczynski 2005). This source of income inequality is better explained by the 
structural transformations of labor institutions carried out during the Pinochet era. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 According to Infante (2010), high quality employees are considered to have work contract, social security and remunerations 
higher than the average income of wage earners; medium-high quality employees lack either contract or social security, and 
perceive remunerations superior to medium incomes and fluctuate between median income and the average income of wage 
earners; medium-inferior quality employees are those workers that with or without work contract , perceive higher incomes 
67% of the median income and inferior to the median income of wage-earners; finally, low quality employees are those that, 
with or without work contract, perceive incomes lower than 67% of the median income. 
41 For instance, 30 percent of the income of the richest income decile in 2003 came from property rents, which accounted for 
95.5 percent of the total amount of that particular type of income (González 2008). 
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As I mentioned before, labor unions were dismantled and labor reforms encountered several 
obstacles to their organization. In general, the inability to change labor regulations has to do with the fact 
that while unions lost presence in the political scenario, business grew ideologically coherent, politically 
influential and organizationally united, being also able to block reforms that could have increased the 
costs of labor (Palacios 2006). The result was an institutionalized incapacity of Chilean wage-earners to 
effectively demand participation in the benefits of growth, as well as regain social rights and protect 
themselves from new forms of flexibility, exposure to the economic cycle and increasingly powerful 
economic groups.  
Although militancy grew in the late 1980s, unions throughout the 1990s followed two main paths: 
they grew in numbers due to less restrictive conditions to create them (fragmentation); and militancy at the 
national level declined (Ensignia 2005). Indeed, the opinion that strikes were ineffective due to the 
decision of employers to replace workers was widespread among workers during the mid-nineties 
(Palacios 2006).  
Figure 9: Percentage of Real Wage Readjustments in Total Collective Contracts, 1990-2002 
 
Source: data from Palacios (2006)  
 
Between the 1990s and early 2000s the labor unions´ bargaining power declined further and real 
wages adjustments from unions´ collective contracts decreased more than 80% between 1990 and 2002. In 
the period 1993–2004 the percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining contracts and the total 
number of contracts negotiated by labor unions fell in 33% and 20% (Palacios 2006). As a consequence, 
the results of collective bargaining processes also decreased (Fren-Davis 2002), having a direct impact on 
income distribution. According to estimations of  Landerretche/Lillo/Puentes (2013), using panel data for 
the 2004-2009 period, unionization in Chile increased wages by  20 percent, having a higher impact 
among low-wages workers. Reinecke/Valenzuela (2011) find a similar result analyzing the 1994 Socio-
economic Characterization Survey (CASEN), according to which unionization benefits more workers with 
lower educational levels than their non-unionized counterparts. This explains that even though between 
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1993 and 2004 the GDP grew 90.3% and employment grew 31.4%, real salary increases averaged only 
36.1% (Riesco 2011a). 
In general terms, both the transformations of labor institutions and the structural heterogeneity of 
the economy gave birth to specific distributive conflicts in Chile´s Privatized Keynesianism system, 
basically by leaving inequalities almost untouched during the last thirty years. In this sense, inequality not 
only helps us shed light into how the financialization of consumption relates to structural transformations, 
but also pushes us to think of the rising indebtedness from the perspective of the differentiated effects of 
both the privatization of risk and economic growth. To understand how this actually happens, one has to 
rely on sociological theories of consumption and class differentiation.  
Summarizing, up to now I have sketched the foundational pillars of Privatized Keynesianism in 
Chile, the specific historical coordinates where the financialization of consumption should be located: 
economic growth, privatization of risk and inequality. Once we have outlined these historical and 
institutional foundations, it is possible to start thinking of it as a political economy system. In doing this, I 
will argue throughout the following chapters that inequality is at the core of the financialization of Chilean 
households by amplifying distributive conflicts and modulating the way in which growth and the 
privatization of risk will combine and trigger escalating processes of consumption and indebtedness. 
Before showing how these structural forces exactly shaped the financialization of consumption, I first 
move to the first level of explanation and assess how Privatized Keynesianism works as a political 
economy system in this particular context, and shows what the specific role of financialization is when 
explaining its functioning.  
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CHAPTER 4 MODERNIZATION THROUGH FINANCIALIZATION 
 
If the financialization of consumption has something to do with the institutionalization of 
Privatized Keynesianism, it is because it makes the negative effects of inequality and the privatization of 
risks less salient or postpones them in due time. But what is the specific role of the financialization of 
Chilean families in this system? 
In this chapter, I argue that the impacts of inequality and the privatization of risk were moderated 
not only by a rise in real wages but also by the financialization of Chilean households directly fostered by 
the state. Through demand subsidies and progressive financialization policies, Privatized Keynesianism in 
Chile made commodification processes viable by creating consumers for new markets. This resulted in a 
general improvement in the material conditions of the population characterized by expansion of education 
and housing coverage, which went hand in hand with a rise in real wages and persistent inequality. In this 
context, consumer credit fueled the economy and furthered the modernization process by integrating 
excluded social sectors into consumption, while at the same time made the uneven distribution of growth 
and the deficiencies of existing social policies less salient. This is why instead of replacing stagnant 
wages, the expansion of the market for consumer credit –and financialization at large- pushed forward and 
made the neoliberal modernization process viable.  
The unintended consequences of these dynamics, however, were escalating mechanisms of “arms 
race” consumption and indebtedness that created new risks and undermined the legitimacy of the Chilean 
debt-fare capitalism. In this context the Chilean state will rely on the “politics of debt” and put an 
unacknowledged “social policy of forgiveness” at work that will serve as a valve to relieve the pressure 
born out of the illegitimate sources of some debts. In concrete terms, the politics of debts will become a 
crucial policy tool that the state will use to make the modernization process viable while at the same time 
concealing the contradictory principles of social and market justice. 
4.1 THE CHILEAN DEBT-FARE CAPITALISM AND THE POLITICS OF DEBTS  
The story of the Chilean “great transformation” has been told countless times. As depicted before, 
it starts with the overthrow of the first elected socialist president, Salvador Allende, and it is followed by 
the very first implementation of monetary theories undertaken by the Chicago boys that we now know as 
the “standard neoliberal package”: trade and price liberalizations, privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
welfare state retrenchment resulting from fiscal austerity, dismantling of union power and 
commodification of public goods. Irrespective of whether it is told by historians, economists, political 
scientists or sociologists, they all agree that the embracement of a neoliberal regime is primarily a story of 
the creation and expansion of markets, commodification and the institutionalization of a “market society". 
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Such expansion has, of course, a corollary in many other spheres, such as a renewed entrepreneurial spirit, 
the consolidation of new globally oriented economic elites, the rise of a consumer-citizen, and the shrink 
of a state, to mention some. But the thread is always the same, a society that transits from a 
communitarian and state-led social system to another that embraces the market and its individualistic 
culture as its core principle of social organization; from a society organized under the principle of 
universal entitlements to another based on the individual effort; from social to market justice.  
But the Privatized Keynesianism hypothesis makes us think differently, and draws attention to the 
relation between distributive conflicts and the social organization of debts in society at large. From from 
the point of view of Privatized Keynesianism, commodification and financialization are different but 
closely related phenomena. Since commodification processes require consumers to fuel the demand for 
new available goods and services, it is possible to understand the progressive financialization of Chilean 
households as a corollary of the creation of markets. In this sense, in parallel to the transformations 
previously mentioned, the inauguration of Privatized Keynesianism in Chile was only complete with the 
Chilean state playing a key role in creating consumers for new markets for education, housing and 
consumption. As it will be showed now, in these three spheres the Chilean state subsidized the demand by 
directly and indirectly ensuring the access of Chilean families to financial means. It is in this process 
where the politics of debt is revealed every time that the Chilean state either fosters financialization to 
make distributive conflicts less salient and make the modernization process viable; or manages the 
“forgiveness” and enforcement of these debts as a valve that relieves the state from social pressure. In this 
sense, the politics of debts is broader than a social policy in its most traditional sense of allocating 
resources, and it has also to do with the construction of social order.  
This idea is not new at all. As anthropologists have consistently pointed out since Mauss, the 
asymmetrical character of debts is one of the foundational elements of social order. As Graeber (2011) has 
most recently shown, the political role of credit/debt relations stems from the fact that they underlie the 
moral foundations of society. According to his study, a social concern about the morality of debts has been 
going on for thousands of years, ranging from old religions to classic philosophy.  Throughout these 
conversations about debts, there has been a constant encirclement between the idea of paying, forgiving or 
cancelling debts as a source of morality. At any point in history, Graeber says, debts are morally endorsed 
by the idea that they have to be paid, but at the same time, lenders are usually conceived of as evils, so 
morality also seems to stem from the fact that debts can be forgiven. This ambivalence has manifested 
throughout history in different forms, being, for example, the charge of usury among the most evident 
tensions in Western civilization (Nelson 1969). It is in this sense that governors throughout history have 
consistently made use of –what one can call- the politics of debts in order to prevent revolts, maintain the 
status quo or legitimate their power.  
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Hence, from Graber´s perspective one could even argue that the state does not only have the 
monopoly over violence (as Weber puts it), but also reaffirms its symbolic power in the capacity of 
determining who has too much or too little debt; who deserves forgiveness, and what debts should be 
enforced. This is the particular meaning that I confer upon the politics of debt throughout this chapter.  
Rather than merely stressing its policy role, the politics of debts is meant to stress the strategic 
management/utilization of the underlying credit/debt relations between borrowers and lenders to solve 
distributive conflicts. In this sense, the politics of debts also includes the mobilization, organization and 
actions of lenders and debtors that seek to raise concerns about the legitimacy of existing debts. 
In this chapter, I seek to provide the political foundations of consumer lending in Chile. With this 
aim in mind, I look at the financialization of Chilean households from the perspective of the politics of 
debts. The chapter has three main parts. The first section outlines the subsidiarity principle that will 
underlie Chile´s financialization policies in the fields of education and housing. The second and third 
sections will describe how the progressive financialization of education and housing fostered Chile´s 
modernization process, while at the same time created new risks and distributive conflicts that were dealt 
with specific “politics of debts”. Then, in the next chapter, I will move on and look into how in this 
context consumer credit worked as an unacknowledged policy tool that rather than helping people smooth 
their consumption, made income inequality less remarkable by expanding their incomes and allowing 
families to participate in the benefits of Chilean modernization. In this story, lack of regulations and low 
wages were exploited by department stores, which managed to promote their sales by creating consumers 
in a context of low wages but high expectations of participation in the benefits of growth. 
4.1.1 THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE  
The privatization of risks and the progressive financialization of households went hand in hand 
with the development of a new way for fighting poverty, and social policies aimed at preventing the 
politicization of a pauperized population that suffered the effects of austerity policies during the military 
dictatorship (Taylor 2006). The new style of social policy implemented by the Chicago Boys was meant to 
make a strong contrast with the distributive dynamics of previous decades, where distributional conflicts 
were settled by the state and intermediate interest groups, mainly unions and professional associations. 
Already diminished social benefits were no longer universal social entitlements (such as health, education 
and housing during Allende´s government) or benefits distributed according to the ability of different 
political sectors to mobilize their particular interests (Moulian 2002). Following technocratic principles 
that aimed at preventing any sort of political conflict, social spending would be rather subjected to rational 
scrutiny and technical procedures implemented by the technocrats of the new administration (Gárate 
2012). Social benefits would now target resources exclusively for those considered not able to provide 
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their own livelihood. Such institutional transformations, as well as all reforms oriented to establishing the 
market system in the Chilean society, came from the team of economists formed in the Chicago School of 
Economics. These were paradoxically brought into the “Planning Office” (ODEPLAN) in 1974 for the 
specific purpose of tackling “economic front”. Thus, the Planning Office created by the government of 
Eduardo Frei Montalva in 1967 to coordinate national economic policies became the main operation 
center of the reformers, where economists from the Catholic University with strong inclination towards 
the monetarist orthodoxy were successively recruited (Gárate 2012). 
With the aim of focusing social benefits on the poorest segments of the population, the economists 
of the Planning Office created a new device that would boost social policies, the “Ficha Cas”. The “Ficha 
Cas” is a compound index constructed from a survey implemented by municipalities along the country in 
order to sort households according to their economic conditions. Following restrictive criteria, the “Ficha 
Cas” delineated new boundaries between the poor and the non-poor in order to efficiently allocate state 
resources. This gave birth to the so-called “subsidiarity principle” that was institutionalized along with 
structural transformations, and nowadays one of the main legacies of Chile´s neoliberal growth model. 
The principle of “subsidiarity” established that the state would only cover the demand for social services 
where private enterprises would not find enough incentives to do so, or organize the provision of those 
goods and services for those that could not afford to buy them on the market. The subsidiary logic of 
social policies meant a shift from supporting the supply of social services via price subsidies and direct 
provision to the implementation of demand subsidies or “vouchers” (Torche 2000).  
This newly and strongly focalized way of allocating social spending became, in practice, the 
fundamental principle underlying social policies during the last three decades. The key formula to 
advancing a modernization process, however, was to explicitly combine subsidies with financialization 
policies in order to create a demand for new markets. This formula worked nowhere better than in the 
spheres of education and housing. 
4.1.2 THE FINANCIALIZATION OF EDUCATION 
It was already mentioned that the educational reform forced both public and private universities to 
charge high fees to their students. In expanding educational coverage, the financialization of higher 
education in Chile underwent a progressive privatization from the state as the main creditor subsidizing 
the demand to a system that relied on the intermediation of banks as the main creditors and the state.  
The new educational system created in 1981 was first funded by private spending and 
governmental subsidies. Existing subsidies were divided into a direct fiscal contribution (AFD) and an 
indirect fiscal contribution (AFI). While the former was distributed among public and “traditional” private 
institutions (designating those universities that existed previous to the reforms), the latter was distributed 
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among all higher education in proportion to the distribution of students that obtained the highest scores at 
the national university selection test (Prueba de Actitud Académica, now known as Prueba de Selección 
Universitaria). 42   Besides the subsidies, the government created the “University Fiscal Credit” (Crédito 
Fiscal Universitario) in 1981, which was meant to be paid-off in 10 or 15 installments, at an annual 
interest rate of 1%.  
Later in 1987, the government introduced a new mode of financing higher education (Law 18.591), 
according to which universities would administrate the so called “University Credit Fund” (Fondo de 
Crédito Universitario), distributed according to the socio-economic background of students (Cariceo 
2012). However, although these credits helped promote access to higher education for students from the 
bottom of the income distribution, the system faced many problems, basically because students scarcely 
paid off their debts and created important deficits for new budgets. This led the government to reassess its 
financialization policies, and introduce in 1991 a law (Ley 19.083) that established the possibility of 
renegotiating debts and new benefits for those students willing to pay, such as reduction of interest rates 
and discounts for anticipated payments (Cariceo 2012). 43   This were the first adjustments of the politics 
of debts in the sphere of education  
New modifications were introduced in 1994 (Ley 19.287) to the “University Fiscal Credit”, now 
renamed “University Loan Solidary Fund” (Fondo Solidario de Crédito Universitario). This credit was 
issued by the state only for students of the so called “traditional universities” (25 universities that existed 
prior to the 1981 reform out of a total of 59) at a 2% annual interest rate that had to be repaid in 
installments that should not exceed 5% of gross income. These credits helped fuel the educational system 
and expand the coverage of higher education in significant ways. By 2011 the Solidary Credit funded 
around 30% of students from “traditional universities”. 
The further and definitive step towards the financialization of education, however, took place in 
2005 with the creation of the Crédito con Aval del Estado (Government Guaranteed Loan). The new 
system would be administrated in a very different way, where the state becomes the warrantor of students´ 
debts and thus would provide the confidence for banks to lend money without taking real risks. In this 
case, this meant that the government only guaranteed access to student loans with apparently better 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 These subsidies are distributed according to the best 27.500 scores on the selection tests. 
43 As the successive politics of debts shows, educational debts in Chile have been apparently debts that “can be forgiven” or 
simply “not repaid”. Trying to tackle the recollection problem, as well as the negative consequences for debtors, a new law was 
introduced in 2012 (Ley N° 20.572), which aimed at facilitating debt recollection and alleviating those in debt. It consisted of a 
condonation of penal interests for those that paid at least 50 percent of their educational debts. It also considered eliminating 
debtors from the black list of the credit bureau (DICOM), avoid judiciary costs, and special benefits for debtors that did not 
complete their studies. The benefits were available for debtors of Crédito Fiscal Universitario (Law N° 4 from 1981), Crédito 
Universitario (Law N° 18.591 from 1987) and Crédito Solidario (Law N° 19.287).	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conditions, such as subsidized annual interest rates, flexible income requirements, the right to switch 
undergraduate programs and institutions, suspend payments for six months in case of unemployment, and 
that monthly installments should not be higher than 10% of income (if required by the debtor).  But the 
students had to bear all the consequences of not paying their debts, which were potentially subject to 
seizure by banks.  
This new wave of financialization aimed at making the access to finances a universal affair by 
expanding its beneficiaries also to non-traditional private institutions. This particular debt-policy had also 
the aim of solving the problem of debt collection by introducing a more experienced actor, banks. This 
was specially pressing since educational loans issued by the government were considered by the debtors as 
debts that “can be forgiven”.  
As the chart above shows, the financialization of education through government loans and later on 
the CAE, proved to be very efficient in expanding educational coverage by booming higher education. It 
made this expansion possible especially by allowing students from low and middle-income quintiles to 
have access to the university for the very first time. To mention a few figures, while in 1990 there were in 
Chile around 245.000 undergraduate students, enrollment in 2000 reached 436.000 and doubled by 2009 
to 835.000. In 2005, around 64 percent of college new comers were first generations joining higher 
education (Arellano 2011). 
Figure 10: Number of Recipients of CAE by Income Quintile 2006-2013 
 
Source: data from Ingresa, available in http://portal.ingresa.cl/estadisticas-y-estudios/estadisticas/ 
 
This further financialization was seen as necessary because there was an increasing demand for 
higher education coming from the bottom income deciles, while at the same time prices had been steadily 
rising. As it is evidenced in the chart above, the first income quintiles benefited from the CAE in a bigger 
proportion that the other income groups, becoming the driving force of the boom of higher education. 
Moreover, the real demand for higher education among these groups might be understated by these figures 
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since, as the table below shows, the share of households from the first income quintile that apply but do 
not receive the benefits is also higher than those from the second and third income quintiles. 
Table 2: Share of Beneficiaries of CAE (Student Loan for Higher Education) from the Total 
Number of Applicants 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Quintile 1 16% 24% 24% 28% 31% 28% 27% 20% 
Quintile 2 18% 31% 27% 31% 34% 31% 29% 21% 
Quintile 3 21% 30% 29% 32% 37% 32% 31% 22% 
Quintile 4 28% 16% 25% 33% 36% 34% 35% 24% 
Quintile 5 40% 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 19% 18% 
Source: data from Ingresa, available in http://portal.ingresa.cl/estadisticas-y-estudios/estadisticas/ 
 
The success of the expansion of higher education carried out through financial means pushed the 
modernization project forward and made income inequalities less evident by letting poorer families send 
their children to college for the very first time (and it also made colleges a profitable business). But this 
financialization policy was soon called into question in two fronts: it was fostering banks’ profits in 
detriment of students, and reproducing existing inequalities in new ways.  
Indeed, the financialization of education through the CAE proved to be not only a means of 
modernization by successfully integrating students into higher education- at least in numbers, but it was 
also a very profitable business for banks. If in the first year of its implementation the share of beneficiaries 
(debtors) accounted for 11% of total student assistance and loans (21.317 of 192.611 beneficiary students), 
by 2009 it reached a 41% (149.455 of 364.971 beneficiary students). Nevertheless, one of the most 
important sources of profits for banks came not only from the pockets of low-income and indebted 
families, but also from the government.  
Between 2006 and 2011, before the first generation of students with the CAE graduated, seven 
banks that participated as financial intermediaries obtained already 150 thousand million pesos from the 
Chilean government (around USD 310 million) (Guzmán/Riquelme 2011).44 This was part of the design of 
the loan system, which stipulated that after participating in the CAE through a tender process, banks could 
sell these debts back to the government charging a Recarga (fee).  This Recarga was a fee created to give 
banks an incentive to lend money to poor students without taking real risks, which banks had used in a 
scandalous way. Ultimately, the Recarga was the crucial clause of the politics of debt by turning students 
from low-income families into subjects of credit. Between 2006 and 2011, for instance, the amount 
assigned to pay for these fees in the budget for education multiplied 25 times, from 10.3 thousand million 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The average worth of the USD in 2011 was 483 Chilean pesos. 
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pesos (around USD 21 million) to 250 thousand million pesos (around USD 515 million). The higher fees 
charged for Recarga right after the financial crisis in 2009 reached around 70 percent of student loans. By 
2014, estimations indicated that budget of the Ministry of Education would be 355 thousand million 
Chilean pesos (around USD 730 million) to buy student loan portfolios from banks (Figueroa 2013). 
These, on the other hand, selectively sold those credits of poorer students that –probably due to a lack of 
information and proper preparation- became indebted in low-quality private universities with the 
possibility of not receiving a good education and having less chances of being successful. After all, not all 
debts are “good debts” in the eyes of lenders. 
With regard to students, the financialization of education displaced the problem of the 
commodification of education, but it soon proved to reproduce social inequalities, rather than diminishing 
them. The new system created two types of “defaults” (considered as being delayed at least in three 
installments): one that takes place when a debtor leaves the educational system and the other when the 
debtor graduates. By the end of 2010, the share of debts in default from those that dropped out reached 
45%, while the share of debts in default among students that completed their studies reached 30%. These 
students (around 2,100), were the first recipients of the CAE in 2006 -2007 and their default rates are 
evenly distributed throughout all income quintiles (Bank 2011). (In any case, one can expect higher rates 
of default from next generations, since these borrowers were more concentrated among the lowest income 
groups).  
In practice, CAE potentially works as a perverse mechanism that perpetuate the indebtedness of 
those students that are less prepared to study in the university and need longer periods of time to obtain a 
professional degree. In this sense, the unequal distribution of cultural capital at home is translated into 
failure and a bigger debt. These students, who represent a 45% of those that started studying in 2006, are 
to the CAE what minimum payers are to the market of credit cards: they meet the minimum academic 
level at the university and with this they perpetuate their own indebtedness; they are the “revolvers” of the 
educational system. 
In this scenario, the politics of debts has been pushed to its limits for the sake of the student social 
movement that reached its peak in 2011. To be clear, student protests (the only in twenty years calling into 
question the foundational pillars of neoliberal Chile) were driven by much broader goals than the 
remission of debts, and vindicated a whole re-structuration of the educational system at both secondary 
and higher level. But the movement took the form of the politics of debt every time it raised claims over 
the immoral and illegitimate sources of educational debts.  
Student movements started in 2006 when thousands of students aged between 15 and 18 went out 
into the streets and made the most massive demonstration in Chile since the return of democracy. The 
protests targeted particular benefits (transportation) and fees (university admission exam fee), but it soon 
targeted a constitutional law that was at the basis of the 1980s reform. This paved the way for the second 
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wave of protests in 2011, which lasted seven months and whose convocation gathered more than 100,000 
protesters in the streets of Santiago. This movement went further and claimed for defending the right to 
public education by demanding free education, the rejection of profit-seeking in education and elimination 
of school discriminatory practices (Bellei/Cabalin 2013).  
Chile´s right-wing government rejected these demands and rather responded by tackling the issue 
of educational financing. The politics of debts was put at work as a means to relieve some pressure from 
the movement that had already deposed two Minister of education, while at the same time not changing 
the subsidiarity principle underlying the market organization.  
In an attempt to harmonize demands for both social and market justice, the government created 
two benefits to alleviate the burden of debtors and diminish the pressure of the social movement: to 
decrease the interest rate that fluctuated between 5% and 6% to a 2%, and allowed students to repay their 
debts in installments that should not be higher than 10 percent of their income. Trying to tackle the 
collection problem, as well as the negative consequences for debtors, a new law was passed in 2012 (Ley 
N° 20.572), which aimed at facilitating debt collection and alleviating those in debt. It consisted of a 
remission of penal interests for those paying at least 50 percent of their educational debts. It also 
considered eliminating debtors from the black list of Credit Bureau (DICOM), avoiding judiciary costs 
and special benefits for debtors that did not complete their studies. The benefits were available for debtors 
of Crédito Fiscal Universitario (Law N° 4 from 1981), Crédito Universitario (Law N° 18.591 from 1987) 
and Crédito Solidario (Law N° 19.287). These lean benefits did not affect the profit margins of banks 
because the government paid for the difference.  
However, these reforms proved to be insufficient for the rising student movement, which kept 
putting pressure until the presidential elections of 2013. In this new political scenario, voters inclined the 
balance towards the center-left coalition that this time promised to carry out radical structural 
transformations, instead of merely “buying time” with the traditional and delegitimized politics of debts 
implemented by the government. 
4.1.3 THE FINANCIALIZATION OF HOUSING POLICIES 
Expenditures on housing policies, which in 1975 dropped to 61% compared to 1974, followed a 
similar path than other social policies in the 1980´s. Under Pinochet´s dictatorship homeownership was a 
right recognized by the state, but unlike previous decades, it was felt that it should be acquired with family 
savings. In this sense, the state would ensure and foster homeownership no longer by directly building and 
providing dwellings, but implementing a new policy mixing family savings, subsidies and housing loans 
(Torche 2000). The only exception was conceded to address the needs of the poorest by implementing a 
plan to relocate people living in very precarious conditions in occupied territories in “social dwelling 
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units” with basic services as a way of providing an intermediary solution. The system, operating until 
now, was created in 1979 and its essence is based on a rational allocation of fiscal spending, as well as 
redistributing benefits by subsidizing the demand for housing in indirect relation with their value 
(Casgrain 2010). Housing policies since then consisted of progressively creating a private market for 
housing, and facilitating the access of families to sources of finance. 
In this scenario, both subsidies and financialization policies were very successful in materializing 
the modernization project. With the return to democracy, the housing policies of the center-left coalition, 
referred to as Concertación, tackled the problem of dwelling deficit, which by the beginning of the 
nineties was calculated to be more than one million. In twenty years, housing policies (which prioritized 
the construction of dwelling units rather than their quality) reduced the housing deficit to around 543,000 
units (Casgrain 2010). In the period 1983-2008, characterized by an average increase in the real product of 
5.6%, Chile experienced an average construction of 106.000 new housing units per year. 
From a broader perspective, it is possible to argue that the housing situation of the Chilean society 
dramatically changed during the last 40 years. According to Simian (2010), the housing stock grew 
between 1952 and 2002 at an annual average rate of 2.6%. In this period, the amount of housing units 
multiplied by a factor of 4.1, while the population grew at a rate of only 2.9. Although there are no 
existing data to account for the number square meters per person in Chile, there has been an important 
reduction in overcrowding.  
Figure 11: Number of Finished Dwelling Units and Subsidies 1964-2009 
Source: 
Data taken from “Observatorio Habitacional” 
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Urbanism (MINVU) created in 1965, and its regional agencies, SERVIU (Service of Housing and Urban 
Development). Although the underlying idea behind housing policies from the 1980´s onwards was to 
leave space for an active participation from the private sector, the state played a crucial role in creating the 
housing market and facilitating its functioning. Making believe the market for housing exists, SERVIUs 
undertook to organize the demand and subsidies, while loans were issued by both the MINVU and the 
“Banco del Estado” (Government Bank) (Gilbert 2003; Casgrain 2010).  
A precondition to purchase housing units with the help of state-subsidies is to sign a “savings 
contract” with a financial institution, which, in practice, operated also as a policy to expand banking 
operations. All these subsidies are directly given to the buyer only once, and the acquisition is 
materialized by adding up people´s initial savings, a progressive subsidy, and housing loans that were first 
issued by the state and later on by banks in the 2000´s.  
There were four types of mortgages operating during the nineties. The first two were issued and 
administered by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development through the subsidy programs 
“Viviendas Progresivas” and “Viviendas Básicas”. The former was issued without interest rates for a 
maximum of eight years, and the latter was issued at an 8% annual interest rate for a maximum of 20 
years. Through SERVIU agencies, the state subsidized more than 60% of dwelling units built in the 
1990´s and more than 60% of those were constructed by the private sector and directly transferred from 
the state to their owners (Morandé/García 2004). In other programs (“Programa Especial para 
Trabajadores”, “Subsidio Rural” and “Subsidio Unificado”), the Ministry guaranteed the concession of a 
mortgage credit issued by the Banco del Estado (Government Bank) for a period ranging between 12 and 
20 years.  
Other instruments created under Pinochet´s dictatorship were directly issued by banks and traded 
in secondary markets. The “Letras de Crédito Hipotecario” or “mortgage bonds” were instruments 
established in 1977, issued by banks in the form of securities, and usually bought by institutional investors 
(banks charge intermediation fees in these operations). These instruments were preferred by Pension 
Funds Administrators (AFPs), which were allowed to invest up to 50% of the fund value in mortgage 
bonds (Morandé/García 2004).45 (This shows the connection between the accumulation of capital in the 
hands of pension funds, and financialization policies that strengthened the position of banks). Endorsable 
mortgage loans, on the other hand, allow banks to finance mortgages with their own resources and then 
transfer them to other financial institutions (mostly insurance companies) (Micco et al. 2012). By the 
2000s, both mortgage bonds and mortgage loans represented more than 40 percent of total banks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Although these types of credits were very appealing to financial institutions, since they are inflation-indexed and are easily 
tradable, they could be very dangerous for borrowers in times of economic turndown. That is why between the 1982-85 crisis, 
for instance, the state had to invest important sums to carry massive renegotiations with debtors; nowadays, there exists a Fund 
especially created to deal with gaps between remunerations and the consumer price index (González 2002). 
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investments in the housing system.  
Figure 12: Investment in Mortgage Bonds as a share of AFPs´Assets, 1981-2001 
Source: Data taken from Morandé/García (2004) 
 
As a result of the housing policies based on savings, subsidies and credits, the number of dwelling 
units grew from 79,000 in 1990 to almost 143,000 in 1996. In parallel, the private sector started playing a 
more crucial role, representing 15% of the total production in 1990 to 45% in 1997 (although it declined to 
28% in 2000 due to the economic crisis) (González 2002). Nevertheless, the government kept playing a 
crucial role in channeling resources to families to the extent that by the 2000´s two thirds of the dwelling 
units were supported by some sort of subsidy, which ranged from financing 8 and 10% of a dwelling unit, 
to 94% of its value in the most extreme cases. As the chart below shows, the numbers of “social dwelling 
units”, i.e. built for families that were not able to acquire debts, were relatively steady throughout the 
period, while those with subsidies given to families able to acquire debts grew at a higher pace since the 
mid-1980´s. 
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Figure 13: Evolution of Construction of Dwelling Units in Chile, 1960-2000 
 
Source: chart taken from González (2002). 
 
This development provides additional information about the economic culture of Chilean families, 
which is that an important share of them has been consistently able to save some money in order to access 
to the “homeownership dream”. Indeed, the government´s housing policy proved successful in promoting 
savings for families throughout the nineties, to the extent that in 2000 there were 1.8 million savings 
accounts, more than three times than in 1990 (González 2002), and by the end of 2010 the number of 
accounts earmarked for this special purpose rose to 3.36 million (Garcia et. Al 2013).46 This means that 
the expansion of debts in other areas such as consumption does not necessarily relates with a culture of 
“immediacy” or lack of “savings culture”, but most likely with the fact that those goods that are 
considered as “legitimate” but not priorities are not available in the present unless people use credit.  
 Although very successful in promoting homeownership, these financialization policies 
soon brought the politics of debts into the focus of political reforms. The expansion of homeownership 
through the support of government subsidies and credits became after some time one of the main obstacles 
for the efficiency of the system, especially because the number of non-paid loans escalated. Policy makers 
consider this as the “Achilles heel” of Chile´s housing policy, which is that the state has not been 
successful in enforcing the repayment of poorer debtors. In this sense, in 2000 –and after some 
renegotiations- more than 60% of the credits issued to non-eligible families by the financial system had at 
least three installment payment in arrears (González 2002). As the following table shows, by 2000 debtors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 According to González (2002), the average amounts of these savings accounts are relatively small, which indicates the 
important role played by low-income families.  
 
	   	  
82 
that declared being delayed or not paying their mortgages were overwhelmingly concentrated on SERVIU 
debt portfolio.  
Table 3: Are You Currently Paying your Mortgage? Socio-economic Characterization Survey 2000, 
(Metropolitan Region) 
 
SERVIU State Bank Private Banks 
Is paying on time 66% 85.7% 96.1% 
Is paying with some 
delay 30% 12.9% 3.5% 
It is not paying 4% 1.4% 0.4% 
Source: Data taken from Morandé/García (2004) 
 
This problem was nothing new. Back in 1996 two senators sent a proposal to relieve debtors that 
acquired their houses in the early 1980s, claiming that “Hard situations due to external causes were 
affecting housing debtors. We estimate that 20% of debtors with the private system are under this 
condition and less than 50% of the SERVIU.”47 
To deal with these problems, the new administration in 2000 created a commission that in 2001 
traced the so-called “New Housing Policy” (Nueva Política Habitacional). The housing policy in the 
2000s thus experienced some reconfigurations that built on and furthered the existing housing model. 
Since the poorest households were not able to repay their mortgages and social demands to clear-off some 
of these debts were putting pressure on the political system, it became very clear that not all the population 
was “financializable”. Thus, the government created two alternatives for the “un-financializable” that 
were targeted with the help of the Ficha-Cas.48 At the same time, it switched its credit offer to those 
sectors that even though perceive low incomes, could be channeled through the banking sector under 
certain conditions. “Fondos Concursables”, “Vivienda Dinámica Sin Deuda” and “Chile Barrio” 49 were 
the major programs targeting the poorest 20% of the population, indigents and “insolvent poor” (Casgrain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 “Situaciones difíciles por causas ajenas a su voluntad afectan a una parte de los deudores habitacionales. Estimamos que 
están en esta condición menos del 20% de los deudores del sector financiero y menos del 50% del sector Serviu.” Montes and 
Sota, p 6. 
48 The government built a new index based on the Ficha Cas, the seize of the family, level of savings and seniority of 
applicants. 
49 “Chile Barrio” was among the most important programs launched by the government with the aim of erradicating poor 
settlements where the most striking levels of poverty were concentrated throughout the country.  
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2010; Morandé/García 2004).50 
This represented a new stage in the financialization of housing policies, which aimed at 
subsidizing the lower income quintile without any type of loans, while offering mortgages to the middle -
low income families at similar rates than those obtained by the middle-class with banking access. As with 
the market for higher education, however, the government had to ensure conditions attractive enough for 
banks to lend money to the poorer but still “financializable” population. In this spirit the government of 
Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) took action to stimulate the secondary market for mortgages through 
securitization and creation of a default-insurance. The government committed to reimbursing the 
difference between the value of the insurance and the value of the foreclosure of dwelling units of low-
income families. Navarro (2005) summarizes these benefits concisely: 
·  Subsidy for closing costs: A fixed amount between US$300 (if the housing unit cost is US$9,000 or 
less) and US$120 (for housing values up to US$18,000) is given to the bank for each loan granted to 
finance a subsidized house.  
·  Implicit subsidy: MINVU guarantees that the loan is sold in the secondary market at 100 percent of its 
face value. If that does not happen, MINVU pays the difference to the bank. 
·  Default insurance: In case of foreclosure, MINVU guarantees that the bank will recover the debt balance 
and the cost of legal proceedings. Contrary to FHA loans in the U.S., the foreclosure is executed by the 
issuer of the loan, not by MINVU. 
With these benefits, the conditions for lower income families to get a mortgage became simpler. 
New applicants should not be on the black list of Chile´s Credit Bureau and the amount of the mortgage 
should not be higher than 25% of their income; in case this condition is not met, the regulation allows for 
the intervention of a third party or co-debtor. The total debt to income ratio of the new applicants should 
not be higher than 55%, and these credits had to be insured against fire, unemployment, earthquake and 
disability (Jirón/Cortés 2004). 
In general, scholars agree that the financialization of Chilean households has been possible due to 
the help of the government subsidy, which not only forces households to save some money in advance and 
thus reduce the asymmetries of information between lenders and borrowers, but also diminishes the 
amount of credit to be lent to riskier families. Indeed, the amount of loans required to buy these houses are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Furthermore, the government implemented programs to equip social dwelling units with better services, such as multipurpose 
spaces, sports facilities and children´s gardens, among others.	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relatively low (though they might become an important burden for the poorest families).51  
Figure 14: Total Number of Families with Access to Housing Credit and Subsidies, 1950-2009 
 
Source: Data taken from Garcia de Freizas/Magnabosco/Cunha (2013) 
 
Accordingly, it is worth of note that between 1976 and 2009 slightly more than three million 
families bought a home, half of them with credit and 35% with both credit and a subsidy. Conversely, 
forty percent of them did not benefit from any program and more than seventy percent of families with 
access to credit received a subsidy, which reinforces the idea that having access to credit depends to an 
important extent on receiving the subsidy (Garcia de Freizas/Magnabosco/Cunha 2013). Furthermore, as a 
result of the New Housing Policy, banks experienced an important expansion of their mortgage portfolios, 
especially through non-endorsable mortgage loans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Finally, another change that consolidated in the 2006 administration was the creation of the Social Real Estate 
Management Entities (GEIS), which externalized the process of application to state subsidies. Thus, the Chilean 
government completed a new phase where it would no longer build dwelling units, nor would provide credit.  
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Figure 15: Evolution of Bank Mortgage Stocks, 2000-2010 
 
Source: Data from Observatorio Habitacional 
 
This is the context where a peculiar social movement re-emerged and called into question the 
legitimacy of the debt-led housing policy. Indebted families would demand the “forgiveness” of part of 
these debts for the sake of the increasing participation of the banking system in the “New Housing 
Policies”.  
In this scenario, intentional default among some homeowners came to play a crucial role in the 
“counter-politics of debts” of an emerging social movement that carried with it high impact 
performances.52 Debtor movements already spread in the early 2000´s in the poorest neighborhoods where 
committees were formed to oppose resistance to foreclosures (Casgrain 2010). But their organizational 
peak was reached in 2004 when the movement formalized in a National Association, ANDHA Chile 
(National Association of Housing Rights). Since then, their manifestations range from busting on TV 
shows, breaking into presidential palace, pitching camp by the side of Mapocho river in Santiago, and 
disrupting in the government Bank offices, among others. One of the spokeswomen of the movement, 
Roxana Miranda, was even independent presidential candidate during the 2013 elections. 
The “counter-politics of debts” undertaken by families that refused to pay government loans and 
demanded a relief of their debts, was indeed one of the reasons why the “New Housing Policy” of the 
2000s shifted to a more focalized allocation of subsidies, as well as attempted to make the market 
appealing for banks. Banks not only have better experience in collecting debts, but since they do not 
operate under the logic of social justice, it is easy for them to enforce the payment of these loans without 
having to bear any political cost. Anyhow, this created more fear among many families, which saw in this 
shift towards the banking system a progressive abandonment of the state and reacted again by putting 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 The group became very controvertial since the movement divided during the Bachelet administration (2006-2010). 
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pressure on the political system. After all, banks are “evil lenders” that unlike the state, are willing to seize 
one´s goods. 
As usual, the politics of debts is very controversial. The dominant interpretation among policy 
makers and experts was that, as it happened in the field of education policy, the successive “politics of 
forgiveness” in the early nineties created a problem of moral hazard by fostering a culture of “non-
payment”. This means that people progressively internalized the idea that government loans are debts that 
could be “forgiven” (González 2002; Micco et al. 2012; Casgrain 2010). As expected, families also learnt 
how to use these subsidies in strategic ways. As Casgrain (2010) has documented, some families even 
invested important sums of money to document their belongings to professional associations, which in 
turn would allow them to access better subsidies (especially the PET subsidy for formal middle level wage 
earners). This also had to do with the fact that the classification of applicants was also based on the 
information provided by families, which in many cases understated their socioeconomic situation in order 
to have access to better subsidies. By doing this, many families also acquired mortgages that they could 
not afford (CChC 2014). Nevertheless, from the perspective of families, there were important reasons 
explaining why mortgage debts that represent high shares of their incomes were not legitimate or should 
be forgiven.  
To understand the fundamentals of these claims and the struggles over Chile´s housing policy it is 
important to keep in mind that homeownership is among the most pervasive aspirations of Chilean 
families, which not only represents an insurance in times of crises, but is a means to move out of poverty. 
This has been reinforced by the rise in homeownership rates, which already in 1992 were particularly high 
(80% according to Casgrain (2010)). Unlike other countries, where most of top earners and only a reduced 
portion of bottom-income families are homeowners (80 and 50 percent in the US and 70 and 30 percent in 
Germany), in Chile all income quintiles enjoy high levels of homeownership (table below). 
Table 4: Share of Households by type of Home Property and Income Quintile, 2010 
 
I II III IV V 
Own-Paid 62.7% 60.4% 59% 55.6% 48.2% 
Own-Paying 5.2% 9.6% 9.8% 13.9% 20.1% 
 
67.9% 69.9% 68.8% 69.5% 68.3% 
Rented with contract 3.3% 6% 8.2% 9.3% 14.9% 
Rented without contract 5.6% 6% 6.1% 7.7% 6.3% 
Source: Data taken from Simian (2010) 
 
The central role of homeownership in the Chilean society was further fostered by the housing 
policy, which discriminated against the acquisition of second-hand houses and prevented the emergence of 
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a secondary market for these dwellings (Simian 2010). Although this changed in 1996, there seems to be 
still an inertial residential immobility, since families tend to remain in these houses regardless of the life 
cycle and usually over-invest in them (Morandé/García 2004). 
In this scenario, it is clear that Chilean families feel entitled to own their homes and raise political 
claims accordingly. Indeed, throughout the 1990s´ and 2000s the “counter-politics” of housing debts 
carried out by families took place in a context where the housing deficit already dropped to historical 
records, and the demands accordingly moved from claims over coverage to claims over quality. The 
expansion of homeownership, in fact, ratcheted up the standards of living of the population and 
homeownership was no longer the main goal to achieve but rather the starting point for many families. In 
this context, housing policies were progressively delegitimized along with the deficiencies of social 
dwellings that became evident throughout the years. Not only did the quality of the dwellings prove to be 
deficient in the winter of 1997, but also these dwellings became sub-urban neighborhoods that barely met 
the conditions of creating communities and fostering social integration, thus contributing to solving the 
problem of “having a roof” but reinforcing spatial segregation (Sabatini/Cáceres/Cerda 2001; Corvalán 
2004). Throughout the years, this contributed to turning debts into an unbearable and illegitimate burden 
(Casgrain 2010). On the one hand, small debts became unbearable burdens for the sake of the vulnerable 
situation of low-income families that were exposed to the economic cycle and crossed the poverty line in 
both ways (Contreras et al. 2005).53 On the other hand, the clear deficiencies of these dwellings and 
neighborhoods created the conditions for people to refuse paying some of their debts. In practice, debtors 
feel that it is more secure to default on credits issued by the government than banks, basically because the 
former cannot just simply seize these houses without paying a high political cost (Casgrain 2010). 
Furthermore, the “New Housing Policy” in the 2000s also aimed at tackling the problem of 
residential immobility by implementing a leasing system to incentivize housing rentals, as well as 
allowing families to sell and acquire new dwellings before the five years-period stipulated by the former 
regulation. The problem with the leasing system, in practice, was that families paying monthly rents with 
expectations of becoming homeowners were disappointed every time they could not meet their 
obligations, and lost the right to claim the property they had been paying for years.  
As a result, by 2008 the Chilean Senate counted 280 thousand families in default that owed money 
to SERVIU agencies, both private banks and SERVIUs, and debtors from the PET program (Casgrain 
2010). For the sake of this pressure, the “New Housing Policy” did not prevent the Lagos and Bachelet 
administrations (2000-2006 and 2006-2010) from undertaking again “politics of debt alleviation” by 
means of forgiving some debts or providing some benefits for debtors. Between 2000 and 2011, at least 23 
decree laws were passed to relieve the pressure exerted by social movements, whose protests still in 2014 
called into question the financialization of the poorest. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 For example, in 2001 46% of poor households were not in this condition by 1996.	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CHAPTER 5 THE FINANCIALIZATION OF CONSUMPTION 
 
In 2011, the Chilean parliament designated a comission to discuss and propose a change in the 
regulation that would reduce the interest rates charged for loans smaller than 200 UF (USD 8,000 
approximately) from around 54% annual interest rate to a maximum of 30%. Reactions towards the 
possibility of regulating what for the last thirty years was taken for granted soon appeared. The National 
Chamber of Commerce, Services and Turism warned in a document that “Those belonging to the lowest 
strata, the ones using credit cards as the main and indispensable form of payment, will be the most 
affected with changes to the TMC [Maximum Conventional Interest Rate]” (CNC 2012, p5).54 As a 
solution, their proposal was that “To prevent consumption and sales from being affected, it is necessary to 
educate the population regarding the way they administer their debts, help them plan their payments and 
provide them with all the pertinent information at the moment of acquiring debts. If one lowers default 
rates then interes rates will decrease by their own weight…”55 (CNC 2012, p. 6). One of the main 
concerns, of course, is that the exclusion of the lower-income groups from the financial system would 
push them to acquire these (necessary) credits with informal lenders or “loan sharks”.  
Later on, after the law regulating interest rates was passed in 2012, comments circulating in the 
newspapers claimed that the apocaliptic prophecy preached by the financial industry had come true: 
poorer families were excluded from the financial system due to higher supply restrictions. This was 
reflected in the fact that during the last five years, the informal debts of Chilean households arose from 
1,7% to 10%, among low and middle-income population (12,7% y 9,6% respectively). The consensus 
among analysts in the media was that regulations that lowered interest rates in 2012 caused distortions on 
the market by making the extension of credit more rigorous and excluding those households in the 
margins. As a result, families with poor financial situation and limited access to the financial system have 
been excluded from the formal sources of credit.  
The problem seems to be evident and the main concern of analysts and regulators is the fact that 
the rise of informal debts shows the need for ensuring credit access to all Chilean families. In the end, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 “Serán entonces los estratos más bajos, que usan estas tarjetas como fuente de financiamiento principal e indispensable, los 
que se verán amenazados con el cambio de la TMC” 
55  “Para que el consumo y las ventas no se vean afectados lo que necesitamos es educar a la población en cuanto a la manera de 
administrar sus deudas, ayudarlos a ordenarse en sus pagos y proveerlos de toda la información necesaria al minuto que toman 
la deuda. Si logramos disminuir la tasa de morosidad entonces las tasas bajarán por su propio peso ...”	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reinforces the idea that good intentions driving regulations should be assessed against the background of 
the exclusion of households from the financial system, considered as a negative consequence per se.56   
No matter if preached by politicians, media critics or experts, the picture that emerges from these 
public discussions has a main thread, which is that people´s reliance on credit to lead their lives is taken 
for granted and should be guaranteed as a social entitlement. As a result from this ideological conception 
of credit, the exclusion from the formal financial system to the fringe of informality has apparently 
nothing to do with the fact that the majority of Chilean workers earn less than two minimum wages, and 
that the richest income decile accumulates more than 40% of wealth.  How did we get into that situation?  
The answer is simple: consumer credit in Chile became de-facto one of the main driving force of 
Chilean modernization, allowing big shares of the population to participate in the “party of consumption” 
without solving the problem of structural inequality. In other words, consumer credit became a sort of 
“sacred” object in so far it performed a double function in Chile´s Privatized Keynesianist system: while it 
fostered and furthened the modernization project that materialized in the fields of housing and education, 
at the same time it prevented the problem of income inequality from becoming a source of instability. 
Unlike the cases of housing and education, however, the financialization of consumption was not 
undertaken by the government but by department stores. In this area, the government will play an indirect 
role by legitimating the financialization of low-income population on the part of unregulated department 
stores. To show how this was possible, I first take a look at the overall trends of consumption and the role 
played by department stores in creating new consumers.  
 
5.1 THE PARTY OF CONSUMPTION  
In 1979 the Chilean government conducted a survey to evaluate a National Program of 
Complementary Nutrition (Programa Nacional de Alimentación Complementaria, PNAC), showing that 
among the two bottom income quintiles, 86% and 62% of families did not have what was considered as 
the household “standard package”. Not having the “standard package” meant not having either a color tv, 
a refrigerator, a washing machine, a dish washer or a vacuum cleaner (Torche 2002). By the early 1990s, 
this situation started to change dramatically. During the 1990s, Chilean families experienced a sustained 
expansion of their consumption, which changed the material conditions under which Chilean families 
would live. This was in part facilitated by economic growth, but also the consequence of the expansion of 
consumer lending. Chilean families were not only more educated and increasingly becoming homeowners, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56  La Tercera, 27.01.2014. http://www.latercera.com/noticia/negocios/2014/01/655-562699-9-en-cinco-anos-deuda-informal-
de-hogares-salto-de-17-a-10.shtml 
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but in spite of their lean salaries they would be able to buy home appliances, make improvements and 
decorate their new homes. Thanks to the progressive extension of small consumer credits to those in the 
middle and bottom of the income distribution, the Chilean modernization would also take place in the 
domain of consumption. 
Figure 16: Evolution of Household with Durable Goods 1992-2010 
 
Fuente: Data taken from Ariztía/Agloni (2012) 
 
As mentioned before, the expansion of consumption was also possible because Chile went 
through a process of trade openess since the mid 1970s, promoted by a reduction of import tariffs. As a 
result, the volume of commerce increased in 1970 from representing a 40% of the GDP to 60% in 1990 
(De Gregorio/Cowan/Baytelman 1999). From the 1990s onwards, this policy took a new impulse by an 
active agenda that consisted of signing bi-lateral free-trade agreements that boosted the import sector and 
lowered the prices of durable goods (Fazio 2010). Department stores, on the other hand, were able to 
diminish the prices of their goods at a faster pace than the Consumer Price Index (CCS 2005).  
These changes explain in part some of the changes in consumption patterns. Between 1987 and 
2011, the prices of goods that became part of the standard package such as TVs and personal computers, 
for example, diminished around 80%, while the prices of both “luxury” and “normal” cars decreased in 
almost 40 and 30 percent. At the same time, the prices of expenditures considered to be more basic for 
families such as transportation (fuel and public transportation), electricity, milk, bread and water, saw an 
important rise in their prices that, as it will be shown, did not prevent families from all social strata from 
spending significantly more on other goods such as perfumes, jewelry and beauty products (PNUD 2002).  
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Figure 17: Variation (%) of Real Prices of Different Goods from May 1987 to May 2011 
 
Source: Data taken from Méndez (2011) 
 
 Of course, not all income groups benefited from these changes. While TVs and later on in 
the 2000s computers were part of the standard package of families across the whole income distribution, 
more educated workers that profited from the growth of the nineties started buying better cars and 
enjoying vacation in Miami or Europe.  
Analyzing the evolution of household budgets and expenditures, it becomes evident that 
consumption patterns and lifestyles of Chilean consumers have changed in substantial ways: on the one 
hand, in total terms Chilean families dine out more often than before; they travel abroad and “explore the 
country” during vacation (Tironi/Ariztía 2003). They are spending ten times more on personal care and 
beauty products, automobiles and technology. On the other hand, even though the prices of water, 
electricity and food rose, expenditures on these “basic items” represented a smaller share of the budget of 
Chilean families. In other words, this suggests the rise of a “consumer culture”, and that “consumption 
standards” have been changing throughout the social structure into a more stylized pattern. As expected, 
this was also accompanied by an increase in the share of household budgets allocated to serve “financial 
services”, i.e. debts. 
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Figure 18: Variation of Household Expenditures as a Share of Income by Income Quintiles, Gran 
Santiago 1996-2013 
 
Source: Data taken from the Households´ Budgets Survey, different years. 
 
 There is no doubt that credit played a crucial role in boosting the “party of consumption” 
and changing expenditure patterns. But the crucial question this raises is to what extent such expansion 
was possible by the extension of consumer credit to all social strata? Framed in terms of political 
economy, how did consumer credit become an indirect de facto policy tool that made the problem of 
inequality less salient and how did it work in practice?  
 My answer to this question throghout the second part of the dissertation is the following: 
in a context where most families were better-off than their previous generations, but top earners were 
having access to new lifestyles at a faster pace than the rest of the population, department stores sought to 
capitalize on lack of regulations, rising expectations and inequality to boost their sales in unsuspected 
ways. This inequality, however, was less expressed in total terms as in the previous decades when the 
population over the poverty threshold was higher than 40%, but in the form of relative deprivation 
stemming from the fact that even though in real terms the minimum wage had considerably increased, 
more than half of Chilean workers in 2006 perceived incomes lower than two minimum wages.57  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 For both 1990 and 2006, for example, the percentage of workers that earned under the monthly average income (of the main 
occupation) was higher than 70%, while only the richest received incomes above the national median (US $583 approximately, 
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Figure 19: Share of Households with Incomes under $250.000 Chilean pesos (approximately US 
$480 in 2008), 2006 
Monetary Income (Autonomous Income + state subsidies)  33,2 
Autonomous Income (Labor income + allowances, bonuses, 
rents, interest, as well as retirement, pensions and private 
transfers) 
34,5 
Labor Income (Income earned by main occupation, earnings 
from self-employment and self-provision of goods produced 
by the household) 
41.8 
Source: Data from Reinecke/Valenzuela (2011) 
 
In part III I will further explore this line of reasoning by arguing that the “privatization of risks” 
and inequality deepened this process by a) pushing households to compete with each other in order to 
secure their positions, engaging in “arms race” for positional but inconspicuous goods, while at the same 
time b) creating “budget gaps” that would result from the attempts to secure their status in a very insecure 
and threatening context. Ultimately, this would leave many Chilean families with no other option than 
using consumer credit in order to catch up with more demanding standards of living and execute the life-
projects they considered legitimate to pursue. 
It is in this context of changing standards of living and high inequality that department stores 
progressively financialized Chilean consumers from all social strata; made them “feasible economic 
consumers” (Ossandón 2013); converted consumer credit into an indirect policy tool that made the 
problem of structural inequality less salient; and became a fundamental pillar of the Chilean 
modernization process. In the next two sections of this chapter, my intention is to pave the way for 
developing this line of argument by showing that i) department stores took advantage of particular 
junctures and made important efforts to boost their own sales by financializing Chilean consumers; and 
that ii) these types of credit have been helping expand the incomes of these consumers in times of positive 
expectations, rather than only help them cope with instability.  
5.2 THE FINANCIALIZATION OF THE CHILEAN CONSUMER  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
values of 2006). As a matter of fact, by 2006, when the market for consumer credit was at its peak, 63.1% of female and 48.5% 
male workers fell into this category. 
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The fact that sellers financialize the population in order to sell goods is hardly a historical novelty. 
It is characteristic of the expansion of installment credit throughout the first half of the twentieth century 
in Europe, America and Asia. Sellers of durable goods such as sewing machines in Japan (Gordon 2012), 
cars and home appliances in the US (Hyman 2013; Carruthers 2010), and clothing and footwear in the first 
department stores in France (Trumbull 2014), systematically issued installment credit as a way of selling 
their own goods in more massive ways during the first half of the twentieth century. The novelty, 
however, is that, unlike those previous experiences, department stores in Chile relied on relatively new 
risk-based pricing techniques and credit card technologies developed in the banking sector in order to 
financialize sub-prime consumers. Furthermore, the expansion of credit by means of these financial 
innovations was not directly supported and promoted by the state as a social entitlement as in the US 
(Calder 1999; Calder 2012; Logeman 2012; Carruthers/Ariovich 2010), but resulted from a lack of 
regulation that allowed them to charge the high interest rates necessary to make the business work in a 
context of low wages. Both financial innovations and lack of regulations made of consumer credit an 
implicit social policy, whose importance for the Chilean consumer would be taken for granted and would 
be hard to change throughout the years. 
How did the market for consumer credit emerge in Chile? As economic sociologists have shown, 
the emergence of a modern market for consumer credit cannot be taken for granted because it entails 
important efforts to solve very specific coordination problems. Markets for consumer credit require an 
important cognitive infrastructure that allows lenders to frame the behavior of prospective borrowers 
(Guseva/Rona-Tas 2001; Rona-Tas 2009; Róna-Tas/Guseva 2014; Róna-Tas/Hiß 2010). In contemporary 
capitalism, there are complex networks of actors that trace and circulate information on consumers, being 
“credit bureaus” the most specialized organizations in gathering and distributing information on the 
financial behavior of consumers. Once this information is available to lenders and there is a market for it, 
financial institutions can lend money at a large scale by developing techniques of risk management. These 
techniques allow lenders to dissembed the process of framing consumers from their networks and face-to-
face relations, and rely on automatic and rational calculations that sort the risk of borrowers in efficient 
ways (Guseva/Rona-Tas 2001). In the field of consumer lending, this is done, for example, with the 
calculation of the Fico Score, which estimates the probabilities of default of borrowers by taking into 
consideration their past behavior (Marron 2006; Marron 2009). Nowadays, this score and other models to 
classify risk are being constantly improved with the work of data miners, and the incorporation of new 
inputs, such as socio-demographics and other relevant information that companies acquire through private 
and public sources.  
Of course, characterizing how this market emerged in Chile from an organizational point of view 
would deviate us too much from our main goals, but we still have to sketch the main features of the 
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market to understand what the financialization of consumption in Chile is about. In particular, the role 
played by department stores in  “financializing” consumers deserves closer attention. 
5.2.1 THE IRRUPTION OF DEPARTMENT STORES  
Department stores have a long tradition in Chile and the history of some of them and their owners 
goes back to the late XIX century. Falabella, for example, the leading credit card issuer in Chile 
(administered by CMR Falabella), began as a tailoring shop in 1889 in the downtown section of Santiago, 
which only hundred years later -in the 1980s- started selling home appliances. In a similar vein, Paris 
(now Cencosud holding) started as a furniture shop located in the center of Santiago in 1900, expanding 
the business to electronics and clothing only in the second half of the twentieth century, and issuing their 
first credit card in the late 1970s. Today, Cencosud is the second biggest issuer of credit cards in Chile, 
after Falabella. Finally, the third biggest department store, Ripley, was founded in the mid-1960s as a 
garment shop, which in 1993 became the first retailer within a shopping mall. Although its expansion 
took-off following the paths of Falabella and Paris, it managed to break through the fierce competition and 
became one of the biggest department stores in Chile.  
Nowadays, these stores are modern companies. Already in the middle of their “boom” in the 
nineties, both Falabella and Cencosud opened their business to the stock market in 1996 (they would be no 
longer family companies), followed by Ripley in 2005. This boosted their investments and prompted their 
internationalization into other South American countries.  Currently, these department stores in Chile 
operate now as conglomerates of companies that own banks, supermarkets, insurance companies, travel 
agencies and home improvement stores, a business model known as “multi-channel retailing”. With this 
business model, Falabella nowadays makes profits over USD 5.000 million in 1.42 square kilometers 
(Ortega/Soto 2011). According to Ossandón (2013, p. 9), Falabella´ credit card “… represents 43% of the 
store cards’ transactions and 38% of their monetary worth, while 17% – of both transaction and value – 
corresponds to Cencosud’s cards.”  
A second generation of department stores, better known as “multitiendas”, consolidated in the 
1990s and led the financialization of lower income groups. The specific niche for these department stores 
is known in marketing classifications as “poor” or low socioeconomic group, according to the 
classification system implemented in Chile by the Association of Marketing Research (AIM). Under this 
classification, this group represents 35% of households, whose incomes range between the first three 
income deciles, are vulnerable to fall under the poverty threshold, and are more exposed to the economic 
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cycle (Rasse/Salcedo/Pardo 2009).58 Although they are defined as “poor” (which coincided in 1987 with 
the share of the population under the poverty threshold), these families now moved out of the poverty 
threshold and have purchasing power, and are usually recalled by scholars and marketing researchers as 
the “emergent-middle class”.59  
These stores, small brothers of big department stores, have been successful in targeting poorer 
consumers, and nowadays have more than three million clients. La Polar, for example, which started in the 
tailoring business back in 1920 and issued its first credit card in the late 1980s, was one of the most 
prosperous retailers in the 2000s, raising capital in the Chilean stock market since 2000 and 
internationalizing its business. A similar story accounts for the trajectory of Hites, a “multitienda” that, 
although had more difficult trajectories throughout the last decades, it started issuing its own credit card in 
the early 1990s, consolidated their niche with poorer consumers and now has more than one million 
clients. This is representative of other smaller “multitiendas” that proliferated on busy streets of the main 
cities of the country as well, as Tricot, Corona and Abcdin. To have a better picture, the chart below 
shows the market shares of the ten existing non-bank credit card issuers in Chile in 2008.  
Figure 20: Non Bank Credit Card Issuers, Market Share December 2008. 
 
Source: Data taken from Matus et al. (2010)60 
 
The history of how these organizations embraced more sophisticated risk classification techniques 
is yet to be written.  We know, for example, that Ripley started lending money before the 1980s with a 
book held in the store where the seller (the owner) would keep track of the payment schedule of well-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The Association of Marketing Research in Chile adapted the classification of the system of the European Society for Opinion 
and Marketing Research (ESOMAR) to the Chilean reality.  
59 Nowadays, scholars searching for better classifications that account for the important transformations of the Chilean society 
suggest that this group might account for 25% of households.  
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known and trusted clients. The main discovery for the department store was that the seller (now also 
lender) should not be worried too much about the overall cost of the garment at stake, but about the 
amount of money that a consumer would be able to set aside on a monthly basis to pay the installments. 
This is the milestone of the department store credit cards, which is the transition from framing of 
borrowers based on their total income (the traditional model of banks), to the assessment of their 
“financial behavior” and the share of income that these can allocate to pay installments. Even though we 
do not know how the transition from these old lending systems to the contemporary credit card was 
orchestrated, due to recent research conducted by Ossandón (2013) we have a better grasp of how the 
business model came about from the perspective of risk management techniques. 
As Ossandón´s research shows, department stores have successfully invested in expanding the 
market to low-income populations through the embracement of a particular risk-management technique 
known as “sowing”. To some extent it reminds us of the strategy deployed by American banks in the late 
1960s which issued thousands of unsolicited credit cards to solve the complementarity problem between 
credit card holders and shops accepting them (Guseva 2005). But “sowing” has the peculiarity of creating 
consumers by progressively lending very small amounts of money to unknown customers in order to 
engage people in credit relations and produce financial information. As the metaphor suggests, some of 
these consumers will pay their debts and a long lasting credit relation will flourish (and information is 
created), while others will perish without generating great losses (Ossandón 2013). Thus, with the help of 
a credit bureau (Dicom) that works as a black list for debtors since 1919, and the traces left by within-
store purchases with credit cards, department stores systematically improved their predicting ability, 
refined their credit assessment policies and targeted new populations (for a characterization of the 
institutional infrastructure of the market for consumer credit in Chile see Ossandón/González (2010a)).61  
This represented an important advantage against banks, because the technique of “sowing” allowed 
them to gather financial information that is not shared with other financial institutions, which in Chile has 
created a major concern over the stability of the financial system for the sake of asymmetries of 
information (for a review of these socio-technical controversies, see Ossandón/González (2010b)). 
In the end, department stores managed to lend money –and foster their sales- by issuing credit to 
those traditionally excluded from the banking sector. Of course, the criteria used to issue credit cards 
changed along with the economic cycle, but “sowing” allowed department stores to innovate and expand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 In this regard, uneven regulations will also play a crucial role in shaping the competition dynamics in this market since, 
unlike banks, department stores are not obliged to share this information with the rest of the financial system. According to 
(Montero 2010), this is a crucial advantage since the amount and quality of information grows as it does the amount of credit 
transactions, so retailers enjoy a decrease in the marginal cost of extending credit due to improved selection capabilities. In fact, 
persistent disputes over the property of such information after the 2000s will attune department stores corporate interests 
against those of banks. I will come back to these issues in chapter 5. 
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the business to new financial profiles that represent important segments of the middle-low income groups: 
housewives, youth, retired or seasonal workers, among others. 62 This is, for example, how “multitiendas” 
went on differentiating their lending policies for workers and pensioners, as it is in the cases of Hites or 
Corona. The common characteristic behind these new profiles, and that differentiates these from other 
lenders such as banks, is that department stores, in general, have less restrictive lending policies, 
especially with regard to income requirements. As the chart below shows, the “multitienda” Corona 
requires a minimum income of USD 200 for workers, while only USD 120 for pensioners. Hites, on the 
other hand, requires an income slightly over the USD 300 for both dependent and independent workers, 
and USD 160 for pensioners. In the most demanding cases, such as Falabella, the worker is required to 
certify a minimum income of only USD 400.  
Figure 21: Minimum Income Required to Apply for a Credit Card, According to Different 
Department Stores (USD of March 2015) 
 
Source: Data taken from respective websites. 
In general such requirements relate to the fact that, unlike banks that differentiate their products 
according to the profile of their customers, department stores marketized credit cards as a very 
homogeneous product where the main difference are not the interest rates charged, but the available 
“room” on their credit card balance sheet. Thus the requirements are very low but the “available room” 
will change from customer to customer. In turn, these will have the capacity to improve their available 
credit by repaying their debts (creating positive information). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Thus for example, CMR Falabella implemented a system of geographical localization that bans credit cards for specific 
districts in the city, a highly discriminative practice that brings the segregation of the city of Santiago into the department store. 
The map was published by CIPER Chile and it is available here: http://ciperchile.cl/multimedia/mapa-con-las-poblaciones-y-
villas-vetadas-por-falabella/	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In many occasions, due to the access that department stores have to external sources of 
information, such as pension funds administration agencies, it is possible to apply for a department store 
credit card only with a personal ID. In other cases, department stores rely on the classification of other 
department stores, and a credit card with small credit line –usually around the USD 200- is issued if a 
consumer already has a credit card in her pocket; this is explicitly stated in La Polar department store 
“lending policies”, for example. 
Finally, a second advantage these institutions enjoy over other lenders is that many of them operate 
mainly in shopping malls, which have proliferated in both urban and suburban areas (the three main 
department stores have also entered into the real estate business by buying and even building some of 
these shopping malls). Although department stores in Chile existed long before shopping malls, their 
incorporation into these new “cathedrals of consumption” (as called by Moulian (2002)) created a 
particular synergy between consumption and credit.63  
In this regard, the inauguration of the shopping mall "Plaza Vespucio" in one of the most 
populated district in the city in 1990, La Florida, represented for many the epitome of the 
"democratization" of consumption via the extension of credit to their consumers. According to 
Pérez/Salcedo/Cáceres (2012), nowadays "Plaza Vespucio" has 180,000 built square meters and in 2010 
received 36 million visits, an impressive number if we consider that this is bigger than the visits to Mall of 
America (28 millions) and slightly lower than West Edmonton Mall (40 millions).  
The arrival of department stores at shopping malls in the 1980s not only helped this new business 
to consolidate (as Salcedo/De Simone (2013) argue, without these department stores shopping malls in 
Chile would have failed), but it also fostered the sales and the promotion of department stores in important 
ways (nowadays, more than 25% of retail sales take place in these spaces). In this sense, one of the crucial 
advantages that department stores have over banks, is that they can not only better predict the behavior of 
prospective consumers, but also engage them more easily. Unlike banks, these credit cards are offered 
within department stores and shopping malls that are open to the public not only during longer periods 
(usually from 11 am to 9 pm) (Montero/Tarjizán 2010), but also during weekends, where the affluence of 
public to the shopping malls is huge. According to the Chamber of Commercial Centers in Chile, for 
example, taking the three biggest shopping mall chains (Mall Plaza, Parque Arauco and Cencosud), the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 According to GEO Research, there are more than 160 department stores only in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, from 
which 95 are the so-called "big stores" ("grandes tiendas") and 67 are smaller "multitiendas". While there seems to be a clear 
preference of big department stores to be located in shopping malls (63% of them) -where they can target broader publics, 
"multitiendas" are predominantly located in the streets (64%). 
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number of visits for the first half of 2013 reached 1.2 million a day, which tends to concentrate more 
during the weekends when consumers not only plan purchases but also go out with their families. 
Moreover, such spaces became important for lower income consumers that in some cases find 
cheaper products than in traditional stores, see in them decent public spaces, and find an offer of culture 
and entertainment that is not available in their own neighborhoods. As such, shopping malls have become 
in many cases the only way to reach a sense of comfort (Cáceres et al. 2006). Indeed, shopping malls 
increasingly diversified their range of services, offering not only goods on sales, but also cultural spaces 
such as ice rinks, concert halls, libraries or cirques (Salcedo/De Simone 2013). 
Summing up, because of these techniques and advantages, in less than fifteen years department 
store credit cards surpassed the number of bank credit cards in at least four times, especially by expanding 
their business to those considered as “non-financializable by banks, such as instable independent workers, 
housewives and non-qualified manual workers (Zahler 2008). This explains why even though the spread 
of department store credits is much higher than banks, their credits are in average considerably smaller 
(which accounts also for the fact that banks still concentrate most stocks of debts in Chile).64 
Table 5: Average Amount of Consumer Debts, 2011-2012 
 
 
Source: Encuesta Financiera de Hogares, 2011-2012 *The average value of the dollar in May 2012, when 
the survey was finished, was 497.09 Chilean pesos. 
 
Thanks to these advantages, department stores consolidated during the last twenty years as some of 
the most important corporative actors in Chile and Latin America. Some of them, especially those that 
target the lowest income populations, have relied to a great extent on financial services to allocate their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 According to Zahler (2008), in 2007 banks concentrated 63% of total consumption stocks, while department stores only 
reached 18% of the market share and compensation funds 10%. 
 
Bank Loan 
Cash 
Withdrawals 
Bank Credit 
Card 
Department Store 
Credit Card 
Chilean Pesos 143,2000 426,000 501,000 195,000 
US Dollars* 2,880.77 856.99 1,007.87 392.28 
 
Car Loan Social Educational Other Debts 
Chilean Pesos 2,973,000 519,000 1,508,000 120,000 
US Dollars* 5,980.81 1,044.08 3,033.66 241.40 
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goods and generate their profits (Hites department store, for example, sales almost 60% of their goods on 
credit). 
Figure 22: Total Sales Made on Credit, Different Department Stores in 2012 
 
Source: chart taken from Center for Retail Studies, CERET. Available at http://www.ceret.cl/indicadores-
tiendas-por-depto/2012-2/ 
 
5.2.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSUMER LENDING IN CHILE 
The embracement of risk-management and “market attachment” techniques stress only the 
organizational side of the story. The other side is rather institutional and relates to the lack of regulations 
that actually allowed department stores to make their business model by charging high interest rates 
viable. It is in this sense that I argue that, unlike the fields of housing and education policies, the Chilean 
state in the sphere of consumption acted by omission.  
Even though department stores were undoubtedly considered as the main lender among Chilean 
families, their operations came to be regulated only in 2006. This is one of the reasons why there are no 
available data on the interest rates department stores have been charging to their customers. Anyhow, one 
can have a clearer picture by looking into the interest rates charged according to the new regulations.  
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Interest rate regulations in Chile are stipulated in “Law 18.010” for the operation of credit money. 
Since April 2006, when department stores were finally supervised and regulated as financial institutions, 
their interest rates have been subjected to the “Maximum Conventional Rate” (Tasa Máxima Covencional) 
that can be charged by financial institutions in Chile. The Maximum Conventional Rate is a nominal rate 
that is monthly calculated by Chile´s Financial Regulatory Agency (Superintendencia de Bancos e 
Institutiones Financieras), based on the average cost of credits charged by the most important banks 
(Flores/Morales/Yánhez 2005).65 Until 2012, this law stipulated that the interest rates charged by lenders 
in Chile could exceed the average interest rate of the previous period (month) by no more than 50%. Thus, 
for example, if the Maximum Conventional Rate was 50% and the monthly average interest rate charged 
by banks in the previous period was 5%, department stores were allowed to charge up to 7.5% monthly 
interest rates. Under this regime, the rates differ according to the amounts of credits and installments, 
normally consumer credits, credit cards and overdraft lines, applying monthly rates whose values range 
from 3.5 to 4.8.  
Figure 23: Annual Maximum Conventional Interest Rate, 2000-2013 
Source: Data from the National Service of Consumers´ Protection, SERNAC 
 
As shown in the table below, the interest rates charged by department stores differ considerably, 
being those which target low income populations the most expensive sources of credit: La Polar, Johnsons 
and Presto (now Walmart). One of the main costs associated with these credit cards is the administration 
fee, which is normally charged in case of an existing debt or if transactions have been carried out. 
Furthermore, most department stores charge extra fees associated with the different services offered, such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The maximum Conventional Interest Rate was created in 1929 and it was succesivelly published by the Central Bank until 
the Financial Institutions´ Regulatory Agency took over the task in 1981. It was initially settled at a 50% of the median interest 
rates of the previous period; then, it was reduced to 20% between 1953 and 1965, and reestablished at the 50% in 1966. 
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as installment credit, purchases in associated commerce, cash withdrawals, and associated insurances. 
According to a former risk-management CEO of one of the biggest department stores in Chile, before the 
2006s regulations were passed, department stores were charging interest rates that could easily be 30% 
higher than the current interest rates.66  
 
Table 6: Annual Interest Rates Charged by Department Stores in Associated Commerce, September 
201167 
 
USD 107.12 in 3 installments (no upfront payment) 
 
CMR 
Falabell
a 
ABC/DI
N 
La 
Polar 
Johnson's 
Multiopci
ón 
Paris 
Más, 
Jumbo 
Más y 
Más 
Easy 
Presto 
Riple
y 
Clothing and 
Footwear in 
Department 
Store 39.48% 50.28% 
n/a 
50.28% 38.40% 50.11% 
46.68
% 
Electronic 
Appliances 
Department 
Stores 39.48% 
50.28% n/a 50.28% n/a 
50.11% 
46.68
% 
 
USD 214.25 in 6 installments 
 
CMR 
Falabell
a 
ABC/DI
N 
La 
Polar 
Johnson's 
Multiopci
ón 
Paris 
Más, 
Jumbo 
Más y 
Más 
Easy 
Presto 
Riple
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66 Interview conducted in April 2013 
67 US Dollar of 12 September 2011. 
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Clothing and 
Footwear in 
Department 
Store 33.84% 
50.28% n/a 50.28% 35.04% 
38.16% 
46.68
% 
Electronic 
Appliances 
Department 
Stores 33.84% 
50.28% n/a 50.28% n/a 
23.88% 
46.68
% 
Source: Data taken from SERNAC  
     
In general, charging high interest rates proved to be the crucial element of department stores to 
expand their market to lower income populations. One can clearly see this in the effect that a new law 
passed in 2012 (Lez 20.715) had on the financial system. According to these new regulations, the 
Maximum Conventional Rate should be progressively reduced from the 55% average annual rate to 
around 35% for credit under 200 UF (USD 8,000 approximately), issued at more than 90-day installments; 
this basically covers all consumer credits issued by department stores and other lenders, as well as an 
important share of bank consumer loans. Immediately after its enactment, the interest rate was reduced to 
6.3% and progressively decreased 0.5% every fifteen days.68  
As a result, a recent report issued by the “Banks and Financial Institutions´ Association” (ABIF) 
announced that by march 2014 at least 26,400 consumers were left out of the financial system; at the same 
time, the spokesman of department stores financial committee declared that the market experienced an 
important contraction due to more restrictive risk-criteria, evidencing the impact that a decrease in interest 
rates has in a market whose expansion has been favored by lack of regulations.69 In other words, it became 
clear that the expansion of the business relies to a great extent on the possibility of charging these high 
interest rates to low income consumers, the big majority of the Chilean working force. 
To sum up, it is possible to say that if department stores capitalized on persistent inequality and 
positive expectations on the part of consumers, it was because they were able to develop financial 
innovations that allowed department stores to progressively financialize middle and low-income 
consumers. This business model, on the other hand, was successfully applied because of lean or inexistent 
regulations that allowed them to charge high interest rates and reach those riskier consumers excluded 
from the banking system. This proved to be crucial in the business model, since new regulations of interest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 The new regulations are available at: http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1057087 
69 See interviews at: http://www.pulso.cl/noticia/empresa-mercado/mercado/2014/06/13-45486-9-un-total-de-26440-deudores-
de-consumo-salieron-de-la-banca-en-un-ano.shtml	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rates introduced in 2012 had an important effect on the contraction of the market. What still has to be 
shown, however, is that if consumer credit became a social policy that boosted in part the “Chilean 
modernization” process, it was –at least at the aggregated level- by expanding people´s purchasing power 
rather than helping people to smooth it in times of crises. The question that has to be tackled, then, is 
about the logic of this particular type of indebtedness and how it works in practice. For this, it is worth 
clarifying some trends of the financialization of Chilean households. 
 
5.3 EXPANDING PURCHASING POWER  
One of the most ingrained belief in the field consumer lending, especially held by economists, is 
that credit helps people smooth the consumption of households in the face of income shocks and 
throughout the life-cycle. Thus, for example, economists from the Central Bank of Chile argue that “The 
utilization of credit allowed families to spend in present consumption, compromising their future income, 
and, in this way, smooth the path of consumption along the life-cycle” (Ruiz-Tagle/García/Miranda 2013, 
p. 4).70 Or that unsecured debt is important because it "...is mainly backed by future expected incomes, 
allowing for consumption smoothing over transitory income or need shocks, being more volatile as 
requirements and use of debt are more linked to income/need shocks." (Cox/Parrado/Ruiz-Tagle 2006, 
p.6). But to what extent is this true? What is the general role played by consumer credit in Chile´s 
Privatized Keynesianism? If consumer credit in Chile fostered a modernization process in the area of 
consumption, as I argue in this dissertation, wouldn´t we expect credit to serve as an extension of people´s 
purchasing power, rather than as a substitute?  
As it has been already shown that the first wave of expansion of department stores credit cards in 
the early nineties took place in a context where the GDP grew at an average annual rate of 7.8 between 
1987 and 1997, and the per-capita product at a 6.1 annual average rate. These trends moderated their pace 
after the 2000s when the economy started recovering from the “Asian crisis” in the late 1990s. This crisis 
marked a break with the expansive and euphoric growth of the 1987-1997 decade. In one year, economic 
growth diminished from 6,7% to 3,2% in 1998, and unemployment ballooned from 6,4% in June 1997 to 
11,1% in 1999 (Tironi/Ariztía 2003). As shown in the following chart, this had an important impact on the 
market, and the number of circulating credit cards grew at a slower pace after 1998 and the average 
amounts of debts decreased more dramatically. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 “El uso del crédito ha permitido a las familias gastar en consumo presente, comprometiendo sus ingresos futuros, y de esta 
manera suavizar la senda de consumo a los largo del ciclo de vida.”  
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Figure 24: Evolution of Number of Department Store Credit Cards and Average Amount of Debts, 
1993-2000 
 Source: Data from PNUD (2002) 
 
This situation changed with the economic recovery that started after 2001 and a second wave of 
financialization materialized between 2000 and 2009, where consumer debts grew almost four times faster 
than the whole country´s economy: the average annual growth of the economy was 3.6%, while the 
average annual growth of household debt was 12% (14% consumer credit and 12% mortgages). Although 
the atmosphere was not as optimistic as in the nineties, the expansion of consumer debts was quite 
impressive, to the point that in 2004 the Minister of Finance already named it as the “fiesta del consumo” 
(“Consumption Party”).71 This second “party of consumption” was driven by the expansion of department 
stores and compensation funds to the low-income households, retired workers and younger consumers, as 
well as a more aggressive campaign undertaken by banks, whose consumer stocks gained importance in 
their overall portfolio. Among the new populations targeted by lenders, two of them at the extremes of the 
life cycle called the attention of policy makers, youth consumers and retired workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Revista Capital, Friday, September 21st, 2007. http://www.capital.cl/poder/2007/09/21/050900-el-pai%C2%ADs-el-pie-y-las-
cuotas 	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Figure 25Consumer Debt, Thousands of Million Chilean Pesos (nominal) 
 
Source: chart taken from Cowan (2009) 
 
Consumer debts kept growing after the crisis in 2007 but at a more moderate pace. The real annual 
growth rate of consumption debts dropped from 15.8% in 2007 to 9.1% in 2008, and to1.8% in 2009, to 
slowly recover in the second half of 2010 (Central 2010).  Of course, both crises had important 
consequences for many families and consumer debts escalated for those that were not able to make their 
payments on time, especially among the bottom income quintiles. But during both crises, Chilean families 
moderated the uses of department store credits and started using them very intensively in times of 
recovery. According to the 2008 Financial Stability Report of the Chilean Central Bank (second semester), 
for example, the contraction of department store debts in 2007 was related to an important decrease in the 
demand for durable goods, which indicates these consumer credits were not necessarily used as a means to 
cope with instability but rather to expand people´s consumption in times of growth.  
This might help explain why periods of expansion and contraction of the market for consumer 
credit not only showed a clear relation to the economic cycle, but also to people´s expectations towards 
the whole economy and their own situation. As the following chart shows, the evolution of the consumers 
confidence index (which is a compound index of people´s attitudes towards the economy and the 
opportunity of buying durable goods), the periods of major expansion of the market for consumer credit 
(1990-1997 and 2000-2007) coincide not only with economic growth, but also with positive expectations 
on the part of consumers, which reinforces the idea that rising consumption debts in Chile relate less to 
periods of crisis than to collective improvement.  
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Figure 26: Consumer Perception Index, 1981-2012 (quarterly average) 
Source: chart taken from Adimark, IPEC: Índice de Percepción de la Economía, Informe Mensual Febrero 
2012.  
 
Credit cards are used to expand purchasing power basically because department store credits are 
usually associated with within-store purchases (especially durable goods) and they are not useful to 
smooth consumption. In this regard, the Household Financial Survey conducted by the Central Bank in 
Chile is very informative. According to the 2009 survey, for example, people admitted using different 
types of consumer loans in the first place to buy home appliances, which in the case of department store 
credit cards reached an overwhelming 70 percent (38% of bank credit card debts, 34.8% department store 
or financial institutions cash loans, and 21.3% bank consumer loans). Moreover, in the case of department 
store credit cards, concerning the second most important use of consumer loans, the surveyed mentioned 
“other within-store purchases” such as buying clothing and footwear that reaches 16.7%, which means 
that almost 90% of these debts are acquired to make within-store purchases. As one can expect, other 
“non- earmarked” credits, i.e. not attached to within-store purchases, seem to be allocated to more 
“defensive purposes”, such as paying other debts (29.5% of bank consumer loans and 17.25% of loans 
with financial institutions or department stores), or cover medical treatment.  
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Table 7: Credit Utilization by Credit (%) of Households with Consumer Debts in 2009 
 
Bank Credit Card or 
Overdraft Line 
Department Store 
or Financial 
Institution Loan  
Bank 
Consumer 
Loan 
Department 
Store Credit 
Card 
Purchase of home appliances 38,06 34,76 21,27 70,19 
Vehicles or other 
transportation means 
6,72 2,46 8,87 1,65 
Purchase of luxury articles 
(jewelry, pieces of art) 
0,93  - 0,48 1,42 
Other purchases 10,46 22,04 11,74 16,17 
Vacation 2,95 2,29 1,36 0,08 
Medical treatment 5,17 7,62 7,46 1,8 
Cancellation of debts 14 17,25 29,52 4,12 
To finance an investment 6,4 0,99 6,34 0,16 
Home remodeling 6,29 9,49 0,29 1,85 
Other 7,24 3,1 7,11 1,96 
No answer 0,96 0 5,14 0,49 
Does not know 0,38 0 0,42 0,11 
Source: Data from the Households´ Financial Survey, EFH 2009. 
 
The point I am trying to make here is that, in line with the idea that credit has served as a policy 
tool to foster a modernization process and make income inequality less salient, the evidence supports the 
notion that credit works mainly by expanding people´s incomes in times of prosperity. This would rule out 
in principle the “defensive consumption” hypothesis in its most simple form, which is that credit helps 
people smooth their consumption in times of distress. Moreover, as one can also preliminary argue, this 
would also call into question two other beliefs commonly held in the media and political economy: firstly, 
the idea that credit is serving the purposes of an out-of-control consumer in search for status by deploying 
luxury goods, fancy vacation, up-to-date clothing and vehicles, and so on. Secondly, it calls into question 
the idea that most consumers are acquiring consumer debts to afford the rising cost of education and 
health care in context of stagnant wages, as political economists usually argue.  
In place of these three options (smooth consumption, deploy wealth and catch up with rising living 
costs), people seem to be buying the “standard package” of durable goods with which they furnish and 
equip their houses. In this sense, it is possible to extend the argument and hold that housing policies 
worked as a crucial force boosting the expansion of credit throughout different mechanisms. Firstly, the 
 
	   	  
110 
expansion of homeownership stabilized the situation of families across the middle and bottom income 
distribution, and demanded new investments to equip these new homes (as I will depict with credit-stories 
of families in chapter 9). Secondly, poorer families have higher levels of homeownership but enjoy low 
wages and less residential mobility. This pushes them to rely heavily on credit in order to make 
improvements in their homes.  
Up to this point, it becomes clear that consumer credit boosted the Chilean modernization process 
and worked as a policy tool to integrate all social strata into the “party of consumption”<<. The last issue 
to tackle now is to show the particular shape that the politics of debt took in this context. 
 
5.4 THE POLITICS OF CONSUMER DEBTS IN CHILE  
The solid expansion of the market for consumer credit is essentially based on the fact that Chilean 
families learned how to deal with credits and that they pay-off their debts. In my view, three major reasons 
account for this.  
The most obvious reason is that lenders are powerful actors, entitled and with the means to enforce 
the payment of these debts. In fact, consumer credit contracts with banks and department stores are very 
similar. In both cases, consumers sign a promissory note with an open date, which is eventually used to 
enforce the payment of the existing debt at any point in the future. This gives the right of suing consumers 
until the last consequences, which basically means seizing their assets, including money in a bank account 
and tax returns. In most cases, an extra-judiciary process takes place, where lenders insist that consumers 
cancell their debts by making phone calls or sending letters, which are normally in the hands of a debt 
collection agency. When conventional collection fails, lenders approach consumers by offering them a re-
negotiation of their debts, which is nothing different from the creation of a “new debt” that covers unpaid 
debts, interests and fines. There is a good reason to do this: suing a consumer takes time: firstly, a 
consumer is formally sued; then, the consumer is notified; and in the end lenders can seize goods after a 
while. Furthermore, suing a consumer takes time and it is very expensive if we consider that most of these 
debts are relatively small. 
The second reason is that being on the “black list” of Chile´s credit bureau (Dicom) is 
symbolically and materially punished within and outside the domain of consumer lending. This is an issue 
I will come back to later on in this chapter when assessing the off-label use of Dicom´s black list (Rona-
Tas 2014). 
And finally, as a matter of fact, these debts seem to have been well received by the majority of 
consumers that see in them a step to a new form of citizenship, less centered in entitlements, and more 
dependent on participation in the “party of consumption”. Furthermore, since consumption is seen as a 
private affair subject to personal preferences and freedom of choice, it is less acceptable to raise claims 
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over the legitimacy of these debts. After all, people seem to be participating in the “consumption party” 
rather than defending themselves from the privatization of risks and making the burden of inequality more 
bearable.  
This state of affairs raises some questions. If Chileans pay-off their debts and they even seem to 
use credit to materialize their desires, how did interest rates regulations of 2012 come about? If consumers 
were financing the “Chilean dream” and over-indebtedness is not causing “systemic risks”,72 what are the 
reasons for raising concerns, monitoring the market more closely and implementing some regulations?  
In the domain of consumption, the erosion of the legitimacy of debts and the “counter politics of 
debt” came very late on the part of consumers and, to a lesser extent, on the part of the political class 
regarding three phenomena that brought to light the obscene practices of some department stores: public 
scandals, abusive and asymmetrical contracts, and the “off-label” use of credit ratings. 
A big fraud carried out by one of the biggest department stores, La Polar, marked the “beginning 
of the end” for these absolutely deregulated markets in 2010. La Polar´s fraud was a sort of small “Enron” 
case, where the balance sheet of the company was systematically modified to raise capital in the stock 
market. Since 2003, the big department store, which specialized in lending to low-income consumers, had 
been unilaterally re-modifying the credit contracts of their consumers and making its debt portfolio more 
appealing. Thus, with a software developed by their informatics and risk-analysts, the company constantly 
reorganized the payment schemes of a total of 990,000 low-income families´–most of them in default- in 
order to make them appear as “clean debts” in their balance sheets (Traslaviña 2013). After the scandal 
came out, the managers of La Polar argued in court that the company was issuing “new loans” to these 
customers and extending their payments on time in order to supposedly alleviate them and avoid legal 
problems. In this manner, defaulters were “helped”. However, what the managers omitted in their 
statements was that the portfolio of the company was more appealing in the stock market, where the 
company has been raising capital since 2003.  
With a gigantic and appealing portfolio composed of manipulated debts, the executive staff 
systematically convinced share-holders -among them the AFPs and the six million workers that suffered 
losses in their saving accounts- that the company was in an excellent shape to acquire more debt and keep 
growing. After all, as the executives said later on in court, during the previous years the company invested 
annually around 30 to 40 million dollars in their marketing strategy and was issuing around 10 thousand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 According to experts of the Central Bank, over-indebtedness is not a problem in Chile, at least from the perspective of 
systemic risk. The share of households with riskier debts, i.e. whose burden reaches 75% of their income, is only 9%, and 
corresponds to households that hold the smaller shares of total debts (Fuenzalida and Ruiz-Tagle 2010). 
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credit cards a year (Traslaviña 2013).73 This unscrupulous strategy put La Polar on the pedestal of the four 
biggest department stores in Chile, materialized international expansion to Colombia in 2010 and put the 
face of its “CEO of the decade” (Pablo Alcalde) on the cover of prestigious business magazines;74 but it 
also drove to despair to thousands of low-income workers, pensioners and housewives who saw their 
small debts systematically rising due to re-organizations, fees and insurances they were not aware of.  
Figure 27: Number of Clients that Suffered Re-arrangement of Debts 
 
Source: Data taken from Traslaviña (2013) 
 
After the scandal came out in 2010, this department store, that by then had a market value of USD 
1,900 million dollars, saw its stock value plunge from one day to another to USD 200 million. After 
periods of high uncertainty and negotiations between the company, regulators and shareholders, the latter 
decided to keep the company on the retail market, while thousands of clients overcrowded the department 
store to get the reimbursement and compensation that the big retailer had to pay out. Since the scandal, 
department stores and their financial business were under the scrutiny of the public opinion, as well as the 
regulators, who had proved to be completely inefficient in preventing these and other abusive practices 
that came out after the La Polar scandal.  
What is most surprising about the scandal from the perspective of the politics of debt, however, is 
the reaction of consumers. After receiving a compensation for the scam, consumers kept using their La 
Polar credit card to buy their home appliances, clothes and footwear as if nothing had happened. This time 
the “politics of forgiveness” did not come from the state or the lender, but -more surprisingly- from the 
borrower themselves, which makes us think about the crucial role that these financial instruments play in 
the life of these low-income families. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 One of the strategies department stores used in 2004 was to illegally appropriate the database of the Social Security Institute 
(Instituto de Previsión Social) and to send unsolicited credit cards to thousands of pensioners, even those who were already 
deceased. 
74 In 2009, for example, the newspaper La Tercera chose Pablo Alcalde the „CEO of the decade“ 
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In general, La Polar scandal had an important impact on the public opinion and prompted a closer 
supervision and the need for creating a special agency to protect consumers from the financial services 
industry. Under this scrutiny, more abusive practices came to be known in the successive years, which 
were, in many cases, adjoining legal boundaries. Among them, the most typical were the authorization of 
the acquisition of insurances, increase of available room in credit card balances and re-negotiations of 
debts via telephone calls, which, in many cases, did not clearly inform the consumer. As research 
journalists have shown,75 for example, in 2010 department stores commercialized almost twelve millions 
of insurances in this way, which reached more than 218 thousands of million Chilean pesos (around USD 
450 million of 2011). 
These practices and more suspicious attitudes of consumers towards the financial services industry 
seem to explain the rising number of complaints that the National Consumer Protection Service 
(SERNAC) received in the years following La Polar scandal. Between June and October 2010, for 
example, SERNAC received 15,730 complaints from the financial services industry, 64% related to 
department stores credit cards and 32% to banks. These trends do not seem to have changed over the last 
years, since only in the first semester of 2014, where SERNAC received 143,000 complaints, 27% and 
19% of which came from department stores and their financial services, respectively, amounting 
altogether to 65,780. Among those related to financial services, 41% were related to illegal charges or 
excessive commissions, and 16% related to poor quality service.76 
Finally, another important reason that pushed regulators to implement one of the most unusual 
“politics of forgiveness” on the market for consumer credit was the off-label use of credit reports that 
employers had being using to frame prospective employees during the last decade. As Rona-Tas (2014, p. 
4) explains, an off-label use of credit ratings takes place when “(financial) instruments developed in the 
specific context of a particular financial transaction come to be deployed for novel purposes, outside their 
original context”. In fact, like the United States, consumers credit reports in Chile were systematically 
used by employers to assess prospective employees´ trustiness. In this case, however, the reports provided 
by Chile´s Credit Bureau, Dicom (bought by Equifax), operated as a black list informing about consumers 
misbehavior. Thus, by paying a small amount of money employers used to access on the commercial 
information of prospective employees, which basically certifies if one is or not in the “black list” of 
defaulters. This became in practice one of the main “social tests” against which Chileans are successively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75  Available at: http://ciperchile.cl/2011/08/08/despues-de-la-polar-las-otras-%E2%80%9Ctrampas%E2%80%9D-de-la-
industria-del-retail/ 
76 These studies are available at: http://www.sernac.cl/radiografia-de-los-reclamos-recibidos-por-el-sernac-durante-el-primer-
semestre-del-ano-2014/. In the same period, the agency received also 1,793 complaints against compensation funds, most of 
them related to their financial services. See http://www.sernac.cl/cajas-de-compensacion-cobros-indebidos-y-falta-de-
informacion-son-los-principales-problemas-que-afec/. 
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evaluated, and a very controversial issue in the public opinion during the last ten years (Viñuela 2011). 
The fear of falling in Dicom´s black list is one of the most effective mechanisms to enforce the payment of 
consumer debts, either by preventing stigmatization or allowing people to have interrupted access to 
credit. 
In this sense, regulators called the attention to the fact that the off-label use of Dicom´s black list 
reports was creating vicious circles for those consumers that underwent job loss and were trying to 
reincorporate into the labor market. Paradoxically, those debtors that fell into the “black list” due to job 
loss faced more obstacles to obtain a new job every time employees discriminated against them for being 
in default. This, in turn, would create spirals of debts by preventing them to find new sources of income 
and get out of Dicom´s black lists, perpetuating the circuit of debt, stigmatization and unemployment.  
In this sense, the controversial “Dicom Law” passed in 2012 carried with it two main changes on 
the market. Firstly, it banned the off-label utilization of Dicom´s black list records and restricted it only to 
the exclusive purpose of assessing the risk profiles of prospective borrowers. Secondly, in trying to 
reverse the perverse effects of the off-label use of Dicom´s black list reports –and arguably gain increasing 
popularity among consumer- the law applied a peculiar “forgiveness policy” and “washed away the sins” 
of debtors by erasing them from the black list, provided that their total debts in default were less than 
approximately USD 5,000 (excluding interest rates).  
Finally, the main consumer protection agency was also slightly reformed in 2012 and aimed at 
providing solutions for market failures rather than strengthening the institutional capacities of regulatory 
agencies for effectively protecting consumers. In the spirit of the “nudge” theory of behavioral 
economists, the new regulations focused mainly on equipping consumers with better tools to behave more 
rationally on the market.77 For this reason, the Chilean government created a new agency geared at 
protecting consumers from and informing them about existing financial products in the market called 
“SERNAC Financiero”. Nevertheless, its jurisdiction made it a mediator between consumers and lenders, 
rather than a protective institution and a relevant actor in the politics of debts. In this regard the main 
reform came about later in 2014 with the implementation of a bankruptcy law. Only enacted in October 
2014, the new law “Ley de reorganización y liquidación de empresas y personas” (Law of Reorganization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Concerning the most important issues, the new legislation establishes that consumers have the right to keep credit conditions 
and prices offered for seven days in order to compare with other bidders; they should receive a sheet summing up the relevant 
aspects of credit contracts; consumers have the right to be informed about the reasons for credit refusal; credit bills will contain 
more detailed information (including now insurance policies and administrative fees); a new indicator containing the annual 
cost of the credit (CAE for its acronym in Spanish) has been introduced in order to make price comparisons easier; credit 
insurance policies are now voluntarily acquired; there are no costs associated to plastic card replacement, and companies must 
open a specialized customer service area that has to process queries in less than 10 working days. 
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and Settlement of Companies and People), establishes a normative especially designed for “natural 
persons” that have a 90 days default and whose debts reach over the 80 UF (around US $3500), which 
were previously subject to the same regulations as companies. Consumers will now be able to renegotiate 
debts with their creditors without being on trial during the period. The impacts of the new law and the 
characterization of bankruptcy and recovery process in Chile are yet to be written.  
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CHAPTER 6 THE DEBT OF CHILEAN FAMILIES 
 
So far, I have depicted the overall logic of debts in Chile´s Privatized Keynesianism, showing that 
the financialization of education, housing and consumption fostered a modernization process. Likewise, I 
have also demonstrated that consumer debts in Chile served as a means to expand people´s purchasing 
power, rather than to cope with emergencies. But why do Chileans buy on credit? If credits help them 
“smooth their consumption” throughout the life-cycle, what exactly moves them to acquire consumer 
debts instead of saving for the goods they want to have? The first logical step to answer these questions is 
to establish who have these debts, how much debt, and what are the structural factors behind the 
financialization of consumption? To this end, the current chapter draws on the Household Financial 
Survey and existing research. With these sources, one can characterize the “debts of Chilean families”, 
provide the overall picture of indebtedness, and suggest where to start looking for concrete answers. 
6.1 CONSUMER DEBTS IN CHILE: WHO, HOW MUCH AND WHY  
In general, the share of households with consumer debts in Chile fluctuated between 60 and 63% 
between 2007 and 2012 (period for which there is systematic information). The most important types of 
debts are by far department store credit cards, which reached its peak in 2007 (49.4%), followed by 
mortgages (15.2%), bank credit cards (13,8) and consumer loans (13.5%).  
These debts are unevenly distributed across income groups. Following the unequal distribution of 
income, the Central Bank of Chile groups these households into three categories: low (income deciles 1 to 
5), medium (income deciles from 6 to 8) and high (the top 20%). Under this categorization, one can notice 
that while department store credits are the most “democratic” source of credit for Chilean families, other 
types of debts are very stratified. On the one hand, bank loans, bank credit cards, and to a lesser extent, 
educational loans, are mainly held by medium and high income households; on the other hand, social 
loans and informal sources of credit are held in higher proportion by households that belong to the bottom 
50% of the income distribution. This is something one can expect, since there are supply factors shaping 
the distribution of these debts, such as high-income requirements by banks, versus the low requirements 
by department stores. It is also noteworthy that the fact that people from lower income groups had 
increasing access to department stores, was not a reason for higher income consumers to stop using them. 
This has to do with the fact that there is an important segmentation within the credit market where 
“multitiendas” tend to focus exclusively on “subprime” borrowers, while big department stores have a 
wider range of public. As interviews with managers from department stores show, a same department 
store credit card has different “lending criteria”, “offers” and “benefits” according to the location of the 
department stores. Thus, for example, a store in the suburbs of Santiago offers a product in up to 12 
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installments, while in an upper class shopping mall the same product is offered in 3 installments with no 
interest; this means that in the former case credit allows people to purchase things, while in the latter it is a 
matter of fostering loyalty and serving as a means of payment. 
Table 8: Share of Households with Different Types of Debts by Income Group, Different Years 
 
Strata 1 (income 
1-5 decile) 
Strata 2 (income 
6-8 decile) 
Strata 3 (income 9-
10 decile) 
 
2007 2009 2012 2007 2009 2012 2007 2009 2012 
Bank Loan 6.7 7.9 8.7 15.6 17.0 15.3 22.9 26.1 22.6 
Bank Credit 
Card or 
Overdraft Line 
6.7 3.4 7.9 13.9 6.1 14.7 30.7 26.1 27.5 
Department 
Store Credit 
Card 
46.3 42.8 40.8 55.4 49.8 48.9 48.2 45.0 42.2 
Loan with 
Department 
Store and other 
Financial 
Institutions  
4.4 1.7 5.4 6.9 4.0 7.5 3.8 3.7 3.4 
Social Loan 7.9 7.9 11.6 7.6 9.0 14.8 6.0 5.9 10.0 
Car Loan 0.2 0.9 0.6 2.3 1.4 1.6 4.7 2.8 5.2 
Educational 
Loan 
2.6 1.7 3.5 5.3 2.3 6.2 7.2 7.7 9.2 
Mortgage 5.6 8.8 7.5 15.6 15.8 17.0 29.7 31.5 31.8 
Source: Data from the EFH 2007, 2009 and 2012 
 
In general, it is possible to outline main trends in the utilization of consumer credit for the last 
eight years, for which there is available information. In the first place, as the table below shows, it is 
noticeable that banks have implemented a more aggressive campaign to compete with department stores, 
targeting lower income population –though at a moderate pace. This is why the share of households from 
the low-income group with bank loans and credit cards increased between 2007 and 2012, while it 
remained very stable in the other segments. Likewise, department stores lost importance among low-
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income groups, whereas “social loans” issued by “Cajas de Compensación” that administer workers´ 
social benefits, and “other” (informal) debts gained increasing importance.  
There are different reasons behind the scenario aforementioned. While the expansion of “social 
loans” has to do with the fact that the so-called “Cajas” started lending money to low income consumers 
without taking any risks, the expansion of “informal debts” relates to the fact that during economic 
downturns Chilean families tend to resort to personal networks (informal debts) rather than formal loans, 
as it happened between 2007 and 2012 (see chapter 10).  
In principle, there are no big differences with regard to the gender of the heads of households 
holding debts. While women tend to have more department stores credit card debts (46% over 39.6% in 
2012), men use bank credit cards in a higher proportion (16% over 12.4% in 2012). This has to do with the 
fact that men enjoy better conditions in the labor sector, as well as the fact that department stores have 
targeted populations that do not get incomes and are less attractive to banks, such as housewives.  
With regard to age groups, heads of households aged between 35 and 49 years old hold higher 
levels of debts, with a total debt to annual income ratio close to 100%, which relates to the fact that 
mortgages are more important for this segment.78 This group is followed by consumers under 35, whose 
total debt represents in average almost 80% of their annual income. Household heads over 50 hold a 
similar debt to income ratio around 60% of their annual income, and it decreases in less than 30% for 
heads of households over 64 (the legal age for retirement for men in Chile).79  
Figure 28: Debt to Income Ratio and Share of Households with Different types of Debts by Age 
Group, 2012 
Source: Data taken from data from EFH 2012 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
'( The Central Bank of Chile suggests that an over-indebted household has a total debt to annual income ratio over 80% 
') The financialization of this group is very recent, and it has been fostered not only by department stores but also by “social 
loans” issued by “Cajas”. 
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6.2 THE DETERMINANTS OF HOUSEHOLDS´ DEBT 
One has to be careful when drawing conclusions from debt ratios. The reason is that there are 
important differences between mean and median values, which suggests that there are extreme values 
conditioning the ratios (Ruiz-Tagle/García/Miranda 2013). That being said, there are important aspects to 
take into consideration to understand the financialization of consumption in Chile, for which survey 
analyses are very informative. 
Levels of indebtedness and financial burdens of Chilean consumers have their own local 
specificities. In general, high interest rates charged by department stores not only made the business viable 
(as we saw in chapter 5), but they also explain the nature of the financial burden of Chilean households, 
characterized by a low total debt to annual income ratio, and a high monthly debt service (i.e. the share of 
monthly income that people have to allocate to honor their formal debts). Indeed, the total level of Chilean 
household debt as a share of the GDP is not as high as in other countries, which in cases such as Denmark, 
Holland, Ireland or Norway, to mention just a few, reaches considerably more than 100 percent of the 
national income (BC 2013). Nevertheless, the average debt to monthly income ratio is particularly high in 
comparison with other developed countries (around 17%), which is mainly explained by the relative 
importance of mortgage and consumer debts. While mortgage debts in Chile reach around 20% of total 
debts, such percentage in European countries is around 80%, which is also translated into a much higher 
total annual debt to income ratio. Consumer debts in Chile, on the other hand, are short-term and charge 
high interest rates, which makes the monthly burden of households particularly high at a lower level of 
total annual debt 
Figure 29: Total Debt to Annual Income Ratio and Monthly Debt Dervice in Chile, 2013 
 
    Source: Chart taken from BC (2010). 
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As it can be seen in the chart below, the monthly-debt-service in Chile ranges between 30 and 40% 
of household incomes. In this respect, two facts are important to keep in mind: Firstly, that higher levels of 
debt in Chile are held by high income and educated heads of households (completed education) aged 
between 35 and 44 (Ruiz-Tagle/García/Miranda 2013). That is why the bottom 20 percent of the income 
distribution concentrates no more than 10% of secured debts, while the richest 20% concentrates more 
than 50%. This has to do with the fact that high income households acquire real state property of 
considerably higher value than other income groups (Ruiz-Tagle/García/Miranda 2013). Secondly, 
although high-income consumers hold higher levels of debts, the monthly debt service is considerably 
higher for the bottom 50% of the income distribution (“low income” in the chart).  
Figure 30: Evolution of Financial Burden by Income Group 2007-2011 
Source: Data taken from from EFH 2007, 2009 and 2011. 
 
The chart also shows how these burdens fluctuated between 2007 and 2011 with the financial crisis 
in between, affecting the burden of poorer consumers more significantly.80 Thus, while middle-income 
groups experienced a relatively moderate increase in their monthly debt service ratio between 2007 and 
2009 (from 60.1 to 75.7%), it almost doubled for lower income households (from 48.8 to 86.6%). As 
expected, this is not related to a more intense utilization of consumer credits (defensive consumption 
hypothesis), but by the fact that their incomes dropped in significant ways due to higher unemployment 
rates (Ruiz-Tagle/García/Miranda 2013).81
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(# Between 2008 and 2009 Chilean households experienced a 7.5% reduction in their wealth; unemployment rate reached 10% 
and banks strengthened their credit policies (Álvarez/Opazo 2013). 
("!Along these lines, for example, Madeira (2012) estimated that an increase in unemployment rates from 7% to 10.5 between 
1990 and 2009 (similar to the one Chile experienced between 1998 and 2001) could increase the number of insolvent families 
by 3 to 4 times the normal rates.!
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The rising indebtedness of Chilean households has called the attention of scholars and policy 
makers alike, who tried to address the main determinants of over-indebtedness and default rates. In the 
spirit of monitoring risk, for example, the Central Bank of Chile defined a “risky debt” as a high debt to 
income ratio. Accordingly, the “negative financial margin” is the event in which the total spending of 
households exceeds their incomes in 20%, and the “monthly debt service” exceeds 50% and 75% of their 
income. In this scenario, 13.6% of Chilean households present a negative financial margin and a financial 
burden over 50% of their income, a group that concentrates the 20% of the total debt of households. The 
share of households with a financial burden over 75%, on the other hand, reaches 9.5%. 
The question now is: what are the reasons explaining debt levels? There are several ways to tackle 
this issue. Ruíz-Tagle and Vella (2010), for example, studied the relationship between the Chilean 
financial sector and household indebtedness, assessing the role of the relaxation of borrowing constraints 
as a potential inducer to higher levels of both consumer and mortgage debt. They define households with 
credit restriction as those that: a) have applied for a credit and have been rejected, or b) have not 
applied because they thought it would be rejected.82 Their econometric analysis reveals that the access 
to credit is determined by education level, housing assets and employment contract, all of them 
associated with the permanent income of households. Thus, for example, they estimate that the 
probability for a household head with primary education to face credit restrictions is 3% higher than a 
household head with elementary education. Following this logic, the possibility of facing credit 
restrictions of a household head with an employment contract decreases in 5%.  
Another way to address debt levels is to estimate their main determinants, which has been the 
concern of most scholars. In general, scholars recognize that models estimating both default rates and 
over-indebtedness are very heterogeneous.83 Among these estimations, there is at least one important 
remark that stands out as a consensus, which is that income related variables are the most important 
determinants of debt levels. Thus, for example, Fuenzalida/Ruiz-Tagle (2009) found that the income 
obtained through te employment is one of the most important factors explaining the over indebtedness of 
households. By the same token, Alfaro/Gallardo (2012) found that the only significant variables for both 
mortgage and consumer credit default are income and income-related variables, while individual and 
demographic variables only have effects that vary between the types of debt. Thus, the level of education 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 It is interesting that this conceptualization includes the expectations of households. Nevertheless, due to the construction of 
the data, it is impossible to distinguish which is more important. Furthermore, it is important to mention that sometimes people 
apply for amounts of credit that are per default above their possibilities. 
83 Meaning that results change depending on the source of data and the years of the survey; second, most models have a small 
R2; and third, their marginal effects are still economically relevant. Moreover, most models have a potential bias since they 
consider only those households that have debts. 
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affects the mortgage default more significantly, while the age of the household head and the members of 
the household are more important in the case of consumer credit default (Alfaro/Gallardo 2012).  
A second feature derived from existing estimations is that “income shocks are more prone to affect 
poorer consumers. This happens because, at the aggregate level, unemployment affects individuals 
differently. Assessing this issue, for example, Fuenzalida/Ruiz-Tagle (2009) estimate the effect of 
aggregate unemployment on the probabilities of individual unemployment and find that men have a 30% 
lesser probability of losing their jobs than women at any moment, individuals with superior education 
have around 30% less probability of losing their jobs than those with secondary and elementary education, 
and young workers are also more likely to lose their jobs. Including these probabilities of losing their jobs, 
the authors find that the number of households under financial stress increases between 13% and 16%, 
while the risky debt increases from 20% to 25%.  
In any case, due to the concentration of the debt on the high income households, an increase in 
unemployment rates could be translated into a significantly rise in financial risk only if it affects the 
higher income groups, which is, in turn, very unlikely to happen (BC 2010; Ruiz-Tagle/García/Miranda 
2013; Alfaro/Gallardo 2012). 
There is, in general, no doubt that “income shocks” are the main factor explaining debt levels and 
default rates, and these might have several sources, which are not appropriately addressed by these 
estimations. We can get a more precise picture of the reasons that can lead to a default from the EFH 
survey 2011/2012. The survey shows in the first place that “job loss” is by far the most important reason 
behind people´s defaults, followed by “health-related” problems and “higher expenditures”. These causes 
are of course stratified, and “job loss” and “accidents” affect more those workers from low income groups, 
while higher expenditures seem to be more important for high income groups. 
Figure 31: During the Last Twelve Months, did Any Event Prevent You From Paying Your Debts? 
Source: Data from EFH 2011/2012 
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Assessing the role played by different “shocks” or “structural factors” in explaining debt levels, 
Ruiz-Tagle/García/Miranda (2013) provide by far the most complete assessment of the determinants of 
debt levels. Their study uses the Social Protection Survey (EPS) and the Household Financial Survey 
(EFH) in different years to estimate the role of different “shocks” in a) the debt to income ratio, b) the 
probability of becoming over indebted in a cross sectional perspective, and c) the probability of becoming 
over-indebted over two periods. 
Shocks are operationalized as dummy variables in the models. “Income shocks” are drops of 
income generated by unemployment suffered by any household member; “health shocks” take place if a 
household member was hospitalized or underwent through surgery; and “educational shocks” take place if 
a household member studies at the university.   
For the EPS 2009, the authors report that the effects of “health shocks” are not important for any of 
the indicators. Income shocks, on the other hand, are relevant to determining the levels of debt, being 
significative for all models except the total debt to annual income ratio. These shocks are not altered with 
the introduction of socio-demographic variables. The most important demographic factor across models 
for different years is the number of household members, which seems to reduce debt levels. As expected, 
income quintiles are the most powerful predictors, which diminish the effect of all other variables when 
included, showing that higher incomes predict less levels of debt.  
The results for other years are similar. “Health shocks” do not seem to be relevant to explaining 
debt to income ratios, and “income shocks” are relevant to explaining the debt ratios of non-secured debt. 
These became more important after the 2008 crisis, augmenting their coefficient from 0.16 in 2006 to 0.39 
in 2009. “Educational shocks”, on the other hand, are relevant to estimating the total debt to annual 
income ratio in 2006 and 2009.  Taking the EFH 2009, educational shocks are significant in terms of the 
non-secured total debt to annual income ratio and total monthly debt service. This coincides with the years 
of the educational boom, diminishing its effects by 2009 when more students obtained student loans to 
afford their college education degrees. Health shocks, on the other hand, are relevant for the same years to 
explaining the monthly debt to income ratio.  
In relation to the probability of being over indebted (80% total debt to annual income ratio and 
50% for the monthly debt service), the results are heterogeneous. For the EPS 2009, “health shocks” seem 
to be relevant for both indicators but their effects vanish with socio-demographic controls. “Income 
shocks” seem to play an important role but their effects also diminish with the introduction of income 
quintiles (this might happen because the risk of being unemployed in Chile is very much determined by 
income levels; see Fuenzalida/Ruiz-Tagle (2009)). An important difference with regard to the previous 
models assessing debt levels is that socio-demographic factors seem to be more important to estimate the 
probability of being over-indebted. Years of education, age and having a family, they all reduce the 
probability of being over-indebted, even when controlled by income quintiles.  
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Table 9:The Determinants of Debt Levels, Summary 
Source: Table taken from Ruiz-Tagle/García/Miranda (2013) 
 
With regard to the probability of becoming over-indebted in 2009 while not in 2006, the results are 
also heterogeneous. “Health shocks”, for example, positively affect the probability of becoming over 
indebted in 2009, being stronger for total levels of debt than for non-secured debts.  “Income shocks”, on 
the other hand, do not exert a significant effect on the possibility of becoming over indebted from one 
period to another in all models. But “educational” shocks play a significant role in the probability of 
becoming over indebted, only when measured with the total debt to annual income ratio. 
Summarizing these findings (table below), one can say that the results of these estimations are 
heterogeneous, but there are some clear relationships that are worth exploring. In the case of cross-
sectional data, health shocks, unemployment and educational shocks are important in explaining 
household indebtedness, although in different ways. Health and educational shocks are consistently 
important in explaining the probability of being or becoming over indebted, but they are not important in 
explaining debt levels. In this respect, income shocks are by far the most important factor, because the 
incomes have a direct effect on the “debt to income ratios”.  Moreover, as the authors argue, lenders 
implement more restrictive policies when unemployment is higher and consumers can also anticipate drop 
in income.  
   
Health 
shocks 
Income 
shocks 
Educational 
shock 
Levels of 
Debts 
Total Debt to annual Income ratio - - - 
Non secured debt to annual Income ratio - 32% - 
Monthly total debt to income ratio - 121% - 
Monthly non secured debt to income ratio - 133% - 
Probability 
of being over 
indebted 
Total Debt to annual Income ratio - - 3.10% 
Non secured debt to annual Income ratio - - 1.6 
Monthly total debt to income ratio 3.20% - - 
Monthly non secured debt to income ratio - - - 
Variation of 
indebtedness 
between 
2006 and 
2009 
Total Debt to annual Income ratio 3.20% - 1.90% 
Non-secured debt to annual Income ratio 1.90% - 1.40% 
Monthly total debt to income ratio 3.30% - - 
Monthly non secured debt to income ratio 
2.30% - - 
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The important role of income-related variables in determining debt levels has to do with the fact 
that indebtedness increases when income drops. But these estimations do not say too much about debts 
themselves. An interesting clue provided by these estimations is that there seems to be a relation with the 
commodification of education and health, which goes in line with the idea that the privatization of risks 
exerts an important effect on the budget of households. The particular mechanisms that explain how this 
happens, however, will be assessed in part III of the dissertation. Now, I seek to complement these 
estimations by exploring the relation between socioeconomic variables and the likelihood of having 
different types of debts. 
6.3 TO BECOME INDEBTED OR NOT, THAT IS THE QUESTION 
In general, estimations of debt levels are based on the assumption that people already have 
financial obligations with different institutions, and the underlying idea is to estimate what factors bring 
about changes in debts levels in relation to income. That is why most studies use a sub-sample of 
households that actually have debts. But there are no estimations of why people might have acquired those 
debts in the first place. Trying to tackle this issue, I use the EFH 2007 and perform logistic regressions to 
assess the likelihood of having different types of consumer credit, such as department stores, bank 
consumer loans and bank credit cards.84  
The analyses presented here consider the household as the unit of analysis, represented in the 
database by 3,828 heads of households that are expected to provide relevant information. A dummy 
variable was created for each type of debt, with value “1” when households report an amount of debt over 
0 and “0” when the amount of debts is 0 or information is not reported.85  
As socio-demographic control variables, I included gender, age group, educational level and 
number of household members. Then, I successively included the number of household members 
generating expenditures in education, occupational status, income group and homeownership. The 
underlying idea behind including “the number of household members generating expenditures in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 I use the EFH 2007 because it contains the information of household members generating expenditures on education, and 
also because it reflects the debt levels previous to the crises in 2008 and regulations of interest rates carried in 2012 (that 
excluded many families from the financial sector). 
85 The analysis is carried in the software Stata 13.1 using the command svy:logistic for complex survey data. Tables in appendix 
present Odds ratios. The analyses are run with and without weight factors, showing similar results in most cases. The only 
exception is for department store debts, for which educational levels are significant and positively related factors. This might 
occur because the survey oversamples households from the high-income group. 
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education” is that existing estimations that include “educational shocks” (a household member studying at 
the university) overlook the role of expenditures on education in two ways. Firstly, because many families 
send their children to “subsidized” and “private” schools, and spend considerable amount of resources on 
educating their children. Secondly, because many students that enter the university acquire long-term 
educational loans that are not reflected in the monthly debt to income ratio. In order to assess the role 
played by current expenditures on education, we introduce a categorical variable based on how many 
household members actually create expenditures on education. This would portray both school and college 
expenditures. Furthermore, this is not considered a “shock” since families incorporate these payments into 
the monthly budget for several years (12 in the case of subsidized and private schools and at least 5 at 
college). The categorical variable considers “none”, “one” and “more than two” members generating 
expenditures. Furthermore, the variable “Homeownership” is included to assess the role of “being” or 
“becoming” homeowner in the case of those paying for their houses (which includes bank mortgages and 
government housing loans). The results are reported in appendix E. 
For the three types of debts analyzed (department store debt, bank consumer loan and bank credit 
card debt), being a male is significantly and positively correlated with the odds of having a bank credit 
card, everything else equal, but it is not significant for the other types of debt. With regard to age, being 
“over 65” is the only significant age group when controls are added, and in comparison to those heads of 
households under 35, they are less likely to have both department store credit and bank loans (the relation 
is not significant for bank credit cards). Educational level, on the other hand, presents different results. 
While higher levels of education increase the odds of having a bank credit card in comparison with those 
heads of households that only have elementary education, only having secondary education or a college 
degree increase the likelihood of having a department store debt (in comparison with those that only 
attended primary school). Unlike bank credit cards, having a graduate degree is not significant to explain 
the odds of having a department store debt. Finally, the effects of educational levels are significantly and 
positively correlated with the odds of having a bank loan until income is added as a control variable. The 
reasons for this are not entirely clear, but one can argue that this may relate to supply controls in at least 
two ways. On the one hand, it might be explained by the fact that lenders use educational level to assess 
qualities different from income, such as economic stability,  pre-disposition to cancell their debts, or the 
ability to find a job in case of unemployment. But, on the other hand, the model measures the effect of 
family income, while lenders care about individual income for which educational level serves as a proxy. 
In this sense, specifying the effect of education on the odds of having debts would require to deeppen into 
the classification systems used by these lenders. 
The odds of having a department store debt augment with the number of household members, but 
in the case of bank loans and credit cards, additional households’ members are not significant when 
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income variables are added. As I will venture in chapter 9, this relates to the fact that the utilization of 
department store credit cards is directly related to the density of family networks and family-related social 
commitments. 
An important factor seems to be the number of households’ members generating expenditures on 
education, which is significantly and positively related to the odds of having the three types of debts. 
Having one household member generating expenditures on education increases the odds of having a 
department store debt, while more than two household members generating these expenditures increases 
the odds of having a bank loan or bank credit card debt, even when income controls are added. As I will 
argue in the last part of the dissertation, this might occur because expanding education will put a direct 
pressure on the budgets of Chilean families that allocate higher shares of their discretionary incomes to 
cope with educational “arms race”.  
Being employed is significative and positively correlated with having a bank loan debt, while it is 
not significant in the cases of department store and bank credit card debts. This is something one can 
expect, since bank loans are usually solicited and consumers are constantly re-evaluated, while credit card 
holders have available room in their balances regardless of their occupational status.86  
Income groups are also significantly and positively correlated with the odds of having bank 
consumer loans or bank credit card debts, but not with the odds of having a department store debt. This 
goes in line with the lending policies and framing techniques deployed by banks and department stores. 
While the former have more demanding income requirements, department stores have very flexible 
policies and lend money to very low-income consumers, and even to groups that do not receive incomes at 
all, such as housewives. 
Finally, homeownership has a significant positive effect on the odds of having consumer debts, 
although it does it in different ways. Currently “paying one´s home” increases the odds of having bank 
loan debts in comparison with “not owing a home” at all (living with a relative or renting). In a similar 
vein, “homeownership situation” has a significant effect on the odds of having a bank credit card debt, 
although it operates in different directions. While being “owner” of an already “paid home” decreases the 
odds of having a bank credit card debt, being “owner” but still be “paying for one´s home” augments the 
odds of having these debts in comparison with non-homeowners.  
Similarly, “still be paying for one´s home” augments the odds of having bank loans, but owing an 
already “paid house” does not exert any significant effect on the odds of having bank loans. Finally, being 
homeowner exerts a positive and significant effect on the odds of having department stores debts, 
regardless of whether one is currently paying for the home or it is already paid. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 It is important to keep in mind that the dummy variables consider if the household has a debt, which is different from saying 
that they have or do not have a credit card. 
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The effects of homeownership on the odds of having different types of consumer debt will become 
very evident in the next chapters. As I will show in part II of the dissertation, expanding homeownership 
has been one of the main driving forces of financialization for both poorer and middle class families. 
Chileans are, in general, very inclined towards the idea of improving, decorating and furnishing their 
“own homes”, while they seem more reluctant to make any transformations or investments when they do 
not owe their homes. This is why becoming a homeowner and moving to one´s home will turn out to be a 
crucial turning point in which people start using bank loans to make home improvements in the case of 
better-off families.  Department stores, on the other hand, will be systematically deployed to buy home 
appliances across all the social structure. Finally, credit-stories will reveal that people paying for their 
mortgages have to make extra efforts to improve their homes, resorting mainly to bank loans to make 
major transformations. 
Summing up, educational levels and income can be considered as supply control variables, whose 
signs and significance make perfect sense in the light of lending policies and segmentations of the market. 
But educational expenditures and homeownership suggest that there are other phenomena at stake, which 
are usually neglected. Being a homeowner might be a supply factor because it means that consumers 
actually have assets (collaterals). But most people in Chile are homeowners, and homeownership is still 
significant when income variables are added (the most important supply control). In the next chapters, I 
will show the crucial connection between being a homeowner and acquiring consumer debts across 
different income groups. Finally, these analyses also provide interesting clues about the importance of 
health shocks and expenditures on education in increasing debt levels, as well as in the odds of generating 
these debts. This raises the question about the particular mechanisms underlying these relations, which 
will be further assessed in part III of the dissertation. 
In general, the structural factors determining default rates and over-indebtedness are of crucial 
interest in understanding how the financialization of consumption turns debts into a new source of risks, 
especially for the less protected families. Nevertheless, although this provides the general picture of the 
indebtedness of Chilean families, it tells us, however, too little about why they acquire these debts, the 
consumption practices used with different types of credit, how they take risks, make calculations and 
handle their debts. If the “determinants” of debt levels in Chile reviewed here make any sense (or not), is 
an empirical question that has to be grasped from a different angle. In the following chapters, I will further 
explore these relations and suggests new venues to think of the financialization of consumption in Chile 
by a) looking into socio-cultural dynamics shaping consumption and financial patterns, as well as b) by 
uncovering the “black box” of households and their actual financial practices. The question that concerns 
this work now is why and how people consume with credit in contexts of improvement, and how this 
relates to the determinants of debts sketched here. 
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Growth, Inequality and the “Status Anxiety” Hypothesis 
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INTRODUCTION 
Why do people expand their consumption, and why do they even acquire debts to do so? If one 
cannot resort to “wage stagnation” to explain the indebtedness of Chilean consumers, what is the role of 
economic growth and inequality in this process?  
I have already argued in chapter 5 that the indebtedness of Chilean families has been directly 
related to the expansive cycles of the economy and that, accordingly, many people seemed to have 
acquired debts in contexts of improvement and positive expectations. But why do they acquire consumer 
debts at all?  
A simple answer to this question would be that Chileans actually take credit because they are 
“doing better”, and that, in this context, it is rational to acquire debts for two reasons: i) consumers smooth 
their consumption throughout the life cycle by acquiring and accumulating assets and wealth during their 
work-life; and ii) because positive expectations are a crucial condition to acquire debts. 
There is, of course, some truth in these statements: most Chileans do not use credit to deal with 
income shocks but to expand their purchasing power; they use them to acquire a package of durable goods 
throughout their life-course, and the financialization of consumption has been marked by positive 
expectations with regard to the economic cycle. But what does that tell us about the reasons people have to 
consume with credit? What are then the institutional and political foundations behind the rising debts of 
households? Is it not the same to say, “People acquire debts because they want to”? In other words, with 
this type of answer, as Abbott (2004, p.35) puts it, “Essentially, microeconomics is telling us that if we 
can explain what people want to do, it can then explain that they do it. So what.”. 
Furthermore, that people smooth their consumption throughout their life-course might be true, but 
the question is “why?” As it will be shown, decisions over the life cycle are very important to understand 
the financialization of consumption not because consumers make a rational planning of their consumption, 
but because there are normative expectations associated with life-transitions and appropriate standards of 
living. Indeed, most people in Chile do not invest in expensive durables (only 16% has mortgages) but in 
home appliances and smaller items that are replaced once in a while (provided that they are not buying 
clothing or paying-off other debts). Moreover, it is true that there should be at least some certainty with 
regard to one´s future income, but most people do not think of debts in this way and rather resort to simple 
heuristics to assess their financial capacity.  
To answer the questions posed here, I rather embrace a different point of view, which is that in 
order to understand the financialization of consumption it is necessary to embed consumer´s decisions in 
their real social context, i.e. within their ongoing social relations (Granovetter 2002), relevant institutions 
(Fligstein 2001), and cultural templates (Zukin/DiMaggio 1990; Beckert 2007). In general terms, this 
means that it is necessary to account for the role played by growth, inequality and the privatization of risks 
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alltogether in shaping material practices in the domestic sphere. More specifically, it means paying 
attention to the intertwinement of people´s aspirations, their normative expectations and shared beliefs. 
Hence, my answer to the question of why people consume with credit in contexts of improvement 
takes these ideas seriously and anticipates the following working hypothesis:  
The fact that standards of living grow at a higher pace than wages creates a gap between 
aspirations and incomes. This gap raises a major concern about “rank”, “achievement” and 
"security" that I called -borrowing de Botton´s (2004) concept- "status anxiety". The status anxiety 
of Chilean families is expressed in two different but related concerns: the will to take part in the 
benefits of growth, and the fear of falling behind. These two sources of status anxiety exert 
different effects on the financial and consumption practices of households. The former creates 
pressures to perform belonging to an imaginary middle class that demands ever-expanding 
standards of consumption; and the latter pushes people to deploy "position-taking" strategies and 
invest increasing shares of their budgets in improving or ensuring their positions in society. 
Undertaking these endeavors, most Chilean families progressively incorporated consumer credit as 
an expansion of their purchasing power. 
Indeed, the idea that mismatches between expectations and actual income usually take place in 
contexts of growth, and that this produces “status anxiety” or, broadly speaking, social unrest, is not new 
at all. Classical authors from the second half of the twentieth century such as Galbraith (1999) and 
Inglehart (2007) argued that problems of a different nature arise when a certain threshold of affluence is 
reached. This not only relates to a shift from material concerns to post-materialist values, but also to the 
fact that surpluses or affluence bring its own problems and phenomena, such as fashion, as classic social 
theorists Veblen and Simmel suggested (Simmel/Levine 1971; Veblen 1994).  
Broadly speaking, social theorists such as Marx or Tocqueville made a similar point when arguing 
that revolutions, for instance, take place when there is a gap between rising aspirations and actual 
deprivation in contexts of prosperity (Davies 1962). From this perspective, the notion of “status anxiety”, 
as I used it here, resembles the concept of “relative deprivation”, according to which actors perceive a 
discrepancy between “the goals and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably 
entitled” and “the amount of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep” 
(Majeed 1979, p.141). In this regard, no one could summarize the perspective adopted here as Marx did: 
“A noticeable increase in wages presupposes a rapid growth of productive capital. The rapid 
growth of productive capital brings about an equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social wants, 
social enjoyments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the workers have risen, the social satisfaction 
that they give has fallen in comparison with the increase enjoyments of the capitalist, which are 
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inaccessible to the worker, in comparison with the state of development of society in general. Our 
desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the 
objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative 
nature.” (Marx (2012), quoted in Davies (1962,p. 5)). 
According to this perspective, the “status anxiety” hypothesis brings together the main insights of 
consumption sociology and political economy by connecting the role played by broad institutional 
arrangement, inequality and the “everyday making” of the standards of living.  Following this idea, this 
part of the dissertation is devoted to showing how the first source of “status anxiety” -the “will to 
participate in the benefits of growth”- illuminates the financialization of consumption. The role played by 
the second source of “status anxiety” will be addressed in part III.  
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CHAPTER 7 INEQUALITY, STANDARDS OF LIVING AND SOCIAL COMPARISON  
The current chapter anticipates the “status anxiety” hypothesis in five steps. Firstly, I outline major 
trends in inequality in Chile during the last twenty years in order to magnify the inequality we are talking 
about. Then, I provide international evidence to support the idea that inequality plays a major role in 
shaping people´s indebtedness, even though the way this happens has not been empirically proven. To fill 
this gap, I will then depart from standard economic explanations and rely on sociological approaches to 
show how inequality could possibly affect the financialization of consumption in Chile. Fourthly, from 
this I move on to look in more detail into the distribution of the benefits of growth in order to put the role 
of material improvements of poorer consumers in perspective. This provides the key insights to show in 
the last section how these improvements and inequality shaped the financialization of consumption among 
poorest consumers. 
7.1 THE EVOLUTION OF INEQUALITY IN CHILE 
Chilean families benefited from sustained economic growth during most of the nineties and the 
2000´s, experiencing an important improvement of their material condition associated with an increase of 
real wages and targeted social policies. This translated -as the chart below shows- in that an important 
share of families moved out of poverty, as well as processes of upward social mobility and 
transformations in the social structure. This raised the question about why people acquired debts if their 
economic situation is better than it was in the past, showing that the acquisition of consumer debts in Chile 
is less related to times of crises and expands in times of prosperity. In this scenario, one could expect 
inequality to play an important role in explaining the social dynamics underlying people´s behavior in 
contexts of growth. But what inequality are we exactly talking about? 
       Source: Data from the Socio-economic Survey CASEN87 
 
Inequality in Chile is a historical phenomenon. As Contreras (1999) shows, the per capita income 
Gini coefficient between 1957 and 1996 decreased under 0.50 only during the government of Salvador 
Allende in the early 1970´s. Adjusting by economies of equivalence, Contreras shows that the magnitudes 
of inequality have been very stable throughout many decades. At least in the last two decades, as I argued 
before, the benefits of growth were unevenly distributed and wealth concentrated on top earners, high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Poverty refers to the share of households whose members do not satisfy “basic needs” according to a set of goods. The 
“poverty threshold” for urban areas in 1990 reached around USD 120, while in 2011 it reached around USD 150 (prices of 
2011). Indigent accounts for those households whose members do not satisfy “minimum alimentary needs”. The “indigent line” 
for urban areas in 1990 reached around USD 65 and around USD 75 in 2011 (prices of 2011). 
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skilled workers and owners of capital. In this scenario, the sharp reduction in poverty coexisted with 
persistent levels of income inequality, to the extent that the Gini coefficient for the period 1990-2011 
fluctuated between 0.52 and 0.58. 
In general, as Solimano/Torche (2008) argue, the underlying problem in Chile seems to be the 
excessive concentration of income on the very top of the income distribution, basically because income 
inequality among the first nine income deciles is much less pronounced when the richer 10 percent is 
excluded, as one can immediately notice in the chart below. 
Figure 32: Average Household Percapita Monthly Income by Income Decile 2011, Excluding 
Government Transferences (average USD 2011) 
Source: Data from the Socioeconomic Survey, CASEN 2011. 
But this is still an inaccurate picture. Data collected through self-reported income surveys 
underestimate the levels of inequality in important ways. This happens because rich families tend to 
understate their incomes, but more importantly because income data do not include any form of capital 
returns. This is a crucial issue since the Chilean tax system created during the Pinochet era allows 
investors to avoid paying taxes on their profits, provided that these are not distributed among shareholders 
and kept in a specific fund that is meant to foster investment called FUT (Fund of Tributary Profits). Since 
income taxes are much higher than corporate taxes (40% and 18% respectively), there are strong 
incentives to keep these profits in the FUT and not declare them as part of incomes. Nevertheless, in the 
end, these non-distributed profits do not necessarily foster investments, but become liquid capital of 
companies, raising their value on the stock market and benefiting shareholders through higher capital 
gains that are not subject to taxation (López/Figueroa/Gutiérrez 2013). 
Tackling these issues, López/Figueroa/Gutiérrez (2013) collected reliable income data from the 
Internal Tax Service (Servicio de Impuestos Internos) and estimated the real wealth of top 1%, 0.1% and 
0.01% earners considering their capital (or non-distributed profits kept in the FUT). As the chart below 
shows, the participation of the total income of the richest 1% for the period 2005-2010 increases at least 
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5% when calculated with data from tax revenues rather than from self-reported income, without 
considering yet the non-distributed profits. Thus, while according to the national socio-economic survey, 
the average share of total income that the top 1% concentrates is 15.1; this figure rises to 21.1% average 
with data from Internal Tax Services.  Compared to 17 countries for which there are available data, the 
authors report that Chile´s concentration of wealth on the top 1% is 20 percent higher than the second 
most concentrated country, the United States.  In this scenario, the Gini coefficient for 2010, for example, 
rises from 0.55 to 0.58, which means that inequality in Chile is even higher than what is usually reported. 
Figure 33: Share of Total Income of Richest 1% 
 
Source: Data taken from López/Figueroa/Gutiérrez (2013) 
 
Finally, if non-distributed profits of private companies are included, one can witness even more 
pronounced levels of wealth concentration, where in 2010 the richest 1% concentrated 31.1% of the 
national income. Taking into consideration these non-distributed profits, the Gini coefficient jumps from 
0.55 (calculated with income surveys) to 0.63. 
In this scenario, there are good reasons for thinking that inequality might play a key role in shaping 
the financial practices of Chilean families. The question now is how does inequality exactly affect the 
indebtedness of people across all social strata in contexts of general material improvement? Showing this 
from a sociological perspective is still a pending issue in the specialized literature. To start with, one can 
rely on some international evidence and the works of economists that sought to quantify this relation. 
7.1.1 INEQUALITY AND DEBTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 
There is strong evidence suggesting that inequality plays a crucial role in the financialization of 
consumption by radicalizing the effects of social comparison. Nowadays, this perspective gained salience 
to account for the rising levels of household indebtedness in the US for the sake of rising inequality. This 
is somehow expectable because income inequality is after all a form of social differentiation where one 
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group -top earners- shapes the consumption dynamics of the rest, the non-rich (and according to 
sociologists “vice-versa”). In this vein, in strong contrast with the Privatized Keynesianism hypothesis, 
some economists88 followed the main intuitions of Duesenberry´s “Relative Income Hypothesis” that 
stressed the role of social norms, interdependence and reference groups in the definition of consumption 
levels. Based on this hypothesis, they offer an alternative to Friedman´s “Permanent Income Hypothesis” 
and Modigliani´s “Life-Cycle Hypothesis”, estimating the effects of inequality on consumption patterns. 
To make this contrast clearer, these studies can be encompassed under the name of the “trickle-down 
consumption” hypothesis. In concrete terms, it is a “soft” version of Veblen´s theory of conspicuous 
consumption, which states that concentration of wealth at the top of the income distribution creates 
pressures in the form of cascades on those consumers behind in the ladder to imitate their consumption 
patterns. Since wages remain stagnant but pressures to consume increase, consumers systematically use 
credit to close the gap between aspirations and constraints. 
 Cynamon/Fazzari (2008), for example, argued that consumer preferences should be understood as 
endogenous and historically contingent. They stress the role of “consumption norms” created through the 
media exposure and reference groups, mimetic behavior in contexts of uncertainty, or simply habits and 
lifestyles, which affect the utility of consumption. In a similar way, Barba/Pivetti (2009) hold that 
acquired standards of living tend to determine their consumption levels, explaining the inelasticity of 
workers´ consumption in the face of income shocks. 
This framework has already been put at work by Christen/Morgan (2005), who argued that “the 
need for conspicuous consumption to maintain or increase social standing within a community, combined 
with increasing income inequality, leads to an escalation of household debt, all else equal.” 
(Christen/Morgan 2005, p.4). Studying 84 quarters of aggregated data between 1980 and 2000 in the US, 
the authors find a strong and positive correlation between income inequality and total household debt, as 
well as different types of debts. Moreover, this effect is especially stronger for non-revolving credit and 
these effects are also stronger than those associated with changes in interest rates. For example, they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88  According to the “Life-Cycle Hypothesis” individuals redistribute their purchasing power among different periods of their 
lives in order to maximize their lifetime utility through saving and borrowing. Since incomes are usually smaller at early stages 
of the life-cycle, increase in the middle, and draw back with retirement, consumers seek to smooth their consumption by 
borrowing during the early low-income stage, build wealth and repay their debts during the high income-stages, and spend 
savings during retirement. Besides the traditional critiques to the “expected utility theory”, what is problematic of economic 
explanation is that the underlying assumptions that individuals have expectations of increasing future incomes and that 
borrowing and consumption raise private household utility are both questioned in the context of flexible labor markets and 
changing economic cycles. (Montgomerie 2006).  
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document that the impact of a 10% increase of the gini coefficient on the level of non-housing debts is 
44% bigger than the effect of interest rates.  
 Bertrand/Morse (2013) provide by far the most complete account of the trickle-down consumption 
effect by researching on the consumption expenditures of "non-rich" consumers and showing that "middle 
income households consume a larger share of their current income when exposed to higher upper income 
and consumption." (Bertrand/Morse 2013, p.1). This effect is also more important among households in 
the middle of the income distribution, i.e. between percentiles 20th and 80th. (They discuss five 
alternative explanations to this finding, summarized in appendix F) 
The most convincing explanation for these authors is a modified version of the "supply-driven 
demand" hypothesis, according to which the consumption of richer consumers trigger a rising demand for 
more expensive goods (while other goods remain unchanged), which might operate mainly via 
social comparison. Following a similar logic of the “catching up with the joneses” hypothesis (people 
emulate their main reference groups, mostly their neighbors), they make sense out of their findings by 
relying on Frank´s notion of "expenditures cascades", according to which the consumption of a given 
household is positively affected by the consumption of those households whose consumption is just above 
theirs (Frank 2007). This is supported by the fact that the data show that the sensitivity of budget shares to 
top income levels changes with the income elasticity or visibility of expenditure categories.89  
Summing up, this evidence shows two things: firstly, that inequality is an important factor behind 
the rising indebtedness of households. Secondly, that underlying explanations should be found in social 
rather than individual, economic or physiological factors. Nevertheless, to our ends, it is not enough to 
point out the existence of high levels of inequality and outline a few hypotheses about how this might 
have fostered rising indebtedness. There are two main reasons for this: Firstly, this sort of 
“sociologization” of economics –which I would argue goes in the right direction- has not led to empirical 
accounts of the relation between household indebtedness and the socially constructed standards of living. 
Economists are very good at providing estimations of the effects of inequality on other variables, but fall 
short in showing the particular mechanisms that led people to acquire debts in these contexts. In this 
regard, for example, most hypotheses reduce consumption to its “emulative” or “conspicuous” forms, 
providing a partial and poor picture of the social dynamics underlying the successful expansion of 
consumer debts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 This is further explored by recent analyzes carried out by Kamakura and Yuxing Du (2012), who have shown that the utility 
of households depends on the changing economic conditions. Classifying goods according to their “essentiality” and 
“visibility”, they have demonstrated that the relative share of non-essential goods that are publicly consumed decrease in the 
context of economic recessions, while essential goods consumed under less visible circumstances gain importance.  
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Secondly, one still has to show how inequality shapes indebtedness in a context where most people 
experience material improvements, meaning that the basic assumption that wages remain static does not 
hold true. To close this gap, I outline in the following section a framework to think about the role of 
inequality in shaping the financial behavior of households in contexts of material improvements and 
economic growth. 
7.1.2 INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL COMPARISON 
Why does inequality lead to more debts? And what is the role of social comparison in shaping 
consumption expectations? At this point, one has to depart from the work of economists. Following the 
suggestions of consumption sociology, happiness studies and psychology, I argued in chapter two that, to 
tackle this issue, it is necessary to move away from individualistic notions of consumption and utility 
maximization. There are many reasons for this. As several studies have shown “…judgments of personal 
well-being are made by comparing one´s objective status with a subjective living level norm, which is 
significantly influenced by the average level of living of the society as a whole.” (Easterlin 1995, p. 36). 
In this line of argument, assessing the role of comparisons studies have shown, for instance, a negative 
effect of local average earnings on self-reported happiness (Frey/Stutzer 2002), which goes in line with 
the idea that people´s income aspirations are formed in relation to social comparisons. Furthermore, 
reported subjective wellbeing depends, to a great extent, on the gap between reported aspirations and 
households´ incomes.90  
From a social-psychological point of view, this happens because the evaluation of goods and one´s 
situation is always contextual and depends on the possessions and situations of others, as well as the 
magnitude of our expectations. On the one hand, we know that people consistently prefer to acquire goods 
of less quality (such as smaller houses) if the ones they own are considered better (bigger) than those of 
others, rather than having better ones in absolute terms (bigger houses) that are worse in comparison with 
others´ possessions (Frank 2005a). On the other hand, anxiety and frustration might stem from a gap 
between people´s expectations and the constraints they face to materialize them, an idea that one can 
easily extend to the social level. The faster the pace with which a society creates expectations of 
consumption for their citizens, the higher the likelihood that some of them will be frustrated and will share 
a feeling that their incomes are not good enough.  
In any case, both expectations and the ability to fulfill them, as well as the extent to which the 
members of a community systematically engage in social comparison, are always socially determined. As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 In any case, we still do not know too much about the marginal utility of income and how it relates, for example, with the 
sources of income (higher incomes coming from more work hours or stressful jobs might not increase subjective well-eing).  
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the philosopher de Botton (2005) argues, the “anxiety” that stems from social comparison seems to be 
characteristic of modern societies, and people nowadays are more anxious about their status and position 
than nowhere else in history. As De Botton study shows, the increase in wealth, food supply, consumer 
goods, scientific knowledge, physical security, economic opportunities and life expectancy, brought about 
a rise in levels of "status anxiety" among ordinary western citizens, by which is meant a rise in levels of 
concern about importance, achievement and income; citing his words, "A sharp decline in actual 
deprivation may paradoxically have been accompanied by a continuing and even increased sense of 
deprivation and a fear of it."(de Botton 2005, p. 45) This happens because, unlike pre-modern societies 
where one´s position in social order is given, modern societies are meant to be essentially “meritocratic”, 
citizens are considered all “equal”, and people´s success or failure should not depend on their ascriptions 
but on their own effort. This is at least what we strongly want to believe.  91  
If “status anxiety” refers to the exclusive concern about “rank” and “achievement” that people 
achieve in modern societies, it is possible to go beyond De Botton and argue that existing distributional 
arrangements can induce “status anxiety” by unevenly distributing opportunities and constrains, as well as 
shaping patterns of social comparison and competition. Thus, a concern about rank might be very 
demanding, for example, when hierarchies become ambiguous in contexts of changing social boundaries 
(markers of distinction change); or when lifestyles are threatened in cases of lack of a safety net. By the 
same token, one can expect that in societies where the consumption of “positional goods” expands, for 
example, people might feel “anxious” about their own possessions and have the feeling of being “falling 
behind”.   
This idea is further supported by the traditional theory of reference groups, according to which 
individuals tend to identify themselves with advantaged groups in societies that have high rates of upward 
mobility (Merton/Kitt 1997). In this sense, the inducement of “status anxiety” is a crucial way in which 
the actions of others (especially in the sense of Bourdieu distinctions or position-taking strategies) create a 
dissonance between one´s position as compared to others, what Lahire (2008) calls “self-distinction”. 
These are the basic social foundations that allow social comparison to emerge and become crucial 
in shaping people´s aspirations. In this scenario, the connection between social comparison and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 It is important to avoid confusion and mention that “status anxiety” is different from the notion of “status inconsistency”. 
“Status inconsistency” occurs when there is an imbalance between the positions of an individual in different status hierarchies 
(Lenski 1954). In this case, the researcher has to construct scales in order to rank status in different fields -typically education, 
income and occupation- and look for inconsistencies among them. As a methodological prescription, such scales should be 
comparable (Hartman 1974). Thus, “status inconsistency” of an individual (such as highly educated but low income) is used to 
account for other behaviors such as political preferences, migration patterns or alcoholism (Lee/Toney/Berry 2009). Of course, 
individuals occupying “inconsistent positions” might be quite anxious about their status, but the concern about rank and 
achievement (status anxiety) might well have many other sources. 
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consumption becomes clearer because, as Weber/Roth/Wittich (2013) point out, consumption in market 
economies is not only segmented by socioeconomic strata but it becomes in itself a variable of social 
segmentation. Thus, following the tradition that goes from Weber to Veblen and to Bourdieu, one can 
argue that the dynamics of class differentiation are crucial to understand consumption, and the socially 
constructed standards of living underlying the expansion of consumer credit.  
From this perspective, the answer to the question of whether something is “enough or not” has 
social roots, which is that we arrive at such decisions by comparing our condition with that of a reference 
group, with people we consider as equals (or at least potentially equal) although they are not part of our 
own groups (Merton 1963). Accordingly, one can say that if credit closes a gap between expectations and 
incomes, it might be because we have the feeling that everybody else is doing better, and that we are not 
what we can potentially be. After all, as De Botton puts it, "It is the feeling that we might be something 
other than what we are - a feeling transmitted by the superior achievements of those we take to be our 
equals -that generates anxiety and resentment." (de Botton 2005, p. 46).92  
An important implication that derives from this is that the standards of living against which we 
contrast our own situation are changing all the time, and those things we recognize as sources of “status”, 
“necessary” or simply “comfortable”, change in relation to one another.  In a metaphorical sense, one 
could think of the relation between status, necessities and wellbeing, for example, as the forms of colors 
projected by a kaleidoscope. The Oxford Dictionary defines a kaleidoscope as a “toy consisting of a tube 
containing mirrors and pieces of colored glass or paper, whose reflections produce changing patterns when 
the tube is rotated.” It works by the multiple reflections produced by several mirrors placed at a certain 
angle from one another. As with the kaleidoscope, the socially constructed notions of needs, 
wellbeing and status underlying consumption patterns work as a system of relations that reflect upon each 
other, for which a change in its parts is reflected upon its general form.  In simpler terms, if one had asked 
people in Chile in the early 1990´s to classify cellphones, they would have most likely told you that they 
were luxurious devices for wealthy people; while in the 2010´s having a personal number, being reachable 
and able to check your emails and social networks 24 hours a day is considered by many almost a 
necessity. This change of a single good from a “luxury” to a “necessary” thing means that with the 
incorporation of smartphones into the “standard package” the frontier that defines what “needs” are is 
extended and reflected upon the definition of what “luxury” or “wellbeing” mean as well. This is why a 
society that experiences growth and a certain degree of affluence is less concerned about alimentary 
restrictions or sanitary services, and more oriented to the acquisition of technology, beauty products and 
education.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 As a consequence, if it is proximity what generates envy, and we only envy those we consider as equal, one should seriously 
consider the question of whom do we consider as equal in a society that experiences structural changes.  
 
	   	  
141 
Now imagine that through a span of twenty years the same change of goods from “luxury” to 
“everyday” or “ordinary” goods applies equally to a wide range of things and practices such as computers, 
housing, vacation, internet access, clothing, cars, sports, recreational activities, and so forth. Things get 
messy and the shape of our kaleidoscope changes in unpredictable ways; consumption expands, lifestyles 
standards and reference points to compare one another change substantively, to the extent that establishing 
parameters to assess and classify household budgets in a static way is a complicated -if not impossible- 
task. 
The dynamism of standards of living triggers important social processes. With the total level of 
consumption ratcheted up across social strata, social codes associated with consumption, people´s 
expectations and markers of status also change. Moreover, economic growth certainly changes the life of 
many families and provides them with more opportunities. But in a context of generalized improvement, 
the absolute social mobility and rising consumption levels of those previously classified as “poor" is not 
necessarily reflected in a better position in relative terms. As I show in the following section, non-poor 
people might live better, but they might well still consider that they are just satisfying “basic needs” and 
feel anxious about their status in society where everybody else is far “better-off”.  
The consequence of adopting such relational point of view is that the expansion of consumption is 
not only driven by the search for “status”, but also through the constitution of shared expectations about 
what is a proper life, what legitimate aspirations are, how to reach them, and what the markers of success 
in the quest for the desired lifestyle are. Not taking into consideration these elements is problematic, 
especially in a country that underwent deep structural changes and economic growth, because it provides a 
wrong picture of the wellbeing of households that “fall behind” the consumption levels that a society 
defines as appropriate. If one wants to consider how inequality shapes the financial and consumption 
practices of households, it is necessary to think in terms of relative rather than absolute measurements.   
With these elements now settled, it is possible to move on and elucidate how it is possible that 
consumers that experience material improvements end up acquiring debts in a systematic fashion, and 
what that has to do with high and persistent levels of inequality. The next step in this direction is to 
characterize the material improvements of different socioeconomic groups, and to what extent they 
benefited from economic growth. With this contextual background, I first explore the financialization of 
low-income consumers. Later on, in chapter 9 and 10, I address the financialization of the so-called “new 
middle classes”. 
7.2 GROWTH, INEQUALITY AND CREDIT AMONG THE POOR  
What is the nature of the material improvements among the poorest families in Chile and how does 
this relate to rising debts? The sharp reduction in poverty in Chile had different causes. The main source 
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of income of Chilean families are wages, which represent around 80% of monetary income (which 
includes state transferences and other benefits), and wage earners represent around 70 percent of the labor 
force (Reinecke/Valenzuela 2011). Seen from the perspective of the marginal contribution of each source 
of income, it is noticeable that an increase in wages accounts for half of the increase in real wages during 
the period 1990-2003, while higher incomes of employers accounts only for one fourth. The latter, 
however, are concentrated on the two richest income deciles and represent a 45% of the increase in 
income of the top 10 percent, contributing in a considerable way to perpetuate the structure of income 
distribution. Finally, according to experts, around 12% of the increase of household income is explained 
by socio-demographics and family changes such as decreasing fertility rates and the creation of new 
households (Larrañaga , O./Valenzuela, M. E. 2011).  
Contrary to what one can expect, the educational boom of the nineties did not contribute to 
mitigating inequality. Although school coverage rose from 9.7 to 11 years during the same period, the 
boom of secondary education increased the gap between workers with secondary and higher education, 
which concentrate most wage improvements between 1990-2003 (Reinecke/Valenzuela 2011). Even 
though the coverage of secondary education among workers between 20 and 24 years old increased from 
53 to 80 percent in the period 1990-2006, it did not translate into higher wages but created an “inflationary 
effect”. It was indeed the occupational group with 12 years of education (those who finished high school) 
the one that experienced the smallest increase in wages and higher unemployment rates 
(Larrañaga/Herrera 2008).  
Trends of inequality seemed to have improved after the 2000´s. Between 2000 and 2006 there is a 
reduction in the income gap among different educational levels and a reduction in income equality in all 
indicators (gini, q5/q1, d10/d1, p90/p10). Nevertheless, this is not explained by better conditions in the 
labor market but by two different phenomena: firstly, a reduction in income inequality among workers 
with different educational levels and a smaller dispersion of wages among educational categories. Income 
grew more among the less educated, while it decreased in the case of more educated groups. Indeed, the 
decrease in income of workers with 12 and more years of education takes place in a period of growth. This 
is explained because the growing number of more educated workers devaluated educational achievement 
and pushed their salaries downward. This time the devaluation of high-skilled labor went hand in hand 
with the boom of tertiary education sketched in chapter 4.  
The second cause behind the slight decrease in inequality between 2000 and 2006 is an increase in 
the per capita income of households at the bottom of the distribution, caused by lower fertility rates. This 
reduction in inequality has contributed to the reduction in poverty, which contrasts with the previous 
decade where the decrease in poverty was mainly associated with social policies and growth. 
 Regarding poverty reduction in the period 1990-2006, on the other hand, there are two 
distinguishable causes. Larrañaga/Herrera (2008) distinguish between growth effect understood as a 
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change in poverty due to the increase in the median income (assuming equal income distribution), and the 
distributive effect where changes in poverty are originated by changes in inequality (assuming equal 
incomes for the two periods). Under this logic, they showed that between 1990-1996 growth effect 
accounts for 95% of poverty reduction, while between 2000-2006 80% of poverty reduction is explained 
by changes in distribution. 
Regarding the late period, Two effects help explain the role of wages in the reduction of poverty 
between 2000-2006. According to Larrañaga , O./Valenzuela, M. E. (2011), the concentration of labor-
incomes and its participation in total income explains by itself at least half of poverty reduction, meaning 
that the bottom per capita work-incomes grew at the same time they increased their share of total income. 
Independent work-related-incomes help explain 20% of poverty reduction through share effect, basically 
because it is a very concentrated type of income whose participation in total income diminished in 2%. In 
the end, income inequality improves basically because low-incomes increased around 15%, while median 
household incomes show moderate improvements and high incomes have a negative growth. 
  Finally, an important factor explaining a third of the increase in income is the demographic change 
of Chilean households. As the authors previously quoted show, there is a clear negative relationship 
between the number of household members and income levels. An important difference is that for each 
income recipient in the top income decile there are 0.8 non-income earners, while such number rises to 
3.47 times at the bottom decile. But demographic changes have been unevenly distributed across social 
strata, where the lower half of the income distribution has seen a drop of 0.35 person per household 
between 2000 and 2006, accounting for a third of the increase in the per capita income.93 Ten percent of 
the 17% drop in the number of children per household in the period is explained by a reduction in the 
absolute number of children, while the other 7 points are explained by the increase in the number of 
households. 
Summarizing, these data show that most improvements in inequality and poverty indicators relate 
to different effects that are not necessarily related to better wages. In this sense, the persistence of high 
inequality stems from the scarce valorization of labor. This issue becomes evident in the fact for both 
years, 1990 and 2006, the share of occupied workers earning less than the average monthly income was 
higher than 70%, while only the richest 20 percent perceived incomes over the national average (U$583 
approximately, values of 2006). Rather, as Reinecke/Valenzuela (2011) show when analyzing the socio-
economic survey CASEN for the period 1990-2006, for the poorest families there were no real 
improvements in labor income, but mainly in higher monetary subsidies. In fact, as seen from the 
perspective of labor-incomes, the bottom 40% diminished its participation in total income and the 10/10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 The general trend since 1960 has been a sort of convergence in fertility rates across socio-economic strata; the difference 
between the top and bottom income deciles in the 1960´s was 2.5 higher for the later, while such rate diminished to 1 in 2000. 
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and 20/20 ratios worsened.  
To get a better picture of labor-income improvements, if government subsidies are excluded, the 
share of households that in 2006 earned slightly over the minimum wage in Chile increases from 33.2% to 
41.8%, which means that most material improvements among the poorest were the result of targeted social 
policies. This is important because it implies that although poorest households -many of them 
creditworthy- experienced material improvements in the last two decades, which were not enough to be 
successfully integrated into the new consumption levels of better-off consumers, such as skilled and 
educated workers, and capital owners. Indeed, many of these government transferences are not monetary–
fungible money- but rather sanitary, educational and health services provided by government agencies. 
These represent a relief to the discretional income of these households, which is mainly used to cover 
basic needs, but do not improve the purchasing power of many families in substantive terms. 
Figure 34: Distribution of Monetary Subsidies Among Households by Income Decile (2013) 
 
     Source Data taken from CASEN 2013 
 
The trends in material improvement have important implications to understand the dynamics of 
financialization among low-income consumers. To start with, there is a collateral consequence related to 
this particular feature of Chile´s social policies. Although very effective in reducing poverty levels, 
targeted social policies have played a crucial role in progressively financializing low-income populations, 
since those benefits that represent constant money strands reduce the risk-profile of poor borrowers. A 
good example of how social policies that aim at correcting market failures have promoted financialization 
is the introduction of “Pensión Solidaria Básica” (Basic Solidary Pension) in 2008. This subsidy resulted 
from the lean results of the “individual capitalization” system, when it became evident that around 60% of 
affiliates to Private Pension Funds (AFPs) would not receive the minimum pension. This monthly benefit 
(around USD 160) targets the poorest 60% of the population and it includes a special bonus per child that 
aims at reducing gender inequalities among pensioners. As an unintended consequence, this lean but 
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stable subsidy ended up subsidizing the risk-profile of impoverished retired workers that rely on consumer 
credits to cope with an important drop in their income and a rise of their necessities.  
A more important thing to understand about the indebtedness of the middle-low income groups, 
however, is the direct effect of social policies on changing the standards of living of the population. With 
the aid of targeted social policies to the 20 percent poorest consumers -which according to the Family 
Budget Survey of 2012 consume in average around 45% of their budget only in food and transportation, 
many families moved out of the poverty threshold (today around the monthly USD 170). With these 
improvements, standards of living were ratcheted up and new necessities arose in the horizon, such as 
buying new or better clothing, school supplies and electric appliances for their new homes. But this 
happens in a context where labor incomes are still not enough to invest in or spend on the wide range of 
available goods that flooded supermarkets and department stores in all neighborhoods of Santiago, which 
means that the only option to participate in the “party of consumption” for many is having a department 
store credit card.  
This is a second unintended consequence of growth and social policies. Better access to basic 
sanitary, housing and educational services promoted by the government for the poorest households were 
basically not provided with better opportunities in labor markets. Considering that cost of living in Chile is 
very expensive for most workers that do not earn more than two minimum wages (around USD 900), the 
material improvements experienced by many Chilean families –at least in the bottom five income deciles- 
left them on the verge of a new form of citizenship that is centered around the participation in the 
collective ritual of consumption, rather than the recognition of social entitlements. As I argued before, this 
incremental but implacable process is exactly what department stores sought to exploit, in order to boost 
their sales by creating a consumer out of people that can barely cover basic expenditures, but with strong 
desire to participate in the “party of consumption”.94   
For most people at the bottom of the income distribution that moved out of poverty, the living 
costs in Chile made their unstable incomes insufficient to catch-up with the available goods produced by 
trade openness, and displayed in the showcases of department stores at the shopping malls. This is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 If we bring this reasoning further, one could think of this system of “credit and low wages” as a sort of feudal system. For 
these consumers, a credit contract with the lords of commerce –and now finances- becomes the legitimate means to carry the 
adequate life. These provide shelter, clothing, durable goods and protection against vulnerability stemming from more exposure 
to labor market volatilities. In this regard, poorer consumers owe their prospective wages in advance, ensuring future discipline, 
servitude and gratitude to those sub-prime lenders that, paradoxically, have systematically engage in abusive practices, as we 
saw in chapter 5. This explains why Chilean consumers strive to keep their only source of credit active and seem to have 
forgiven the gigantic scandal of “La Polar”, sub-prime lender per excellence that unilaterally changed the credit contracts of 
thousands of poor debtors in order to manipulate their debt portfolio, and thus allow them to keep buying in their department 
stores throughout the country as if nothing had happened. 
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something department stores exploit when realizing that the so-called “bottom of the pyramid” represents 
an important share of the population that has higher aspirations for participating in the ritual of 
consumption, but required the appropriate offer. Of course, not all poorer consumers could be 
financialized, but there is an important share of Chileans that belong to the first three income deciles (most 
of them earn under USD 850 median income, approximately), that became the target of marketers and 
department stores in the 2000s. 
These consumers are depicted in marketing studies as the middle-low income group, which in 
Santiago represents around 35.7% of the population. According to a survey conducted by a marketing 
agency in Santiago, it is a group that feels that their main problems (and of all Chileans´) are “lack of 
cash” (42%), “low wages” 22 (%) and “few labor opportunities” (21%). In line with the idea that social 
mobility was not attained with better opportunities, we witness that although an important share of 
consumers argue that their situation has improved in relation to their parents (39% is better and 37% says 
it is the same); a big majority thinks that they are not being favored by the “economic growth that the 
social media talk about” (78%).  
In any case these consumers have expanded their consumption in considerable ways. In a normal 
month in 2007, for example, 23% declared to spend part of their incomes in recreation; 23% buy clothing 
for family members, 22% have some drinks at a bar, and 18% buy clothing for themselves. This group is 
not necessarily consuming to show their status by deploying wealth. Although more than 80% declare that 
never “save money”, their main aspirations are essentially oriented towards family life and -in order of 
importance- “becoming homeowner” (31%), “that their children become professional” (15%) or “finish 
their college undergraduate programs” (14%), and “provide a good education to their children” (14%). 
This is something can expect, since 60% of them have a nuclear family (i.e. a couple with children).  
Nevertheless, what they consider to be important has changed, and, for most of them, is still far 
from being within their reach. As the chart below shows, the big majority of these consumers consider 
having a mobile phone and a computer at home important (95 and 80%), but less than 70% has a mobile 
phone and only slightly more than 30% has a computer. More impressively, however, is the fact that more 
than 50% of consumers consider that having Internet at home is important, but the share that actually has 
internet is barely 10%. In terms of a “gap” between aspirations and acquisitions, it is important to notice 
than almost 20% consider having an iPod important, while only 1% has one. 
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Figure 35: The Gap Between Property and Aspirations, 2007 
 
Source: Data taken from Criteria Research 2007 
 
In this sense, it is possible to argue that the increasing exposure to available goods arguably 
affected the expectation of consumers (throughout the whole social structure), who assist to the shopping 
malls not only to consume but go also during the weekends to go the cinema, celebrate birthdays, 
anniversaries, have dinner or simply “chill out”. As scholars have pointed out, the shopping mall 
represents for the Chilean consumer a space where her/his desired class-identities are performed (that 
Salcedo/De Simone (2013) call an “imagined middle class” ). For many –especially in the case of lower 
income consumers- these spaces represent the only option they have to carry out recreational activities 
(meaning that they spend in average more time at the shopping mall), although they face many more 
restrictions to materialize these rising aspirations. As Salcedo/Stillerman (2010) show studying the 
practices of young consumers in the most populated municipality in Santiago (La Florida), middle-low 
income consumers do not appropriate the space in the mall in utilitarian ways (the shopping mall is not 
inhabited by people that seek to buy), but celebrating everyday life and courtship rituals, or expressing 
roles and belonging to subcultures, among others. As a consequence, say the authors, since they spend a 
lot of time in these spaces carrying out these meaningful practices, they are very prone to ending up 
making unplanned purchases.  
But for lower income consumers, this happens not only because their aspirations are too high, but 
also because the average wage falls short for the sake of the rising cost of living in Chile. A few examples 
help depict this gap. Already in 2005, when the National Institute of Statistics compared the cost of living 
in Latin American countries, Chile was the most expensive country in the region, and the expenditures on 
goods and services were 48% over the regional average. Total levels of expenditures were only surpassed 
by Argentina (60% over the regional average), whose prices are considerably lower than in Chile as 
compared in terms of purchasing power parity (INE 2006). According to an international student exchange 
agency, for example, an average student in Chile should at least spend $1243 monthly, which only 
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includes a room, transportation, food, and $25 to spend freely.95 In a country where an average worker has 
to spend at least USD 135 a month in public transportation  (considering two daily bus trips and subway 
riddes), the average wage of most workers is just not enough to materially reproduce and participate at the 
same time in the standards of living that people consider as legitimate. 
Altogether, rising aspirations and more demanding standards of living, higher cost of living and 
low incomes, seem to explain why the expenditures of the poorest families have been systematically 
higher than their income during the last twenty years, surpassing in average more than 50% of their 
income in the first income quintile and fluctuating between 15 and 30% in the second income quintile. 
Only the richest households (top 20 percent), which according from data of the Central Bank concentrated 
in 2010 47.2% of total debts, spend in average less money than their incomes. (This raises another issue, 
which is that if not all debts are meant to close a gap between incomes and desires or necessities (as with 
the highest income earners), credit-money might serve very different purposes across income groups.).  
Table 10: Average Expenditure as a Share of Average Income, by Income Quintile 
 
1996-1997 2006-2007 2011-2012 
I 156.3% 152.8% 148.2% 
II 121.8% 128.1% 115.8% 
III 105.8% 117.8% 109.0% 
IV 96.6% 105.9% 98.0% 
V 80.6% 90.5% 81.9% 
Source: Data from EPF, different years. 
 
In addition, the participation of the 80% of the population in total debts is higher than their 
participation in national income, a situation that is only reversed in the case of the richest 20%. Thus for 
example, the participation of the poorest 20 percent in total debts is almost twice their share of total 
income (4.6 versus 2.5%), while the richest concentrate 47.2% of total debts and 64.2 of total income 
(Central 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 http://www.contactchile.cl/es/descubrir/costo-de-vida/presupuesto-mensual.html 
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Figure 36: Share of Different Income Quintiles in Total Income and Total Debts, 2010 
 
Source: Data from Central (2010) 
 
The fact that lower income households participate to a lesser extent in total debts should not lead 
us to think that these consumer debts are less important for families of the bottom 50 percent of the 
income distribution. To understand this, we have to look into these debts in more detail. According to the 
EFH survey, in 2009 almost 80% of interviewed households declared that they did not apply for any credit 
during the last twelve months, something one can expect if we consider that in Chile unemployment rose 
and growth plummeted in 2009 due to the economic crisis. Among those that did not acquire debts in that 
year, we find a considerable bigger share of households from the lowest income group (45% of them, 
versus 30.7% and 25.3% of middle and high-income groups, respectively).96 However, if we look into the 
underlying causes, it becomes clearer that this does not mean that poorer consumers are more reluctant to 
acquire debts than consumers in higher socioeconomic groups. Why did they reject acquiring debts in 
2009? 
For each income group, around 30% of household heads that did not acquire debts in 2009, 
declared that the reason was that they “don´t like acquiring debts”. Interestingly, the reluctance among 
those that did not acquire debts in 2009 is homogeneously distributed across social strata. But there is a 
highly stratified cause that explains why poorest consumers did not apply for a credit in 2009 in a higher 
proportion. From the total of households that did not apply for a credit in 2009, almost 55% from the 
lowest income group indicated that the reason was that they could either not be able to face the monthly 
installments, or were not confident about being “creditworthy”. Moreover, only 14% of them declared that 
they “do not need these credits”, versus a 30% and 47% in the medium and high-income groups.  This 
basically means that people in this group would have preferred to acquire more debts, but they faced more 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 It is important to keep in mind that the Household Financial Survey groups households into these three income groups in 
order to resemble the real distribution of income: low-income from the 1th to the 5th income deciles, middle-income from the 
6th tot he 8th, and high-income from the 9th tot he 10th. 
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restrictions.97 But, to what extent are the consumer debts of poorer consumers born out of necessity? What 
exactly do they purchase with these credits?  
As mentioned before, unlike households from middle and high income groups, the main source of 
consumer credit for families from the first five income deciles are department stores (42.8%), followed by 
far by social loans (7.9%) and bank loans (7.9%). The question then, is how consumers use these loans. 
Table 11: Distribution of Consumer Debts by Income Group, 2009 
 
Low (income 
1-5 decile) 
Medium 
(income 6-8 
decile) 
High 
(income 9-
10 decile) 
Bank Loan 7.88 17.01 26.12 
Bank Credit Card or Overdraft 
Line 3.36 6.11 26.07 
Department Store Credit Card 42.79 49.78 45.01 
Loan with Department Store 
and other financial institutions  1.72 3.95 3.66 
Social Loan 7.87 8.97 5.94 
Car Loan 0.93 1.44 2.75 
      Source: Data from the EFH 2009 
 
As the data consistently shows (see chart below), people across all income groups use the first 
department store credit debt they report to buy home appliances. Nevertheless, households from the 
bottom 50% use these cards to buy home appliances in a higher proportion than wealthier families, who 
use them also most often to buy clothing and other items. This is something one can expect, since 
department store credit cards are attached to within-store purchases, thus reducing the possible ways of 
using them.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Furthermore, one should be careful when interpreting these reasons because “disliking” debts does not mean that people do 
not use consumer debts at all. Indeed a 35% of those that argued did not acquire debts in 2009 because they “do not like them”, 
had at least one credit with department stores, implying that in many situations disliking debts is apparently not a good reason 
for not acquiring them. 
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Figure 37: For What Purposes did You Use Your Department Store Credit Card? Different income 
Deciles 2009 
Source: Data from the EFH 2009 
 
But this is still a broad approximation. To get a better picture of the items customers are buying 
with these credits, we have to look into the available studies that address the financial practices of the low-
income groups in Chile. For the time being, there are only a few studies on this subject, but they are quite 
informative for our purposes.  
As Barros´ (2011) qualitative study in a poor municipality of Santiago shows, consumers from the 
bottom income quintiles most typically use department store credit cards to buy items for their homes that 
improve their “comfort” and “life-quality”. In this category we find goods such as a living room, a new 
TV or a water heater system, in many cases more expensive than their monthly incomes, and for which 
people feel they could not put money aside for the sake of more urgent expenditures. Ariztía (2003) 
arrives at a similar conclusion interviewing poor families in Santiago, for whom the department store 
credit card is the only way to acquire a “package of durable goods”.  
In this regard, Ureta´s study on the material transformation and decoration among low-income 
families in Santiago provides important clues. His qualitative study shows that the process of “home-
making” among poor families goes beyond the acquisition of a house, and entails the formation of 
people´s identity and expression attuned with their integration into the Chilean society (Ureta 2007). Both 
material transformation and decoration represent important changes for families that for the very first time 
have access to private property, which they can modify and transform according to their preferences and 
reflecting their own identities. Functional and aesthetic transformations merge in this process, such as 
ensuring security and decorating with a fence, or changing their old furniture. In this context, Ureta (2007) 
shows that poor families are not only oriented by a “choice of the necessary” (as Bourdieu would say), but 
also by people´s aesthetic judgments in contexts of economic constraints (Ureta 2007).  
In view of the notion aforementioned, the broad picture becomes clearer in that the financialization 
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of consumptions stands at the intersection between social policies that provide housing and private 
property, and the consolidation of new standards of living.98 On the one hand, new houses, no matter if 
bought with a mortgage, cash or a social dwelling, they all have to be equipped with furniture, decorated, 
painted, modified and transformed according to the identities of the owners. On the other hand, in a 
country where financialization policies expanded homeownership to unprecedented levels, but 
improvements in the labor market were only restricted to the most qualified workers, department stores 
became for many the only alternative to buy those goods that people increasingly considered legitimate to 
acquire. In this process, many Chilean families progressively learned how to incorporate small credits into 
their budgets, pay on time and ensure their permanent access to goods that otherwise they could not have 
afforded.  
In more general terms, low-income Chilean families learned to combine different circuits of 
commerce (Zelizer 2005b), alternating purchases in free fairs where fruits and vegetables are considerably 
cheaper than in supermarkets, buying many times second-hand or counterfeit clothing and footwear, while 
using credit cards to do what people consistently call “big purchases”, referring to durable goods in 
department stores (Barros 2011). As I will show later on, some learned how to capitalize on the 
department store offers and lend their credit cards to relatives and friends in order to improve their credit 
scores; many others had traumatic experiences; and an important share incorporated the payment monthly 
installments into their normal financial affairs.  
By now, before getting into the qualitative details, it suffices to say that the department store credit 
card in this context of improvement and inequality becomes an extension of labor-income, and a passport 
not for consumerism but for a different form of citizenship. This new form of citizenship is no longer 
materialized in entitlements, but expressed in the participation in the benefits of growth, which finds its 
expression in the market.  
The idea pointed out above does not necessarily mean that these consumers acquire debts in order 
to improve their status in a quest for “spurious” upward mobility. If a “consumerist fever” was the main 
driving force of these consumers, we could expect a different utilization of their credit cards, more 
oriented towards the acquisition of clothing and other items such as cars (only 1.3%) and luxury goods 
(less than 1%) that serve as markers of distinction. What one witness, in contrast, is that the main use 
families make of department store credit cards is to access to unaffordable durable goods (Ariztía 2003). 
That is why most families strive to have a good financial record in order to avoid discrimination, and 
ensure a permanent access to credit. In this scenario, acquiring durable goods and “better” (branded) 
clothing with these credit cards might be a marker of social status among their peers, but evidence 
suggests that many families prefer to use consumer loans in order to have access to what seems to be the 
legitimate “standard package”, provided that theirs and others´ standards of living change. As Stillerman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Many of these families were previously living in precarious settlements known in Chile as “tomas” or “campamentos” 
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(2012, p. 73) notes when studying families on the edge of the poverty line, “These families access goods 
and services available to most of their peers rather than seek to emulate higher social strata.” At the most, 
social comparison works in the contrary direction, when poorer consumers buy items on credit in order to 
demarcate themselves from the stigma of poverty, as revealed by the qualitative research conducted by 
van Bavel/Sell-Trujillo (2003). 
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CHAPTER 8 INEQUALITY AND THE FINANCIALIZATION OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES 
 
It has been already discussed that poverty in Chile diminished in impressive ways between 1990 
and 2011 from 38.6% to 15.1%. As I showed earlier, most of these improvements were possible due to the 
direct intervention of the Chilean government via subsidies and targeted social policies. These policies 
helped people move out of poverty and created higher aspirations among families that did not experience 
better opportunities in labor markets and participated only indirectly in the benefits of growth. In this 
scenario I ventured that department store credit cards became a legitimate means to acquire those goods 
that allowed them to materialize life projects associated with their new condition of “homeowner”, and 
thus achieve and perform their new class and personal identities.  But what happens with those non-poor 
families that experienced an increase in their wages? If they are better off, why do they use consumer 
credit at all? How does inequality affect their financial behavior?  
Consumers from the middle of the income distribution (now between the IV and VII income 
deciles) have indeed experienced different trajectories. They experienced a rise in their wages, and since 
they are less prompt to fall under the poverty threshold, they have more opportunities for maintaining or 
improving their status (Contreras et al. 2005). These groups enjoy better work contracts and are essentially 
meritocratic (they do not receive government subsidies) (Bazoret/Fierro 2011; Espinoza/Bazoret 2009). 
Additionally, they enjoy better access to credit and mix different types of debts (Marambio 2011). 
In order to account for customer financialization in line with the “status anxiety” hypothesis, I 
explore in this chapter the question whether credit fills in the gap between incomes that have risen in 
average, and expectations of wealth accumulation and status that grow even faster in a context of 
structural inequalities. In this regard, Bourdieu´s theory of habitus and class differentiation is useful to 
“think with” the problem of expectations and incomes, not necessarily as a master framework for 
interpreting reality, but as a heuristic to approach it in a sociological way.  
As it was seen in chapter two, Bourdieu´s theory of class differentiation and consumption 
dynamics rests on the assumption that individuals acquire -through socialization processes- a relatively 
coherent set of dispositions to act, think, appreciate and classify the world which he termed habitus 
(Bourdieu 2012). In this sense, individuals that occupy neighboring positions in the social structure, i.e. 
share a similar structure of capitals, are subject to similar conditioning factors, so they consequently  
“…have every chance of having similar dispositions and interests, and thus of producing practices and 
representations of a similar kind." (Bourdieu 1985, p.5). This proximity in the modes of perceiving and 
acting created by a similar -or homologous- position in the social structure is what Bourdieu termed a 
“probable class” or “class on paper” (Bourdieu 1985). Since these dispositions reflect people´s positions, 
the habitus works as a sort of social “genetics” that makes social order stable by reproducing the symbolic 
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and objective boundaries between groups that appear as “given”. More importantly for us, however, is that 
the habitus creates a match between people´s expectations –horizon of possibilities- and their objective 
position in social space (which is given by the distribution and structure of economic and cultural capital). 
This “match” is manifested as a sort of “sense of one´s place” which according to Bourdieu, is “…at the 
same time a sense of the place of others, and, together with the affinities of habitus experienced in the 
form of personal attraction or revulsion, is at the root of all processes of cooptation, friendship, love, 
association, etc., and thereby provides the principle of all durable alliances and connections, including 
legally sanctioned relationships." (Bourdieu 1985, p. 5). Thus, for example, the fact that people compare 
themselves and contrast their success or failure with those they consider to be somehow “equal” (from 
which the notion of “relative deprivation” stems), is a clear demonstration of the non-reflexive “sense of 
one´s place” in the world.  
The notion put forward above helps us to frame the sociological puzzle we are tackling and think of 
consumer credit as a cultural tool that fills in the gap –a mismatch- between incomes and expectations. If 
Bourdieu is right, and subjective expectations tend to resemble very closely the objective positions of 
individuals in a field, one could argue that consumer credit becomes a means for closing the gap between 
incomes and desires in four different but related scenarios where inequality plays an important role, 
although the mechanisms differ.  
- Firstly, if there are processes of collective upward mobility but inequality is left untouched, 
people´s personal and intergenerational improvements are shadowed and might, in many cases, 
make them feel as “falling behind”. In this case, positive consequences of material improvements 
fade away because new and more demanding standards of living create higher aspirations that 
cannot be met with existing income. Credit would serve, in this scenario, as a means for catching-
up with the new consumption standards that are collectively ratcheted up, explaining why people 
that experience material improvements in contexts of inequality acquire debts in a systematic 
fashion. For this to be true, one would expect to find more people living under the “median 
standards of living”, or what is called “relatively poor”. 
- Secondly, one can expect credit to fill in the gap between incomes and expectations also when, due 
to high levels of inequality, people are systematically exposed to the lifestyles and consumption 
patterns of richer people that create pressures to consume beyond their capabilities. In this case, the 
gap between incomes and desires grows bigger because consumer expenditures at the top of the 
income distribution would create a “trickle-down” effect that changes the standards of living of the 
rest and puts pressure on different socioeconomic groups in the form of “cascades”. In such a 
scenario, consumers would have a distorted impression of other´s possessions, against which they 
will compare themselves and feel anxious. Consumer credit, in this case, would serve as a means 
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for “catching-up” with abstract or other types of wealthier reference groups. If this is true, one has 
to look into specific mechanisms through which standards of living of top earners exert anxiety on 
the rest, while deforming their perception of others´ wealth.  
- Thirdly, in a complementary vein, there might be both structural and cultural forces that accounts 
for the mismatch between incomes and people´s aspirations that we have to explore. In particular, 
dynamics of class differentiation and individualization processes will be surveyed as contextual 
factors that shape the embracement of consumer debts of an increasing share of Chilean families. 
- Finally, the fourth possibility -which I explore in the next chapter- expands this line of argument. It 
might be the case that once Chilean families have access to formal financial institutions, consumer 
credit itself creates the gap between current and potential standards of living. In other words, it is 
necessary to pose the question whether these desires for expanding one´s purchasing power 
precedes the utilization of credit, or if its availability produces the gap between incomes and 
desires. If the latter is true, one can expect to see an intertwinement between the aspirations of 
Chilean families and the modes of utilization of consumer debts. 
In this chapter, I begin tackling the financialization of the middle-class in Chile by taking into 
consideration the three first hypotheses (the last one will be clarified in chapter 9). This will provide the 
context in which one should understand the specific financial practices of middle-income families that I 
will sketch in a more detailed fashion in the next chapter. The chapter is organized as follows. The first 
section explores whether Chilean middle-class are relatively poor and to what extent this might account 
for a mismatch between their current incomes and desired lifestyles. The second sketches different 
mechanisms through which the “trickle down consumption” effect exerts pressure to consume beyond 
people´s means in contexts of inequality. The third section moves on to consider the question of whether 
the rise of the new middle classes triggered processes of class differentiation that created spirals of 
consumption that demand important financial efforts. Finally, the last section complements these 
processes by sketching some cultural trends of the Chilean society that have shaped consumption 
dynamics.  
8.1 ARE CHILEANS RELATIVELY POOR? 
The most common measurements of material improvement used in Chile are not enough to 
characterize what happens with consumers in the middle of the income distribution. In particular, because 
the standard measurement of poverty in Chile has been updated according to the price index, but it does 
not take into consideration the profound changes in the standards of living and consumption patterns of 
the Chilean population. Not only do Chilean households across the whole income distribution spend more 
in food, home appliances, education and beauty products than before in absolute terms, but also the shares 
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of the family budget spent on “basic” goods diminished in relation to those “positional goods”. This is 
even more problematic in the case of the middle-class, which even though in absolute terms might enjoy 
high standards of living, might as well have a generalized feeling of “falling behind” for the sake of 
increasing inequality, as it has been systematically documented in the US (Frank 2005a; Frank 2007; 
Sullivan 2000; Hodson/Dwyer/Neilson 2014; Warren 2003). As I argued before, this happens because 
standards of living against which people compare themselves are never absolute, something that holds true 
for upward as well as downward mobility.99    
If we take these assertions into consideration, one can conclude that the problem with absolute 
measurements of poverty and income is that they do not grasp the importance of social comparison and 
social differences in a given society. But when it is the case of a middle class family “falling behind”, how 
might this affect indebtedness? Do we find evidence to show that Chilean families feel poor even when 
they have experienced important improvements? In order to explore these questions, I will now draw on 
the notion of “relative poverty” to develop the idea that inequality radicalizes the effects of social 
comparison, forcing people to consume beyond their means. 
 
Relative Poverty in Chile 
In general, unlike the developed world where relative measurements of poverty have been adopted 
and systematically used since the post-war era (Sen 1983), Latin American countries have historically 
dealt with the problem of ensuring a minimum level of subsistence. This turned “absolute poverty” into 
the main measurement guiding social and distributive policies in the region. Thus, when I say that Chile´s 
poverty experienced the sharpest reduction in the region, it basically means that the share of population 
that can meet a basic alimentary level increased. In more concrete terms, “total” or “absolute” poverty is 
measured with the survey of socioeconomic characterization as the reversed proportion of “food 
expenditures” of the first household that satisfies alimentary necessities. If the share of the budget spent on 
food of this household is 50%, the reverse is 2, which means that the value of the poverty threshold is 
settled as two times the set of basic goods that is necessary to satisfy the alimentary threshold. The 
fundamental problem with this measurement in Chile is that the absolute standard takes into consideration 
the share of expenditures for basic goods of 1987, which is obsolete in the context of the huge changes in 
consumption patterns and higher standards of living. It has been only updated according to the price index, 
but it still resembles the consumption patterns of the Chilean society more than two decades ago. 
The notion of “relative poverty” avoids such problems by taking as a reference point the median 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Unemployment, for instance, which is negatively correlated with subjective well being, diminishes people´s happiness less if 
they are not alone. As Frey/Stutzer (2002, p. 6) put it, “When unemployment is seen to hit many people one knows or hears of, 
both the psychological and the social effects are mitigated. Self-esteem is better preserved, because it becomes obvious that 
being out of work is less one´s own fault and more due to general developments in the economy.” 
 
	   	  
158 
income. This captures the social dynamic of consumption every time it refers to the distance between 
actual consumption and the socially acceptable standards defined in a community. Typically, international 
organizations such as the OECD and ECLAC proceed by establishing the “relative poverty threshold” as 
50 or 60% of the median income.100 Thus, in an unequal society one can expect an important share of the 
population to live in “relative poverty” or living “behind” the standards of the “median citizen”, regardless 
of their absolute wealth. What happens in Chile? 
Currently, there are no official measurements of “relative poverty” in Chile.101 Filling this gap, 
Pino (2011) made an important contribution by characterizing trends in “relative poverty” using the socio-
economic characterization survey, CASEN. According to Pino´s work, measured as a 60% of the median 
income, relative poverty in Chile has been higher than total poverty during most part of the last two 
decades, the later only surpassing “relative poverty” only in 1996, increasing steadily until 2000s and 
slightly diminishing since 2003 (the gap diminished in 2009 due to an increase in total poverty).102   
Figure 38: Evolution of Relative and Absolute Poverty 1996-2006 
 
Source: chart taken from Pino (2011) 
 
These trends in relative poverty imply that there is an important share of the population in Chile 
that is “relatively poor”, or whose income falls behind 60% of the median income, households that can be 
considered as living behind the standard of living that the median income reflects. In this sense, 
considering that relative poverty is higher than total poverty, it is possible to argue that “status anxiety” 
among families at the bottom and middle of the income distribution augmented since the mid-nineties, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 The complexity, however, lies in the fact that standard consumption level should be determined by the researcher. 
101 Absolute poverty in Chile is a matter of concern because many low-income families remain over the poverty line with the 
help of government subsidies. That is why social policies still combine materialist concerns hand in hand with the rising 
demands of the non-poor and more educated population. 
102 Pino shows that at different levels from 40 to 70% of the median income, there are similar variations, which means that there 
are no important income transfer in the 40-70 groups. 
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which coincides with the expansion of credit to sub-prime borrowers. But this is not everything. 
Pino concludes by saying that there is an important group of “relatively poor” families currently 
considered as “non-poor”, which share very similar characteristics with the poor population. Nevertheless, 
the most striking remark is that an important share of “relative poor” households have different 
characteristic from “poor” individuals, such as the predominance of male household heads, a smaller 
number of family members under an alimentary budget, fewer children under 14 years old, and more 
elderly people. Moreover, the “income” that excludes government subsidies (ingreso autónomo) of these 
“relatively poor” families has augmented at a higher pace than those of the absolutely poor, accumulating 
a difference of 8.43% in 1996 to 28.8% in 2009. This means that there are good reasons for thinking that 
families that experienced upward mobility, and that we consider as being in a “good economic situation”, 
could well share the feeling of poorest households that are not participating in the benefits of growth, at 
least not at the pace that other families seem to enjoy the Chilean modernization.  
According to our framework, the situation described above becomes a source of “anxiety” that 
might explain the gap between incomes and desires that credit seems to fulfill across all income groups. 
This provides a basis for a sociological explanation of indebtedness. After all, even research in the field of 
economic psychology has consistently found that there is a strong correlation between the distance 
perceived between people´s income and reference groups, and favorable attitudes towards debts 
(Cosma/Pattarin 2012). For these reasons, if inequality in the form of relative poverty amplifies the gap 
between incomes and desires, it is by creating and reproducing among the “relatively poor” the feeling 
that they are not “catching up” with the rest. Is this true? 
Evidence points in the direction indicated in the paragraph above. Already by the early 2000s it 
was pretty clear that an important share of Chilean families –more than 50%- felt they were not integrated 
into the party of consumption. According to the analysis of United Nations Development Program only a 
few educated consumers in 2002 saw themselves as “winners” and consumed for enjoyment (26% of 
respondents), while an important majority declared that could barely meet basic needs (42%), or consume 
in order to improve their life-quality (13%); in the latter cases, mostly among low and middle-income 
consumers, consumers felt as “losers” of the Chilean modernization process (PNUD 2002).  
But higher and more demanding standards of livings along with economic growth seem to affect 
the perceptions of those consumers that are better off as well. Although "material deprivation" is not a 
pressing issue for middle and top earners in comparison to those at the bottom of the income distribution, 
those households that experienced sustained prosperity at a faster pace than the rest of the families are still 
prone to feeling unsatisfied with their incomes. As reported by a survey conducted by Universidad Finis 
Terra in 2008 about “Chileans and money” with consumers from middle-upper and high socioeconomic 
groups, 59% of the interviewees declared to be unhappy about their current income, which seems to be 
even more noticeable among those of the middle-upper group (65% of the middle-up group against 47% 
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of upper classes). Among the most unsatisfied top earners -who belong to the 7th and 8th income deciles, 
around 60 percent would like to see a 25% increase in their incomes. Why are these consumers, the 
“winners”, unsatisfied with their incomes? 
From a sociological point of view, this is somehow expectable since every time the horizon of 
possibilities is displaced and widens with better incomes, new consumption standards become new and 
more demanding reference points; “what once was the roof now becomes the floor”, says the saying. In 
other words, those standards of living people reached throughout their life-course stand now as the norm 
against which they compare and evaluate themselves (Schor 1999b), which means that even if people have 
access to new goods and better material conditions, for most of them old necessities are simply replaced 
by new and more demanding consumption standards.  As we saw in chapter 4, this trend started in Chile in 
the nineties, where Chilean families experienced increasing access to a set of goods that were previously 
restricted to a minority. This process that started with the penetration of a “standard package” of durable 
goods such as TV, refrigerator, microwave and phone connection, moved later on to cars, computers and 
mobile phones (as well as education and other intangible assets), as the chart below shows. With this, the 
standard of living represented by the new “standard-package” of consumer goods became more 
demanding for all equally, generating a sense of “relative deprivation” (Majeed 1979). 
 
Figure 39: Evolution of Imported Goods, 2003-2013 
Source: Data from the Central Bank of Chile 
 
Bourdieu (1984) had already stressed in Distinction that individual trajectories might not be noticed 
when collective social mobility has occurred. Thus, while vertical mobility produces important changes in 
the total mobility expressed in changing lifestyles, it might represent static “relative mobility” regarding 
their position in the overall social hierarchy, provided that almost everybody else is better off. In simpler 
terms, since these improvements left inequality untouched, the effects of processes of collective social 
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mobility are lessened and many feel still unsatisfied: unlike the previous decades, children from poor 
families attend school, wear shoes and live in their own home, but within the new consumption standards 
of the median Chilean they are still very poor. By the same token, a middle class family now earns higher 
wages, can travel across the country during vacation with a new 4x4 vehicle, has internet connection and 
computers at home; but they are still a middle class family far from the consumption standards of the 20% 
most affluent consumers that now have a second home, travel abroad and have access to luxury cars. 
The relative character of consumption standards is probably nowhere else better depicted than in the 
following chart, which shows that at very different levels of income and education, people feel that their 
income can barely help them meet what they consider “basic needs and nothing else”. This goes in line 
with the interpretation made in happiness studies, according to which once individuals cross a certain 
threshold of consumption, they become essentially “aspirational”, in the sense that their reference groups 
change (Easterlin 1995) and have expectations of constant improvement (Merton/Kitt 1997). 
Figure 40: Consumers Who Think that Their "Incomes allow them to meet only basic needs and 
nothing else", Year 2008 (Different Socioeconomic Groups) 
Source: Data from the Encuesta Nacional UDP 2008. 
 
The perception marked by the feeling of “falling behind” of Chilean consumers seems to be also 
rooted in major cultural changes brought about by the institutionalization of a market-oriented society. An 
important cultural change underlying people´s lack of satisfaction with their incomes is that the moral 
meanings associated with money and wealth seem to have changed profoundly in contemporary Chile 
(Moulian 2002). If egalitarianism in the decades prior to the radical neoliberal reforms was spread enough 
to result in a generalized condemnation of wealth -especially preached in the socialist narrative of 
Allende´s “Unidad Popular” and the social doctrine of the church, nowadays things seem to have changed. 
Today there exists in Chile an important association between being rich, virtuous and successful. In sharp 
contrast with the previous decades, for most middle and middle-upper classes money might not only bring 
happiness to all alike (as the survey mentioned above shows), but it is also a sign of success that can be 
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deployed and showed to others with pride and without fearing to be recriminated. As a consequence, if 
being able to show affluence becomes a marker of social distinction and a legitimate means for 
communicating one´s success, having access to goods becomes a source of anxiety for consumers across 
all socioeconomic groups. 
As illustrated in the data, the survey on “Chileans and Money” above mentioned, for instance, 
found that most consumers of upper and middle-upper socioeconomic strata (ABC1 and C2 according to 
marketing classifications) consider that money is important or very important to be happy (90% of 
respondents), and an important number feels that money is much more important than in the past (79%). 
In parallel, most of respondents also said that in Chile there are excessive pressures to consume (77%). 
Among these, around 50% said they feel "vulnerable" in front of this situation, being this feeling stronger 
among women (55 against 42%). The upper-middle class, however, is the group where people feel more 
strongly inclined to thinking that the “search for status” is underlying the consumption decisions of 
Chileans (43% of the middle-upper group and 29% among upper class agree that this motive is very 
important). This perception stems most likely from the increasing access to consumption of the “new-
middle class”, which tends to blur existing “status hierarchies”. This general concern with rank and 
achievement in the new standards of the Chilean society (status anxiety), explains why Chileans across all 
socioeconomic groups feel relatively happy about the job they have, their free time, sexual life, friendship, 
family relations, and their neighborhood, but highly unsatisfied with their economic situation (as reported 
by the national survey carried in 2008 the Universidad Diego Portales).103  
Summing up, there are clear signs of “status anxiety” among Chilean families that, even though 
they have experienced material improvements still feel unsatisfied with their incomes. This is linked 
directly to our earlier statement that the social construction of the standards of living should be understood 
in relational rather than substantive ways (Frank 2005a; Schor 1999b; Easterlin 1995; Bourdieu 1984). 
According to the picture presented above, one has good reasons for believing that consumer credit serves 
for financing more demanding lifestyles among middle class consumers. But what are these expectations 
about and where do they come from? Does this mean that Chilean families became essentially 
consumerists? In the following section I explore different social processes that help explain how 
inequality has shaped the “anxious” behavior of Chilean consumers in contexts of general improvements, 
and how this might have affected their indebtedness. Considering these mechanisms, in the next chapter I 
will tackle in a qualitative fashion the question of whether people systematically use consumer credit to 
fill in this never-ending gap, and if so, how people actually use them. 
8.2 THE “TRICKLE-DOWN CONSUMPTION EFFECT” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 The report is available at: 
http://encuesta.udp.cl/descargas/publicaciones/2009/Satisfaccion%20de%20los%20chilenos%202005-2009.pdf 
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The second scenario, where credit might close a gap between incomes and aspirations, is one 
where the expenditure of the wealthiest affects the expectations of less affluent consumers. But how does 
the “trickle-down consumption effect” exactly work? In other words, how does the lavish expenditure of 
wealthy people affect the expenditures of the rest?  
In Chile, one can arguably say that one of the main mechanisms through which the “trickle down” 
consumption effect exerts its pressure is through the most pervasive form of creating representations of 
wealth and wellbeing at the middle and bottom of the income distribution, the TV. As has been seen, 
almost every Chilean family owns a TV, which places them within the scope of TV shows that depict the 
lifestyles and daily life of the wealthiest, as well as companies and marketing agencies targeting these 
populations. Thus, for example, along with the rise of more “affluent consumers” and niche 
differentiation, marketing has seen an important explosion in the last decades, providing an account of the 
increasing exposure of Chilean consumers to the temptation of saturated markets. As the following chart 
shows, companies in Chile have more than doubled their investments in advertisements, which is very 
indicative of the extent to which Chilean consumers are exposed not only to new goods and trends, but 
also getting to know how richer people live, consume and deploy their lifestyles. 
Figure 41: Expenditures on Advertisement Investments (Millions of US Dollars 2012) 
 
Source: Data from the Chilean Asociation  of Advertising Agencies, ACHAM 
 
In a country where social classes barely share common spaces due to deep segregation in the cities 
and within the educational system, the TV and social media become the most important channels through 
which low and middle-income families are exposed to the expenditures of top income earners. This might 
be considered as both a cause and effect of the increasing access to consumer goods. According to a 
survey conducted in 2009 by ICSO, 98.1% of Chileans have a color TV and 68% of them watch TV on a 
daily basis. The exposure to TV is considerably higher among housewives than for those integrated into 
the labor markets. While 71.8 and 74.7% of housewives with and without children watch TV every day, 
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the number diminishes to 63.6 and 56% among women that work on the labor market with and without 
children.  In average, however, middle-low income groups spend more hours watching TV a day (3.2) 
than individuals from middle and middle-upper income groups (2.6 and 2.3 hours a day, respectively), 
which means that these consumers –the drivers of the expansion of credit in the 2000s- are more exposed 
to the influence of consumption pressures (data from 2011, see CNTV (2011)) 
But not only have marketers more access to target Chilean families and expose them to  constant 
advertisements (which concentrates around 50% of total advertisement, see CNTV (2007)), but also the 
content of TV-shows matters. A good example of how content might have shaped the perception of 
Chilean consumers is the “showbiz“ boom we have witnessed in the last ten years. 
These TV shows in Chile boomed in the early 2000´s. According to experts, the milestone of 
Chileans´ concern about the daily life of national celebrities was the full coverage of the fight in a Disco 
held by two models wooers of Chile´s national team striker, Iván Zamorano. Only a few weeks after the 
fight, important national newspapers (“Las Últimas Noticias”, “La Cuarta” and “La Tercera”) changed 
their editorial format to include a permanent section of Showbiz. Since then, the industry grew in 
impressive ways and in 2006 the specialized Showbiz TV show “Primer Plano” was reaching an 
impressive 21 point rating. As the 2011´s report of the National Council of Television showed, these TV-
shows represent around a stable 5% of the total offer of the open TV in Chile (CNTV 2011) and have also 
differentiated and targeted audiences specializing in middle-low, middle and middle-upper socioeconomic 
backgrounds, being predominant among the former groups (CNTV 2013b).  
There might be several reasons why these shows are successful. Among them, people look for light 
entertainment that can be enjoyed without fully engaging with them (they do not require any 
concentration) and many individuals watch them by chance. But as a producer in the industry suggested in 
an interview with “La Tercera”,104 these shows are successful because they depict many times “normal” 
people that reached fame and wealth, and with whom they can identify themselves (indeed, the most 
recalled concepts with which Chileans seem to associate “showbiz” are “fame” and “money” (CNTV 
2013a)),. According to the report of the National Council of Television (CNTV 2013b), qualitative 
inquiries suggest that viewers are mainly interested in romance, every-day life of famous people, as well 
as curiosities such as “how much do they spend on clothing?”. That is why, regardless of the reasons 
explaining the increasing attention towards the life of national celebrities, what remains is that many 
Chileans become interested in the lives of “successful” and wealthier people with whom they can identify 
themselves. With this, they are consistently exposed to the lifestyles and consumption standards of 
“normal” but richer people, which goes in line with Merton´s suggestion that in societies that experience 
upward mobility, people tend to identify themselves with successful groups.  
Although there is not enough research to be conclusive about the role of the TV in shaping 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Available at: http://www.latercera.com/noticia/tendencias/2014/08/659-593607-9-ya-no-lo-siento-tu-hora-paso.shtml 
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people´s expectations in Chile, and we know that consumers are not passive recipients of these messages 
(Hall 2006), one could argue that the exposure to the life of others on a daily basis naturalizes and distorts 
the perception of one´s success and lifestyle, while triggers the desire of being attuned with the main 
trends of Chilean society. This can be easily extrapolated to other genres.   
The boom of showbiz, for instance, went also hand-by-hand with the consolidation of “reggaetón” 
in the whole region for at least the last fifteen years. “Reggaeton” is a music genre born in Puerto Rico´s 
ghettos that reproduces the lifestyles of gangsters and reapers. “Reggaeton” shows in its lyrics and clips 
the deployment of jewelry and expensive clothing (not to mention the objectification of women, which has 
received most attention (Gallucci 2008); for an analysis on the relationship between masculinity and 
identity see Carballo (2007)). 105 As artists systematically stress in their lyrics and interviews (see for 
example Dinzey-Flores (2008)), the exaltation of wealth in its different forms serves for establishing 
distance from former material constrains and becomes an explicit marker of success in the struggle for 
social mobility. One can argue that this and other cultural influences in Chile –and arguably everywhere- 
had an important factor explaining the rising concern about clothing and appearance from an increasingly 
indebted youth, especially among the poorest. This is reflected on the allocation of their budgets as well as 
their debts. 
Indeed, according to the Sixth Youth National Survey conducted in 2010 “clothing and footwear” 
are the second most important declared aspiration of young people in Chile after homeownership, reaching 
a 15.1% of preferences, and surpassing issues such as saving (11.2) and affording educational costs (10.4). 
In general, this preference accounts for the fact that younger consumers use department store credit cards 
to afford clothing, footwear and accessories in a bigger proportion than other age groups, except those 
over 75.106  
As the Household Financial Survey 2009 reports, among those that declare having at least one debt 
with department store credit cards, around 20% of consumers younger than 35 use these credits to make 
“other purchases” (clothing, footwear and accessories), decreasing in the middle of the life cycle where 
households conversely use these credits more systematically to buy home appliances and pay other debts. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Which range from romantics and gangbanging to competition for women- luxury cars, mansions. 
106 As expected, the number of young people with all types of debts as well as their amounts increases with age, being 
mortgages the biggest financial burden, followed by educational loans, bank consumer credits and department store credit 
cards. This is nothing new, since we already know that in average department stores´ loans are the smallest in the market, 
although they represent the most extended form of debt across all income groups.  
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Figure 42: Utilization of Department Store Credit Cards, Different Age Groups 2009 
 
Source: Data from the EFH 2009. 
 
But the pressure to spend on the items listed in the precedent paragraph seems to be especially 
important among poorer young consumers. As the Sixth Youth National Survey shows, for instance, the 
average amount of expenditures on almost all items such as housing, debts and education differs 
considerably according to socioeconomic strata. But the difference in the average amount of money spent 
on clothing and footwear between the highest and the lowest strata is very small, and even higher among 
the middle and middle-low strata (chart below). Nevertheless, as a share of the incomes of these 
consumers, expenditures on clothing are significantly more important for young consumers in the middle-
low and low socioeconomic groups. Thus for example, young consumers from the two poorest 
socioeconomic groups spend on the average the same amount of money than their homologous in the 
upper classes each month (around USD 45), but on the average the former groups allocate 20 percent of 
their incomes on clothing and footwear, while their counterparts in the middle, middle-upper and upper 
socioeconomic groups allocate only between 10 and 15% percent of their incomes (INJUV 2010). In other 
words, clothing and footwear are important aspirations among young consumers, who allocate similar 
amounts of money to these items across all socioeconomic groups; but in relative terms, those from lower 
socioeconomic strata make a stronger effort than everybody else to keep a similar level of expenditure. 
This goes in line with the suggestion that their exposure to reference groups that deploy wealth as a 
marker of identity and success in contexts of material constraints, might create pressures to spend and 
acquire debts to perform their class identities. 
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Figure 43: Average Amount of Monthly Expenditure Among Youth, Different Items 2010 
 
Source: Calculated from data from the “Sexta Encuesta Nacional de Juventud” 
 
In the end, no matter whether it is through advertising, the content of TV shows or other cultural 
manifestations, the mechanism though which the “trickle down consumption effect” exerts pressure on 
consumers seems to be the same. With the constant exposure to the lifestyles of wealthier individuals, one 
witnesses the rise of abstract reference groups that, in many cases, go beyond face-to-face relations 
(traditionally term with the expresion “keeping up with the Jonesses”). These abstract groups of reference 
depict, in most cases, stories of success with which people identify themselves. But this not only creates 
new desires and aspirations, but also distorts the perception of reality, generating a generalized feeling of 
“falling behind”. This seems to be the case in Chile, where a national survey conducted by the 
Universidad Diego Portales in 2008 shows, for example, that an important share of Chileans actually tends 
to have a very distorted view of the wealth and money that other families have. As the chart below shows, 
the feeling that “more than half of Chilean families earn more than me” reaches 50% of middle socio-
economic groups –among them administrative staff, mid-level managers, skilled workers and independent 
professionals that represent 25% of Chilean households.107  
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107 According to Rasse/Salcedo/Pardo (2009), this is the group that represents the “emergent middle-class” that resulted from 
the economic growth experienced in the last two decades. 
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Figure 44: People That Think That “more than half of Chilean families earn more than me”, 2008 
Source: Data from the Encuesta Nacional UDP 2008. 
 
This perception might be also rooted in the “luxury fever” deployed by top earners in Chile during 
the last decades. The Human Development Report in 2002 already pointed out that the imports of luxury 
goods such as jewelry and perfumery grew 302% and 903% between 1990 and 2000, respectively (PNUD 
2002). Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 5, households from the lowest and middle-income quintiles 
increased the share of expenditures on care and beauty products rose consistently since 1987 to date.  
In general, the industry of luxury arrived in Chile in the late nineties. The arrival of Louis Vuitton 
in 1997 was indicative of the trend, followed by the arrival of successive brands and the creation of the 
Luxury Brand Association (Asociación de Marcas de Lujo) in 2005,108 which nowadays gathers around 30 
associated firms in order to coordinate, promote and protect the industry of luxury in the country. 
Altogether, many of these brands complement each other and shape a whole “luxurious package” that 
includes clothing, watches, cars, hotels and restaurants. And they have been very successful. The industry 
in Chile grew exponentially in the last ten years, registering according to an article published in the 
newspaper “La Tercera”, profits around USD 472 million in 2012 (10% more than in 2011). Recently, this 
trend received a new impulse on the part of the pioneers of shopping malls in Chile, “Parque Arauco”, 
which inaugurated in 2013 a “Luxurious district” in the wake of the increasing demand of Chilean 
consumers for luxury goods. With this, luxury brands landed in the heart of Chile´s commercial system, 
the shopping mall. 
Currently, the industry is reaching its highest peak and experts argue that in the last ten years, 
Chile became the “capital” of luxury cars in Latin America, registering the record of having the only 
“Aston Martin” sold in the region (whose cost is approximately USD 2 million).109 In this sense, luxurious 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 http://amlchile.org/aml/ 
109 Chile became an attractive country for the industry because of its political stability, economic growth, as well as security as 
compared to the former poles of the luxury industry in the region, Argentina and Brasil.  
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cars, the segment that has experienced the biggest growth in the industry according to the president of 
Association of Luxury Brands (AML) (55% between 2010 and 2012 followed by premium liquor and 
jewelry), are very indicative of how expectations might be created by expenditures of wealthiest 
consumers in the Chilean society. Indeed, cars became a major concern of Chilean consumers in the last 
decade and for many, they belong now to the “standard package” of durable goods, as the explosive 
expansion of car owners shows in the chart below. Since cars are, by definition, deployed in the streets 
and represent “positional goods” -which means that the evaluation that consumers make of their cars 
largely depends on the cars they see running in the streets- we can expect that the standards of many 
consumers have been ratcheted up by the progressive penetration of luxury brands, such as Mercedes 
Benz, Audi, BMW, Lexus, Land Rover, Volvo and Alfa Romeo, and later on the incorporation of “super 
luxurious” cars such as Porsche, Ferrari, Maserati, Jaguar and Aston Martin, whose prices range from 
around USD 60,000 to 300,000. 
Figure 45: Evolution of  Number of Sold Cars, 1999-2012 
Source: Data from the National Association of Automobiles (Asociación Nacional Automotriz de 
Chile). 
 
A similar logic applies to a set of other positional goods. Experts argue, for instance, that the 
industry is moving towards the service sector, such as premium coffee houses, hotels and restaurants.110 
This might put pressure on Chileans´ expectations and budgets, if we consider that in items such as eating 
out Chile is one of the most expensive countries in Latin America, but that does not prevent Chilean 
consumers from being among the three countries that spend more money on restaurants in the whole 
region (INE 2006).  
Finally, there might be more subtle mechanisms through which exposure to others wealth via face-
to-face relations or abstract reference groups takes place. For example, a structural factor that accounts for 
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the establishment of new standards of living and consumption patterns through changes in the reference 
groups, especially among moderately educated families, is the increasing participation of women in the 
labor force. Between 1920 and 1982 women´s participation in the labor force in Chile remained stable 
between 20 and 25%. The inflection takes place in 1982, where we have seen an increasing participation 
in labor markets that accumulated a 20% increase in 2009 (PNUD 2010). According to CASEN survey, 
the participation of women between 15 and 60 years old increased from 32% to 49% between 1987 and 
2006 (PNUD 2010). In general, higher participation in labor markets is related to higher levels of 
education, concentrated among those with high and medium education (78 and 56% accumulated growth 
rate). Nevertheless, in the period 1996-2008 the main increase was concentrated among those women that 
live with a partner and have medium education, the segment that had bigger space for growth. This 
structural change has several implications. Among them, it translates into an important change of the 
reference groups for many middle class families. The housewife that on the average watches more TV 
than other groups is, in many cases, replaced by the woman that gets to know the lifestyles of colleagues 
and other professionals above and below her in hierarchical organizations (Schor 1999b). On the one 
hand, the standards of living, consumption patterns and expectations of new wage earners (or/and now 
two-income families) are ratcheted simply because they have more resources. On the other hand, this 
broadens the scope of existing reference groups and former housewives have access to face-to-face 
relations with richer people, triggering new patterns of social comparison. Furthermore, a new job –
especially in the service sector- requires new investments in personal appearance oneself in front of others 
and demands a constant monitoring of one´s appearance.  
8.3 CLASS DIFFERENTIATION, SOCIAL TRAJECTORIES AND CREDIT 
Of course, the “trickle down consumption effect” cannot fully account for all consumption 
dynamics. Indeed, many goods that do not have visibility and cannot be deployed in front of others but 
represent anyhow an important part of people´s lifestyles. Furthermore, it is hard to establish the causal 
relation of the consumption patterns of one income group over another. As studies on consumption show, 
in some cases emulation also occurs in the opposite direction, from the bottom to the top in a sort of 
“trickle up” effect (Slater 2005b; Gabriel/Lang 2006; Trigg 2001). This happens not only by emulation, as 
with the famous example of “blue jeans” where working class clothing was embraced as an upper class 
fashion, but with broader dynamics of class differentiation. If the middle-class can increasingly afford 
goods formerly restricted to the elites or upper classes, these have responded by deploying new forms of 
consumption that reproduce the symbolic and material boundaries of class differentiation (Veblen 1994; 
Bourdieu 1984).111 In this sense, the expansion of markets for luxury, for example, could have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 According to Trigg (2001), the extent to which people consciously engage in “conspicuous consumption” in Veblen´s 
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fostered by the expansion of consumption among the Chilean middle classes, which seems to have an 
increasing preference for “branded” goods, which was in turn facilitated by the availability of department 
store credits. Following this logic, I will show in the next chapter that credit affords not only increasing 
access to goods but also works as a “quality enhancer”, which places branded goods within the scope of 
the rising middle-class. In this vein, one now has to consider the idea that the rise of new middle classes in 
Chile was both the cause and consequence of the expansion of consumption and consumer debts.  
Historically speaking, the Chilean middle class emerged in its most modern version in the first half 
of the XX century in urban centers, mainly composed of employees in the public sector. This sector 
consolidated between 1940 and 1960, and represented around 30 percent of the population. Even though 
they had a precarious situation, they enjoyed political representation and obtained important benefits on 
the part of the developmental state (Bazoret/Fierro 2011; Espinoza/Bazoret 2009). Neoliberal reforms 
affected these segments in important ways, dismantling their ties with the government and pushing them 
to migrate to the new private bureaucracies, especially in the service sector (Bazoret/Fierro 2011). As a 
result of neoliberal reforms, the Chilean middle-class became a very heterogeneous group, to the extent 
that authors argue that nowadays it is hard to talk of a “Chilean middle class” (Mendez 2008).112 
Several changes characterize the rise of the “new middle-class” and the reconversion of the 
“traditional”. As previously mentioned, the reconfiguration of educational opportunities and the 
occupational structure were followed by a rise in wages and patterns of both intergenerational and 
individual social mobility (Arzola/Castro 2009; Nuñez/Miranda 2009). In terms of the occupational 
structure, Torche/Wormald (2004) show that middle class occupations – public and private wage earners, 
as well as independent workers- grew systematically during the last 25 years, especially concentrating in 
the private and service sector. 
In terms of their access to goods and services, the “new middle-class have been characterized as 
increasingly integrated into the “consumption party”, especially due to the availability of credit and the 
consolidation of shopping malls (Moulian 2002; Tironi 1999). But this integration does not only occur 
with regard to the access to new durable goods –as I showed in chapter 4- but also to the acquisition and 
appropriation of “cultural goods”. I mentioned, for example, that already in 1997 the share of the income 
that Chilean families allocated to leisure activities doubled the figures of 1987, from 2.6 to 5.5 (Torche 
2012). According to Brunner (2006), the rise of these new groups, more educated and with higher 
purchasing power, modified the social boundaries demarcated by old hierarchies by transforming the 
access to cultural goods as well as their modes of appropriation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
account has been overstated by his critiques. Veblen indeed recognizes that consumers also seek to comply with certain 
“standards of decency” and “accumulated culture” play a major role in positional struggles. 
112 Depending on whether they are measured in terms of income or occupation, they represent around 40 and 45% of the 
population, respectively (Mendez 2009). 
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In the first place, the expansion of both secondary and tertiary education meant a redistribution of 
cultural capitals among those traditionally excluded from the educational system. A similar process 
occurred with the consumption of basic cultural goods such as books, magazines, movies, theater, and 
mass culture events, although there is still an important share of the population that remains “inactive” or 
“passive” in terms of cultural consumption (Gallo/Teitelboim/Méndez 2009). This represents a break with 
Chile´s republican history, marked by a very restricted distribution of symbolic capital, classism and a 
predominant hierarchical organization. In this sense, for example, as Gallo/Teitelboim/Méndez (2009) 
argue, the consumption of radio and television grew so much across all social strata, that they no longer 
represented criteria of distinction; by the same token, the consumption of public cultural goods do not 
longer discriminate among social groups, and Chileans go to the theatre and concerts on a more 
homogeneous basis, in part because these activities have been strongly subsidized by the state (Torche 
2012). Thus, criteria of social distinction change and consumption standards become more demanding 
through activities that are meant to exclude an important share of the population 
(Gallo/Teitelboim/Méndez 2009).  
This overall logic of class differentiation with the rise of the new-middle class has two important 
consequences to understand the financialization of consumption, and provides the relevant context to 
frame the credit stories and practices of Chilean families that will be depicted in the next chapter.  
Generally speaking, one can say that growth and credit broadened the horizons of consumption 
across all income groups, creating spirals of consumption every time the increasing access to goods of 
aspirational middle-class put exert pressure on the upper classes to administer the criteria of social 
distinction. Inequality perpetuates these zero-sum games because social differences remain basically 
untouched in contexts of growth. In this way, the markers of distinction and success change, and 
consumption keeps expanding. Thus, better wages among middle-class workers do not close the gap 
between income groups, and the consolidation of their new lifestyles are followed by pressures for those 
above and below them in the social hierarchy to either take distance from rising socioeconomic groups by 
deploying new consumption patterns and tastes, or to catch-up with new consumptions standards. This, 
conversely, fuels the economy and provides a solid ground for Privatized Keynesianism to consolidate as 
a growth model. 
Secondly, one can expect people to put special emphasis on purchasing and deploying goods with 
credit when performing their class identities in a context of changing social boundaries. This happens 
because purchasing power, which is ultimately used to acquire both durable and cultural goods, is the 
crucial criterion of social distinction in Chile. As Torche (2012) argues, unlike other countries with 
important racial or religious cleavages, culturally speaking Chile is a very homogeneous country; 
indigenous groups represent less than 5% of the population, more than 80% declare themselves as 
Catholics and foreign population is less than 2%. As a consequence, scholars have found that cultural 
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differences and status stratification are strongly correlated with income and education, and that they are 
hardly distinguishable from each other (Torche 2012). Having access to goods and services on the market 
thus becomes the crucial marker of social distinction, which explains why unlike developed countries, 
going to the movies is in Chile a highly stratified activity, while consuming other cultural goods strongly 
subsidized by the government such as theatre is not.  
The situation depicted above provides a key entry point to understand the financialization of 
consumption in contexts of upward mobility. If the new middle-class changed the social boundaries 
among socioeconomic groups by changing consumption patterns, and the main criteria of social 
distinction were strongly correlated with purchasing power, it would be possible to argue that there are 
strong pressures to consume beyond people´s means across all social strata, in order to deploy the proper 
consumption standards and perform their desired class identities.  
Some evidence supports the aforementioned idea. Scholars in Chile have shown that, by 
prioritizing expenditures and allocating incomes, the so-called new middle-class workers seek to perform 
what they conceive of as their “expected” and “authentic” class identities (Mendez 2008). In this case, it is 
the indeterminacy of people´s status in a context of changing social boundaries that makes people pursue 
an “ethics of authenticity” when performing their class identities (status anxiety).  As Salcedo/Stillerman 
(2010) conclude from their observations, interviews and focus groups with middle-low class young 
consumers in a shopping mall in the most populated municipality of Santiago (La Florida), middle-low 
class youth carry out practices of distinction from both poorer and richer consumers, for which they 
simulate practices of middle class adults. This goes in line with the research conducted by Salcedo/De 
Simone (2013), who argue that the shopping mall -and its associated consumption practices- became in 
Chile a crucial space to perform a sort of “imaginary middle-class”, not necessarily by deploying wealth 
and affluence in front of others, but by sharing with the family, going out and eating together.  
Unfortunately, there is not enough research to know what this “imaginary middle-class” is like, but 
scholars studying the middle-class in Chile have systematically pointed out that there are clear signs that 
performing the “desired” class identity is a constant tension for Chilean families in the wake of changing 
social boundaries (Ariztía 2009 ; Mendez 2008; Mendez 2009; Salcedo/Stillerman 2010). Put this way, 
one can say that the” imaginary middle class” is a source of “status anxiety” every time the dynamics of 
class differentiation blurs social boundaries and standards of living become more demanding. As a result, 
being a middle-class citizen becomes a difficult task to perform, for which consumers deploy practices of 
distinction and consumption that are constantly –though indirectly- challenged by rising standards of 
living. This is probably nowhere else better depicted than in the fact that most Chilean families across all 
income groups see themselves as middle class families (Rasse/Salcedo/Pardo 2009). Paradoxically, the 
more families strive to perform the middle-class identity, the more the “imaginary middle class” becomes 
a more demanding standard of living, perpetuating the “status anxiety” of Chilean families.  
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To some extent, one can think of these rising aspirations that materialize in an imaginary middle 
class in part as an imaginary community. As with the imaginary community of the nation that Anderson 
(1991) described, the representation of an average imaginary middle class refers to a community of others 
you have never met face-to-face, but which you still claim to belong to (as the polls consistently show). 
As the imaginary community of the nation, the imaginary middle class is also a limited imagination 
because it has boundaries: the imaginary middle class distinguishes their members from the poor that 
receive government´s assistance as well as from the rich. The difference, however, is that the imaginary 
middle class is a residual category whose boundaries are not as clear as the ones of the nation, and remain 
constantly challenged. Unlike the community of the nation, where the issue of belonging can be 
institutionally and materially endorsed with citizenship and a passport, the belonging to an imaginary 
middle class has to be demonstrated, acted out and performed.  That is why, as I argued, credit becomes 
for many the passport to a different form of citizenship based not only on entitlements but also in taking 
part in the benefits of prosperity.  
In this sense, the way the imagined community of the middle class induces “status anxiety” and 
prompts people to consume beyond their means, resembles more the effects of the predestination doctrine 
on the actions of ordinary people, as Weber understood it: just like there is no other way to prove that one 
has been chosen by god than carrying out (performing) worldly activities, there is no other way to prove 
oneself and others that one is a middle class citizen than acquiring the “standard package” and catching up 
with the new fashions of the Chilean society.113  
Of course, the extent to which these aspirations materialize in a collective representation of the 
“middle classes” is something difficult to prove in a quantitative fashion, although we know from surveys 
and marketing studies that there is an extended self-identification with being middle classes, and at the 
same time a perceived gap between people´s aspirations and their possessions. But the question if credit 
serves as a means to perform and reaffirm people´s class identities, can be rather assessed by looking into 
the financial practices of these households. This is one of the main goals of next chapter. 
8.3.1 SOCIAL MOBILITY AND THE “INCOME SPIKE EFFECT” 
A corollary of the dynamics of social differentiations is that one can expect people´s trajectories in 
the social space to be crucial in explaining how the social construction of aspirations and consumption 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 As Weber puts it, “Work, and work alone, banishes religious doubt and assures one´s status among the saved” To what he 
added that worldly work “…could be viewed, so to speak, as the suitable mechanism for the release of emotion-based religious 
anxiety…” (125) Notice the formulation one gets when replacing the words “work” for “consumption” and “religion” by 
“status”: “Consumption, and consumption alone, banishes status doubts and reaffirms one´s status among the saved” And 
consumption “…could be viewed, so to speak, as the suitable mechanism for the release of emotion-based status anxiety…” 
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standards shape the utilization of credit. As our credit stories will depict in more detail, the “social 
origins” of families play a major role in the way people conceive debts, money and consumption. This 
sheds light on subtler mechanisms through which a re-configuration of the social structure shapes the 
logics of indebtedness by changing reference groups and the trajectories of individuals in the social space. 
An important mechanism boosting the demand for credit is what I call the “income spike effect”, or the 
effect that sudden upward mobility has on financial practices. In this regard, Pinto´s (2004) study on the 
indebtedness of miners in one of the subsidiaries of Chile´s National Copper Corporation (Codelco) is 
very illustrative. 
Although Pinto´s thesis was meant to serve as a guide for the Human Resources Department, it 
gathers interesting information about the relation between debts and standards of living. In particular, the 
study is interesting for our purposes for two main reasons: Firstly, unlike most employees in Chile, 
Coldeco´s indebted workers with indefinite contracts –the subjects under study- enjoy stability and 
important benefits associated with public institutions, special benefits (subsidies to pay for electricity, 
water and gas, scholarships and in many cases housing), high levels of unionization, successful bargaining 
experiences, and earn wages over the national average.114 In this particular subsidiary (currently known as 
“Coldeco Norte”), for example, miners used to perceive wages 10 to 20% higher than those in the private 
sector and over outsourced miners.115  
On the other hand, in Pinto´s study 70% of Coldelco workers have only secondary education, 20% 
a technical degree, and only a few of them are professionals (around 8%). This means that most of 
Coldeco´s indebted workers under study have experienced impressive upward mobility, coming from very 
poor backgrounds to enjoy wages over the national average, stable working conditions, and aspirations of 
improvement guaranteed by the most successful and biggest unions in the country. This means that they 
are at the other extreme of the vulnerable, non-unionized, poorly rewarded and indebtedness worker 
traditionally depicted.  
Of course these working conditions and wages make workers very attractive for department stores 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 According to estimations of Durán/Kremerman (2015), workers from the mining sector in Chile perceive higher wages that 
their counterparts in Commerce or Industry. While 70% of workers in the Commerce sector earn less than USD 600monthly 
income, only a half of workers in the mining sector earn wages below the USD 1300.  
115 In 2011 80 to 90% of the wages in Codelco were fixed, versus 50 to 60% of the wages in the private sector. 
http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=86653. According to estimations of the industry, the base wage of a 
productive worker reached in 2008 around USD 1400 -versus USD 580 of an outsourced worker, which increases to USD 2200 
with extra hours and bonuses.  In the biggest subsidiary (Codelco Norte), a truck driver or a “palero” that fills the wheelbarrow 
-considered the most elemental work among miners- earns an annual income around USD 6000 before paying social security, 
while a non-professional in the administrative staff earns around USD 2600.  
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and banks when it comes to having access to credit, something that these workers –and Chilean consumers 
in general- perceive as a source of status and recognition. Like most Chileans, they spend many hours in 
the shopping mall inaugurated in 2002 (Mall Calama) and later re-opened as “Mall Plaza Calama” in 2011 
when the big department store Falabella became the owner, which, according to the testimony of one of 
the workers, altogether brought to the arid and quiet city of Calama the “freedom of choice” that people 
enjoy in the big cities. According to what we can see in Pinto´s interviews with indebted workers, 
different phenomena account for their indebtedness. To start with, workers recognize the strong incentives 
to consume, to buy things in the shopping mall, a car for the very first time, hopefully a 4x4, and better 
clothing. But more interestingly, they perceive the problem of “consumerism” that hunts workers in the 
sector as a mismatch between education and income. As one of them puts it:  
 
“What happens is that people (…) buy and buy because that makes them feel good with 
themselves, and also to show something they are not. That is typical in Calama (the city), a lot of 
money, no education (...) wages are high, so these buddies do not have education but have a lot of 
material things, which they deploy to show something they are not” (Pinto 2004, p98)116   
 
This simple quotation provides two key insights to understand the underlying pragmatics of 
credit/debt relations. Firstly, it clearly shows that new consumption standards of less educated workers -
facilitated by credit- call into question existing social boundaries, and irritate the traditional middle-class. 
“Buying with credit” in this sense becomes a synonym of “consumerism”, and a label with which these 
rising middle-class workers are normally classified. If one reads between the lines, credit is seen as a 
means for helping people reach “spurious” identities, “being something they are not”. As such, labeling 
these workers as “consumerists” is a clear indication of the “status anxiety” among traditional middle 
classes.  
Secondly, if one takes some distance from one´s first impression (consumerist workers!), the 
underlying phenomenon seems to be that the turning point where people move out of poverty and change 
their reference groups, somehow makes people consume beyond their capabilities and acquire debts. So, 
does this mean in the end that these workers are consumerists or not? 
The answer to the question posed above is both yes and no. One could say that they are 
“consumerists” because many of them consumed and acquired debts beyond their means, and used more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 “Lo que pasa es que a la gente no le interesa saber cosas sino tener, no están ni ahí, compran y compran porque eso los 
ayuda a sentirse bien con ellos y también ostentar imagen de lo que no son, eso es típico acá en Calama, harta plata y poca 
educación (...) los sueldos son altos, entonces los viejos no tiene educación pero tienen muchas cosas materiales y con eso 
ostentan y muestran algo que no son” (Operativo Endeudado Planta N° 2). 
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than 50% of their monthly income to serve their debts. But this consumerism has less to do with a 
hedonist consumer that seeks self-gratification and status. As interviewees consistently point out in Pinto´s 
work and in our fieldwork with middle class families, there are two phenomena at stake that shed light 
into the indebtedness of this emerging working class. First, managing money and wealth is a learning 
process. As it will be shown in the next chapter, “consumerism” and over-indebtedness might only be a 
phase in a usually long-lasting relationship with credit. Workers that never had money before learn how to 
deal with their higher incomes and debts by experiencing traumatic episodes, or learning from others´ 
experiences. In parallel, upward mobility in many cases triggers a sense of “euphoria” that can have 
disastrous financial consequences. To some extent, according to these testimonies, being impulsive or “not 
denying oneself anything” stems, in many cases, from previous experiences of poverty and material 
constrains. In this sense, displaying wealth is both the expression of a sense of pride regarding one´s 
achievement, as well as a clear way of erasing traumatic experiences and the markers of one´s social 
origins. This might become even a more demanding task in a context where social boundaries blur, and a 
subtle way in which performing one´s class identity leads people to acquire debts. Indeed, having 
discretion over one´s income and moving away from daily restrictions is part of the imaginary of the 
“middle classes”. 
Broadly speaking, one can encompass these ways of acquiring debts as manifestations of what one 
can call the “income-spike effect”, or the fact that abrupt upward mobility leads people to acquire debts 
and spend money beyond their capabilities. As I further depict in chapter 9, the way this happens might 
differ. Thus, for example, some people just lack the practical skills to handle their “new money” and 
“credit availability”. But many people also become excited about getting a credit card or available balance 
because credit is a source of recognition in the Chilean society, just as being on the black list of a credit 
bureau is bad reputation. Indeed, being recognized by lenders as a “subject of credit (something they 
exploit by differentiating their products), means being trustworthy and recognized as a potential customer 
(exaltation of credere). This, in part, explains why consuming through credit in Chile does not have a 
negative moral connotation for debtors: in a context of “status anxiety” becoming subject of credit is a 
source of recognition and a passport to the ritual of consumption, an invitation to take part in the 
modernization of Chilean society. 
These two sides of credit/debt relations, being considered as “consumerist” by those on top the 
hierarchy, and feeling proud when recognized as a trustworthy person, are manifestations of the “status 
anxiety” latent in the Chilean society. It resembles the “status anxiety” of those that feel threatened by 
new consumers, as well as the anxiety of those that want to participate in the benefits of growth and 
become part of the imaginary middle class. I will come back to this issue in the next chapter. What should 
be kept in mind now, is that class differentiation dynamics and people´s trajectories in the social space 
provide crucial coordinates to locate the financial practices of Chilean households, a largely ignored issue 
 
	   	  
178 
in the specialized literature. 
8.5 CONSUMPTION, CULTURAL CHANGES AND DEBTS 
Finally, one has to consider the role played by cultural changes in shaping the anxious perceptions 
about one´s and others´ success, and ultimately contributing to increasing the gap between aspirations and 
incomes. As many critics have noticed, the rise of the consumer –cause and effect of the expansion of 
finance- has been associated with the crucial role played by the market in the constitution of people´s 
identities, which replaced “work” as the sphere of personal and collective realization (PNUD 2002; 
Moulian 2002). As the standard narrative argues, if the past was marked by the central role of 
collectivities and political belonging, now the sense of “us” weakened and gave way to increasing 
fragmentation of subjectivities and individualization processes (Güell 2012; Martuccelli 2012b). As a 
corollary, people perceive themselves more as consumers and competitors (Engel/Navia 2009), rather than 
as workers or belonging to a political community; they share a strong sense of individual responsibility in 
shaping their life-course and embrace the meritocratic values, especially among the middle-class 
(Bazoret/Fierro 2011). According to the common interpretation, this is nowhere better reflected that on the 
fact that while people spend more and more hours in the shopping mall and watching TV, their political 
engagement has decreased steadily since the early 1990´s (although this causal relation has not been 
entirely proved, see Scherman (2009)). In tune with the Frankfurt school, most critical observers have 
argued that workers, previously the incarnation of a historical subject, now feel much more comfortable 
and seduced with the “party of consumption” (Moulián 1998). 
The importance of the market and the decline of collective identities is seen by many as an 
indicator of individualization processes, according to which people seem to care much more about 
building their own identities and biographical trajectories in relation to abstract reference groups, rather 
than following collective projects (for a review of this literature in Chile see Yopo (2013)). Life-styles are, 
accordingly, increasingly mediated with reference to the market and shaped by the imperative of late 
modernity according to which, in Giddens (1991) terms,  “We have no choice but to choose” (Güell 2012; 
PNUD 2002). Under this imperative, our apparent capacity to choose in every instance –what to wear, eat, 
listen or do- is reflected on a social identity that resembles the history of one´s decisions, creating an 
inevitable anxiety and the quest for stabilizing one´s self-identity. Such process implies that consumption 
and the manipulation of meanings attached to goods should be administered and conveyed in ways that 
our identity be made available to others (Warde 1994).  
In Chile, the process of individualization finds a crucial expression in a sort of “aestheticization of 
everyday life”, characterized by an increasing concern about the stylization of the self (PNUD 2002). This 
stylization relies on the fact that people increasingly believe that their success depends on "appropriate 
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cultivation” of the “self” through body projects, developing personal style or dieting, to mention a few 
(Zukin/Smith Maguire 2005).  
The “appropriate cultivation of the self” seems to be an important social process fostering spirals of 
consumerism, or, at least, contributing to the expansion of consumption and credit. As already sketched in 
chapter 5, Chileans are much more concerned about their appearance and spend considerably more on 
beauty products than in the previous decades, a change that noticeable in the lowest income groups. This 
is a trend that started in the nineties and continued expanding during the 2000s, from which the impressive 
rise of imported of perfumes is only one example (chart below). 
Figure 46: Evolution of Imported Perfumes, 2003-2013 
Source: Data from the Central Bank of Chile 
 
But there are probably no better examples to illustrate the increasing importance that “investments 
in the self” have gained than the direct body interventions throughof fitness training and esthetic surgery, 
embodied markers of lifestyles that became increasingly important for Chilean consumers. Fitness centers, 
for example, proliferated in the last years beyond the traditional districts in the city center and upper class 
neighborhoods. If by 2007 there were only 75 fitness centers in Santiago, by 2011 the newspaper “La 
Tercera” counted 129 of them. Only in the most populated district of Santiago, “La Florida”, for example, 
there was only one fitness studio in 2007, while in 2011 it was possible to find at least 8 of them. This 
change has been so important, that in 2014, the National Bureau of Statistics (INE) incorporated 
expenditures on fitness centers into the set of basic goods with which the price index is calculated. 
Plastic surgery for aesthetic purposes, on the other hand, has seen an impressive expansion during 
the last decades, in part caused by the increasing exposure to local celebrities that legitimate direct 
interventions in the body. In Chile there are no good data on plastic surgery (mainly because of its private 
character), but estimates made by the newspaper “Cambio21”117 suggest that these interventions increased 
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between 1992 and 2012 in at least 150%, which lately found an important niche among young consumers. 
Nowadays, this is so popular that it is possible to find “groupons” and “gift cards” to undergo breast 
implants and liposuctions, among others, which seem to increasingly attract the attention of consumers 
under age 18. 
Plastic surgery might become more important in the future. In the past years, the aestheticization of 
everyday life gained a renewed impulse with the possibilities boosted by the new information 
technologies. Social networks, which are increasingly available with the penetration of the Internet and 
smartphones, made people much more aware of their physical appearances (not to mention global 
reference groups of celebrities in all fields). The practice of taking pictures of oneself or “selfies” in order 
to share them on social networks is an exemplary catalyst of these processes. In Chile, according to a 
survey conducted by the Faculty of Communications of the Universidad Católica de Chile with 1345 
people aged between 18 and 35, 80.3% of respondents have at least taken a picture of themselves or 
“selfie” during the year, and only 5% do not share them on the social networks; an overwhelming 98.2%, 
on the other hand, declares to have friends that share their “selfies” with them.118 This trend seems to be 
related to the increasing concern about shaping the body among young people. As the annual survey of the 
American Academy of Facial Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery conducted in 2014 found, “…one in 
three facial plastic surgeons surveyed saw an increase in requests for procedures due to patients being 
more self-aware of looks in social media”,119 especially among youth.   
New and more stylized lifestyles are demanding because many of these goods and services come 
in packages. This means that the more people engage in specialized activities, the more they have to spend 
on sets of goods (Warde 2011). Fitness training is a case in point. It is a “fixed” and expensive activity; 
people are required to pay an initial fee plus a monthly payment; it also demands a proper outfit and it 
entails, in many cases, the consumption of dietary supplements. As Rodríguez et al. (2011) argue, the 
increasing importance of fitness centers in Chile went hand in hand with the flourishing of the industry of 
dietary supplements. This might explain why the consumption of both “bottled water” and “sports´ 
drinks”, two goods that nobody would have considered important more than fifteen years ago, explosively 
expanded in the last decade. 
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Figure 47: Evolution of Sold Liters of Botled Water and Sports Drinks 
 
Source: Data from the National Association of Beverages 
 
That goods come in packages is something marketers know and seek to exploit. Nowadays, these 
“packages” include from fashion to cultural goods. In this spirit, for example, the advertisement of the 
festival “Lollapalooza” sponsored in Chile by a department store in 2013 reads as follows, “Don´t you 
know what to wear in Lollapalooza? We show you here three different outfits to inspire you”, followed by 
a description of three items of clothing, footwear and accessories that depict a “relaxed surfer”, “someone 
different” and “the comfortable and stylish look” (which even includes a bike).120  
 These cultural templates play an important role in shaping the consumption dynamics in societies 
that reached a certain threshold of affluence. But if there are notorious processes of individualization in 
Chile, it is worth asking whether the imperative of building more stylized lifestyles becomes a motive for 
most people to consume beyond their capabilities. Undoubtedly, the stylization of the self, for instance, 
creates pressure on many consumers and makes lifestyles more demanding. But, to what extent is the main 
orientation of Chilean consumers?  
There is apparently a blurry line between higher aspirations, the social definition of proper 
lifestyle, and people´s quest for differentiation. As Ariztía (2002) showed, wage earners from the middle 
sector in the late nineties were spending money on clothing and self-care products considerably more than 
other occupational groups. As he interprets this change, in line with post-modern theories of consumption, 
such pattern could be understood as the result of individuation process and a progressive stylization of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Peterson (2005) argues that the differentiation of lifestyles is reflected on the great range of clusters that increasingly 
sophisticated marketing studies have detected. In turn, this had performative consequences because marketing actors –cultural 
intermediaries according to Bourdieu- seek to predict and shape existing differentiations and systems of distinctions. In 
particular, marketing agents, a crucial agency shaping markets, “package” systems of distinctions as “sets” of goods and 
practices that when carried out altogether define certain lifestyles (which is not different from what Bourdieu meant with the 
concept of structural homology). 
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everyday life, where the act of performing one´s identity is increasingly mediated by the need of 
establishing differentiated lifestyles. But this is somehow hard to confirm, says Ariztía, and as studies in 
marketing showed, these groups were more than anything concerned about having a “good appearance” 
(Buena presencia) than creating particular lifestyles. The so-called "good appearance” in Chile has to do 
with the attempt to conform oneself with others expectations of decency, especially in the occupational 
context of the service sector where appearance matters considerably more than in other domains.  
Marketing studies provide interesting insights to clarify this issue, or at least to provide some 
perspective. The marketing consultant firm "The Lab Consulting” has been applying in Chile the Cross 
Cultural Consumer Characterization, known as the 4C´s since 2001. This classification seeks to go beyond 
traditional marketing   characterizations and builds a profile of consumers based on brand preferences, 
motivations, lifestyles and class. In Chile, they have conducted an annual survey with 2000 consumers in 
the main urban centers of the country and the last report provides interesting insights to understand the 
changes among Chilean consumers in the last ten years. 
The characterization distinguishes 7 types of consumers that provide a glimpse of the major trends 
among Chilean consumers. “Simulators”, which represent around 16% of the population, are defined as 
materialistic, ambitious and motivated by the opinion of others. Depicted as “status seekers”, they seem to 
worry about fashion, appearance and to show off their accomplishments to others more than 
anything. This group, which has gained importance during the last ten years, embodies the aspirational 
and emergent middle-class that feel some fascination for luxury and branded products. In this sense, we 
could expect these consumers to be in part a resemblance of the processes of individuation previously 
depicted and, as it will be seen in the next section, these consumers might be more prone to be affected by 
the increasing wealth of others (trickle down consumption effect). 
But this is not an accurate characterization of the “stylized consumer” of post-modern theories of 
consumption. Indeed, one finds more individualized and independent consumers that the so-
called “reformers" and “explorers”, two profiles representing a sort of avant-garde, that might well 
embody the “new stylized consumer”. These groups altogether represent around 13 and 9% of Chilean 
consumers, and are characterized by being concerned about exploring new products (mainly 
technologies), building original styles, and establishing new orientations and trends.  
Interestingly, the most important profile of Chilean consumers in the last decade has been 
the “mainstreamer”. These represent around 33% of the population, and their main concerns are security, 
social belonging and acceptation. These consumers are depicted as oriented towards the family, 
conservative in terms of consumption preferences, and rather than showing-off their main motivations are 
more concerned about care relations. This group is giving way to the “simulators” during the last ten 
years, but it is by far the most important profile of the Chilean society. This group seems to fit the credit-
stories that I will depict in the next chapter. In this case, I will show that they also feel anxious about their 
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status, and their incomes seem to be not enough to satisfy their needs. But the way these consumers use 
consumer credits are less driven by consumerist fever than by a subtle expansion of their expectations. In 
many cases, credit is used as a way to enhance the performance of the self, as well as to comply with more 
demanding esthetic canons. But this way of using credit is not necessarily driven by hedonist motives, but 
rather by the need of complying with normative expectations of “decency”, especially for those that 
experience upward mobility and deal with the barriers to entry into their new social networks. 
On the whole, dynamics of consumption, social comparison and class differentiation sketched 
throughout these chapters are still very general.  The question now is what signs of “status anxiety” we 
can find in the actual practices carried out by consumers. And what is the everyday building of the middle 
class identities and the socially constructed standards of living. The next chapter tackles these issues by 
looking into the concrete credit-stories of middle class Chilean families. 
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CHAPTER 9 CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE STATUS ANXIETY HYPOTHESIS FROM “BELOW”  
Chapters 7 and 8 aimed at exploring how different social dynamics might account for the rising 
indebtedness of Chilean households in contexts of collective improvement and inequality. I explored the 
possibility that in such scenario consumer credit closes an existing gap between people´s aspirations and 
their incomes. I argued that better living conditions and collective social mobility –whether fostered by 
social policies or higher wages- ratcheted up the standards of living, which, due to high levels of 
inequality, created the perception that many families are “not taking part” in the benefits of growth. In this 
sense, I sketched a few social processes that explain how Chilean families become systematically anxious 
about their own status (especially among the middle-class). Among them, I sketched the role played by 
social comparison, more demanding consumption standards, “relative poverty”, rising expenditures of 
wealthier consumers, cultural changes and dynamics of class differentiation. But does this mean that 
Chileans are essentially consumerists? What is the dividing line between consuming beyond one´s means 
and complying with socially constructed standards of living? How are these aspirations fulfilled, and what 
is the role of consumer debts in practice?  
This chapter tackles these questions from a qualitative perspective. In line with the “status anxiety” 
hypothesis, some financial practices are better described by making reference to individualization 
processes, class differentiation dynamics, the feeling of “being excluded”, or a more subtle transformation 
of people´s aspirations throughout their life-trajectories. In the sociological spirit of classifying and sorting 
debtors, these processes might describe in a more accurat way the utilization of credit of some families 
over others. But the truth is that the “way people use credit” cannot be reduced to “what people buy with 
credit”, no matter whether people buy luxury goods, home appliances or clothing items, or they use them 
to finance investments. The financialization of consumption should be rather framed in the whole 
symbolic and material universe of the household, the trajectories of families, their turning points and life-
cycle transitions. Regarding this perspective, it becomes clear that the financial practices of one and the 
same household changes with time, and can be depicted from the perspective of different theories of 
consumption, in different points of their “credit-trajectories”. This happens because being indebted is not a 
monolithic phenomenon, but rather a process that has different stages, turning points and denouements. As 
the following sections seek to depict, the same family can mobilize debts to materialize expectations of 
social mobility and fulfill class identities (moving to one´s home); take risks and attempt to improve their 
position (turning debts into capital); participate in social rituals and commitments (making gifts to others); 
managing care relations (making gifts to the loved ones;) or reaching some sense of independence 
(making gifts to oneself). In the process of embracing credits into their everyday life, most people learn 
how to handle debts, deploy strategies, and their consumption aspirations and attitudes towards debts 
change.  
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In order to show this in more detail, the chapter proposes a different approach to the qualitative 
studies of debts, which is to focus on the relationships between financial practices and life-trajectories of 
families. This longitudinal perspective helps sheds light into the trajectories of debts and how these 
intertwine with the life-trajectories of families in the social structure. The chapter is organized as follows:  
The first part outlines a credit-story of an average middle-class family in order to show how a 
family that experiences upward mobility embraces consumer debts in different stages of the life-cycle, 
helping us recognize particular turning points and practices that are present across all consumers. 
The second section characterizes one of the most important life-cycle milestones for the 
acquisition of consumer credit, which is “moving into one´s own home”. This is a crucial mechanism 
explaining the indebtedness of Chilean households in a context of increasing homeownership, rising 
aspirations of wealth accumulation and social mobility. The two credit-stories depicted in this section 
show how the same process can have very different outcomes, embracing credit as a normal affair or 
going into financial distress. 
Then the chapter moves on to depict some of the financial and consumption practices identified in 
the previous credit-stories. The section changes the methodological strategy and relies rather on a cross-
sectional perspective to depict financial practices across different consumers, such as taking credit by 
chance or making gifts with credit.  The chapter finally provides some conclusions and outlines a few 
lessons we can learn from the qualitative study of debts in contexts of improvement.  
9.1 MOBILIZING CONSUMER DEBTS  
Mauricio and Pamela, a couple in their mid-30s live in a 40 square meter apartment with their son –
Franco- in La Granja, a middle-low income district in Santiago. The apartment belongs to Pamela´s 
mother, who lives in the same building. They both have a job and during the last fifteen years experienced 
a slow but steady improvement in their incomes and living standards. Both contributed to this process. 
Pamela used to work as a free-lance sales agent for many years, and then worked as an assistant to a 
dentist while she studied nursing with the help of a student loan. Nowadays, she has been working in a 
hospital for a year, where she has a work contract and receives a stable income (of around USD 600). 
Mauricio, on the other hand, worked as a waiter for a few years after finishing his technical school and 
then, when his son Franco was born at age 23, he worked as a welder, improving his position over time. 
As assistant, he earned around USD 600 -less than USD 1000 that he earned as a waiter- but in a span of 
seven years he reached the USD 1200 as a “1st class master”. In 2006, he decided to leave his work as a 
welder and explored the parallel activity he had pursued for several years as a martial arts instructor, in 
part because he felt that he was not fairly remunerated as a “1st class master”. After two to three years, 
however, it became clear that martial arts would not bring him the expected income. A USD 800 income 
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was simply not enough for his aspirations; Mauricio wanted to go out with his family, go to the movies 
and have a car, as he points out. According to him, it was merely an aspirational issue. He moved then 
back to his old job in 2009, and then an opportunity came up to become independent and Mauricio 
experienced an important improvement. He earned now slightly over USD 2000 as an independent 
contractor, and became an employer for the first time. By the time of the interview that was his main 
occupation, and the family per-capita income reached around USD 900, which places them between the 
fourth and fifth income deciles. 
The whole life-trajectory described above is the context in which Pamela and Mauricio 
progressively embraced the utilization of consumer debts, becoming a permanent extension of their 
incomes. Like many consumers, Mauricio acquired his first credit card by chance. He was working as a 
waiter in a cafe in a shopping mall in 2000, just in front of a department store, when the saleswoman who 
stood at the entrance offered him an immediately approved credit card. He obtained the credit card with 
USD 200 credit line, which he used later on to apply for a new credit card in a different department store. 
This is a special feature of department store credit cards: lenders are willing to issue a credit card by 
verifying that the consumer already has a credit card in a similar institution. That is why these credit cards 
usually come in pairs.  
 By then, Mauricio considered credit cards unnecessary; he was single, had no kids and had 
always carried some “cash money in his wallet”.  Rather than accessing new goods, this credit card 
allowed him to enhance those he already had, which basically meant “branded” products, a “good” tennis 
racket and “better” clothing. He used this credit card a few times, although he was not a regular consumer.  
The second credit card was used later on in a different way, when his mother required a few 
medicines. The idea was to use Mauricio´s USD 200 credit line to buy these medicines immediately. He 
would pay the debt with the help of his three brothers, but nobody paid in the end: Mauricio lost his job as 
a waiter and his brothers just forgot to give him the money. He was not really worried about paying that 
debt. He finally got a letter from the department store telling him that he was on the black list of Chile´s 
credit bureau, Dicom, and Mauricio did not use any sort of credit for around four years.  
Their second experience with credit took place once he was living with Pamela and his son Franco 
was born. They borrowed the department store credit card from Pamela´s mother to get expensive “cash 
withdrawals” that they used to buy some medicines for Franco, who, by that time, became sick very often 
(he had a three year long pneumonia). These expensive credits helped them smooth these expenses 
without changing their lives too much (a sort of “soft defensive consumption”). According to Pamela, by 
then they could have afforded the medicines without using credit, but with difficulty. They used to spend 
around USD 80 a month on these medicines.  
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But the most problematic time came when Franco´s health worsened and it became clear that 
surgery was the only option left, around 2004. By then, Mauricio and his son had private health insurance 
(Isapre), so they managed to face the overall costs of medical care and the surgery. Nevertheless, in this 
period they used the department store credit card of Pamela´s mother (“cash withdrawals”) more 
frequently in order to carry out the medical exams in a private and prestigious clinic. According to 
Pamela, it was necessary to spend more money on the clinic because this was much more efficient in 
issuing Franco´s exams (besides the fact that they considered the public health service bad). In the end, 
after much time went by, they wanted to know as soon as possible what was really going on with Franco´s 
health.  The point was not that they were not protected nor that they faced incredible costs associated with 
Franco´s health problems. But that they knew that by paying a bit more, he could receive faster and better 
quality attention. Credit made this possible. 
The whole period of the illness took around five years, where Mauricio and Pamela used to 
withdraw money with the credit card at least once every three months, and in some occasions more than 
once a month. They never bought anything on credit at the department store; they only used cash 
withdrawals of around USD 400, which they normally paid in six to ten installments; 6 when they were in 
good financial situation and 10 in times of constraints. Economically speaking, it was a very hard time for 
both, especially for Mauricio, who was in charge of paying all the bills. They indeed have a particular 
division of labor within the household. While Mauricio takes care of the basic expenditures (housing, 
basic utility services, food and clothing), they earmark Pamela´s money as discretionary income, which 
they save, or spend on going on vacations, buying extra clothing or going to the cinema. By that time, 
those expenditures were very variable, as was Pamela´s income. 
After a while, once Franco recovered from the surgery, Mauricio obtained a new credit card, this 
time a Master Card issued by the retailer “Lider” (now Walmart). Although he got it when he was passing 
through the supermarket, he had the idea of acquiring a credit card for a while, in part motivated by the 
fact that he started working as an independent contractor. According to Mauricio, he needed some 
“liquidity” to conduct his business, and required more autonomy with regard to Pamela´s credit card 
(associated with the account of her mother). They use nowadays this credit card very often, 60% to run 
Mauricio´s contractor business, and the rest to “buy some stuff” and pay some bills, according to his 
estimations. At the moment of this interview, they had used their credit cards for at least 7 years.  
What did they purchase with these credit cards? Nowadays they tell themselves –laughing- that 
they are consumerists: they go to the store looking for something and come back home with something 
else. But in the end they argue that they basically buy things they consider “necessary”, such as a “juicer” 
to prepare some drinks. They usually make a list of those things they “need”, not in an urgent sense, but in 
the sense of things that might be useful and comfortable to have. Thus, for example, they knew for a while 
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that they had to change the sheets of their bed. They were not planning to buy them specifically, but once 
they were at the department store and Pamela noticed that “good quality sheets” were on sale, they just 
bought them with their credit card.  Interestingly, with these things they “needed”, they could also become 
more independent from their relatives. As Mauricio puts it, “Now, for example, we need an electric 
grill…we don´t need it, but we want one. If we want to make a barbeque, we have to go to the next block
(where his mother-in-law lives)”, which ultimately means that they depend on others.  With a new grill, 
the family would be able to manage their own “time” and become a more independent household. 
Mauricio and Pamela register the purchases in a book they keep in a cupboard at the living room. 
In this book, it is possible to find, every month, a detailed list of the things they bought on credit, such as a 
refrigerator, clothing or a video game, and the installments they have to pay.  
 
Figure 48: Mauricio´s and Pamela´s “Book keeping” 
 
The video game, for example, was not a planned acquisition, but they just “had to” buy it on credit. 
It was Christmas and Mauricio was confident about a project he was investing money on, so he promised 
Franco that he would get the video game. But it turned out that the project did not work as expected and 
Mauricio lost a lot of money.  Nevertheless, it was almost January, a good season for Mauricio´s job, so he 
decided that he could buy Franco´s video game (around USD 600) at the department store in 15 
installments. This was a “precautionary” decision, because they usually pay everything in 6 installments, 
they try to avoid interest rates, and want to get rid of the debt as soon as possible (probably to buy 
something else, since they never have a zero balance). This resembles a very common practice among 
Chilean consumers that is invisible to surveys, which is that people use credit cards to make “appropriate” 
gifts. In this sense, debts are embedded in the relational work of families, which resembles very much the 
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profile of the “mainstreamer” that seem to care about family relations and security rather than everything 
else. Equipping one´s son or the loved ones with the proper tools –goods- is indeed a main driving force of 
many indebted parents. 
In general, Mauricio is very organized; he is “the type of person” who goes to the supermarket 
with a calculator and a list at hand. They remember only one time when Mauricio lost control over their 
finances. It was around 2009 when he stopped working as a martial arts teacher, began working 
independently and obtained a very good contract. Suddenly, from earning USD 800 he jumped to earn 
USD 2000 income. That changed his lifestyle and, in his words, he “became a bit crazy with the money”. 
This is a similar mechanism to that of the indebted miners I referred to in the previous chapter, what I 
termed the “income-spike effect”. Once Mauricio´s salary increased, he did not save more money –
contrary to Keynes´ predictions- but started smoking better cigarettes; he stopped buying “jeans” in the 
supermarket and got “branded” ones; his shirts costing now USD 60. Although he saved some money to 
buy machinery to start his own business, Mauricio argues that in this period of excitement, he spent most 
of that money on “things that do not last”.  
But despite Mauricio´s early experience with the department store credit card that was closed, and 
the euphoric moment that a higher income brought in 2009, he and Pamela never had troubles with their 
debts. As one notices, they keep track of their debts very closely. They estimate that they could allocate a 
monthly amount of USD 500 to pay installments, although they are always paying around USD 280, 
which means that they still have “room” to eventually acquire more debts. Moreover, in the last months 
they also decided to “put all their debts” into Pamela´s MasterCard, basically because they can keep track 
of their debts more easily when having them only on one account.  
At the moment of the interview, Pamela and Mauricio were preparing themselves to enter into an 
important life cycle transition. They wanted to acquire their own home, which is what they have been 
saving for the last year, to apply for the housing subsidy and a mortgage in 2015 to move to a better place. 
To materialize this “dream” however, they foresee important expenditures in the future. 
 In the scenario above depicted Mauricio estimates that he and Pamela will need to acquire some 
debts because most of their home appliances belong to Pamela´s mother. This is actually why they never 
invested too much in that home, except for the “extra-room” that Mauricio built close to the living room to 
put the kitchen when they moved in there. To some extent, they knew they would not stay in that 
apartment forever; they feel that that place “is not for them”. In the spirit of fulfilling what they perceive 
as their true class identity, the apartment was not only too small and too noisy, but they feel that the 
people around are different, with other aspirations. As one can expect, extra credit line will become 
necessary in the process of moving out into their own home, especially because rather than bringing with 
them the old stuff that they inherited from Pamela´s mother, they want to have the “things they want to 
have”, i.e. things they choose, such as a new living room, a dining table and curtains. All this, as they 
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argue, requires them to have more “balance” in their credit card, for which they plan to switch to a 
different department store.  
The credit-story of Mauricio, Pamela and Franco depicts more clearly some of the processes 
outlined in the previous chapters and show that rather than a clear “debtor-profile”, their ways of 
mobilizing debts change over time. They obtained their first credit by chance, tempted by the 
organizational strategies of lenders that intercept the trajectories of consumers almost everywhere. While 
this credit served to expand Mauricio´s purchasing power and buy “better stuff”, a borrowed credit card –a 
very common practice I will review later on- helped them sort out the health problems of their son. This 
was not about being able to pay for medical bills, but to obtaining a better attention if that was possible. 
Unlike Mauricio´s early experience, this time Pamela and Mauricio learnt how to handle their 
installments, which were much more regular and for an extended period of time. Later on, acquiring debts 
became a normal practice, with which they would “think of” what they consider as necessary, such as 
gaining some independence from their relatives with their own grill or not disappointing Franco during 
Christmas. In this way, Mauricio also used his credit line to run his business. Nowadays, in line with the 
idea that families seek to perform their desired class identities, they prepare themselves to face one of the 
most important life-transitions of Chilean families, moving to their own home. Occupying their “real 
place” in society and creating their own identity will require many expenditures, for which credit will be 
necessary. This is the life-cycle transition I depict in the following section. 
9.2 DEBTS AND THE LIFE-CYCLE 
From the previous story, it becomes clear that the financialization of consumption is not a 
monolithic phenomenon but a process where debts are progressively embraced. An important feature of 
this process is that the utilization of credit is shaped by normative expectations with regard to care 
relations, standards of living and life cycle transition. These are crucial issues to understand how 
financialization works by shaping the socially constructed consumption standards and people´s 
aspirations. 
Life-course studies have suggested the crucial role of the social meaning that different cohorts and 
societies share about the “social timing”, that is, the “…incidence, duration, and sequences of roles, and to 
relevant expectations and beliefs based on age”. (Elder/Johnson/Crosnoe 2006). Life-course studies hold 
that it is in part through the “social timing” that multiple trajectories and their synchronies and 
asynchronies are shaped (Settersten 2006).  Maybe a fresh insight from these studies is that life cycles are 
attached to normative expectations regarding time, sequences and transition during the life-course. Such 
expectations work as cognitive maps and/or norms according to which the organization of one´s and 
others lives are assessed, as well as the different activities and roles that one might expect along a “normal 
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expectable life cycle” (Settersten 2006). These normative expectations are not only negotiated among 
peers, but are also related to the institutional life-courses that are defined in the domains of education, 
labor and retirement. According to such view, the traditional “life cycle” hypotheses that lies behind 
economists´ explanations of indbetedness, are contrasted with the normative and socially constructed “life 
cycle” of sociology. In this sense, the normative property of life transition holds true for big investments 
throughout the life-span, such as getting a mortgage or financing college education; decisions related to 
less salient expenditures such as going on vacation or financing a wedding or simply ordinary forms of 
consumption such as buying groceries at the local supermarket.  
In this spirit, I outline here two similar credit-stories that show the role of life-cycle transitions in 
shaping both people´s expectations and their financial practices. In particular, continuing the life-course 
trajectory of the previous credit-story –a family saving to buy their own home- I want to depict now the 
specific milestone of “moving to one´s home”, a crucial life-cycle transition where Chilean families seem 
to embrace consumer debts in a systematic fashion. In this process, families seek to materialize their class 
identities in a context marked by rising expectations and contested social boundaries. 
9.2.1 IMPROVING AND DECORATING THE HOME 
The so called ‘home ownership dream’ is among the most pervasive and demanding aspirations of 
Chilean families -and arguably families everywhere. Moving to one´s own house is attached to a sense of 
autonomy and achievement that reflects a successful trajectory, a key indicator of citizenship that is 
constitutive of making up a family (Ureta 2007; Bourdieu 2005). But making a house one´s home is 
something different from acquiring property. It not only entails an enormous economic effort, but it also 
requires people´s active engagement in appropriating the space. By making sense of their new houses 
through home improvements and decoration, people make sense of their class trajectories and perform 
their new position in the social space (Ariztía 2009 ). Therefore, moving to one´s home entails an 
important effort to buy what is considered to be appropriate. Interviews indicate that consumer credits –
both installment and revolving- are in many cases incorporated into the modus operandi of families at the 
moment of ‘moving to one´s home’. Indeed, according to the Financial Survey conducted by the Central 
Bank in 2009, from those households that hold department store credit card debts, an overwhelming 70 
percent declared that they acquire them to buy home appliances. This is a practice that Chilean families 
consistently refer to as sacar cosas or literally ‘to take out stuff’ from the department store. Sacar cosas to 
improve or decorate one´s home is a practice through which consumer debts can be routinized when 
managed appropriately, or, conversely, can turn into a nightmare.   
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Two stories illustrate this manner of using credit; in both cases, expectations of consumption, well-being 
and wealth accumulation expand in a context of upward mobility, for which credit becomes a legitimate 
means of acquisition. 
 
Moving to one´s home 1: when things go right  
Diego and Karen, a forty-year-old couple with two children has been very systematic in planning and 
investing in their life trajectories. Two main projects have shaped the last twenty years of their lives: 
moving to and improving their home, as well as increasingly formalizing their education. This has been 
possible because of the economic stability they enjoyed over time, which facilitated an important level of 
control over their own lives. Their credit story is bounded to this situation and projects, where consumer 
credit is being systematically mobilized as a means for building the family biography. Trajectories of 
indebtedness evolve accordingly, where mixed forms of credits are used and progressively incorporated 
into the modus operandi of the family. In this case, debts undertaken for an extended period to accelerate 
the project of improving their home end up normalizing the payment of credit installments. After a while, 
families incorporate the payment of installments as a fixed expenditure and consumer credit is considered 
as a sort of “virtual savings” that could be mobilized to constantly expand their consumption. So far this 
money constantly circulates, it is not considered a debt. This could be regarded a mechanism of 
normalization of debts that neutralizes its asymmetrical character. Credit under these circumstances allows 
families to sustain desired lifestyles without threatening their economic status.  
Diego and Karen live in a 120 square meter house in La Granja, a mixed -residential and 
industrial- urban area in Santiago de Chile. Diego studied in a technical high school and later on studied 
engineering some years later. By the time this interview was conducted, Diego had a stable job working as 
maintenance supervisor in a construction company. Karen, on the other hand, also studied in a technical 
school and specialized as a “drugstore assistant”. She worked in clinics, department stores and by the time 
of the interview had a stable job in a drugstore. In parallel, she was taking classes in a technical school as 
a “nurse assistant” during Saturdays that lasted two years and cost around USD 100 each month. This 
would allow her to have a better work status in her current job and be paid accordingly, a strategy that 
Diego already deployed when decided to study engineering. In total, their monthly income amounted to 
USD 3000. Their two children attend a subsidized private school that costs in total USD 100 a month and 
they all have a “family plan” with a private health insurance company. 
Before buying their current home, they lived with Diego´s parents. By then, it was not possible to 
apply for a mortgage since Diego did not have a stable income, so they saved enough money to buy a 
house with the help of the government housing subsidy of approximately USD 7000 and a 4000 loan from 
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the former owner that they paid in one year (installments of approximately USD 300). The home they 
found was a 400 square meter plot with a 120 square meter house that “required some repairs”. Once in 
their new home in the late nineties, they used savings, bank loans and department stores credit cards to 
progressively make some improvements in the house. Karen took the first bank consumer loans, because 
Diego did not have a stable work at that time. The first three credits they obtained were between USD 
3000 and 4000. Taking more than one credit was not in their initial plans, but once these repairs were 
underway new expenditures were just “unavoidable”. In Diego´s words: “We started doing things; we 
were finishing the “structure” and we had to take care of all the details, pay the workers, replace the 
windows, and that´s how necessities arise when you are in a situation where you want to move forward 
but you lack the money.” That is why Diego also used the department store credit card (which he had in 
his wallet for at least twelve years) to buy some construction materials and finish the windows. For Diego, 
no matter how much you calculate or “tiras el lápiz” (a common expression used to calculate costs or 
future expenses) when building, because there are always costs that you cannot foresee.  
At the beginning, when they run out of money they just stop working, save some money, and keep 
building the house afterwards. But they decided to accelerate the process, although they never took more 
than one credit at a time. What helped them take further loans with the bank was that Diego got a new job 
(his current job), which although did not report a bigger salary at the beginning, provided him with the 
opportunity to build a career and project himself as an engineer within the company he still works for. 
Indeed, after a few years, he managed to change his position within the company from a skilled manual 
worker (machinery diagnosis) to a supervisor in the diagnostic area.  
Throughout this time, the life of Diego and Karen´s family improved. According to Diego, there 
has been a “natural” change in their consumption patterns, “the expenditures have been increasing over 
time…because there are other tastes in life, your life changes”.  As with all their finances, these new 
expenditures have been mostly subjected to some planning. This is also the time of using the department 
store credit cards in a systematic fashion. After all the time repairing and improving their home, they got 
used to pay installments as if it were a normal expenditure. Not having to pay those debts any more 
improved their discretionary income, though they kept using credits to buy more things in installments 
rather than with cash money.  Once their house was finished, using smaller credits to finance smaller 
purchases at supermarkets or department stores became a normal affair. Besides the two “Falabella” credit 
cards that they use more often, he has a “Paris” credit card that he uses to buy smaller items like clothing 
and footwear, which are normally paid in 6 installments (up to USD 25). Considering that credits were 
systematically denied to them in the past, being able to make use of all these credits represents a source of 
pride for Diego, confirming the role of credit ratings as a proof of credibility and a source of recognition 
(Fourcade/Healy 2013; Logeman 2012): “I experienced both sides of the coin, when you have a job the 
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bank does not take you into consideration at all, even if you are a responsible person…”, but now banks 
recognize him as a trustworthy person and lend him money. 
At the moment of the interview, consumer credit for Diego was a resource that should be constantly put to 
work -spent, however with some precaution. Diego was always careful about not buying two durable and 
expensive goods at the same time in department stores. As a general rule, small articles such as a shirt, a 
jacket or a pullover, could be bought while a durable good is being paid. That is how he bought a 
refrigerator first, then a computer and later on a TV. So far, this rule is respected, and they have learnt 
how to live with debts and paying manageable amounts of consumer debts has being part of their daily 
life. This is an interesting mechanism of normalization of debts.  
In so far they have used consumer credits since they arrived at their current home, paying 
installments is now a normal affair included in their monthly expenditures.  That is why every time debts 
have been paid and the balance is in zero, the available credit is considered as a sort of virtual “savings”, 
an available amount of money that should be once again mobilized. As Diego puts it “…I bought a 
refrigerator, then a notebook and then a TV. I finish (paying) this one and I buy another one, and so on. If 
I see the account a bit empty, I go and get excited about something, I buy it and make calculations in order 
to not become indebted (“encalillarme”). As one can see, an “empty” account is a balance without debts -
or quite to the contrary, “full” of available resources ready to be spent at any moment. As such, being able 
to constantly expand their consumption with their department store credit cards became the rule. 
The account is “empty“ of debts, because for Diego becoming indebted does not mean taking 
credit, but a fictional future state where debts are not manageable. In this sense, using credit-money is 
only a different way of using their resources, but not of creating debts. This goes in line with a general 
understanding of debts among the middle-class interviewees, where rather than owing money to someone, 
being in debt is a matter of financial distress, just as debts actually exist when you cannot pay them. “I can 
tell that I have no debts in comparison with the “common denominator” (other people), I live in peace, 
because if I want, I can pay everything in two or three months”. 
That´s how it works sometimes when Karen and Diego go shopping; if there is no available 
amount left on the credit card, Diego pays part of the debt in order to have a new credit card balance to 
make new purchases. Paying the balance in this case does not mean paying a debt, but it is more similar to 
filling one´s car with gasoline to keep it running. This is something that Karen wouldn´t do, because she is 
more afraid of taking too much debt. So if she wants to buy something with the credit card when there is 
no available money in the credit card, Diego has to go with her, make a payment and thud have a new 
credit card balance. After all, he manages the finances and is in charge of paying their credit cards; he is 
the one who knows, indeed. The accounting system that Diego uses is simple; most of the time, he relies 
on “his head”. He uses his bank account to administer and pay himself the fixed costs, the electricity, 
water, telephone and Internet bills. Although he does not have the exact numbers in his head, he is 
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constantly monitoring his account and the credit card balance, so their budget is monthly updated and 
reassessed. Despite the normalization of credit and debt in Diego and Karen´s household, credit is not a 
burden that prevents them from saving some money. This is Karen´s task, who puts money on a different 
account in order to have a safety net. 
For Diego, what turns a “credit” into a “debt” is a fuzzy line. In general terms, a credit should 
remain within the margins of USD 1200 and 1600. Normally, the monthly charge that Diego can afford 
ranges from USD 200 to 350, depending on how his other debts overlap. Only once they had a monthly 
bill of USD 1600 for around three months, because the bank credits used in the construction of the house 
were issued in different time spans of installments, so at some point they overlapped. In those cases, 
normally two or three months where debts are higher due to overlaps, there is no credit money available 
and Diego deploys self-control strategies: “when you reach that peak of “cuotas” (installments), I don´t 
spend, I don’t even show up in Sodimac (the construction retailer) or Falabella, and anywhere…because 
temptation is right out there, and when you have access to credit without anybody evaluating your 
financial situation nor asking for your rent…the credit card is there ready to be used…”.  
Contrary to what one might think, what may be problematic following this logic is to have 
available balance, a credit card “free of debts”. As Diego says, “Sometimes I have the (credit) cards in 
zero, and that´s when it is dangerous because you go and you buy what you like”. An available credit card 
is more dangerous than having it with a fixed amount of debt. The notions of “opportunity” and 
“temptations” associated with the shopping mall and the department stores gain salience. As it is the case 
for most of the interviewees, a visit to the shopping mall to buy clothes for their kids ends up in an 
unexpected way.  
Moving to one´s home 2: when things go wrong 
In her mid-forties, Monica is divorced, lives with her three children and has a stable job as a 
secretary at a private University, where she has been working since she finished her technical career 
twenty years ago.  Her monthly income consists of a stable salary she has received throughout the years 
that reaches around USD 1000, plus USD 2000 that her ex-husband gives her to pay the private school of 
their three children (altogether equivalent to Mónica´s salary) and to cover other expenses.  
By the time this interview was conducted, Mónica was paying a monthly rent of USD 500 for the 
house she has been living since the bank repossessed her former house, and paying a USD 8000 
installment loan that the bank has been withdrawing from her salary for the last five years. The debt was 
the result of an intricate life-story that includes a marriage breakdown, foreclosure and a “fresh start”. To a 
great extent, Mónica´s credit-story is a variant of the “dream home” that characterized the previous story, 
though with a different denouement.  
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In this case upward mobility that comes up from a better work contract fosters positive 
expectations that result in a riskier attitude towards debts. On the one hand, social mobility reaches its 
maximum symbolic and material expression in the home-ownership project, where different forms of 
consumer credit are deployed as a legitimate means for improving one´s home according to expected 
standards. On the other hand, available consumer credits open new courses of actions, ending up 
catalyzing and accelerating existing aspirations and expectations. This is a dangerous self-reinforcing 
dynamics that might well turn into financial collapse. 
As with many consumers, Mónica´s first credit was not planned. It was offered to her in the street 
when she was passing by a “financiera”, former specialized financial institutions that after the financial 
crisis in the first half of the eighties were bought by banks. The “captadora” -a name given in the financial 
industry to saleswomen that offer instant approval credit cards- offered her a loan that reached USD 400 
and could be immediately issued only with her national ID card. Mónica was surprised because by then 
she did not believe she was “credit worth”, and the idea of buying some clothes and “darse gustos” was 
tempting. Using credits, however, was not nothing new for Mónica, since her parents used to “sacar” or 
buy clothes and electronics at the department stores. According to Mónica, they never had trouble with 
those credits because being poorer made them very efficient with their finances; besides, the taking care of 
one´s debts was important to be able to keep buying articles on credit.  
That credit was paid without trouble within a year. But Mónica´s most intense and systematic story 
with consumer credits started at the time she and her now ex-husband were living at the department that 
he inherited from his father in downtown Santiago and their first child was about to be born. Since then, 
consumer loans with banks and department stores credit cards were systematically used to equip their 
home in the way they considered appropriate to the changes in the family composition and in the 
ascendant career of her husband as an informatics engineer. According to her, throughout this period –
around four years they lived in the apartment- they felt their income was not enough to meet the 
increasing necessities that the family project entailed. In this spirit, they bought their first car with a bank 
consumer loan, which was meant to make their lives easier once their child was born and “go out as a 
family”. Due to the overlaps and the complexity of their financial situation in the subsequent period, 
Mónica is not able to recall the exact amount of those loans, but they usually lasted one year and reached 
USD 3000. The important step they took in the same direction was to sell the apartment and move now to 
a 600 square meter house in Ñuñoa, an upper middle-class residential neighborhood in Santiago. The 
decision was driven by the fact that they were planning to have more children, so a bigger house was 
required, which finally they were able to buy due to an ascendant career now yielding around a USD 4000 
monthly income..  
Expenditures arose accordingly, a mechanism known in consumption studies as the “Diderot 
effect”, where a new acquisition changes the standards against which one´s possessions are evaluated 
 
	   	  
197 
(Shove 2001). In this case, not only did the neighborhood set higher standards, but also the size of the 
home required different and new appliances to fit the new place “a new living room, a new dining table, 
everything”. It was a time of excitement and positive expectations “…the house was bigger and we needed 
bigger furniture, besides the fact that my husband had a high position, so he was able to, I assume he was 
able to…” 
Department store credit cards as well as consumer loans with banks were the perfect means for 
equipping the house in the “proper” and desired way. Throughout this time -around 6 years- where their 
two other kids were born, the three department store credit cards she had were systematically used to buy 
electronics, new TV sets as well as kitchen appliances, while Mónica´s husband indulged himself with his 
passion for motorbikes and cars. One car and two jeeps were bought with consumer loans in this period. 
According to Mónica, seen in retrospect it was a time of “consumerism”. Although many purchases were 
a source of dispute, Mónica finally yielded to what she now says were her “husband´s impulses”. As she 
recalls, one of the motorbikes “just appeared one day in the backyard”.  
The change of reference groups seems to have played an important role in this story. In retrospect, 
she argues that her (now ex) husband´s professional career changed him from being a very simple and 
humble man to someone that was too exposed to a life that they could not afford.  
Me: why would you say that he changed? 
Mónica: The work place, his peers, all his people…when we invited people to dinner at home I had to 
“look dapper” (“de punta en blanco”), because the managers were coming. So his world was…it changes 
people when they see each other. 
 
However, this is something that Mónica could see with some distance. In the end, she says, it was also 
comfortable to enjoy all those goods and she was also confident about their financial situation; after all, by 
then she knew that her husband was making good money in the company and had “side business” as a 
consultant.  
But over time Mónica´s prediction proved untrue. Soon the rising expenditures became an 
unbearable burden. Both their mortgage loan and children´s private school fee reached USD 2000, while 
debts started to overlap and turn out to be unmanageable. Department stores credit cards and overdraft 
lines were systematically used to pay for the installments and, later on, to help with the mortgage. As it 
was seen in the previous chapter, using a second debt to pay other debts seems to be a characteristic 
practice among middle and middle-upper socioeconomic groups –rather than poorer consumers, a 
dangerous practice known in Chile as “bicicletear deudas” and in the financial industry as “shuffling” 
debts.  It took time for Mónica to realize what the real situation was, basically because she used to give 
most of her income to her husband in order to pay for the groceries and the domestic services that they 
“had always paid for”. In this case, the division of labor in the household played against her. 
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She realized that the situation was going out of control the day she arrived at home and policemen 
were standing outside and asking for her husband because one of the cars was meant to be repossessed by 
one of the banks. The problem was circumvented thanks to Mónica´s father, who gave them the money 
they needed to pay for that particular debt, approximately USD 7000 that were never paid back. But it was 
only a temporary solution; in the coming years, it would not be possible to save the cars nor their house. 
Nowadays Mónica argues that she was too relaxed and confident about both their financial situation and 
her husband´s abilities to handle those debts, something that she would pay for some time later at a high 
economic and emotional cost.  
The financial collapse came soon and it worsened with the collapse of their marriage. It is a well-
known fact that marital and financial problems usually go together. As scholars have shown for the case of 
the US (Sullivan 2000; Warren 2003), divorce is one of the main causes of financial distress and 
bankruptcy (and causation in the other direction is of course very common), but the difference is that in 
Chile there is nothing such as a “bankruptcy law” protecting consumers from complete collapse. So the 
crisis of trust came from both sides. Not only did Mónica undergo an infidelity, but she also realized that 
her husband was using one of her bank accounts to take more consumer loans. Indeed, Mónica had an 
unusual access to banks´ financial services for her USD 1000 income. The first bank account (with 
BBVA) was accessed through an agreement with her employer and worked as a payroll deduction. The 
second, however, was a bank account she opened at “Banco Santander” through her sister in law –a 
“captadora” that received a fee for engaging an extra customer- with whom her husband was associated 
and could use at any time.  That overdraft line was being automatically withdrawn to pay for the 
installments, until it run out of room and Mónica received a warning from the bank that nobody was 
actually paying the consumer loan (the one her husband took to pay other debts). Now the collapse was 
total and evident for Mónica, who had to renegotiate the payment of two consumer loans and the collapsed 
overdraft lines with her two banks. By the time of the interview, five years after her marriage breakdown, 
she was still paying USD 8000 debt through a small payroll deduction.  
Juggling was not enough to keep debts under control, which were generated through four bank 
consumer loans, three department store credit cards and a mortgage. First the car, and then two jeeps were 
repossessed. The final collapse, however, came once Mónica´s husband left home and their mortgage debt 
accumulated for seven months peaking around USD 60,000. It was a very hard time dealing with an 
important emotional burden. The already painful marriage breakdown was accompanied by downward 
mobility since Mónica´s income was not enough to keep their previous expenditure levels and her ex-
husband was still too over indebted to help her.  As the following quotation suggests, losing their house 
represented an important step backwards regarding the lifestyle that Mónica and her children enjoyed 
during the last five years, as well as her expectations of wealth accumulation. “…I was so used to my 
beautiful house, it was also an asset for our children; I think as a mom that it is something that your 
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children will inherit, because you will leave, and then the kids will divide it anyways”.  Out of necessity, 
almost everything was progressively sold, from plants to the garden fence –which they bought with credit. 
In any case, although she could have tried to “save the home”, to some extent Mónica wanted to get rid of 
everything that was somehow related to her marriage. The house was finally repossessed by the bank after 
a few months and served to pay almost all their debts, while Mónica moved with the children to a smaller 
house in the same neighborhood.  
Nowadays, Mónica has been renting the house close to her parents by almost five years. With her 
salary and the almost USD 2000 she receives from her ex-husband she managed to reach stability and had 
a “fresh start” in her life. Despite the sharp drop and change in lifestyle that followed the turning points of 
the marriage breakdown and financial collapse, Mónica and her now ex-husband managed to keep the 
children in the same school and maintain changes in their consumption habits and routines to a minimum. 
This was possible because Mónicas ex-husband kept supporting them economically, but also because one 
of the major assets Mónica could rely on in order to “protect” their lifestyles and, to some extent, prevent 
them from “losing status”, has been her family support. In the absence of a housemaid, for instance, her 
parents could help her taking care of the nine year old child, while her parent´s small house at the beach 
served as the pre-defined vacation destination during the summer. Furthermore, Mónica received some 
help from her brother -a forty year old single engineer who had a much more solid economic situation- 
who sold her his car in installments that Mónica could comfortably afford.  
The meaning of debts changed in this whole process, although they were still a useful resource for 
Mónica. Although “formal debts” were no longer a resource that Mónica would put at work in order to 
rebuild her life again, she used her Falabella credit card for a while in order to please her children 
sometimes, which she finally closed in order to prevent her from any temptation. It was not about 
condemning debts from what happened, but rather a self-control strategy that would prevent her from 
consumerism  “I just closed them (the credit cards); it is too tempting (…) because women buy anything; 
you try something, you buy it, and you end up bringing with you 2, 3 or 4 things in 3, 4 or 5 installments”. 
Credits would no longer serve to expand their consumption in a lavish way, but help her buy what was 
considered necessary, such as buying a car or replacing the washing machine. 
According to Mónica, she finally brought order to her finances and now has a much more relaxed 
life, although with less discretion over her income; what once was regarded as a normal standard of 
consumption is now considered as “luxuries from the past”, such as eating in restaurants every week or go 
skiing during the winter. Now she goes to the shopping mall only once a month and with clear expenditure 
targets that she distributes among her children, or plans restaurant dinners in advance. She now afford 
things (“darse gustos”) only with cash money, while debts were now restricted to specific uses, such as a 
mortgage that she is actually planning to take next year in order to finally fulfill her expectations of 
homeownership, and to invest in her children´s education by paying a language course. After all, credit in 
 
	   	  
200 
Chile is a “necessary evil” because “nowadays both the middle as well as the lowest classes (…) need 
credits.” 
Lessons from Credit-Stories 
Summing up, I depicted three stories that show how middle class families embrace consumer 
credit into their everyday life, particularly at the life-cycle transition of moving to one´s home. 
Characterizing this milestone is crucial because, as I showed in the previous chapters, expansive 
homeownership seems to be one of the main forces driving the financialization of consumption in Chile. 
The key finding in this regard, is that people consistently use consumer credits to buy home appliances 
rather than to protect their lifestyles, deploy wealth or show-off.  
In general, consumers have a relatively clear idea of the things they are entitled to have, and buy 
with credit things they consider as “necessary”. In this way, in line with the “status anxiety” hypothesis, 
interviews indicated that things people claim to “need” are mobilized to gain independence from relatives 
and materialize the family project. This was the case of people moving out of the house of their relatives, 
acquiring new goods on credit, and replacing “old stuff” according to their own preferences, which also 
demarcates distance with social origins. In this sense, acquiring, decorating and improving home becomes 
a subtle process through which people materialize the standards of living they desire, as well as perform 
their desired class identities (the imaginary middle class) in the domestic sphere. In this way, the 
utilization of credit is bound to processes of improvement (becoming homeowner), even when these are 
not facilitated by better wages. This supports the idea that the financialization of consumption is being 
driven by the rising standards of living fostered by expanding homeownership. 
Moreover, for middle-class consumers, credit in many cases allows people to enhance those things 
they already have (“branded” products, such as a “good” tennis racket and “better” clothing), rather than 
accessing new goods. This means that, in many cases, –especially for those that have enjoyed better 
wages- more demanding consumption standards are manifested in the search for “quality” rather than 
mere acquisition. The immediate association of credit with “branded” goods suggests that buying with 
credit is not only about having access to consumer goods but also about being able to buy the “right” 
goods. 
In this sense, this first qualitative approximation to the indebtedness of middle class families also 
showed that, contrary to what is commonly believed, the constant expansion of consumption actually 
implies that people consume more and standards of living become more demanding, but not all this 
consumption is necessarily oriented towards signaling status. In line with consumption studies, these 
stories also showed that lifestyles are “ratcheted upward” through the incorporation of “ordinary” goods 
into the standards of living (Warde 2011). Following the insights of life-course studies I went beyond the 
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traditional lifecycle hypothesis of economists to show that there is a normative understanding of life-
transitions that shapes financial practices. At this point, it is important to notice that the picture that 
emerges from these credit-stories and financial practices is that the rising indebtedness of Chilean 
households cannot be subsumed under a dominant logic, whether “conspicuous” or “defensive” 
consumption, basically because there are more subtle mechanisms through which people financialize their 
consumption in contexts of improvement. Among these, I reviewed the importance of changes in 
reference groups, rising aspirations over time, Diderot effect, the management of care relations and 
people´s relational work; expectations of wealth accumulation and material improvements, as well as 
normative conceptions over the life cycle.   
In the following section, I describe in more detail some of the financial practices identified in these 
credit-stories, which are hard to characterize with aggregated data. These provide interesting clues about 
the particular ways Chilean families mobilize their financial resources, as well as incorporate consumer 
debts into their everyday life practices. With this, we get a better sense of how credit becomes part of the 
“repertoire” of available practices that shape the culture of Chilean consumers (Swidler 2014; Swidler 
1986). 
9.3 TAKING CREDIT BY CHANCE 
For most people in Chile, credit is encountered for the first time at the market place. As argued in 
chapter 5, lenders in Chile have been very successful in “marketizing” credit by encountering consumers 
at sales points or public spaces and engaging them in credit relations. Although several techniques for the 
“captation of publics” are deployed –to borrow the concept from Cochoy (2007)- they all have in common 
that credits seem to intercept consumers´ trajectories and prompt them to acquire debt, either from banks, 
department stores or compensation funds.  
Different market encounters and organizational arrangements and devices come into play at the 
market place in order to attach consumers to their credit cards (for a review of literature on market 
attachment see McFall (2009) Muniesa/Millo/Callon (2007)). María, for example, a retired widow 
received a phone call from her compensation fund offering her a $400 loan that she could immediately 
receive in cash and repay through monthly installments discounted from her pension. Although she never 
received a loan before and she defines herself as a “person of cash”, she was just tempted by how easy 
they made it for her without having to pay attention to the form of payment. As she recalls, “I said “it´s 
not a big deal”. I will sincerely tell you that sometimes I do not remember, and I do not even look if it is a 
huge withdrawal [automatic debit]…it will suddenly stop and it will be over”  
In this respect, department stores have important advantages over banks and other lenders such as 
compensation funds. Their credit cards are offered within the department stores and shopping malls that 
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are open to the public during longer periods (usually from 11 am to 9 pm and also during weekends) 
(Montero/Tarjizán 2010), where an important share of Chilean families spend their free time doing some 
shopping, eating out or watching a movie. Accordingly, the most common technique utilized by 
department stores for engaging people in credit relations is by directly intercepting them in public spaces, 
a technique known in the financial industry as “recruitment” (captación). The following quote from 
Mercedes, a housewife in her late forties, illustrates how this simple technique capitalizes on consumers´ 
impulsivity, which in some cases will be complemented with the feeling that owing a credit card is a 
source of recognition. 
Mercedes: [the credit card] was offered by a saleswoman that is outside [the department store]…and I said 
“ok”. I really did not want it, but I thought that it could be useful to buy some stuff, so then I bought 
clothes for my daughters, I remember”. 
To understand how this is possible, we have to look into the consolidation of a particular figure in 
the industry called the “scavenging”. The credit “hunter” is usually a woman of variable age that stands at 
the front of the department store (in the mall or simply in the street, depending on where it is located) 
whose task is to “jump” (saltar) onto consumers making shopping or just walking along the streets to offer 
them a credit card with an instant approval for making purchases in the store and associated commerce. As 
the chief of customer service of one of the biggest retail chains in Chile states, there are two types of 
“recruitment” within this industry: the normal and the express. While the “normal consumer” is the one 
approached by “the hunter” and it´s usually seduced by the possibility of doing instant purchases at the 
department store, the “express” consumer is the one that is already buying in the department store and 
payment discounts and/or gifts are offered if he/she uses a credit card. The goal of this technique is to 
issue more credit cards, as well as connecting the information of the purchase with a person. 
This way of entangling consumers introduces an important distinction between installment loans 
and department stores credit cards, which is that the moment of acquiring the credit card is different from 
its usage. Once a “bank loan” has been accepted, for example, the money has to be spent (as a matter of 
fact, nobody applies for a credit to put it in a savings account); but once you received your department 
store, you could potentially go on with the credit for an indefinite time. There are several ways through 
which the “potential credit” in the wallet is converted into “actual income” and debts that ultimately 
benefit the department store, but in most of them lenders seek to exploit some sense “opportunity”. 
A common way to exploit the “cash shortage” problem is by enhancing the complementarity 
between credit card issuers and commerce willing to accept them (Guseva 2007). Chilean department 
stores solved this coordination problem by creating a network beyond the within-store purchases to an 
increasing number of associated stores in the late 1990s, where their credit cards would be accepted at a 
low fee. The Falabella credit card that Waldo had, for instance, was offered to him while he was passing 
through one of the home improvement stores owned by the department store only with his ID. He 
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accepted the credit card though he did not need it at the time, and after ten minutes the card was in his 
wallet. According to Waldo, that card was fortuitously put to use some months after, when he was at the 
gasoline station but realized that he did not have enough cash money to buy gasoline for the truck and 
decided to use his card. He later regretted this decision due to a mismanagement of his revolving debt. 
Another effective way of attaching credit cards to consumers and engaging them in credit relations 
is through the “irresistible offer” marketized at the sales point, what in the industry is better known as a 
the creation of “express” consumers. In this case, the price offered to consumers with the credit card is 
considerably cheaper than the same article bought on cash, even after high interest rates are discounted. 
This is an organizational advantage that department stores have over banks (see picture below). One way, 
for example, would be to turn potential credit into actual debts. In the case of Verónica and her husband, 
who were doing shopping and wanted to buy a new suit when they realized that one of them was offered 
at a discount price with the credit card. They had a Cencosud credit card for many years that expired due 
to account inactivity, but they renewed it in order to buy the suit in installments and to take advantage of 
the special price. In this sense the advertisements of department stores not only seek to make those 
products on sale appealing, but they increasingly emphasize the payment plans and the benefits of credit-
lines through loyalty programs and attractive offers for credit card holders.  
Figure 49: Market Encounters at the Department Store Work as Market Attachment Devices 
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But these marketing devices are not only useful when people are buying goods, but in Cochoy´s 
terms very effective in deviating the trajectories of consumers. María Angélica, for example, went to a 
home improvement store to buy materials to repair the garden when she saw a hair dryer that was on sale 
for USD 25. Nevertheless, when she complained at the sales register that she was being charged around 
USD 40, the sales agent informed her that the discount only applies to credit card holders. Since the 
approval of credit is almost immediate, María Angélica agreed to open a Falabella credit card account. 
Like many consumers in Chile, she went to the store to buy gardening materials and she went home with a 
hairdryer, a department store credit card and a debt. 
It is important to mention that there are also important organizational factors that make these 
market attachment techniques crucial, which are not related to the arrangement of market encounters but 
to the organization of work relations.121 The expansion of department stores throughout the national 
territory has widened their scope, but the marginal profits made by each new department store are not 
necessarily compensated at the general level because it creates competition among department stores of 
the same companies. This means that now a worker that goes shopping after her work near to the city 
center now does it during the weekends at the new shopping mall in the suburbs, putting more pressure to 
reduce the costs of an expanding working force. Some companies, such as Ripley, have taken action and 
increased the base-wage to the legal minimum, but such increase has been subtly compensated by a 
decrease in commissions (according to the industry, an aggressive price competition that has diminished 
prices around 30% in ten years ended up pushing wages downwards). This has affected the credit business 
by pushing salespersons to compensate lower prices -and accordingly decreasing commissions- by selling 
products from other areas or what are called “intangibles”, such as warranties, insurances or purchases 
made on credit, which report higher fees than normal sales. According to a report from CIPER, workers in 
the industry assure that this is one of the most important changes in the internal organization of work, to 
the extent that they receive constant pressure to sell intangibles and compete among them. Indeed, every 
salesperson´s records are revealed within the department store, so they directly engage in a competition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 In this regard, department stores reflect the dilemma of the Chilean growth model. On the one hand, they have been one of 
the most important economic forces driving growth in Chile, which although face a fierce competition among them, have 
managed to enjoy huge profits and expand within and beyond the national territory. On the other hand, their own workers have 
not enjoyed such expansion and their working conditions have systematically worsened over the years. While in the mid-
eighties being a department store seller was compensated almost as a median income professional, the expansion of the 
business to massive markets changed this situation. Nowadays, work contracts have more flexible conditions and wages have 
not experienced significant improvements. The surprisingly small number of labor conflicts in the sector has been facilitated by 
the Chilean labor legislation, which allows companies to divide their areas and operate under different legal entities that 
fragment unions by preventing workers from organizing as a sectorial union.121This is important to understand why so many 
consumers are attached to their credit cards in the department store, although this is not so obvious. 
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for selling these services.122 Thus for example, the salary of a captadora that offers credit cards at the 
department store is basically based on these commissions, which puts them in a situation where they have 
to engage people in credit relations at any cost. 
Figure 50: Saleswomen Wait at the Entrance of the Department Store and “Jump” onto Consumers. 
 
Under these organizational arrangements, the captadora has clear incentives to engage people in 
credit relations. A system of “Points” is implemented by the department stores, where she would get 1 
point for a “normal client” and " for every “express client” she attaches to a credit card. Below 60 point 
the captadora receives USD 2 for each client, and over 60 gets USD 6. As “captadoras” argue, in a normal 
day they would “capture” 4 to 5 clients, while in a good one –usually during christmass or around another 
holiday- they engage 8 to 10 customers a day. 
9.4 BUYING GIFTS WITH CREDIT  
As it could be seen in the previous section, a systematic way of using credit cards is to purchase 
gifts, closely related to the common practice of sacar cosas in department stores, which range from 
clothes and small toys to electronics and furniture. This is a very common way of mobilizing department 
store credit cards, to the extent that some people earmark these credits exclusively for this purpose 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 This has been the successful formula put at work by department stores, which also allowed them to maneuver against 
regulations that aimed at increasing wages. In 2007, for example, the congress passed a bill that established that fixed wages 
before commissions should at least equal the minimum wage, whose effects on labor costs were counteracted by simply cutting 
the share of variable fees. 
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(Zelizer 2002; Carruthers 2010). The practice of buying gifts with credit is relevant because it indicates 
that credit has become an important means for Chilean families to participate in rituals, manage social 
commitments and regulate interpersonal relations. Regardless of the particular reasons, in some cases a 
department store credit eases the burden of unplanned expenses, while in others it serves as a ‘gift 
enhancer’, which might ultimately change the very nature of the social ritual by ratcheting up the 
consumption standards and expectations of coming events.  
Credit is a useful tool for dealing with social obligations because commitments and occasions not 
only shape the context of exchanges, but also the ‘time of consumption’ (Douglas 1982; 
Douglas/Isherwood 1979). In fact, many purchases are made for special occasions that are usually not 
calculated in the monthly family budget, such as weddings, graduations or birthdays, because they do not 
represent regular expenditures throughout the year. Nevertheless, buying appropriate gifts is very 
important for Chilean families, and consumer credit in many circumstances helps people catch up with the 
timing of social obligations that these purchases entail. Just as life-transitions demand major investments 
and expenditures throughout the lifecycle, social obligations demand a commitment to consuming 
according to specific dates, regardless of someone’s financial capacity. In this sense, if people use credit to 
catch up with existing social obligations (Mauss 2005), the practice of making gifts with credit also 
connects the circuits of formal and economic debts with social obligations. Five main occasions are 
usually met and even changed by means of credit, each of them with their own logic: birthdays, weddings 
and holidays, as well as gifts for loved ones and for oneself.  
Olga, for example, works as a secretary in a lawyer’s office, has well-organized finances and three 
credit cards: a Visa card with her bank and two department store credit cards. Although she uses her Visa 
card and pays off her full balance at the end of the month, she uses her department store credit cards 
exclusively for acquiring gifts when birthdays or weddings are approaching. Olga does not account for 
these expenditures in her normal budget, and she is unable to save for these additional purchases. In her 
words, ‘For example my sister´s birthday is on March 15th and by the 15th you don´t have the 
money…you already paid everything you had to pay by the 10th, and there are still around ten days left 
before you get your salary: the answer is credit cards, of course’. And she continues, ‘…my birthday is on 
the 20th and my husband, I am sure, he buys [my gift] with the credit card.’ 
Using credit cards for purchasing gifts also exploits opportunities presented at sales point. Paulina, 
for example, used to travel throughout South America while she was working in a NGO, and she would 
systematically use her bank credit card to buy gifts at the airport´s duty free area, even when her financial 
situation was not in good shape. Buying gifts with credit is not really spontaneous, but planned in 
advance. Tato, on the other hand, who says that she enjoys giving gifts, is actively aware of coming 
occasions when gifts should be given. She is very attentive and takes advantage of special offers, using her 
department store card to buy gifts that she would then store: ‘I have a friend that will be sixty at the end of 
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the month, but I realized that there were offers for Father´s Day, so I went and bought a gift. I watch out 
for offers; there are always gifts to be given, and I always have some gifts stored waiting for the occasion’. 
She continues ‘I know that Aylen´s [her fourteen year-old daughter] friends are all 14 or 15 years old, so if 
I see a pullover that costs five that used to cost seven, I buy it. Because I know someone´s birthday will 
come in two months…’  
In a different vein, for some people department stores credit cards not only also work as a means 
for buying gifts but as a ‘gift enhancer’. Mercedes, for example, a fifty year-old housewife, uses her La 
Polar credit card to buy stuff to please her daughters or nephews. 
Me: Do you use this [department store] credit card often? 
Mercedes: No, only for certain things. A gift for my nephew, I only use it for making gifts, something 
small, a USD 20 installment purchase, always in three installments, no more. […] then I take advantage to 
buy something more fancy [encachadito], not so common, not so simple…  
By the same token, Fabiola and Alberto, a couple in their forties with two kids, systematically 
bought Christmas and birthday gifts on credit for several years. They explained how they took credit 
because they have too many relatives, especially Fabiola´s nephews, cousins, uncles and parents. But most 
importantly, because she wanted them to be ‘good gifts’, which meant buying brand products they could 
afford by paying in installments. Negotiating the amount and qualities of gifts was a source of tension 
every year, until they stopped buying gifts on credit because they got into financial trouble. Alberto closed 
his department store account, while Fabiola started participating at the church, where her peers morally 
condemned such practices. Nowadays, they decided to make ‘good gifts’ (on credit) only to their nephews 
and on very particular occasions such as graduation from school. 
But credit not only serves as a useful resource to deal with social commitments among personal 
networks. On other dates, such as Christmas, the beginning of school season or Chile´s National Day, are 
holidays contemplated on the social calendar where Chilean families feel forced to spend considerably 
more than the rest of the year. As expected, Christmas is the time in the year when Chilean families use 
department store’s credit cards with more frequency than any other time. Indeed, consideraing that 
Chilean families spend between 20 and 30% more in December, in 2013 the Ministry of Social 
Development launched a campaign called ‘You don´t make it’ (Usted no lo haga) to prevent people from 
buying on credit and taking excessive debts.  
Unlike social commitments, such as birthdays (which might not be celebrated), Christmas is an 
annual fixed and predictable date, which shows how scarcely Chilean families are able or willing to save 
for anticipated celebrations. To some extent, the structure of the calendar might play an important role, 
since Christmas is close to summer vacation –starting in January- for which Chilean families allocate an 
important share of their savings. Karen, for example, uses department store credit cards to buy herself 
clothes, to purchase gifts for relatives and to buy home appliances for her parents. As she clarifies: ‘For 
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example for Christmas I buy gifts. I buy everybody a gift and some of them I ‘take out’ [buy on credit at 
the department store]. Something like that, but they were not big things…’ Interestingly, Karen is very 
organized with her finances and manages to save small amounts of money on a regular basis to finance her 
summer vacation in January, or to keep it as a safety net in case of an emergency. This shows that using 
credit for buying gifts is not necessarily related to lavish consumption, lack of savings culture or financial 
disorganization, but rather that gifts are considered as ‘small’, ‘harmless’ or ‘contingent’ expenditures.  
Last but not least, another way of buying gifts with credit relates to darse gustos or something like 
‘to indulge oneself’, a common expression that is used in Chile to refer to those unplanned ‘pleasures’ that 
people give to themselves. Although it might be understood as a sort of self-gratification, the notion of 
darse gustos is connected with both a sense of economic independence and a lack of material constraints.  
Diego, as we saw, managed to change his position within his company from a skilled manual 
worker to a supervisor in the diagnostic area. This promotion improved the lifestyle of Diego and Karen´s 
family, and, according to Diego, there has been a ‘natural’ change in their consumption patterns: 
‘expenditures have been increasing over time…because there are other tastes in life, your life changes’.  
Diego classifies most of these new expenditures as darse gustos. In his words, darse gustos means ‘Do 
you want to eat something? Let´s go and eat something; do you want to buy something? Let’s go and buy 
it. But nothing disordered nor distorted [meaning nothing out of control], that I want to buy whatever I 
desire, but rather something that we could afford to. It involves some sense of freedom and the monthly 
installments of department stores credit cards essentially widen the range of things that ‘we could buy’. 
This is why the economic independence implicit in darse gustos is nowhere better represented than in the 
practice of shopping. In this context, darse gustos means walking around the shopping mall without any 
particular purpose and spending (credit) money on something unusual or simply unplanned, such as a 
haircut, shoes, or a restaurant meal.  
As a housewife, for instance, Mercedes gets money from her husband every week to buy groceries, 
but with her credit card she is able to set aside some money to pay small installments and buy herself (and 
her daughters) some articles in the department store -mainly clothing- without having to ask her husband 
for extra money. This mode of utilization also conceals an underlying but crucial role of credit, which is 
that it also works as a means of reaching independence for housewives. In fact, gender relations are crucial 
to understand how middle-income Chilean families use department store credit cards. The distribution of 
income among couples in Chile shows that in 50% of cases men are the only provider, while only a 36% 
both provide income. Only in 16% of cases women are the main providers (PNUD 2010), which means 
that most women in Chile rely on their husbands to carry their purchases. This was already depicted in the 
three credit-stories depicted before, where husbands have a total control over the household resources. 
What Mercedes´ credit story depicts is that housewives, who became one of the main targets of 
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department stores, use credit cards as a way to reach some independence from male domination regarding 
the allocation of resources. In this sense credit seems to work as a vehicle of individualization. 
9.5 SOCIAL RELATIONS AND THE “TIME OF DEBTS” 
In general terms, the practice of making gifts with credit shows the importance of the calendar in 
structuring the “time of finances”. On the one hand, there seems to be what one can call a “life-world 
time” structured by the local and specific social relations within which a particular individual is 
embedded. Social commitments such as weddings, birthdays or other ceremonies, for example, are directly 
related to the specific ties of an individual or a family, which can simply not be transferred to others. 
These entail, in many cases, important financial efforts, and people seek to honor their social 
commitments and care relations by making gifts on time and, in many cases, enhancing them. In this 
sense, people might want to show-off their purchasing power in the search for rank among their loved 
ones, but the evidence shows that care relations and social commitments –relational work- are crucial 
priorities for many families. This goes in line with the “consumer profiles” I depicted in the previous 
chapter, according to which most Chilean consumers (at least 30% of them) seem to care much more 
about care relations in the households than the quest for status. This relates to a major social process, 
which is that in contexts of high uncertainties and insecurities brought about by the “privatization of risk”, 
individuals seem to focus their attention and energies on strengthening their family relations (Martuccelli 
2012b), something that the ethnographic evidence with low-income families I referred to in chapter 7 
made explicit. In this sense one can say that the intensity of the utilization of department store credit cards 
might be directly related to the number of strong ties that an individual has (Granovetter 2004). This is 
hard to prove, but the fact that the number of department store credit cards increases consistently with the 
number of household members is very indicative of this relation (chart below). Indeed, we know from the 
quantitative analysis of chapter 6 that the number of household members is significantly and positively 
correlated with the odds of having a department store credit card, but not for other types of debts. Of 
course, the reasons behind this might differ across different income groups, especially because of the 
number of economically dependent individuals. But social ties and their specific time structures 
undoubtedly play a crucial role in the way Chilean families use these credits 
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Figure 51: Share of Households with Department Store Debt by Number of Household Members, 
Different Income Groups 
Source: Data from the EFH 2009 
 
  On the other hand, there is an “institutional time” that regulates the calendar throughout a year, 
such as the opening of the school season, Christmas or national celebrations. I already showed the 
importance of Christmas in the credit-stories previously depicted, but there are other dates in the year that 
matter as well. March, for instance, where the school season begins, puts an important burden on the 
shoulders of Chilean families. According to estimates of the Chamber of Commerce, in March, one out of 
each Chilean “peso” is used to pay for scholar books, clothing, transportation and enrollment fees, 
reaching in average around USD 280 (in contrast with the USD 180 of the other months). Expenditures on 
related goods, such as personal computers and accessories also reach their peak during the year.  
The role of “institutional times” is clearly depicted in the following chart. As one can see, the 
number of active department store credit cards –those that are actually used- is very variable throughout 
the year. Unlike bank credit cards, which people use consistently as a means of payment in order to both 
organize themselves and benefit from “loyalty programs”, the utilization of department store credit cards 
has a clear time frame. Thus, for example, one can see that the peak utilization of department store credit 
cards for different years takes place in march (when the school season begins), September (when Chile´s 
independence is celebrated), and Christmas. This in turn raises the question of why Chileans seem to save 
for certain periods or activities over others, such as vacation. 
 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Lower Income Group 
Middle Income Group 
High Income Group 
 
! !
211 
Figure 52: Number of Active Non-Bank (blue) and Bank (red) Credit Cards, December 2007-2013 
 
Source: Figure taken from Retail Financiero (2013), Compendio estadístico de la industria del 
crédito. http://www.retailfinanciero.org/compendios/pageflip_dic2013/index.html 
 
9.6 FINANCIAL PRACTICES AND THE IMAGINARY MIDDLE CLASS 
Taking the broader picture into account, one can say that these practices -invisible to surveys- 
represent important and subtle ways in which credit becomes part of the available repertoire of economic 
practices and shapes the expectations of participation in the Chilean modernization process.  
Insofar these practices are informed by normative expectations about what gifts are appropriate, 
when to carry out life transitions, and what the things one is entitled to have are at a given moment, they 
reflect broader standards of “appropriateness”, belonging, decency and status. In this sense, the practice of 
making gifts with credit stands as a subtle way of performing the “imaginary middle class” and comply 
with existing and shared consumption standards. Thus for example, the economic independence implicit in 
the practice of darse gustos or making gifts to oneself with credit, is nowhere better represented than in 
the practice of “doing shopping”. In this context, darse gustos, which means walking around the shopping 
mall without any particular purpose and spending (credit) money on something unusual or simply 
unplanned, such as a haircut, shoes, or a restaurant meal, is at the core of the imagination of the middle 
class away from material restrictions and with some sense of independence. 
In this line of reasoning, credit in the case of housewives represents a way of gaining economic 
independence in a context where gender relations and unequal opportunities in labor markets prevent them 
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of becoming full members of the economic life of the Chilean society (that is why most housewives that 
learn how to handle the monthly installments of department stores credit cards acquire debts without 
telling their husbands). Likewise, the very fact of being recognized as a “subject of credit” when passing 
through a department store, is a source of recognition and esteem not only for consumers that experience 
upward mobility but also for those who lack purchasing power but can be recognized as potential 
consumers anyway.  
Finally by gifting “enhanced goods” people implicitly recognize that these “better objects” are 
valuable for society and themselves, revealing the latent aspirations of Chilean consumers by ultimately 
gifting the possibility of taking part in the benefits of growth and participating in the affluence of the 
Chilean society.  
Of course, there is in general an important ingredient of impulsivity when consumers acquire a 
credit card by chance or try to exploit what many perceive as an “opportunity”. This relates to the more 
sophisticated “recruitment techniques” developed by the industry, which have shaped the way consumers 
seek to maximize their purchases by having access to offers. But also to the fact that Chileans spend an 
important part of their free time at the shopping malls, where they are exposed to the marketing campaigns 
and “attachment” devices of lenders. In any case, as Mauricio and Pamela´s credit-story showed when 
buying their new sheets and the grill, some of these purchases might be planned in advance and consumers 
just wait for the proper moment to get discounts by using their credit cards. Furthermore, by making gifts 
to oneself or being indulgent with consumption by letting oneself seduce by offers is not an individual 
affair, but a reaffirmation of belonging to the “imaginary middle class”. 
Taking the broader picture into consideration, it becomes clear that practices such as buying gifts 
to the loved ones and oneself with credit indicate that credit has become an important means for Chilean 
families to participate in rituals, manage social commitments and regulate interpersonal relations, proving 
that debts are embedded in the social relations of the household. This goes in line with the hypothesis 
proposed in the previous chapter, which is that in many cases credit becomes a catalyzer and creator of 
possible courses of action that shape these aspirations. Thus, for example, while in Diego and Karen´s 
case banks and department stores debts are normalized first and then considered as a resource that should 
be constantly put in motion; consumer credits in Monica’s case accelerate expectations of consumption 
that eventually end up in financial collapse. More broadly, that credit becomes part of the repertoire of 
practices is clearly seen in the fact that people do not purchase goods on credit but “take out” stuff (sacar 
cosas) from the department store; think of their social commitment and of honoring them with credit 
(making and enhancing gifts); plan major transformations at home and life-transitions with their “available 
room”; and trace of strategies to improve their position with consumer debts (turning debts into capital, 
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depicted in chapter 12). In this way one can say that the “imaginary middle class” that people perform 
with their material practices is also a projection opened by the availability of credit, and reflects the fact 
that people “think with credit”. 
Of course, this set of practices is not exhaustive, but they provide a good overview of how people 
actually consume with credit in Chile, and how these practices relate to their aspirations, social relations 
and life-projects. From this perspective, the “status anxiety” hypothesis provides elements to think of the 
relationship between standards of living and the politics of debt without conflating consumption dynamics 
into the single dominant logic of “conspicuous” or “defensive” consumption. More specifically, by 
attending to the role played by consumption standards in the everyday making of the middle-class, many 
practices that cannot be considered neither as entirely “conspicuous” nor “defensive”, prove crucial in 
boosting the financialization of consumption. What I want to address in the next chapters is the role of the 
Privatization of Risk and the second source of “status anxiety”, the fear of falling and being left behind in 
shaping these aspirations and practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I argued in part I that if consumer credit works as an unacknowledged social policy in Chile´s 
Privatized Keynesianism, it should be located at the intersection of three main coordinates: economic 
growth, inequality and the privatization of risk. Part II was accordingly devoted to exploring different 
social processes through which the particular articulation between economic growth and inequality 
compels people to acquire debts in contexts of collective improvement. In this part of the dissertation I 
turn to a different issue, which is the particular role played by the “privatization of risks” in shaping the 
financialization of consumption.  
This is not an easy task. As I pointed out in the previous chapters, commodification processes do 
not exert the same effects in contexts of stagnant wages and a general deterioration of the middle-class, 
than in contexts of economic growth and collective improvement. Indeed, debts in Chile are less used to 
smooth consumption and systematically mobilized to expand income. But does this mean that rising 
expectations of wealth accumulation and emulative forms of consumption are the only social forces 
driving the rising indebtedness of these families? Are these dynamics of competitive consumption the only 
sources of their “status anxiety”? What is the role of commodification and insecurity in this story?  
What one knows so far does not provide an answer to these questions, but tells us where to look 
for. What became clear to us in part II is that the fact that people expand their incomes with credit does 
not mean that they are lavishly consuming. In a nutshell, I accounted in the previous chapters for the 
different ways in which the life-projects and aspirations rise at a higher pace than people´s income, 
inducing “status anxiety” and prompting them to purchase goods on credit. But what happens when these 
life-projects are threatened by insecurity or interrupted by the volatility of markets and the economic 
cycle? What is the role of consumer debt in securing these lifestyles in times of material constrains? And 
does the commodification of social services affect the financialization of consumption? 
Now we have to reiterate the fact that the process of “taking control over one´s life” and following 
the desired class and life-trajectory, for which people systematically mobilize different types of consumer 
loans, takes place in a concrete institutional context. More specifically, that it is shaped by the existing 
balance between the government support and the importance of the market in the provision of goods and 
services, such as education, housing, health and basic services. 
To clear this up, we have to follow political economists in that the provision of public goods, for 
instance, works as protective institutions that insure people´s lives against labor market volatilities, the 
economic cycle, retirement or illness (Streeck 2009). A safety net provides thus some relief and reduces 
“status anxiety” every time people have the certainty that job-loss or high medical bills do not mean the 
entire interruption of their life-projects. But in highly commodified societies, on the other hand, the 
market provides these goods and services, and their access is stratified according to people´s purchasing 
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power. As a consequence, the means to carry out life-projects, cope with existing risks, reproduce people´s 
status, secure their position and attain the desired lifestyle depend heavily on the capacity of families to 
accumulate wealth and mobilize it in the desired ways. In an unequal context, this means that both 
constraints and opportunities will be unevenly distributed.  
Taking this into consideration is a clear way of bringing into focus the main insights from political 
economists into the microanalysis of consumer debts, from which we can advance a working hypothesis: 
If this is true, and in the context of commodified social services the materialization of people´s aspirations 
and trajectories depend to a great extent on the changing access to resources and opportunities that they 
experience throughout their life-course, one could also expect people to acquire consumer debts in order 
to either: i) cope with instability (the classic “defensive consumption hypothesis”); or ii) to deploy their 
position-taking strategies that aim at catching up with a more demanding economy. Furthermore, if social 
mobility depends on the deployment of individualized “position taking strategies” (rather than a collective 
outcome), one can expect iii) that competitive dynamics mediated by “inconspicuous” forms of 
consumption lead to important pressures on household budgets that ultimately contribute to the 
financialization of consumption.  
The propositions outlined above provide a similar account to that held by most scholars in the field 
of political economy, but without conflating them into the “defensive consumption” hypothesis. They do 
not imply that consumer credit is necessarily used to “smooth consumption” in times of material 
constraints, and certainly do not contradict the assertion that consumer credit in Chile is mainly used to 
expand the purchasing power of workers in times of prosperity. But they rather provide a more nuanced 
account of the subtle mechanisms through which the privatization of risk affects the consumption and 
financial practices of households as a whole. Ultimately, what I want to show throughout the next chapters 
is that the fact that debts in Chile are mostly used to expand people´s consumption is also a result of the 
particular way Chilean families carry out their life-projects and allocate their resources in a context of 
commodified social services, lack of safety net and inequality. In this way, the privatization of risks 
becomes a different source of “status anxiety” that prompts families to consume beyond their means.  
Chapter 10 starts assessing these propositions by sketching the insecurities of Chilean families, 
which stem from the institutionalization of meritocracy and heterogeneous social trajectories. It then 
moves on to tackle the question of why people become so indebted, even if they feel very insecure 
regarding their status, for which the relation between coping strategies, savings and debts is assessed. 
Chapter 11 follows up on this topic and shows how the commodification of education and the “fear of 
falling behind” affect the financialization of consumption by creating “arms race” dynamics. Continuing 
with the same line of reasoning, chapter 12 addresses the role of the commodification of health and 
pensions, and the “fear of being left behind” in shaping the allocation of resources. Finally, the last 
chapter assesses how debts themselves become a source of risk in Chile´s Privatized Keynesianism, for 
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which it sketches dangerous practices that Chilean families carry out, and shows how these consumers 
handle their debts. 
CHAPTER 10 INSECURITY, DEBTS AND SAVINGS 
Commodification processes in contexts of high inequality distribute social risks in uneven ways 
throughout the social structure. This represents, in turn, an enormous source of “status anxiety” for 
Chilean families, which does not stem from pressures to consume but from pressures to secure them 
against market volatilities and other threads (risks). 
In fact, Chilean families are on average satisfied with their accomplishments and life-trajectories, 
and they seem to have very defined life-projects that they would like to materialize. As a recent Human 
Development Report showed (PNUD 2012), for instance, most people seem to have a “defined life-
project”, which is even considerably important among lower income groups, as the chart below shows. 
Figure 53: Definition of the Life-project According to socio-economic group 
 
Source: Data taken from PNUD 2012 
 
But Chilean families also feel very insecure with regard to the chances they have to materialize 
these projects, or prevent them from being interrupted. There are some indicators that help us clarify this. 
Since the late 1990´s, for instance, the United Nations Development Program in Chile monitors, among 
other things, the “subjective human security” of Chilean families. It uses a “Subjective Human Security 
Index” (ISHS) that ranges from 0 to 1 that weights the evaluation people make of the existence and 
efficacy of available “security mechanisms” in different aspects: work, retirement, health and urban 
security.  
Subjective Human Security in Chile in 2011 was 0.39, which means that for most components of 
the index, more than 50% of individuals tend to be located at the pole of insecurity. Already during the 
nineties, Chilean families were quite aware that the world around them –characterized by an open 
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economy and privatization of social services- was insecure in many respects. According to the CEP-
PNUD national survey, in 1998, almost 70 and 80 percent of interviewees negatively evaluated the 
likelihood of finding a new acceptable job or re-inserting themselves in the labor market in case of job 
loss, respectively. 
The general situation has not improved very much and, in many cases, has worsened, as the 
disaggregation of the index shows. 123 Nowadays, people have consistently lost confidence in that their 
educational level would let them carry out their life-projects, and a consistent majority declares that they 
would not be able to pay their medical bills in case of a catastrophic illness or chronic disease. To this we 
have to add that around 60% feel they would have trouble finding a new job and less than 30% are 
confident about not losing their job in the next twelve months. Finally, most people in Chile feel that their 
pension would not even cover their basic necessities, which also holds true for those who have and do not 
have a savings account for retirement (PNUD 2012).124  
But what is the source of these insecurities? As we will see now, these insecurities and anxieties 
stem from structural transformations and new dynamics of social mobility in contemporary Chile. 
Showing this is crucial to understand how the materialization of the life-project in a volatile context leads 
directly and indirectly to the rise of consumer debts. Ultimately, the underlying idea is that if 
commodification has an effect on the financialization of consumption, it is because it becomes a different 
source of “status anxiety” that affects the materialization of the life-project. 
10.1 MERITOCRACY, “POSITION-TAKING” STRATEGIES AND STATUS ANXIETY  
The key source of insecurity through which inequality and commodification induce “status 
anxiety” is by the institutionalization of meritocracy. After the democratic transition in 1990, governments 
of the center-left coalition sought to correct the main distortions of the newly created markets, in some 
cases deepen and finish the commodification processes, while in others ameliorate the perverse 
consequences of unfettered markets through increasing social spending.  
Social policy throughout this period (1990 onwards) was built on the basis of fiscal discipline, 
which together with economic growth increased social spending from 1990 to 2009 at an annual average 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  The index has seen some improvements during the last decade, from 0.33 in 1997 to 0.39 in 2011. The most important 
improvement was in the dimension of health, where more people seem to feel that they would get a timely medical attention 
than before (31 to 42%), or that would be able to pay for the medical bills (18 to 30%). As one can expect, most of these 
improvements are concentrated on the lowest-income groups, basically due to targeted social policies.	  
124 The relevant fear that is extended across all socioeconomic groups, although it is indirectly related to commodification, is 
the fear of being victim of delinquency (80% of the population feel that it is likely that they or a relative will suffer robbery in 
public spaces).  
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rate over 7 percent. In relative terms, social spending rose from 12% of the GDP in 1990 to a 17% in 
2009, while as a percent of total government expenditure, it rose from 61 to 67% (Arellano 2011).125  
As we saw in chapter 7, however, most social spending targeted the poorest groups of the Chilean 
society and helped improving their life-conditions in important ways, but left the new middle-classes 
basically by their own capitalizing the new educational and labor opportunities, as well coping with all 
sorts of risks. As the table below shows, the net transferences from the state in the last decades has been 
considerable smaller in the case of middle income groups, while it represented an important share of the 
median disposable income in the case of poorer households. As sketched in chapter 8, this new middle-
class –driving force of the financialization of consumption- rather emerged on the verge of rising wages 
and their own effort.       
Table 12: Net Transfers by Income Deciles Chile 2006 (weighted average % of total median 
disposable income) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Net 
Transferences 86 35.4 18.9 9.3 2.3 -1.9 -5.9 
-
8.8 
-
10.6 
-
15.2 
Taxes -16.7 
-
18.6 
-
18.9 
-
18.5 -18.3 
-
17.7 
-
16.9 -16 
-
14.4 
-
16.1 
Social 
Spending 102.7 54 37.8 27.8 20.6 15.8 7.3 7.3 3.9 0.9 
Source: (Bazoret and Fierro 2011). 
 
Culturally speaking, this state of affairs found its corollary in the embracement of meritocracy and 
personal effort as the most important values defining the identities of these groups, as well as a 
generalized condemnation of any type of government support (Bazoret/Fierro 2011). Thus, for example, 
the radical faith in personal effort is illustrated by the fact that an overwhelming share of Chileans believe 
that someone who is “born to a poor family” could perfectly success in her life, while only a few think that 
succeeding is impossible for someone who is “born poor”.126 As another national survey reported, most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 This spending was financed by a flat rate tax (VAT), which remained essentially the same (around 19%).  Surpluses created 
by fiscal discipline made this possible, as well as the release of resources to be spent in infrastructure and social services, which 
were left in the hands of private initiatives through a system of concessions implemented in 1992.  
126 78.4 and 18.9 of respondents respectively, according to a National Survey conducted by the Universidad Diego Portales in 
2013. The survey is available at:    
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Chileans (74% of interviewees) think that “reaching happiness” depends on “what one does”, while only a 
few (15%) consider that it depends on “available opportunities” and “personal luck” (11%) (PNUD 2012).  
The perceptions of Chileans are also rooted in important structural changes undergone by the 
middle-class, such as the demise of the public sector and the rise of private bureaucracies (which by 
definition provide more flexible conditions than the public sector), and an increase in the number of 
independent workers (Torche 2005).127 
Seen from a structural perspective, changes in the social structure indicate an important shift from 
patterns of “collective social mobility” of the decades prior to the 1980´s (based on public investment and 
the consolidation of professional associations, public servants and unions), to more “individualized” and 
“fragmented” forms of social mobility. This is a process that has been characterized as a transition from 
patterns of  “class struggle” to “position-taking struggles” (Bazoret/Fierro 2011). This means that social 
mobility is no longer the result of the political action of collective actors but rather the outcome of the 
specific strategies developed by families, which might rise or fall in the attempt to fulfill their life-
projects. 
This pattern of individualized “position-taking struggles” or “fragmented trajectories” has been 
very dynamic. Thus, for example, one witnesses that only a small share of households that in 1996 
belonged to the poorest income group (28.1), was still poor in 2006, and 24.5 % of them experienced 
upward mobility between the fifth and tenth (richest) income deciles. If one compares these patterns with 
those of developing countries such as Venezuela or Indonesia, one can see that the coefficient of social 
mobility among the Chilean middle-class is considerably high (Contreras et al. 2005).  
In any case, scholars have showed that the “fluid social mobility” of the new middle-class is not 
only ascendant, but an important share of households transits across the poverty threshold in both 
directions (Contreras et al. 2005). That is why -even though many Chileans moved out of poverty in the 
last decades- it is hard to guarantee that these families will not be poor in a different period. In this sense, 
scholars documented, for example, that the lower strata of the middle classes are very vulnerable to fall 
under the poverty line in the face of unemployment, retirement or health problems (Bazoret/Fierro 2011). 
In fact, 34% of families that in 1996 were in the middle of the income distribution (between the V and VII 
income deciles) descended in 2006 to the bottom 20 percent (I and II income deciles). By the same token, 
Neilson et al. (2008) show that 11.4 percent of households that were not poor in 1996 fell into poverty in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://encuesta.udp.cl/descargas/banco%20de%20datos/2013_Primer%20Semestre/Principales%20Resultados%202013_Primer
%20Semestre.pdf 
127 Many of these new independent workers were indeed “forced entrepreneurs” pushed by the dismantling of the public sector 
in the Pinochet era (Munoz 2007).  
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2001, and these ‘new poor’ families actually accounted for 46 percent of “all poor” at that time. Finally, 
20.1 per cent of the population was transiently poor between 1996 and 2001, and chronic poverty was 9.2 
per cent, which implies that more than half of all poor households traced at a moment in time are indeed 
transiently poor, and that 30 per cent of the population earned incomes under the poverty threshold at 
some point during the two periods observed. 
Patterns of social mobility seem to have worsened after the 2000s. According to Torche (2005), 
having an occupation different from one´s parents is now more difficult than a decade ago; the extremes of 
the social structure are harder to penetrate, being more difficult moving out of poverty or becoming a new 
upper class family. This “social closure” might become an important source of frustration for many 
families that internalized the value of personal effort, but in practice face serious constrains to carry out 
their life-projects. Moreover, these studies also suggest that although the expansion of education created 
patterns of upward mobility, families in the middle of the income distribution are susceptible to losing 
their status more than previous generations (Espinoza et. Al 2011).  
This pattern of social mobility provides key insights into understanding the dynamics of 
indebtedness. One of the consequences of such dynamism is that an important share of the Chilean middle 
class had heterogeneous social experiences during their life-course. This supports the idea that for most 
families the realization of their life-projects is not a stable and smooth process. According to 
Bazoret/Fierro (2011), this is reflected on the adjectives with which these groups classify themselves, such 
as emergent (prosperous) and positing their hopes on the future of their children, but with strong feelings 
of anguish stemming from an uncertain future and lack of safety net. This tension between meritocratic 
values and insecurity finds its grounds on the trajectories of these families, which have learnt that just as 
one can succeed and “be on top”, it is possible to fall, especially among the bottom 70% of the population 
(Arzola/Castro 2009; Torche 2005). This contradiction is an important source of “status anxiety” of 
Chilean families, but it operates in a different direction. Rather than prompting people to catch up with 
new and more stylized standards of living, it compels them to take action in order to prevent them from 
“falling behind” or “being left aside”. 
10.1.1 THE PUZZLE OF INSTABILITY  
Altogether, these different sources of insecurity and anxiety pose a striking puzzle: if people feel 
so insecure, why are they acquiring so much consumer debts to buy more things? Do they prefer to 
succumb to the increasing pressures to consume rather than secure their lives? How do these families cope 
with instability if they have nothing but debts?  
Part of the answer to these questions was already outlined when arguing that inequality puts an 
important pressure by ratcheting up the standards of living at a higher pace than the growth of incomes, 
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which creates a gap between incomes and aspirations. But there is still more to unveil. The fact that the 
“smooth consumption” function of credit was ruled out does not mean that there is no relation between 
insecurity and financialization. It only means that one has to look at this relationship from a different 
angle. 
To show this more clearly and understand how the privatization of risks affects people´s financial 
practices, I start by looking into the role of debts and other means for coping with income shocks and 
threads, analyzing in more detail the relationship between savings and debts among Chilean families. 
Then I will move on in the next chapters to analyze the role of the privatization of education, health and 
retirement in shaping the financial practices of these households.  
10.1.2 HOW DO CHILEAN FAMILIES DEAL WITH EMERGENCIES?  
It was already argued that insecurity in the context of commodified social services stems from the 
fact that, without a safety net or the government support, the access to the resources to ensure families´ 
social status and lifestyles is not secured, at least for many families (Streeck 2009). Insecurity in this sense 
also stems from the fact that families do not have access to appropriate market insurance policies, lack of 
self-insuring mechanisms such as savings, or government support. This is especially pressing for middle-
income families that are neither subjects of targeted public assistance, nor their insurance prevent them 
from losing their social status (Bazoret/Fierro 2011). In this regard, one could say that debts are one 
among several forms of coping with risks and insecurity, such as saving for emergencies, paying for 
insurance or working extra-hours to improve one´s income. If one wants to rule out the “defensive 
consumption” hypothesis in its most simple form, one still has to look into these other sources of 
protection. After all, debts are only one component of the budget. 
To start with, people facing expenditures higher than their incomes –for whatever reasons- rely on 
different sources of aid. Thus for example, from the 46% of the people that in 2009 declared that their 
expenditures were higher than their income during the last twelve months, an important share of them 
used as much family support as credit to cope with higher expenditures, and an important number relied 
on savings (see chart below). 
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Figure 54: How people cover the gap between incomes and expenses 
Source: Data from the EFH 2011/2012 
 
But this might not be the best indicator to address people´s coping strategies, since higher 
expenditures might be created by causes different from emergencies, such as social commitments (a 
wedding), a turning point (moving to one´s home) or by making an investment (starting a business or 
home improvements). In this sense, one finds insights into the Household Financial Survey of 2011/2012, 
where interviewees are asked “if they faced unexpected expenditures or drops of income between 2009 
and 2011”. And indeed, one can evidence a different logic for people that experienced unexpected 
expenditures or an important drop of income.  
As the survey shows, 37% of households faced these constraints in this period. Contrary to the 
most common belief held by economists, these families did not liquidate their “assets” in times of crises, 
which suggests that, at least for Chileans, they do not represent any form of “savings”. More interestingly, 
however, is that the most mentioned alternatives by these families to cope with emergencies were not 
formal debts, but support from relatives and reduction in expenditures. 128  
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 We have to keep in mind that they can mention more than one alternative. 
0.0 
10.0 
20.0 
30.0 
40.0 
Selling assets Does not 
know        
Do not answer Other    Savings Family 
support 
Indebtedness 
You said that your expenditures were higher than your income in the last 
twelve months, what do you do to cover this difference? 
 
! !
224 
Figure 55: “How did you manage to adjust your budget?” Percentage of Interviewees that Mention 
Each Category, 2012 
Source: Data from the EFH 2011/2012 
 
The way families seem to cope with emergencies relates to two facts: firstly, in line with what the 
qualitative research of Stillerman (2009), Han (2012) and Barros (2011) found when studying poor 
consumers in Santiago, families in higher risk of losing their jobs and facing health problems pool their 
resources in order to cope with material constraints (from which the multipurpose money of “cash 
withdrawals” is one among other sources of income).129 This is why, in most extreme cases, rather than 
engaging in practices of competitive and emulative consumption in relation to their reference groups, 
poorer families are primarily building networks of reciprocity and mutual care (Stillerman 2009).  
Secondly, that for many families that only have department store credit cards, these credits are 
attached to within-store purchases that would not be useful to smooth their consumption (besides the fact 
that lenders are more reluctant to lend without collaterals). This is further supported by Álvarez/Opazo 
(2013), who analyzed panel data between 2007 and 2011 and showed that non-bank unsecured debts have 
no significant relation to income variations. Furthermore, one can argue that the alternative of 
“downshifting” (“restraining consumption” in the survey) basically means restraining from acquiring 
durable goods, which, in many cases, are purchased with credit. There is some evidence that supports this 
idea. As Gallego/Morandé/Soto (2001) showed, the volatility of purchases is higher for the consumption 
of durable goods than for non-durable goods. The former seem to be much more sensitive to the economic 
cycle, which means that families seem to be more prompt to adjust their budget and not acquiring 
furniture, electronics or cars, rather than changing their lifestyles in the wake of changes of income levels. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129 In this sense, credit plays a “defensive role” at the fringe of the poverty line, every time poorer consumer use formal and 
informal sources of credit to face unemployment, illness or insufficient pensions. 
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For instance, the majority of shocks undergone by expenditures on non-durable goods between 1987 and 
1999, are positive although small, while the negative shocks are less frequent. In the case of durable 
goods, on the other hand, they experienced less frequent but bigger positive shocks, which means that 
crises affect these purchases more than everyday life expenditures. 
Another conclusion one can draw from this is that most people do not resort to savings in order to 
cope with instability. The reason for this is simple: which is that 37.26% of Chileans declare to spend 
what they earn (expenditures=income), and only 15% of Chileans declare to consume less than their 
incomes (expenditures<income). As one can expect, the ability to “save money” -or spend less than your 
income- of families is very much determined by income. Only 7.72% of people from the lowest five 
income deciles can save, which increases to 14.98% for those belonging to the 6 to 8 income deciles, and 
reaches its peak of 29.2% in the richest 20 percent. This is something one can expect, since it has been 
seen that most families in Chile spend more than their incomes and that wages fall short against the 
socially constructed standards of living, especially among the poorest. 
Figure 56: Considering the Last Twelve Months, Would You Say That the Expenditures of Your 
Household Were? (2009) 
 
Source: Data from the EFH 2009 
 
But what is this 15% of family savings for? Using the EFH 2009, one can group the reasons that 
people provide for setting aside their surpluses into four different "logics". The first one (see table below), 
represents an "acquisitive logic" according to which people save to purchase goods or services in the 
future, such as home appliances, a home, home renovations, jewelries, art pieces, vacation plans or future 
savings. What they have in common is that in all these cases people sacrifice the present to purchase 
something defined for the future.  
This seems to be an important criterion to save for Chilean consumers, which altogether is 
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mentioned by 25% of those that save. However, higher income groups save for these purposes in more 
important ways than the rest, especially to go on vacation and buy home appliances. Middle-income 
groups that save under an "acquisition logic", on the other hand, seek to buy a home and make home 
improvements in a higher proportion, although the differences are not very significant. These reasons are 
also the only important motives to save under this logic for poorer consumers. Indeed, one can expect 
poorer people to be “saving for a home” because it is a precondition to obtain the government housing 
subsidy. This goes in line with the idea that the family project is one of the most important aspirations, for 
which people might want to save money or use credit.  
The second logic one can clearly distinguish to group reasons for savings is geared at coping with 
emergencies, which one calls “defensive logic”. This is by far the most important reason that Chilean 
consumers seem to have when saving (at least 40% mentioned “emergencies). In order of relevance, most 
people save to have a safety net, equally distributed throughout income groups; it is followed by 
retirement (which doubles in importance for people of high income groups). In third place, people seem to 
save to afford educational costs in a similar proportion across income groups. And finally, medical 
treatments seem to preoccupy middle income groups in a higher proportion, while paying-off debts is a 
major concern for those who save in the low income groups.  
A third logic, which one might call “relational”, allows us to see if people save in order to honor 
their social commitments and care relations, such as weddings, having a child or bequeath something to 
their relatives. These reasons are not very important for these “savers”, which goes in line with the fact 
that Chileans consistently use consumer credit to finance expenditures that relate to their social 
commitments and care relations (see chapter 9). 
The fourth logic one can distinguish is the “managerial” one, which is basically reduced to the 
decision of saving to invest and start a business. This is not very important in the overall picture, but one 
can see that such motive is much more important for high income consumers. Finally, there seems to be a 
stable group of people (around 20%) that save without any specific purpose, equally distributed across 
income groups, which one can say have a “saving culture”.130 
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  Moreover, there are some patterns that allocate savings according to the life-cycle of these heads of household. Thus, 
medical treatment and paying-off debts are predominant reasons at a middle-late stage of the life-cycle (between 55 and 64), 
while financing education, having a safety net or "just save" are predominant in the middle of the (45-54). Younger heads of 
households, on the other hand, seem to save principally to buy home appliances. With this one sees that savings follow an 
expansive logic in the early stages to progressively turn into a more "defensive" or "protective" logic. 
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Figure 57: Reasons for Saving and Income Group, 2009131 
Underlying 
logic for saving Reason to save 
Low 
Income 
Middle 
Income 
High 
Income Total 
Acquisition 
To buy a home 4,71 7,72 6,43 6,29 
To make major home improvements 3,47 4,96 2,42 3,61 
To buy home appliances 1,61 2,07 7,18 3,64 
To buy Jewelry 0 0 0 0 
To buy and Art Piece 0,42 0 0 0,14 
To satisfy Future Expenditures 2,42 1,86 2,61 2,3 
To go on vacation 1,95 3,09 16,96 7,39 
Future Income 0,16 0,18 3,63 1,34 
Defensive 
Safety Net 39,87 41,52 39,28 40,22 
Retirement 10,39 11,76 20,4 14,22 
Education  9,16 9,47 12,45 10,37 
Pay-off of debts 8,91 5,07 3,88 5,94 
Medical treatment 3,39 4,05 2,19 3,2 
Relational 
Have Children 0 0,4 0,48 0,29 
Wedding or other ceremonies 0,44 0 0,41 0,29 
Inheritance 0,42 0,43 2,2 1,03 
Managerial Investment 0 1,63 6,42 2,7 
No purpose  Purely for saving 22,75 22,15 18,42 21,09 
Source: Data taken from EFH 2009 
 
In sum, in line with the high levels of insecurity one sketched before, most Chilean families that can save 
do it for precautionary reasons (a safety net, education and retirement). Moreover, from those that save to 
buy something, an important number does it to buy a home, which might be the population that wants to 
get a housing subsidy (middle and low income groups) or apply for a mortgage (high income group). The 
rest might account for consumers that prefer to purchase their things on cash and reject becoming 
indebted.  
It is clear from this that most people save to deal with different sources of insecurity and anxiety, 
but only a very reduced number of households manage to spend less than their incomes and set aside these 
savings. The question this raises is why most families, which feel very insecure and anxious regarding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Interviewees can mention more than one option. 
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their future, are not able to consume less than their incomes and save some money. In other words, if 
insecurity is a generalized issue among Chilean households, can one assume that only 15% of them are 
willing to have a safety net? Are they just too consumerist and prefer to sacrifice their future income for 
the sake of the present, even with high levels of insecurity? 
There are two conventional answers to these questions. The first one, which comes from 
conventional wisdom in economics is that Chileans have a good deal of savings, considering that durable 
goods are “assets”. Accordingly, one should then consider most consumer debts in Chile –which are used 
to buy the standard package of durable goods- as some form of savings. And indeed saving rates in Chile 
increase in important ways when one considers investments in education and durable goods as assets (see 
for example Butelmann/Gallego (2000), and Huneus (2001) for the case of Chile). But the problem with 
this answer is that it conflates savings with debt and would lead us to think that almost “nobody” in Chile 
is indebted, and ultimately overlook the role of inequality in shaping the status anxiety of Chilean 
consumers (as it was seen in previous chapters). It was already showed that people acquire durable goods 
on credit not because they think they represent some form of “savings” or “assets”, but they acquire a 
standard package they consider legitimate to have in a context of “status anxiety” and low wages.132 There 
is, of course, no doubt that finances help people accumulate assets (and debts) for which they have not 
enough income in the present moment, and this is indeed the case of people buying durable goods. In this 
sense a refrigerator that lasts for several years becomes a savings in the future. But from the perspective of 
a political economy of debt, the belief that indebtedness is only converted into “savings” shadows the 
political role of consumer credit in making distributive conflicts and inequality less salient.  
The second possible answer is that one can expect that Chileans do not save because, after all, if 
people were willing to save there would be no need for borrowing money. The problem then is that there 
is a culture that emphasizes using resources from the future to enjoy the present, rather than sacrificing the 
present for the sake of an uncertain future (insurances, retirement or conventional savings); i.e. Chileans 
are essentially consumerists. But is it so evident that people that have debts do not save, or, to the 
contrary, that those who save do not hold debts? Are they really two contradictory and exclusive 
behaviors? Ultimately, such perception is based on a “portfolio” view of the household, where savings and 
debts are two sides of the same coin: an indebted household has a negative balance in its budget, while 
one with savings has positive numbers, from which it is deduced that savings and debts are residual 
categories that exclude each other: people spend more or less than what they earn, and the differential can 
be considered as debts or savings.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 The only thing one knows so far, is that the rationale behind the acquisition of consumer loans by educated and higher 
income consumers, is that debts are, in many cases, justified as investments (van Bavel/Sell-Trujillo 2003), which according to 
the Households Financial Survey in 2009 accounted only for 6.34% of bank consumer loans and 0.99% of department store 
credit card debts. 
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But this relation is not so straightforward. That people systematically keep savings while having a 
negative credit card debt balance is a well-known fact in the field of consumer lending, and a striking 
puzzle for neoclassical economists (Telyukova 2008; Bertaut/Haliassos/Reiter 2009; Fulford 2010). And 
this seems to be the case of Chile. As the data of the Households´ Financial Survey 2009 show, from the 
37.2% of heads of households that declare that their incomes have been equal to their expenditures, 37.5% 
have at least a debt with a department store credit card. Moreover, from the 15.8% that declares that their 
expenditures are smaller than their incomes, 44.3% have debts with a department store, which means that 
many of those that actually save money have also debts. It seems to be that for many people “being in 
debt” is not necessarily spending more than your income, something that confirms what was found in our 
first credit-story. 
 So, the question for us still remains the same: why do Chileans fail to save and/or acquire debts if 
they are so insecure? We already outlined part of the answer to this questions when showing that more 
demanding standards of living create pressures to consume beyond people´s means. But as we will show 
now, this is still an incomplete answer because there are less visible mechanisms preventing people from 
saving and fostering the financialization of consumption. To show this, I will analyze in the following 
chapters the role of commodification of social services. 
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CHAPTER 11 THE FEAR OF “FALLING BEHIND”: EDUCATIONAL “ARMS RACE” AND 
FINANCIALIZATION  
In chapter 6, I showed that having household members generating expenditures on education increases the 
odds of having different types of consumer debts. Likewise, existing estimations suggest that having a 
household member studying at the university does not account for debt levels, but it is positively 
correlated with becoming over-indebted from being indebted. This is somehow puzzling. If Chileans do 
not use debts to afford education, but rather to acquire mostly durable goods, why are expenditures on 
education and indebtedness related? In this chapter I provide an answer to this question and show the 
concrete mechanisms through which the commodification of education leads to increasing indebtedness.  
Education is one of the most important subjects to see how commodification leads to 
financialization by affecting the “position-taking” strategies of families. It is, indeed, one of main sources 
of “status anxiety” for Chilean households. Studies in Chile have showed that the life-project is strongly 
related to the educational background and opportunities that people have (PNUD 2012). And, it has been 
demonstrated that in Chile education (investments on human capital) is the most determining factor in the 
transmission of wealth from parents to children, used by parents to pass advantage from one generation to 
another, and such indirect transferences have a direct impact on both life-standards (consumption levels) 
as well as on assets holding (Spilerman and Torche 2005). But how does a commodified education lead to 
increasing consumer debts? 
As was seen in chapter 3, education in Chile was privatized during the 1980s in all levels, and the 
government played a key role in creating “educational consumers” by strongly subsidizing first the 
elementary and secondary levels, and then progressively financializing the access to higher education. In 
both cases, the expansion of education was marked by an important expansion of social spending on 
education at all levels. Although spending on education decreased by 11 percent in real terms between 
1985 and 1990, the situation was reversed during the democratic governments, growing more than 10 
percent in real terms per year between 1990 and 2009. Since then, the main priorities of the government 
have been pre-school, elementary and secondary school, improving their coverage considerably among all 
income groups.133 As it was already mentioned, this made possible an impressive expansion of education, 
especially among poorer households. 
 
Nevertheless, the situation described above did not prevent the commodification and income 
inequality of having unintended consequences that ended up putting pressure on the family budget. Taken 
as a whole “private spending” on education has been as important as “public spending”, and it grew even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Several policies aimed at increasing coverage, from full school day to preferential subsidy per student. 
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faster during the nineties, higher education being the most expensive level for which the government 
contributes only around fifteen percent of total yearly investment (Rodríguez et. Al 2010). This happened 
because the expansion of education went hand in hand with the increasing efforts of families to send their 
children first to quality schools if possible, and then to go to college.  
Figure 58: Total Expenditure of Education as a Percentage of GDP, 1990-2008 
Source: Data taken from Arellano (2011) 
 
Both commodification and the higher social spending on elementary and secondary education 
affected the way families allocate their budgets. In the first place, it was seen in chapter 7 that a bigger 
education coverage did not necessarily translate into better wages. The result of such expansion was rather 
the devaluation of secondary education, which ultimately pushed families to target higher education as one 
of their main goals. In general terms, this explains why Chilean families have been systematically 
increasing the share of expenditures they allocate to afford education, as the chart below shows. This way 
of ratcheting up the demand for education is well described as an “arms race” dynamics, where Chilean 
families enter into the race for positioning themselves and equipping their children properly in a context 
where education at all levels is becoming a minimum requirement. To understand how the new patterns of 
social mobility and educational boom put pressure on the budget of Chilean families, one has to return to 
the logic of “positional goods” in the economy. After all, commodified education is one of the goods 
exchanged on the market whose “possession” affects the life-chances of people more than any other 
goods. 
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Figure 59: Evolution of Average  Expenditures on Education As a Share of Total Expenditures 
 
        Source: Data from the Households´ Budget Survey (EPS) 2011/2012. 
11.1 CATCHING-UP WITH THE ECONOMY  
The “positionality” of goods in economics stems from the fact that people tend to evaluate them in 
relation to the possessions of others (Frank 2007). The question then is why and what types of goods one 
can expect to be considered as positional under what circumstances, and how this might affect the 
financial burden of households. 
Economists have usually posed evolutionary answers to these questions, such as the fact that one 
looks for goods that secure one´s status which ultimately helps us survive (Frank 2007). But from the 
sociological perspective developed here, it becomes clearer that goods are “positional” because under 
specific contexts certain possessions might generate special pressures on consumers to be acquired, 
triggering “arms races” or “bidding war” over the goods in question without them being “conspicuous” in 
any sense. 
As with the emulative form of “conspicuous consumption” studied by Veblen, the concepts of 
“arms race” or “bidding war” stresses the escalating character of competitive patterns of consumption that 
ratchet up the demand for goods in a zero-sum game. The difference, however, is that the possession of 
some “positional goods” might well be “inconspicuous” (in the sense of not communicating status by 
deploying wealth), but their possession is nevertheless directly translated into advantages or disadvantages 
in the “position-taking struggles”. From this perspective, for example, one could argue that the increasing 
expenditures on computers -that rose 3.8 times between 1997 and 2007 according to the Household 
Budgets Survey - is not driven entirely by “status” or “distinction” but by the fact that they became “basic 
tools” in the digital era. The same holds true for other intangible goods such as learning a second language 
or pursuing a professional degree when everybody else is attending college. Education is, indeed, one of 
the most obvious and important examples of inconspicuous positional goods whose demand triggers 
“arms races” dynamics, basically because it is expensive and represents the main means of social mobility 
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for the middle-class.134 It is in this sense that the increasing consumption of “positional goods” (as a result 
of higher wages or available credit) might trigger dynamics that escalate the consumption of 
inconspicuous goods. 
What follows from the previous idea is that every time education has to be bought on the market, 
the budget of families is confronted with a particular trade-off between saving, purchasing goods or 
spending money to ensure the successful trajectories of their children in labor markets. In other words, this 
represents a clear way in which spending money might become a “defensive strategy”. Following this line 
of argument, one could argue that a generalizable mechanism triggering indebtedness is the so called 
“bidding war” that scales up competitive dynamics in different fields, such as college or mortgage prices, 
as well as discretionary consumption. Let me next show this in more detail. 
11.2 “BUDGET GAP” AND “BIDDING WAR”, TWO MECHANISMS FOSTERING DEBTS 
The way educational “arms races” put pressure on the budgets is quite particular and change at 
different levels of the educational system. The three-tier segmentation of the schooling system, for 
example, had specific unintended consequences (which were probably very easily predicted) that triggered 
“bidding war” among Chilean families.  
Currently, the schooling system in Chile is segmented in: a) private, expensive and successful schools; b) 
co-financed, less expensive and average achievement schools; and c) public, free and less successful 
schools (with a few exceptions). The underlying ideology of the neoliberal economists that created the 
system was that families from different socio-economic backgrounds should enjoy freedom of choice 
when deciding which school to send their children to, which would at the same time foster competition 
among schools to attract good students by improving their quality. But it turned out that the most critical 
“market failure” in education is that competition among educational providers does not necessarily 
increase the quality of the service (education), and that ultimately educational outcomes remain strongly 
correlated with the socioeconomic background of students and the school they attend.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  As Warren (2003) showed, this is indeed one of the main explanations behind the rising bankruptcy rates of middle class 
families in the U.S. In this case, “bidding wars” take the form of a “two income trap” that couples with children face in the 
wake of rising housing prices: while women were increasingly incorporated into the labor force in order to give economic edge 
to their families as a palliative to stagnant wages (among other reasons), the new resources brought in by this second income 
has created a competition in the form of a “bidding war” for finding a house in a decent school district. These competitive 
dynamics not only affect families involved, but also inflict huge costs on those who do not, basically because parents´ attempts 
to find the proper house to secure their children´s education have increasingly the prices on the housing market, exerting 
generalized pressure to take huge mortgages in order to fulfill the expectations of a “good education”. This also paves the way 
for a new bidding war that triggers the rising costs of college prices.	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In the Chilean context, this means that private schools systematically reach considerable better 
results than subsidized and public schools in evaluation procedures administered throughout the school 
year (the national test SIMCE), as well as in the standard exams administered by the higher education 
system (exam for university selection, PSU). As Contreras/Corbalán/Redondo (2007) show, such 
differences concerning educational achievement are mainly explained by the socioeconomic background 
of students, being income and parent´s educational levels the best predictors of students´ performance 
(Contreras/Corbalán/Redondo 2007; Spilerman/Torche 2005) . In this sense, results reflect the segmented 
character of the educational system, where in 1998, for example, 70% of students from public schools 
came from the poorest 40% households in the country (Beyer 2000), a tendency that continues until today. 
In the end, although it seems to be difficult to establish clear differences between the results obtained in 
public and subsidized school, studies have showed that even controlled by socioeconomic background of 
student, the results are better among private schools (Beyer 2000).135  
In this context, it is very clear that educational achievement is bounded to the efforts made by 
families to afford a better education, which becomes clear if one takes a look into the prices of successful 
private schools in Chile. If one considers the eight private schools whose students obtained the highest 
scores in the national selection tests to get into college in 2014, one can see that the fees range from 
around USD 1200 a year to a monthly fee of around USD 800, which is almost the wage earned by more 
than half of Chilean workers.136 Moreover, these prices do not include the enrollment fees these schools 
charge every year and that can well reach USD 600. As it is well known, the advantages of attending these 
schools cannot be reduced to educational achievement but also relate to other benefits such as social 
capital. As a press release in 2008 showed, for instance, more than 80% of the CEO´s of the 100 biggest 
companies in Chile studied in private schools, and at least fifty percent of them graduated only from five 
prestigious private schools. This seems to have worsened throughout the years, since the number of 
“young CEOs” educated in private schools reaches 90%.137  
Figure 60: With the Education That Your Son Currently Receives, Do You Think He/She Will Get 
Into College? 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 This might have to do with the fact that these schools have selective screening processes that are reflected upon their results, 
which in turn reflects the fact that the number of families inclined towards private schools surpasses their offer. 
136  Available at: http://www.eldinamo.cl/pais/2014/12/29/cuanto-cuesta-estudiar-en-los-10-colegios-que-promediaron-mejor-
puntaje-en-la-psu/  
137 “La Tercera“ March 30th, 2008. 
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Source: Data from PNUD (2000) 
 
In fact, this is something families were already aware of in the late 1990´s. As the chart below 
shows, most Chilean families sending their children to private schools perceived that their chances to get 
into college were much greater than those that were in the subsidized or public system. Sending your 
children to a public school, on the other hand, seems to be the last option for those parents that want their 
children to enroll in higher education.  
 
This is why the average expenditures of families on elementary and secondary education reflect 
their purchasing power. As it can be seen in the chart below, only the richest 20% of Chilean families 
allocate on average more than 4% of their total expenditures in education, which diminishes to around 
1.5% among the poorest 20%. In terms of total expenditures, the difference is even more noticeable, 
where a family from the richest 20 percent spends on average around USD 160 a month, while a family 
located in the middle of the income distribution spends around USD 20 a month. As one can expected, this 
does not mean that most Chilean families are happy with their educational choices, but that with the given 
prices, it would be just impossible for a median earner to send his/her children to a private school that 
might increase their chances of success.  
Figure 61: Average Monthly Expenditures in Pre-school, Secondary and High School by Income 
Quintile, 2011/2012 (Chilean Pesos) 
Source: Data from the Households´ Budget Survey (EPS) 2011/2012. 
 
Such mixed educational system that reproduces rather than shrinks social differences becomes, in this 
way, a source of insecurity every time education has to be conceived of as an investment that households 
make in context of material restrictions. Moreover, families are quite aware of the results obtained by 
different types of educational institutions, which makes to downshift from private to subsidized harder, or 
from subsidized to public school in the case of decreased purchasing power. In any case, the price 
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differentials between subsidized and private schools (not to mention public ones) are so huge that for most 
families it is simply not an option to divert resources in order to pay for a better private school. In this 
scenario, educational mobility has been much more dynamic in public and subsidized schools, but private 
schools still remain unreachable for the big majority.138 The problem is that, unlike higher education it is 
not possible to apply for a “School loan” in order to attend to a private school to improve life-chances. 
Thus, the battle for gaining territory in the individualized “position-taking struggles” is translated into the 
sphere of higher education, where commodification is almost absolute. 
The effects of the commodification of higher education are more direct. I already mentioned that 
Chile experienced a boom of higher education in the 2000s.While in 1990 there were around 245.000 
undergraduate students, enrollment in 2000 reached 436.000 and doubled by 2009 to 835.000. In 2005, 
around 64 percent of new comers were first generations attending higher education (Arellano 2011). The 
higher education boom brought with it hope for Chilean families to sent their children to college for the 
very first time, but it also created anxiety because this expensive education became a minimum 
requirement for an increasing share of the population. This is reflected on the fact that since 2003 
onwards, people from middle and low income groups increasingly feel that their educational level is not 
sufficient to “freely choose what they want to do”, as the last Human Development Report showed 
(PNUD 2012). This marks a break with the previous years, where education was seen as the main means 
for moving up in the social ladder. 
Higher levels of enrollment at college went in parallel with an increase in public resources in the 
form of tuition scholarships and loans, which reached more than 360.000 undergraduates in 2010. 
Anyhow, rising spending in education has been insufficient in the wake of such expansion if one considers 
that the contribution “per student” in 2009 is lower than in 1990 (see chart below). To understand how this 
shaped the financialization of consumption, one has to look into the specific dynamics of the system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 The enrollment of public schools between 2000 and 2006 diminished in 13% (186,000 students), while subsidized schools 
increased in 38% (386,000 students) (Paredes/Pinto 2009). 
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Figure 62: Average Annual Expenditure per Student in all Higher Education Institutions 
(thousands of 2009 Chilean pesos) 
 
Source: Data taken from Arellano (2011). 
 
Higher education in Chile is paid but segmented into a two tier system: “Traditional Universities” 
that existed prior to privatizations and that receive government subsidies, and entirely “Private 
Universities”. This difference matters because “Traditional Universities” are more prestigious since they 
have historically demanded higher scores at the standardized “university selection exam” (PSU) (probably 
because historically speaking only a few used to get into the university). This conversely means that, 
given that educational achievement is highly correlated with purchasing power, students coming from 
subsidized and public schools are incorporated with less frequency into these universities in comparison 
with those coming from the private system (only a 10% for public schools, 13% for subsidized and 31% 
for private schools). Thus, for example, in 2011 students from the bottom income quintiles still attend in a 
greater proportion “Private” universities (33.4% of the total) in comparison to the share of poorer students 
that attend the “Traditional” ones (28,2% of the total) (Escobar/Eguiguren/Sánchez 2012), even though 
financialization policies have mitigated the difference over the last years. It is important to consider this 
because most benefits (best scholarships and credit conditions) are granted by “Traditional universities”, 
to what one has to add that “private” universities have been historically more expensive than the 
traditional ones because they meet an increasing demand of students that do not meet the academic 
requirements to get into a more prestigious “Traditional university”. 
What follows from the above stated is that i) the segmentation of the access to higher education 
makes more likely that families that could not send their children to quality schools will bear higher 
burdens in the future (less benefits and higher prices); and ii) that to a great extent the expansion of higher 
education had to be financed mainly by families with their future incomes in the form of educational 
loans.  
This situation, in turn, triggers a perverse mechanism: in a context of generalized expansion of 
college enrollment, Chilean families from all socio-economic groups will be increasingly willing to spend 
an important share of their budget to finance their children´s education and catch-up with more demanding 
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labor markets. This results in that prices also rise systematically, reproducing again existing inequalities 
and fueling the “bidding war” for higher education. As the char below shows, only between 1999 and 
2003, when the boom began, “traditional universities” raised their fees 23% in real terms, although they 
still remained cheaper than private ones. In the overall picture, between 1999 and 2009 the average annual 
college fee increased 38.25% in real terms (Salas 2011). 
  
Figure 63: Evolution of Weighted Average Annual Fees in the Higher Educational System, Prices of 
2010 (converted to average USD of 2010) 
Source: Data taken from Salas (2011) 
The “battle for education” had different effects on the budgets and strategies that many students 
and families would follow. Although expenditures on higher education experienced an important rise 
throughout all income groups, the educational “arms race” or “bidding war” seems to be a special burden 
for families in the middle of the income distribution. As the chart below shows, compared to the richest 
20%, families from the third and fourth income quintiles allocate higher shares of their expenditures to 
higher education, although in total terms it is still considerable lower than the expenditures of the richest 
group. In other words, middle income families (not to mention the poorest) make huge financial efforts to 
finance professional careers, but still fall by far behind the richest families that are able to spend much 
more without sacrificing other expenditures.  
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Figure 64: Average Monthly Expenditures on Higher Education by Income Quintile, 
2011/2012 
Source: Data from the Household Budget Survey (EPS) 2011/2012. 
 
This overall logic sheds light on why families in Chile have a preference for buying things on 
credit: educational “bidding wars” create a situation where many middle-class families, the driving force 
of consumer debts, experience important “budget gaps” once they have to cover educational expenses, and 
diminish their “discretionary” income. This leaves many with no other options than acquiring consumer 
debts in order to perform people’s class identities and carry out their life-projects (also more demanding) 
by buying home appliances (decorating or improving home), dealing with their social relations (making 
gifts) or facing emergencies. This is a clear mechanism that explains how standards of living expand at a 
faster pace than wages and demand increasing financial effort to spend on “positional goods” that do not 
only reflect status (as a luxury car would do), but translate into real opportunities or disadvantages to 
succeed in the “position-taking struggles”.   
However, the situation depicted above does not account for the important share of families that can 
simply not deviate resources to pay for the education of their children (for which creating “budget gaps” is 
not an option). Because of low wages, the increasing pressures to acquire more education at rising prices 
implies for the majority of first generation of students –mostly from the middle and bottom of the income 
distribution- that there is no other way to obtain a professional degree than acquiring a debt. As sketched 
in chapter 4, an increasing number of students will apply for student loans granted by banks after the new 
policies of financialization moved towards the private sector to create “consumers” for the newly created 
educational markets in the 2000´s.  
This seems to affect families´ overall financial practices. According to a survey conducted by the 
National Institute of Youth (INJUV) and the Consumer´ Protection Agency (SERNAC) 139  with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
139 Available at: http://www.sernac.cl/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Endeudamiento-Resumen-Encuesta-Telef%C3%B3nica-
2013.pdf  
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individuals aged between 18 and 29, almost half of young individuals in Chile had a student loan (43%). 
Moreover, these individuals not only acquired student loans but also had department store credit card 
debts (39%) or consumer loans with banks (30%), being most of them responsible for paying them back 
(76%). The increasing financialization of youth seems to be more driven by a combination between their 
precarious financial situation and their new educational aspirations rather than lavish patterns of 
consumption. As the survey shows, among those that have had debts, 32% argue it was to face an 
emergency and 25% declared that it was to pay for their education, which confirms the idea that 
educational costs create “budget gaps” for many of the families bearing this burden. Indeed, most 
interviewees declare that most of their expenses are related to alimentary necessities in the first place, 
followed by education, transportation and basic services, and only 33% of them declare that credits give 
them some “independence”. As a corollary, the pressures these individuals have on their budgets prevent 
many of them from saving, considering that 20% declare not to have any leftovers and 13% use eventual 
remainders to pay-off debts. Only 44% can save when possible, which are meant to be used to buy a home 
(33%), face emergencies (30%) or pursue studies (13%), these savings being used to go on vacation (11%) 
or for entertainment purposes (7%). 
Likewise, many families are currently struggling with these debts. According to the same survey, 
24% of those who have had debts have also been in default and 23% of them have renegotiated their 
debts. Nowadays, as a report of the Bank and Financial Institution Regulatory Agency (SBIF) established, 
at least 8.6% of indebted students under age 25, whose debts average around USD 7,000, are already in 
default.  
Summing up, as the picture below shows, the “battle for education” is a clear mechanism driving 
the financialization of consumption among Chilean families and the youth. It shows that even though the 
Chilean government made important investments in education at all levels, the combination of income 
inequality and commodification triggered spirals of competitive expenditures on an inconspicuous but 
“positional good”, education. In this new scenario, where higher education is no longer a clear vehicle for 
social mobility as it was in the past, Chilean families will experience a new source of insecurity: since 
pursuing a college degree will become a minimum requirement, families´ abilities to catch up with the 
new standards of an open and more demanding economy –and to survive in the new “position-taking 
struggles”- is subjected to available incomes. This ultimately puts an important pressure on the budget of 
families, which are either willing to spend a higher share of their incomes on expensive tuition fees and 
see their discretionary incomes diminished (budget gap), or have no other option than postpone these 
expenses on time unless they acquire student loans. 
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CHAPTER 12 THE FEAR OF “BEING LEFT ASIDE”: MEDICAL BILLS, RETIREMENT AND 
FINANCIALIZATION 
The commodification of the Chilean health and pension system also created important pressures on 
the budget of Chilean families and became real threats to the materialization of the life-project, although 
they work in different ways. Unlike education, which is a positional good, both health and retirement 
plans work under the logic of “insurance”, according to which people sacrifice the present (setting aside 
money) in the sake of the future (retirement or eventual health related problems).  
One already knows that low wages and increasing pressures to consume –for emulative or 
defensive purposes- work in the opposite direction of “economic savings”, i.e. setting aside money on a 
monthly basis for emergencies, retirement or health insurances. But unlike a safety-net provided by 
ordinary savings, health insurance and retirement plans are i) meant to be compulsory forms of savings, 
which, in the case of workers with formal contracts, are discounted from their salaries. And ii) cannot be 
used in case of unexpected expenditures or income shocks. In this chapter I address the extent to which the 
commodification of these social services has contributed to the financialization of consumption. 
12.1 HEALTH AND DEBT 
The health system in Chile has had paradoxical results over the last twenty five years. On the one 
hand, the Chilean population improved considerably its health and sanitary conditions from 1970´s 
(Arellano 2011). General and Infant mortality decreased significantly, while life-expectacy rose and 
fertility was progressively controlled (PNUD 1998). On the other hand, this improvement found 
counteracting trends in the dualization of the system, where the quality and opportunity of services 
provided is being conditioned according to people´s ability to buy private insurances, while at the same 
time households have to face rising prices.  
As already explained in chapter 4, the health system in Chile was divided by Pinochet´s 
economists into a two-tier system: a public sector that pools together and administers the mandatory 
contribution of workers (7% of their income), distributing the benefits proportionally according to three 
income segments (A, B and C); and a private sector made up of insurance companies that also own clinics 
and offers a wide range of health plans. 
As with education, the dualization of the health system had important effects on the budget of 
households. While the public system is, in principle open to all citizens, the private system has more 
restrictive policies that discriminate by excluding certain pre-existing illnesses, as well as certain 
vulnerable groups such as elderly people and women of child bearing age (price discrimination). More 
importantly, it created a two tier system of public and private provision that competes with each other, 
which already in the middle term produced an important segmentation between those affluent families that 
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can afford to participate in the new market for health insurance, and a majority that has only access to a 
much more saturated public system (Barrientos 2002).  
Such dualization became an enormous source of anxiety for Chilean families. Already in 1998 the 
Human Development Report in Chile, for example, reported that while more than 80% of high income and 
ensured families were confident and very confident about receiving a timely and good attention in case of 
a minor health problem, those numbers decreased to around 40% in the middle strata and 25% in the 
bottom of the income distribution (PNUD 1998). This feeling continues until today, although it has 
improved. As a study conducted by a consulting firm for the Superintendence of Health in 2011 shows, 
Chileans systematically manifest a predilection towards the private system, which seems to offer a broader 
coverage in their health plans, higher comfort during hospitalization and better waiting times. 140 
Accordingly, the feeling of protection is overwhelmingly higher for those affiliated to the private system, 
as the chart below shows. 
 
Figure 65: Perception of Protection 2011 (Net %) 
Source: Data from the Adimark-GfK survey, 2011.141  
 
The reasons mentioned above explain why families are systematically willing to pay more and 
have insured themselves in the private system since its creation. According to data from the Ministry of 
Social Development, in 2011 only 37.2% of respondents that belong to the public system feel confident 
about getting a timely medical treatment, which rises to 72.6% in the case of those that have a private 
insurance.  
Moreover, the preference for the private system also stems from actual satisfaction with these 
different services. Thus, for example, while more than 20 percent of the population belonging to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 The study is available at: http://www.supersalud.gob.cl/documentacion/569/w3-article-6953.html 
	  
141 Available at: http://www.supersalud.gob.cl/documentacion/569/w3-article-6953.html 
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bottom 40% of the income distribution declared confronting problems with their medical attention (getting 
an appointment, paying for medicines and attention,  difficult access, getting health care), the number for 
the richest 20% decreased to 9,73%.142 In this scenario, being affiliated to a private ISAPRE is a source of 
status and achievement, just as it is to send your children to a private school, thus contributing to enlarge 
the list of distinctive goods that an average Chilean consumer has to handle. 
 
Figure 66: Affiliation to the Public and Private Health System by Income Decile, 2013 
 Source: Data from Casen survey 2013 
 
These are the reasons accounting for the increasing demand that private insurances faced over the 
last decades, and explain why the coverage of the private system rose from 1.33% of the population in 
1982 to 15.99% in 1990, and 26.43% in 1996, when the private system reached its peak. Nowadays, one 
has witnessed that coverage of private insurance companies diminished because of an important reform 
made effective in 2005, which introduced more resources into the public system and made the system 
more attractive for middle-class families. Some of these families migrated back to the public system in the 
mid-2000s, but many would still prefer to be insured by a private company but cannot afford it; for them, 
as for most families, the private system is simply not an available option.  
Furthermore, the costs of medical services also put an important burden on the shoulders of 
families. Even though many families receive medical assistance in public services, they still have to pay 
considerable sums of money for medical treatment and medicines. Thus, for example, among those 
covered by the public system, 48.1% declared that obtained free medicines in the last three months, 13.5% 
paid for some of them and 37.3% paid for all of them (the numbers in the private system are 6.8, 6.7 and 
85.2%, respectively).143 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 http://www.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/ipos-2012/media/ipos_2012_pp_94-125.pdf 
143 http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/documentos/Casen2013_Salud.pdf 
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Figure 67: Out-of-pocket Medical Spending as a Share of Final Household Consumption, 2011 
(selected countries) 
Source: Data taken from Health at a Glance 2013144  
 
In this context, Chilean families have seen a consistent rise in their medical bills during the last 
two decades, which is reflected on the average share of their budgets allocated to covering medical costs. 
If in 1987 an average household spent 3.95% of their monthly budget on medical attention, now in 2012 it 
has increased to 6.3% (Households Budget Survey 2011/2012). Moreover, even with the improvements of 
the public sector, Chile is the OECD country whose members bear the highest levels of out-of-pocket 
medical spending as a share of final consumption (together with México and Korea). Even worse, the out-
of-pocket expenses of Chileans during 2010 was around USD 400, which corrected by purchasing power 
parity falls under the average of the OECD countries (to USD 160).145  
Figure 68: Average Monthly Expenditures in Medical Services by Income Quintile 2011/2012 
Source: Data from the EPF 2011/2012 
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144 http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Health-at-a-Glance-2013.pdf 
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This of course, affects more significantly the middle and low-income populations, which even 
though are assisted by public services, spend almost the same share of their budgets as richer families. 
Nevertheless, as expected, in total terms these amounts are more than 10 times smaller for the poorest 
20% of the population. Altogether, both rising medical bills and the dualization of the health system put a 
financial burden on Chilean households that use their discretionary incomes to either pay for medical bills 
while still bearing high levels of insecurity, or purchase more expensive private health insurances. These 
consumers might not use consumer debts to deal with medical emergencies (especially because coverage 
of public services has systematically improved for the non-rich), but as with education,  dualization of the 
system and rising medical costs reduce their discretionary income and create “budget gaps”. In this 
context, it becomes clear that the only way to catch up with more demanding standards of living and 
materialize the desired life-project is by taking consumer debts. 
12.2 RETIREMENT AND DEBTS 
Retired worked –and more broadly, elderly people- became one of the last sources of profits for 
the financial industry in Chile. Contrary to economic theories of the life-cycle, according to which people 
in the late stages of life are expected to liquidate assets accumulated throughout the productive years, 
retired workers in Chile seem to be acquiring debts at a faster pace, especially during the last ten years. To 
understand how this was possible and the main features of this process, one has to look more generally 
into the current situation of retired workers in Chile, as well as the consolidation of new actors on the 
market. 
The privatization of pension funds in Chile resulted in a direct boost of the financialization of 
consumption in different ways. The private pension fund is considered to represent the two faces of the 
Chilean modernization. It created a huge capital market that largely benefited economic groups that 
consolidated after the financial crisis in the 1980´s.146 In the period 1981-2006, workers´ contributions 
amounted to around $50 billion and AFPs received every third contributed dollar, while the other two 
thirds were lent to foreign and private domestic conglomerates (Riesco 2011b). By 1996, around 65% of 
the working force was covered either by the old system (4,9%), the AFPs (55%) or the Armed Forces 
pension scheme (PNUD 1998).  
But the system has structural problems that had an important impact on the life of many, which are 
mainly related to the segmented coverage of the pension system and the actual benefits enjoyed by retired 
workers. According to a study conducted by Aguila et. Al (2010), the number of contributors grew at a 
rate of 3 percent between 1975 and 2005, while the employment rate grew by 2.7, which means that the 
Chilean economy has experienced only a moderate improvement in labor contracts. However, although 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 According to Riesco (2011), the mass of contributors grew at a 6.5% annual average rate from 1990 to 2006. 
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the coverage grew in the period, workers now experience higher levels of work rotation, which means that 
behind the relatively stable 55% of ensured workers, there is an important amount of individuals that 
contribute in an interrupted fashion (Berstein et. Al 2005). The self-employed worker, on the other hand, 
may have a precarious future since only 7% of them have retirement plans in the pension system and they 
represent around 30 percent of the working force. 
In general, the structure of the contractual situation of the labor force has remained stable between 
1980 and 2001. Self-employed workers reach on average a 18,4% of the labor force and between 1996 and 
2005 only a 4.1% contributed to the pension system, which means that approximately 17.7% do not make 
contributions whatosoever. Among the rest of occupied workers, on the other hand, between 1980 and 
2001 71% and 11.1% are employees with and without work contract, respectively. Altogether, this means 
that in that period around 30% of occupied workers did not make contributions in a given month (Berstein 
et. Al 2005). 
These structural problems of the new pension system came up after the 2000´s when it became 
clear that retired workers affiliated to the private system underwent an important drop in income that in 
many cases leads to poverty. Thus for example, estimates in 2011 established that if workers that started 
contributing the private system since its creation in 1981 retire in 2013, around 60% of them would 
receive less than a minimum wage (Riesco 2011b; Riesco 2011a).  
As a result, now one witnesses that for the majority of workers that are not able to save enough 
money during their working life, retirement means a drastic drop in income, which coincides with the 
stage in life where expenditures rise. Data from the 2010 “National Survey of Quality of Life in Old Age” 
help us grasp the situation of most pensioners. 
To start with, most incomes of individuals in age of retirement come from a pension (78.2%), an 
important share receives subsidies (40.3%), while some of them work (30.8%) and one fifth receives 
support from their relatives (19.5%). In 2010, only a few of them had private health insurance with an 
ISAPRE (6.1%), while the big majority belonged to the public sector (85.6%). In this scenario, these 
pensioners perceive that their economic situation is less satisfactory than all other dimensions. Thus for 
example, while only 52.6 considered their economic needs adequately satisfied in 2010; other needs seem 
to be more adequately met, such as health (65.1%), alimentation, affection (77.7%) or housing (79.7%). 
This represents an important improvement with regard to the critical year of 2007, where only 39% 
declared that their economic needs were adequately satisfied, but it is still a very big share of unsatisfied 
people in their less productive -though expensive- years. 
That is why 25% of those in age of retirement (over 65 for men and 60 for women) keep working 
for a salary; only 19% says that their incomes allow them to live; 55% considers that it is “just in the 
limits”, and 26% feels that it is simply “not enough” (which in 2007 reached 37%). This happens not only 
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because pensions are usually smaller than former incomes, but also because some expenditures increase in 
considerably ways, such as medical bills (PNUD 2012).  
Moreover, since those individuals in age of retirement fall behind the median income in a greater 
extent than other groups, retired workers are more likely to be “relatively poor”, as defined in chapter 7. 
This means that even though the pensions of an important share of the population are above the poverty 
threshold, they do not prevent them from experiencing an important decline in their life quality. According 
to Pino (2011), the number of “Relatively poor” retired workers has been growing from 24.8% in 1996 to 
48.4% in 2009. 
This has important consequences for the financialization of these groups. In a context where 
income drops and expenses rise, credit becomes for many of them an important source of income. 
According to CASEN survey, for example, in 2009 half of the population over 65 had debts with 
department stores, followed by a 12.8% that had “social loans” issued by the so-called “Cajas” (Cajas de 
Compensación de Asignación Familiar). The latter have, indeed, become one of the most important actors 
driving the financialization of these groups, and deserve some attention. 
These organizations traditionally administered workers´ social benefits (affiliated through a 
company or independently), and offer different services, such as tourist packages, or educational and 
consumer loans. In 1997, these organizations were allowed to administer the pensions of retired workers 
charging a 2% commission. Since they have access to their small by stable pensions every month, they 
have managed to lend money to retired workers without taking any risk, which is the reason behind their 
successful expansion in the past years. According to CASEN survey 2009, for instance, more than 80 
percent of those that have “social loans” earn incomes between USD 150 and 400, approximately, which 
means that they barely receive the minimum wage. If one looks into the “National Survey of Quality of 
Life in Old Age”, 16.6% of individuals over 60 had debts with these institutions in 2007, which rose to 
20.2% in 2010. 
In general, different types of consumer credits held by heads of households over 60 are unevenly 
distributed across income groups (see table below). Most “social loans” are held by low and middle 
income consumers; department stores are more equally distributed among income groups; and bank loans 
and overdraft lines are concentrated among the richest 20% (especially bank credit cards).  
The utilization of department store credit debts by these groups is not very different from an 
average household, where these are used to buy home appliances. In this case, the item “other purchases”, 
which might range from clothing to groceries, is considerably important (18.2%). The utilization of social 
loans, on the other hand, is more homogenously distributed among income groups, being used to buy 
home appliances (18%), medical treatments (17%) and making home improvements (22%). In this case, as 
one can expect, the item “medical bills” is considerably higher than in the case of the average household. 
Finally, Bank Loans, which concentrate on middle and high income groups, are used on many occasions 
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by these households to pay other debts, which shows that an important share of higher income consumers 
over 60 years accessing these loans (11.4%), struggle in important ways with their debts.  
Figure 69: Utilization of Different Consumer Credits by Household Heads Over 60 
 
Department Store 
Credit Card 
Social Loan 
Bank Consumer 
Loan 
Home appliances 66,26 18,58 8,35 
Vehicles or other transportation 
means 
1,29 1,03 6,24 
Other purchases 18,27 1,03 9,22 
Medical treatment 3,11 17,74 14,34 
Cancelation of other debts 5,9 1,38 31,3 
To finance an investment 0,84 11,96 6,96 
Home Improvement 2,23 21,95 9,53 
Other 1,29 4,03 13,19 
No answer 0,82 22,3 0,86 
Total share of heads of households 
over 60 with debt 
32,76 10,46 11,45 
Source: Data from EFH 2009 
 
In any case, the ways these debts are put to work also differ considerably according to income 
groups. As the chart below shows, “social loans” used to finance medical treatment (17%) are 
concentrated on more than 80% of low income population, while those social loans used to buy home 
appliances (18.5%) are held mainly by middle and high income consumers; finally, nobody declares to 
buy home appliances with these credits among low income consumers.  
Figure 70: Utilization of "Social Loan" by Income Group, Heads of Household over 60 (2009) 
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Source: Data from EFH 2009 
 
In a different vein, an important reason behind the increasing financialization of retired workers 
has been social policies that aimed at helping poorer segments of elderly people. Since a big share of 
workers was never able to set aside part of their income for their retirement plan, the government 
subsidized the private pension funds by introducing a “basic solidary pension” (Pension Básica Solidaria) 
in 2008 for those workers that never contributed to the pension system (almost half minimum wage), and a 
“complementary contribution” (Aporte Previsional Solidario) for those that contributed but their 
retirement plans still do not reach a minimum (that only in 2011 was established in around the minimum 
wage). Following the logic of targeted social spending, these new pensions are meant to help the 60% of 
poorest families and include a special bonus “per child” that aims at reducing gender inequalities among 
pensioners (while the middle-class were again left on their own). As a side consequence, this lean but 
stable pension-subsidy ended up subsidizing the risk-profile of impoverished retired workers that are 
increasingly becoming indebted. This is something that both department stores and “Cajas” learnt how to 
exploit in order to financialize a population that was previously excluded from the financial system, but 
that required an urgent extension of their incomes.  
The financialization of this group requires further research, and it is a very interesting scenario to 
understand how people struggle to protect their lifestyles and standards of living in the wake of a 
permanent drop in income. In this case, the lack of protective institutions directly leads to the 
financialization of a group of people that, although unproductive, become a clear target for lenders that 
seek to expand their sales (department stores) or just capitalize into their privileged position (“Cajas”).  In 
the end, financialization grows io the verge of institutional vacuums that leave the elderly on their own, or 
it is indirectly fostered by targeted social policies.  The financialization of this group is directly related to 
the privatization of risk. Their status anxiety stems not only from the desire to participate in the benefits of 
growth, but from the fear of “being left aside”. 
CHAPTER 13 THE RISK OF CONSUMER CREDIT 
The last part of this dissertation is concerned about the way credit can itself become a source of 
risk and insecurity, and, ultimately, a source of “status anxiety” by itself. There are several ways to tackle 
this issue. Since the bankruptcy law in Chile was only passed in 2014, there are no reliable data on the 
causes of financial collapse, and qualitative research has not characterized the process of bankruptcy and 
recovery. From the analysis of the EFH surveys conducted by economists, one knows that the “risk of 
debt”, at least at the aggregated level, stems mainly from the risk of losing one´s job.  
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Nevertheless, one still knows too little about the way Chilean families manage their finances, take 
risks, make calculations and handle their debts. As seen in the credit-stories formerly depicted, families 
can get into spirals of debts without undergoing a drop in incomes. This is the case of the “income-spike 
effect” or the “Diderot effect” where process of upward mobility can well lead to over indebtedness. 
Pursuing the idea that over-indebtedness is generated in practices, I seek to complement the structural 
analysis of indebtedness in the following sections with a focus on credit-trajectories and practices that 
people carry out. In particular, I depict two “dangerous practices” and processes that lead people to 
become over-indebted; then I move on to characterize how these practices are influenced by particular 
ways of making calculations. 
13.1 TURNING DEBTS INTO CAPITAL 
Personal loans, mostly issued by banks, are in many cases used to start small businesses or to 
support other types of intangible investments, such as education. In some cases, credit represents a source 
of hope: a vehicle for increasing social mobility, consolidating one´s position or recovering after a crisis. 
This way of mobilizing debts might well be the consequence of “position-taking struggles” and “bidding 
war”, against which many families will seek to “strike back” and pin their hopes on their managerial and 
entrepreneurial spirit by “turning debts into capital”. 
This way of using consumer credits goes in line with the entrepreneurial and risk-taking attitude 
described in the everyday life of finances literature (French/Leyshon/Wainwright 2011), although not 
necessarily with products designed for that purpose. As suggested in chapter 1, such literature is less 
concerned about explaining the rising indebtedness of households and more interested in showing how the 
expansion of finance gives rise to a particular financialized culture (Hall 2011; Coppock 2013). From this 
viewpoint, the democratization of finance is also understood as a political project promoted by 
conventional economic theories (Palley 2007), although it has different consequences. In this sense, 
consumers are demanded to develop particular skills to manage financial products and acquire a more 
favorable attitude towards risk (Erturk et al. 2007; Martin 2008; Langley 2007).147  
This is what one finds when one looks into the practice of turning debts into capital, although one 
knows now that it has more to do with the attempt of people for positioning themselves in an increasingly 
competitive environment, as well as securing their lifestyles and carrying their aspirations and life-
projects. Rather than being a mere effect of financialization processes, it seems to be a consequence of the 
privatization of risk and the “status anxiety of Chilean families. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Along these lines, many authors in this field look for inspiration in Foucault´s theory of  ‘governmentality’ to show how 
financial discourses and practices discipline households by demanding a transformation of people´s subjectivities towards a 
more favorable attitude towards of risks and sense of financial responsibility (Marron 2013; Langley 2013; Martin 2002). 
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Many people use consumer debts in this sense. After going through a financial collapse, for 
example, Mónica (our third credit-story in chapter 9) would no longer take out credit for decorating her 
home or darse gustos (give gifts to oneself), but she did use a bank loan to pay for an English course for 
one of her sons. Similarly, Osvaldo, now in his sixties, obtained his first consumer loan from a car dealer 
after a marriage breakdown in order to start his own business as a taxi driver; later on, he would take bank 
loans to re-invest in his already established business and eventually to purchase a new car. Turning debts 
into capital is seen as a much legitimate way of mobilizing credits, demarcating this mode of acquiring 
debts from consumerist purposes (as with Mónica). This goes in line with the fact that educated heads of 
households in Chile tend to justify their credit decisions on the basis of some sense of investment (van 
Bavel/Sell-Trujillo 2003), though this is also a practice one finds among less educated workers.  
Waldo´s credit-story is a case in point, where credits were rationally capitalized to improve his 
economic situation, but unforeseeable risks turn debts into a real ‘nightmare’. He had a seasonal job at a 
construction project in Santiago. Although he had improved his situation in comparison to his former 
position at a warehouse, he wanted to achieve economic independence. With the help of a consumer loan 
issued by the same bank from which he had obtained a mortgage to buy his small suburban condo, Waldo 
was able to start a side business, improve his economic situation and become less exposed to the risks of 
seasonal construction work. The idea came from a former colleague, who had quit the warehouse job to 
start a small “Logistics Company” that offers transportation services to construction companies. If one has 
the proper contacts with the industry, the business is simple: buy a truck, load it up with construction 
materials, and pay someone to drive it. This was very appealing for Waldo: his friend already had ten 
trucks working for him and had contacts with key people at the same construction project where Waldo 
was working. To some extent, comparing himself to a successful entrepreneur that he considered as equal 
triggered Waldo´s “status anxiety”, so he decided to start a new business. 
So Waldo decided to take a $6000 consumer loan with the bank to buy a $10000 second-hand 
truck. He received the remaining $4000 from his father-in-law, who took a consumer credit loan with the 
department store, Falabella. The idea was to pay off the debt on the truck as soon as possible, so they 
decided to pay a higher level of installments at $300 per month. The business worked quite well at least 
for a year, accruing around $2000 per month, after the costs of gas and paying the driver. It was a time of 
prosperity for Waldo and his family, who managed to save some money to create a safety net and to 
reinvest in the business. But in the second year after starting the business, one of the drivers stole some 
construction materials. Waldo´s contract was canceled and he had to pay for the losses. Then the spiral of 
debts began, in which savings were used to pay for the stolen materials, while the bank debt had to 
continue to be paid even though his income was reduced to its former levels. His bank overdraft was 
automatically withdrawn when he could not pay the mortgage on time, which became an unbearable 
burden for Waldo´s family.  
 
! !
252 
The situation got even worse when the “construction project” finished and his unemployment 
insurance was not designed to cover seasonal workers. In this scenario, the institutional vacuum of labor 
regulations turned his debts into a real nightmare. By the time of the interview, after two years of 
struggling to keep his home and trying to pay all his debts, Waldo was advised by a legal clinic that 
specialized in helping heavily-indebted consumers overcome debt-traps; such law clinics are parasite 
businesses that have emerged from the vacuum of consumer protection laws in Chile. 
13.2 ‘BICICLETEAR’ OR PAYING DEBTS WITH DEBTS 
Paying-off debts is a very common way of acquiring more debts and becoming over-indebted in 
Chile. For instance, one knows that the rise of debt to income ratio between 2007 and 2011 (crisis in 
between) was mainly due to a drop in income, but for the 29% people that sought an increase in their 
debts, almost 20% argued that the reason behind was paying other debts (chart below).148
Figure 71: What Motive is Behind the Increase in Your Debts Since 2007? 
Source: Data from the EFH 2011/2012 
 
This relates to a very common and dangerous practice carried out by Chilean consumers known as 
bicicletear, or literally something like ‘biking’ or ‘pedaling’ debts. This is similar to the common 
expression of ‘juggling’.  ‘Juggling’ debts –also used in Chile- is a way of describing how consumers use 
credits to deal with economic commitments when they have become a heavy burden, which has been also 
documented in other social settings (Guérin et al. 2014). But in Chile debtors usually refer to bicicletear 
when talking about the practice of using personal loans credits to pay other consumer debts. Juggling 
might well apply to these cases, but it is more broadly used to refer to all types of financial commitments. 
A few examples clarify this distinction. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 In the EFH 2011/2012, 19% declared that their debts diminished and 35% that they did not change. 
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As Luz says when explaining how she went through a period of economic constraints years ago 
‘What happened is that at that time I ‘bicicleteaba’ and ‘bicicleteaba’ [used to bike and bike] the other 
one. Because I had some trouble and stopped paying around six or eight mortgages [mortgage payments] 
in a row…’ In this case, unlike the aforementioned cases of Waldo and Mónica, she managed to get out of 
the situation by resorting to her personal networks ‘I decided to fix the situation very fast and I obtained a 
loan from my grandfather to solve the situation; I went on paying him…’. 
 The metaphor of bicicletear describes a circular movement through which one obligation or debt is 
converted into another. Since people systematically circulate credit cards among friends and relatives, the 
metaphor is meant to imply some risk of borrowing to pay other debts. The whole family or the consumer 
is pedaling the bicycle, and as long as resources are constantly put in motion to pay one´s debts on time, 
the ride will continue; but if one loses coordination or is exhausted and not able to keep ‘pedaling’, the 
bike will fall and the fall down could really hurt. In this sense, the metaphor could be also understood as a 
way of ‘buying time’ in order to postpone default by creating another debt in the hope of financial 
recovery in a future time.  
Elizabeth´s credit story illustrates the practice of Bicicletear and ‘buying time’. By the time of the 
interview, Elizabeth had three department store credit cards -all of them with around $2000 balance, much 
higher than the $400 average- but only one consumer debt with a bank, which she was using to pay off 
other debts. This was the result of a bad experience in accumulating debts and an episode of depression 
she suffered. The story with consumer credit started for Elizabeth a couple of years ago. By then, she had 
at least seven credit cards from different department stores, which she had accumulated throughout the 
years. She never formally asked for a credit, but they had been offered to her and she just accepted them. 
The first credit card had been in her hands for at least twenty years, since the early nineties when she 
started working. 
According to her, she used to spend a lot of time at the shopping mall ‘Arauco’, at least every 
weekend, and regularly bought clothing, footwear and homeware. She used to go to the shopping mall just 
to check out sales and offers and eat something with her daughters; but she always ended up ‘buying for 
buying’ because according to her, it was very easy to get tempted. Besides that, she used some of these 
credit cards to buy groceries on a regular basis. Elizabeth estimated how much she could spend, although 
she never had a clear amount. However, at some point she lost control over her debts and started making 
only the minimum payments. She tried several times to pay everything and get rid of the credit cards, for 
which she started taking cash withdrawals from department stores to pay off existing debts. But she ended 
up using them again. At some point, out of despair she borrowed $22000 from the bank to ‘close’ those 
credit cards. That was the point when she decided that she had to tell her husband about the situation. 
Elizabeth´s husband took control over the finances and he is now organizing the repayment of their debts 
and the household budgeting. Hence, Elizabeth spends most of her salary sticking to the payment schedule 
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that her husband settled for her to get out of these debts. In any case, they still have three of these cards 
and make use of them in a very rationed fashion. 
The practice of Bicicletear has two important features. Firstly, as a way of ‘buying time’, 
bicicletear is mostly an unintended consequence of using personal loans for different purposes. In this 
sense, consumer credits might help people cope with financial risk and instability, although it increases the 
likelihood of failure. Secondly, bicicletear often connects individuals and families by creating new debt 
relations. Thus, for example, sometimes -as with Luz and Elizabeth- formal and informal debts circulate in 
the hands of one individual whose debts multiply (structure A, figure below). A second debt is acquired 
with a department store (creditor 2) to pay for the debt of another department store (creditor 1). The 
former, conversely, is paid with a third informal debt acquired with a last resort creditor, usually a relative. 
But in other cases –like Waldo´s story- bicicletear connects with the debts of a third person to acquire 
formal debts via department stores or banks to help someone else pay for her debts (structure B). In this 
case, the debtor asks a relative or another person to acquire a formal debt from another institution. This 
person acquires a new debt and becomes both an informal creditor with a relative, and a formal debtor 
with a department store. In both cases, there is a financial ecology –to use the concept of Leyshon et al. 
(2004)- that emerges from the circulation of debts.  
 
Figure 72: Bicicletear and the Circulation of Debts 
 
Source: Based on qualitative fieldwork 
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 Such a dangerous financial practice raises the question whether the risk of debts originates in 
the misunderstanding of how credit –especially revolving credit- works, lack of calculation abilities or 
practical skills. In the case of Waldo´s story above mentioned, there was a mix between not understanding 
the logic of minimum payments and institutional vacuums created by lack of work protection. But how do 
Chileans make calculations, keep track of their debts and handle their financial obligations? 
 
 
 
 
13.3 MANAGING DEBTS AND MAKING CALCULATIONS: WRONG PERCEPTION OR MISGUIDED PRACTICES? 
Handling debts can be a very demanding task because financial products are very complex and 
hardly understood by consumers. As seen in credit-stories previously sketched, the mismanagement of 
these credits can turn them into a “nightmare” or “bad debts”; but handling debts on time can help 
neutralize its moral connotations and normalize them as an everyday life affair; furthermore, strategically 
lending one´s credit card to others might change the nature of credit itself by enhancing the risk score.  
As already learned, there are several ways of using consumer credits. Interviews show that people 
systematically plan, trace alternative courses of action and make economic calculations when taking a 
bank consumer loan. Bank consumer loans have to be solicited; they require some planning and the 
capacity of imagining possible futures. Since on average the amounts of these credits are considerably 
higher than those of department stores, they also require a more or less clear idea of the amount that will 
be solicited (tirar el lápiz, to use Diego´s expression), how the money will be spent or allocated, and how 
to deal with future payments (in any case, one has also learnt that financial practices that imply some 
planning –turning debts into capital- migh well be dangerous if things do not go as expected). 
But this is not necessarily the case of department stores credit cards. As we have seen, most people 
get their credit card for the first time when walking through a department store, a shopping mall or even 
public places. They feel tempted with the alternative of gaining economic independence or buying the 
irresistible and convenient sale that it is only available through a credit card. But how do Chilean families 
manage these consumer debts?  
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Figure 73: Utilization of Consumer Credit and Financial Planning 
 
Source: Based on qualitative fieldwork 
 
Interviews show that calculations do not necessarily play the central role one would expect. In fact, 
most consumers rather think of debts and manage their finances based on practical skills. People using 
revolving credit do not know how to calculate compound interests; they barely know how much interest 
rates are exactly charged and what the cost of doing minimum payments is. But they are quite aware of the 
fact that buying in more installments is more expensive; that lenders severely punish defaults and that they 
would even “encourage you” to default in order to make more profits. Some of them act by fear of being 
on the “black list” of Chile´s Credit Bureau, Dicom; and others would reject the idea of paying extra 
money due to one´s lack of responsibility. In any case, good intentions, fear or a sense of responsibility 
might end in a very poor performance if debts are underestimated. 
The under-estimation of debts might be an important problem behind the over-indebtedness of 
some households, which are not always aware of how much they owe. As a survey conducted by the 
Universidad Central with workers in Santiago shows, only 42.6% of indebted interviewees were sure 
about being able to pay back their debts, 30.2% thought that they can pay, while 4.2% and 1% had doubts 
or believed that they would not be able to pay them back. In relation to the subjective perception of debts, 
the survey also shows that 26.8% of respondents feel confident, and 37% is “calm” with their debts. 
Moreover, 75.1% declares to know the total amount of their debts, 19.5% have a fuzzy idea, and 1.8% 
says that they have no idea. By the same token, according to a survey conducted by the Universidad de 
Talca in the Region of "Maule" (CEOC-UTalca), 22% of indebted interviewees felt insecure regarding 
their capacity to pay back their debts. In this survey, 72% reported to know exactly the amount of their 
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debts, while 21% have “an idea” and 7% do “not really know”.  
In order to grasp the importance of the gap between people´s perceptions and their actual levels of 
debts, one can use the EFH to conduct a small exercise. Following the recommendations of the Central 
Bank, one can build a qualitative variable with the “total debt monthly service” (i.e. the share of income 
that people allocate to pay debts in a monthly basis) with three categories. One can consider a ratio of 20% 
as a small level of debt, between 20 and 50% as a medium level, and a ratio over 50% as a high level. 
With this, it is possible to assess the gap between the perception that consumers have with regard to their 
expenditures (whether they declare that their expenditures are smaller, equal or higher than their incomes), 
and actual debts measured as the monthly debt service. The results are showed in the table below. 
Table 13: Perception of Financial Burden (row) and Actual Total Monthly Debt Service 
 
Low (up to 
20%) 
Medium 
(between 20 
and 50%) 
High (more 
than 50%) 
Without 
Debts 
 
Total 
Expenditures > Income 
(46.0%) 28.36 19.93 17.37 34.34 
 
100% 
Expenditures = Income 
(37.2%) 20.7 12.7 9.43 57.17 
 
100% 
Expenditures < Income 
(15.8%) 39.57 16.44 6.17 37.82 
 
100% 
Does not know 4.55 0.97 5.43 89.05 100% 
Does not answer 14.7 3.6 0 82.23 100% 
Source: Data from the EFH 2009  
 
 It is worth noticing that there seems to be an important gap between people´s perception and their 
observed debt to monthly income ratios. Thus, for example, those individuals that consider that their 
incomes equal their expenditures (37.2%), 12.7% of them have a medium level of indebtedness and 9.4% 
have a an important financial burden. Even more striking, from those that declare that their expenditures 
are smaller than their incomes (15.8%), only 37.8% do not have debts, 16.4% have a medium level of 
indebtedness and 6.1% have a high total debt to monthly income ratio. 
This raises some questions. As a matter of fact, the financial business in Chile is successful 
because most Chileans actually pay their debts. In this respect, one already knows that Chileans learned 
how to deal with their debts, especially with the installments of department stores credit cards, and that 
this learning process might well have been very problematic. But how do consumers make calculations if 
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many of them do not even know how much they owe? Does that mean that they cannot handle their debts? 
A first answer to these questions is that i) for many consumers having a debt does not mean spending 
more than their incomes, and in this spirit some consumers save while at the same time hold debts. And ii) 
that having a debt with a financial institutions does not necessarily mean that one is “indebted”. According 
to the qualitative analysis, “being indebted” is rather what happens when one cannot pay one´s debts.  
Another option, explored here, is that this gap is explained by the fact that people consider their 
installments as part of their normal expenditures. Two practices help us shed light into the extent to which 
consumers rely on cognitive abilities or practical skills to handle their debts.  
13.3.1 REDUCING UNCERTAINTY: THE MONTHLY TARGET HEURISTIC 
A remarkable phenomenon in the financial industry in Chile is that people normally are not aware 
of the whole debt they acquire, but are only concerned about the monthly amounts they can pay. Indeed, 
as the UCEN survey above mentioned showed, the awareness of the monthly debt burden is higher than 
the awareness of total levels of debts: 86.78% of interviewees declared to know their monthly burden (in 
contrast to 75%), 9.73% has a fuzzy idea (in contrast to 19.5%) and only 0.25% of the interviewees do not 
know it (against 1.8%). This particular way of framing debts is one of the main discoveries of department 
stores, which started selling clothes in installments to loyal customers with a book that would register 
monthly payments at the sales point. One can illustrate this with particular cases. 
Marta, who uses her department store credit cards to sacar cosas , puts it in a clear way “I say, 
what I can afford to is not more than twenty or thirty thousand pesos [around $ 40 and $60]. I ended 
liquidating what I had, but after that I organized myself and said: I can pay up to 20 and I cannot pay more 
than 20, and actually that is what I pay, 22 in Falabella and 7 in Paris”. 
The same logic used Mary when she bought a new TV set for her home in 18 installments at a 
department store “What I pay attention to is how much I can pay in a month. So I say, if it costs fifty 
thousand a month at the most, I can afford to pay it”.  
This simple heuristic is complemented with other rules of thumb such as buying “small stuff”. As 
Mercedes says, she “[uses credit] only for certain things…a gift for my nephew, only for something small. 
An installment of ten thousands, always three installments only and no more”. Diego, for instance, has 
been always careful about “not buying two durable and expensive goods at the same time” in department 
stores. As a general rule, small items such as a shirt, a jacket or a pullover, could be bought while a 
durable good is being paid. That is how Diego end up buying a refrigerator first, then a computer and later 
on a TV set.  
Adhering to these rules could lead one to use credits in a systematic fashion, to the extent that 
people think about debts as regular expenditures rather than obligations; they have learnt how to “live on 
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debts”. For Diego, to continue with the previous story, every time debts have being paid off and the 
balance is in zero, the available credit is considered as a sort of “virtual saving”, an available amount of 
money that can and should be spent on the department store. As he puts it “I bought a refrigerator, then a 
notebook and then a TV. I finish (paying) this one and I buy another one, and so on. If I see the account a 
bit empty, and I go (to the shopping mall) and get excited about something, I buy it and “project” it in 
order not to become indebted”. As one can see, an “empty” account is a balance without debts, or quite to 
the contrary, a credit card with available “room” ready to be spent at any moment. As such, credit 
becomes a permanent expansion of one´s income, and the “negative” connotations of debts are 
neutralized. 
This way of understanding debts is present across many interviews, where being indebted does not 
mean owing money to someone, but rather a matter of having been under financial distress in the past or 
in a fictional future state where debts are out of control. In Diego´s words “I can tell that I have no debts in 
comparison to the “common denominator” (most people), I live in peace, because if I want I can pay off 
everything in two or three months”. 
13.3.2 KEEPING TRACK OF DEBTS 
Fernando is thirty years old, divorced with two daughters, and found himself in a situation where 
the monthly payments of the debts he took with the bank to replace a computer and a guitar that were 
stolen, had increased from $100 to $200. That was an amount that he could barely afford to pay, 
considering that he spends most of his income on his two daughters. He never thought that the debts he 
took with his bank and department store credit card would overlap at some point, and initially he relied on 
his bank overdraft line to handle these debts, a period that lasted around six months. This was a dangerous 
game (pedaling) because even though he used the overdraft line many times before, the bank never took 
money from her salary on her bank account. In his words “the bad thing is that your salary is deposited on 
your bank account but the bank don´t discount your credit line. It stays there, and then it is interesting for 
you to have that debt that will not be charged and still have your salary on your account.” In the end, the 
bank offered him to put these two debts together by granting a new consumer loan that he could afford to 
repay. By now, the $ 3200 that Fernando initially borrowed from the bank became $ 5200, which had to 
be paid in 54 installments of $160. He recognizes that it was a mistake, “…I didn´t figure out the 
magnitude of what was going at that time, by then, (…) I thought that bank credits or cards were a 10%, 
that I would have to pay a bit more than what I owed; a bit more…”  
This seems to be a typical credit-story, except the fact - even striking for Fernando- that he has a 
strong background in mathematics, works as an engineer in a consulting firm, and has given private 
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lessons of physics and mathematics for many years. The question this credit-story raises is how a person 
with such strong background on mathematics could get into such a messy situation? 
There are several reasons that explain why people cannot make complex calculations, which range 
from the unforeseeable character of the future (Beckert 1996), lack of education and cognitive constraints 
(Tversky/Kahneman 1974; Kahneman 2011). Although people use clear expenditure targets in order to 
buy things with credit in a department store, different goods are bought in several installments and with 
different credit cards, creating overlapping debts and making sometimes their payment a hard thing to 
routinize. That is why managing one´s finance is a very demanding task that sometimes requires some sort 
of prostheses (Callon 2008), external aids that distribute the cognitive burden into objectified forms of 
memory. Interviews show that rather than making complex calculations and understanding the logic of 
revolving credit, keeping track of expenditures and financial commitments in objectified forms of 
memories proves to be a very effective way of handling debts. Why is it so? 
The reason behind the phenomenon has been pointed out by different theories. According to the 
view point of Hutchins´ theory of distributed cognition149, memory or the capacity to store and retrieve 
information is seen as a socially distributed cognitive function. According to Hutchins (1991), both the 
environment and its materiality play a major role in assembling functional skills, and assemblages might 
well be contained in one or more individuals, as well as material artifacts. Social studies of science, on the 
other hand, have reiteratively made the point that economic coordination is only possible through the 
assemblage of networks of human and non-human agencies that allow actors to carry out calculations and 
make exchanges possible (Çalışkan/Callon 2009; Muniesa/Millo/Callon 2007; Callon 1998). A few cases 
exemplify how practical skills such as “keeping track” of debts help people handle debts. 
Karen, for example, has been very organized with her finances. She uses department store credit 
cards in a systematic fashion, manages to pay them on time and even to save money for her holidays every 
year. Being organized is a practical skill she developed for many years, starting when her alcoholic father 
left home when she was fourteen, and she took on the responsibility of helping her mother with the house 
expenses and left the school to start working as a baby sitter and cleaning work offices. She understands 
the overall logic of credit cards, and is even strategic when lending her credit card to relatives that she 
knows will pay and improve her credit scoring. But what helps her keep things in order is a small book 
where she writes down all her expenditures and financial obligations (picture 1). In a very systematic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 The theory of distributed cognition aims at understanding how cognitive systems work by emphasizing the interaction 
between internal structures and external and supra-individual components. Distributed cognition introduces a different way of 
understanding how the organization of agencies leads to the performance of new functional skills. Hutchins follows Vigotsky in 
that new functional systems are brought into existence in the interaction of the agent with others and with artifacts, existing first 
as an inter psychological process and then coming into existence as a psychological one. 
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fashion, Karen writes down her incomes (around $900), groups expenditures into items such as household, 
supermarket, Falabella´s department store credit card, mobile phone, a loan she had with his father, a loan 
with a compensation fund and Paris (department store). Furthermore, she adds expenses on gas and 
transportation. Finally, she sets apart what she calls caja chica (or small box), a usual name used to talk 
about liquidity or available cash in Chile 
Figure 74: Karen´s Accounting Book. 
 
 
This way of managing debts and more generally, finance, by keeping track of expenditures and 
debts, proves to be efficient also for other consumers, such as Magaly, Mary and Olga. These “accounting 
books” serve as prostheses or objectified memories that -following Bernard Lahire- one could say enhance 
the capacity of shaping people´s temporality by establishing “daily exceptions to the pre-reflexive 
adjustment of practical sense to a social situation” (Lahire 2011, 121). In fact, these are useful devices for 
managing debts because the financial business is not so much about paying debts, but rather paying the 
right amount at the right time.  
In its most extreme case, for example, the practice of keeping track of one´s expenditures and 
financial obligations can turn the credit card itself into an accounting book, a sophisticated device for 
keeping track of one´s incomes and expenditures. This is the case of Olga, who systematically uses her 
bank credit card to pay in three interest-free installments and keeps with her every invoice she gets at the 
supermarket or any other shop where she makes purchases. To some extent, the bank credit card is a 
suitable device for organizing people´s finances, since unlike any other financial instrument, bank credit 
cards leave a trace that helps people keep tracks of their expenditures. But this way of using credit cards to 
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organize finances requires an important arrangement of devices. In Olga´s case, organizing finances with 
credit card requires at least three other devices: Olga´s agenda (picture 2) is crucial to write down financial 
commitments and future incomes, such as paying a dentist bill for the orthodontic treatment of one of her 
sons, as well as the bonus she gets at the end of the year from the company. The second device is the 
folder where she keeps all of her credit card bills, which she would cross check every month (red marks, 
picture 3) with the help of the third device where she keeps all the invoices (picture 4). To some extent, 
being organized is the result of some sort of professional isomorphism, since she is –as she argues- very 
good at putting things in order, folding papers and organizing information.  
Figure 75: Olga´s Agenda 
 
Figure 76: Olga´s Visa Card Invoices 
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 Summing up, what these practices show is that, contrary to the assumptions of most “financial 
literacy” policies, Chileans are not interested in interest rates or the final price of an item purchased on 
credit. What matters to them seems to be how much they can pay each month to honor their obligations, 
which by many are not even considered as “debts”. Thus, the crucial issue to incorporate credits as a 
permanent expansion income, is not to make complex calculations, but to master the “timing” of their 
debts. In this scenario, practical skills and “objectified forms of memories” seem to be very useful in 
helping consumers handle their debts in appropriate ways, provided that there are no income shocks. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation seeks to achieve two main goals: to explain the explosive expansion of consumer 
lending that took place in Chile over the last thirty years, and to make a contribution to the incipient 
research on consumer lending in developing countries, as well as to the extant literature on 
financialization.  
In attempting to make sense of the financialization of Chilean households, I distinguished this 
work from ethnographical accounts of debts in developing countries, and followed political economists 
who claim that financialization in contemporary capitalist democracies works as a policy tool that 
ameliorates distributive conflicts. I referred to this position as the “Privatized Keynesianism” hypothesis. 
But I also engaged critically with this literature addressing two remarks. Firstly, I argued that 
financialization scholars rarely engage empirically with the way families actually carry out their 
consumption by financial means, abstracting the household from its social context, making strong 
assumptions regarding their consumption practices, and assuming that debt-driven consumption is mainly 
“defensive”. As a solution, I advocated for a micro-foundation grounded on existing theories of 
consumption. 
Secondly, by looking into the case of Chile, where financialization went hand in hand with rising 
real wages and material improvement, this dissertation posed a striking puzzle for most part of the 
financialization literature dealing with the expansion of consumer lending: by focusing on Anglo-
American economies and assuming a major role played by wage stagnation and a general deterioration of 
the middle classes, the “Privatized Keynesianism” hypothesis is unable to explain how credit –and 
finances at large- works as policy tools in contexts of improvement. 
This case raised the main research question: If households in Chile are better off, why are they 
becoming indebted to expand their consumption? My answer to this question has two parts, one rooted in 
political economy and the other in consumption sociology.  
At the level of political institutions, I suggested that the “Privatized Keynesianism” hypothesis 
prompts us to think not only about commodification processes, but also in terms of the strategic 
management and utilization of credit/debt relations carried out by governments to tackle distributive 
conflicts. This is what I called the Politics of Debts.  
From the perspective of the politics of debt, I devoted the first part of the dissertation to show that, 
unlike most cases studied by political economists, where finances are used to indirectly deal with wage 
stagnation and raising living-costs, financialization in Chile was actively promoted to support the creation 
of new markets for housing, education and consumer goods. Unlike the financialization of housing and 
education policies, however, the financialization of consumption in Chile was not carried out by the 
government but by department stores that exploited a situation characterized by lack of regulation and low 
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wages. By financializing Chilean households, consumer credit became indirectly a de-facto policy tool 
that allowed big shares of the population to expand their purchasing power and participate in the “party of 
consumption”. At the same time, credit fueled the economy and made the problem of persistent inequality 
less salient.  
In this overall process, I showed that the legitimacy of the Chilean debt fare capitalism is at stake 
every time the counter-politics of debts carried out by social movements call into question the legitimacy 
of debt relations in the fields of housing and education. This, in turn, resulted in an active politics of 
forgiveness implemented by the government, which aimed at relieving political pressure, while at the 
same time it provided incentives to financialize the population with the help of private actors that do not 
operate under the logic of social justice, for instance banks. In the domain of consumption, however, the 
politics of debt followed a different path because the ideology of consumer credit, according to which 
consumption is a private affair subjected to personal preferences, blinds the financialization of households 
against the counter politics of debt.  
This detour was a necessary step to understand how Privatized Keynesianism works in Chile at the 
macro level. But it provided only one part of the answer. It shows that financialization is functionally 
equivalent to social policies, and that it requires an active intervention on the part of the government to 
regulate underlying credit/debt relations. But it does not explain how it exactly works if it is not replacing 
stagnant wages, nor why do people acquire consumer debts in context of material improvement. As 
argued, this does not contradict the “Privatized Keynesianism” hypothesis, but it prompts one to think 
about more subtle mechanisms driving the indebtedness of Chilean families. 
The first step I took in this direction was to provide an overview of the major trends in 
consumption and indebtedness over the last two and a half decades, proving that: a) there has been an 
important change in the consumption patterns of consumers across all income groups; and b) that in this 
context consumer credit has served as a means for expanding people´s purchasing power and buy durable 
goods, rather than a way to cope with market volatilities.  
I then moved on to characterize the indebtedness of Chilean households in a more detailed fashion, 
showing that department stores are by far the most important source of credit among Chilean families 
across the whole income distribution, and that although most stocks of debts are concentrated on the top 
20%, on average low income families have a higher financial burden measured as monthly debt service.  
Trying to assess the determinants of debts levels in Chile, I drew on the work of economists. 
Although they provide very heterogeneous estimates from which it is difficult to draw general 
conclusions, their studies serve as a first approximation to the structural factors shaping the indebtedness 
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of Chilean families.150 Succinctly speaking, income shocks are, by far, the most important factor 
explaining the levels of debts and default rates, which is also explained by the fact that income has a direct 
effect on the “debt to income ratios”. Accordingly, income quintiles and income related variables are the 
most powerful predictors of debt levels, which diminish the effect of all other variables when included. 
The effects of health and educational shocks, on the other hand, depend on the year of analysis and in 
general are important in explaining the probability of being or becoming over-, but they are not important 
in explaining debt levels.  
Furthering this research agenda, I used three logistic regression models to assess the role played by 
different structural factors in explaining the odds of having different types of consumer debts.151 Two 
remarks deserve special attention. Firstly, that having one household member generating expenditures on 
education increases the odds of having a department store debt, while more than two household members 
generating these expenditures increases the odds of having a bank loan or bank credit card debt, even 
when income controls are added. As I argued in chapter 11, this occurs because expanding education will 
put a direct pressure on the budgets of Chilean families that allocate higher shares of their discretionary 
incomes to cope with educational “arms race”.  
Secondly, in line with the idea that expanding homeownership is one of the main driving forces of 
the financialization of consumption, “homeownership” has a significant and positive effect on the odds of 
having consumer debts, although it does it in different ways. As I previously showed, this is related to the 
fact that Chileans are, in general, very inclined towards the idea of improving, decorating and furnishing 
their “own homes”, while they remain more reluctant to make any home improvements or investments 
when they do not owe their homes. This is why becoming homeowner and moving to one´s home turnout 
to be a crucial turning point in which people start using different types of credits in order to materialize 
their desired class identities.  
These estimates provided a general picture of the determinants of debt levels, but they do not say 
too much about the circumstances under which consumers actually acquire these debts. Indeed, the fact 
that debt levels are determined by “income shocks” does not mean that people acquire more debt when 
facing constraints, but only that these debts become a higher burden when income drops. Estimates rather 
suggest that the way people consume with credit and the risk of being in financial distress are stratified 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 This means that results change depending on the source of data and the years of the survey; most models have a small R; and 
they usually use a sub-sample of indebted households. 
151 The reason for this is that “educational shocks” considered in existing estimations (a household member studying at the 
university) overlook the role of expenditures on education. 
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according to socio-economic background, but they do not allow us to understand why people seek to 
expand their purchasing power even when it can turn into an important burden. 
Since broad characterizations proceed by definition with an “average” notion of the household 
devoid of social relations, I argue that in order to answer the questions posed it is necessary to move on to 
open up the “black box” of households and tackle the relationship between consumption, standards of 
living, commodification and debts. This is paradoxically the cornerstone of the “Privatized Keynesianism” 
hypothesis, but at the same time is its most obscure and less explored dimension.   
The second part of this dissertation followed consumption sociology in that standards of living that 
we consider as “normal” and “legitimate” to accomplish are socially constructed. Drawing on recent 
financial surveys conducted by the Central Bank of Chile, secondary literature, and in-depth interviews 
with 30 middle class Chilean families, I developed in parts II and III a main argument that could be 
summarized as follows: 
The fact that standards of living grow at a higher pace than wages creates a gap between 
aspirations and incomes. This gap induces a major concern about “rank”, “achievement” and 
"security" that I called -borrowing De Botton´s (2004) concept- "status anxiety". The status anxiety 
of Chilean families is expressed in two different but related concerns: the desire to take part in the 
benefits of growth, and the fear of falling behind. These two sources of status anxiety exert 
different pressures on the financial and consumption practices of households. The former creates 
pressures to perform belonging to an imaginary middle class that demands ever-expanding 
standards of consumption. The latter pushes people to deploy "position-taking" strategies and 
invest increasing shares of their budgets in improving or ensuring their positions in society. In 
making these endeavors, most Chilean families progressively incorporated consumer credit as an 
expansion of their purchasing power. 
Following the “status anxiety” hypothesis, I showed that there are good reasons to believe that 
Chilean families across different income groups are very anxious about their status and share a feeling of 
“falling behind”. But the ways “status anxiety” affects their consumption and financial practices differ 
across the social structure.  
 
The financialization at the “Bottom of the Pyramid” 
 
Altogether, a combination of higher aspirations, more demanding standards of living, higher 
living-costs and low incomes, explain why the expenditures of the poorest families have been 
systematically higher than their incomes over the last twenty years. 
As I showed, most of the improvements enjoyed by these households were possible due to the 
direct intervention of the Chilean government via subsidies and targeted social policies. But better access 
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to sanitary, housing and educational services were basically not met with better opportunities on labor 
markets. As a result, the standards of living of people that moved out of poverty were ratcheted up, 
especially for those that fulfilled the “homeownership dream” for the very first time in generations, but 
their labor-money was insufficient to catch-up with the available goods brought on by trade openness, 
now displayed in the showcases of department stores at the shopping malls. This, in turn, increased the 
gap between their aspirations and incomes (status anxiety). 
In any case, for low-income consumers this happens not only because their aspirations are too 
high, but also because the average wage falls short in the wake of the high living-costs. Considering that 
living-costs in Chile are very high for most workers that do not earn more than two minimum wages 
(around USD 900), the material improvements experienced by many Chilean families left them on the 
verge of a new form of citizenship that is centered around the participation in the collective ritual of 
consumption. In this context, small credits of department stores became the only means for being 
integrated into the new consumption standards of the Chilean society by decorating and furnishing their 
new homes, as well as demarcating themselves from the stigma of poverty (van Bavel/Sell-Trujillo 2003). 
I supported the idea conveyed before with different sources. With data taken from the Household 
Financial Survey, I showed that households from the five lowest income deciles (bottom 50%) use these 
credit cards to buy home appliances in a higher proportion than wealthier families. Accordingly, in line 
with qualitative studies conducted with poor consumers in Santiago, I argued that the main aspiration 
bringing about the indebtedness of most of these consumers is not deploying wealth nor the search for 
status, but the acquisition of a “package of durable goods” that allows them to carry out the process of 
“home-making”, which entails the expression of people´s identity attuned with their integration into the 
Chilean society. In this scenario, many of these goods would also serve the purpose of regulating scarce 
spaces and conflicting social relations within the households. 
In this scenario, the broad picture became clearer in that the financialization of consumption stands at the 
intersection of social policies that provide housing and private property for families that were previously 
living in precarious settlements, the consolidation of new standards of living, and persistent levels of 
income inequality.  
 
Status Anxiety and the Financialization of the middle classes 
 
In the coming sections of the dissertation I characterized the financialization of households that are 
from the middle of the income distribution (now between the IV and VII income deciles). The reason for 
making this distinction is that, unlike poorer consumers, these households experienced rise in their wages, 
are less prompt to fall under the poverty threshold, have more opportunities to maintain or improve their 
status, enjoy better work contracts and are essentially meritocratic (they do not receive government 
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subsidies) (Bazoret/Fierro 2011; Espinoza/Bazoret 2009; Contreras et al. 2005). In this regard, their 
financialization seems to be even more puzzling. 
To grasp the financialization of these groups, I relied on the notion of “relative poverty”, that 
serves as a proxy to the median “standards of living” in a society. From this perspective, it became clear 
that an important share of Chilean middle-income households fall behind the median standards of living, 
even though the incomes of these “relatively poor” people have increased at a higher pace than those of 
the absolutely poor. Moreover, “relative poor” households have different profiles than those of poor 
households, such as male heads of households, less children and more elderly people. This supported the 
idea that families that experienced upward mobility, and that one considers as being in “good financial 
situation”, share the “status anxiety” of poorest households that are not participating in the benefits of 
growth.  
In this spirit, I showed throughout chapters 7 and 8 that there are clear signs of “status anxiety” 
among Chilean families that, even though have experienced material improvements, still feel unsatisfied 
with their incomes (for example, I showed that at very different levels of income and education, people 
feel that their income can barely help them meet what they consider “basic needs and nothing else”). With 
this diagnosis in mind, I explored different social processes and mechanisms that might help explain how 
inequality has shaped the “anxious” behavior of Chilean consumers in contexts of general improvements, 
and how this might have affected their indebtedness. 
Assessing the role of the “trickle down consumption effect”, I showed that there is an important 
exposure to the lifestyles of richer consumers mediated by an impressive expansion of advertising, a total 
penetration of TVs and the consolidation of new contents among the average audiences, such as showbiz. 
By these means, Chilean consumers become interested in the lives of “successful” and wealthier 
celebrities with whom they can identify themselves, an idea that I extrapolated to other genres. This not 
only creates new desires and aspirations, but also distorts the perception of reality and creates a 
generalized feeling of “falling behind” (something that goes in line with Merton´s suggestion that in 
context of upward mobility people tend to have higher identification with advantaged groups). 
Furthermore, I argued that the increasing participation of women in the labor force stands as a structural 
factor that accounts for the establishment of new standards of living and consumption norms through 
changes in the reference groups among moderately educated families. Finally, I argued that this perception 
of “falling behind” is also rooted in the “luxury fever” deployed by top earners in Chile over the last 
decades. 
In a similar vein, I explored the role of dynamics of class differentiation pursuing the idea that the 
embracement of consumer credit as a legitimate means of acquisition is bound to the process of 
reaffirming one´s class identity in a context of changing social boundaries and higher standards of living.  
Following consumption studies, I specifically argued that the desire to participate in the benefits of 
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growth materializes in an “imaginary middle class”, which becomes a source of “status anxiety” every 
time expanding consumption blurs social boundaries and standards of living become more demanding. 
With this aim in mind, I showed that although the new middle-class changed existing social boundaries 
among socioeconomic groups, the main criteria of social distinction in Chile are still strongly correlated 
with purchasing power. This in turn creates strong pressures to consume beyond people´s means across all 
social strata in order to deploy the appropriate consumption standards attuned to their new or “authentic” 
class identities. I found support to this idea in both in-depth interviews with middle-class families, and in 
studies on social mobility that suggest that by prioritizing expenditures and allocating incomes, savings 
and credit in specific ways, the so-called new middle-class seeks to perform what they conceive of as their 
“expected” and “authentic” class identities (Mendez 2008).  
In this scenario, being a middle-class citizen becomes a difficult task to perform, for which 
consumers deploy practices of distinction and consumption that are constantly –though indirectly- 
challenged by rising standards of living. Paradoxically, the more families strive to perform their middle 
class identities, the more the “imaginary middle class” turns into more demanding standard of living and 
credit becomes the appropriate way to comply with shared expectations. Finally, I suggested that raising 
standards of living and providing credit access for bigger shares of the population also induced “status 
anxiety” through a sort of “bottom-up consumption effect” that exerts pressures on more affluent 
consumers to redefine their consumption standards in a zero-sum game. 
Of course, there is still much research to be conducted on this topic. We know too little about what 
the “imaginary middle class” actually is, and one can arguably say that it is a very fragmented “imagined 
community”. Anyhow, both quantitative and qualitative evidence points to the fact that there exists an 
extended identification with being a “middle-class family” and at the same time a perceived distance 
between one´s income and aspirations, which ultimately reflects claims for social integration in a context 
characterized by an unequal distribution of income and changing social boundaries.  
Finally, in part III I advanced the main argument by maintaining that the “status anxiety” of 
Chilean families also stems from the “fear of falling and being left behind”; that is to say, the fear of not 
being able to catch up with a more demanding economy and secure one´s position and life-project. In this 
sense, I showed that only a smaller portion of households has a safety net, and that in times of crises they 
do not resort to credit but to social networks or restraining their consumption. This ruled out the 
“defensive consumption” hypothesis in its most simple form, but it does not mean that the 
commodification of social services does not exert a pressure on their budgets. Looking for more subtle 
mechanisms, I showed that households are pushed to compete with each other in order to secure their 
positions, engaging in “arms race” for positional but inconspicuous goods that divert their discretionary 
incomes to these expenditures and create “budget gaps” that are supplemented with consumer credit. This 
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offers an explanation of why expenditures in education are positively and significantly correlated with 
debt levels.  
Moreover, I showed that the commodification of health exerted a less visible pressure on the 
shoulders of these families by raising prices and demanding the highest levels of out-of-pocket money in 
OECD countries. In the case of retired workers, I showed that the privatization of pension funds relegated 
an important share of pensioners to the condition of poor, for which credit becomes the only means for 
filling in the gaps between drops in income and rising expenditures. Although their debts are smaller in 
the overall levels of debts, these became a target for new financial institutions –the so-called “Cajas”- that 
administer their pension funds and lend money without taking any risk.  
Taking the overall picture into account, I thus defended the idea that even though Chilean families 
do not use credits in a “defensive” fashion, ultimately commodification processes leave many Chilean 
families with no other option than using consumer credit in order to catch up with more demanding 
standards of living and carry out the life-projects they consider legitimate to pursue. In this sense, the fears 
of falling and being left behind puts a burden on their budgets and becomes actually an obstacle to the 
realization of the imaginary middle class. 
 
Life-trajectories and Credit: the Status Anxiety hypothesis from “Below” 
 
The qualitative analysis based on in-depth interviews with middle class families sought to cover an 
existing gap in the studies of credit in developing countries that focus mainly on the financial strategies of 
poorer families, as well as a lack of empirical research on the financialization literature. The credit stories 
here sketched depicted the intertwinement of indebtedness and life-trajectories, illuminating some aspects 
of the “status anxiety” hypothesis and brining new insights to light.   
To start with, qualitative analysis showed that “being in debt” is usually a process that changes 
both consumption practices and the meanings of debts. For most people in Chile, credit is encountered for 
the first time at the “market place”, in which lenders have been very successful in “marketizing” credit 
and engaging them in credit relations. Once people get their first credit card or consumer loan, many 
consumers get excited, enjoy being recognized as subjects of credit and acquire things for which they 
would otherwise not save. Rather than accessing new goods, however, for the middle-class, credit allows 
people to enhance those things they already have, which basically means to acquire “branded” products, 
such as a “good” tennis racket and “better” clothing. This logic applies also to the extended practice of 
making gifts with credit, with which gifts are “enhanced”. This means that in many cases –especially for 
those that have enjoyed better wages- more demanding consumption standards are manifested in the 
search for “quality” rather than mere acquisition. The immediate association of credit with “better” or 
“branded” goods suggests that although the availability of credit by itself puts these goods within the 
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reach of consumers, these goods representing latent aspiration. 
People normally learn how to deal with their consumer debts by resorting to simple rules of thumb, 
such as “buying no more than one durable good” at a time, or setting a monthly target to pay installments. 
When this happens, people gradually improve their credit scores and get more “available funds” in their 
credit cards, and many incorporate credit as part of their permanent income. In this process, the 
naturalization of debts changes its meaning and neutralizes its negative connotations. As a corollary of this 
process, people do not feel indebted until they are in trouble, which helps understand why having savings 
is not a contradictory practice with having debts.   
In general, consumers have a relatively clear idea of the things they are entitled to have, and buy 
with credit things they consider as “necessary”. In this way, in line with the “status anxiety” hypothesis, 
interviews indicated that things people claim to “need” are used to become independent from other 
relatives and materialize the family project, rather than protecting their lifestyles or deploying wealth in 
front of others. Thus for example, people moving out of the house of their relatives acquire new goods on 
credit and replace “old stuff” according to their own preferences, which in many cases demarcate distance 
with social origins. In this sense, acquiring, decorating and improving a home becomes a subtle process 
through which people materialize the standards of living they desire, as well as perform their desired class 
identities (the imaginary middle class) in the domestic sphere. In this way, the utilization of credit is 
bound to processes of improvement (becoming homeowner), even when these are not facilitated by better 
wages. This, in turn, supports the idea that the financialization of consumption is being driven by the 
rising standards of living fostered by expanding homeownership. 
Pushing this line of reasoning further, I pursued the idea that social trajectories really matter and 
showed that the “social origins” of families play a crucial role in the way people deal with debts, money 
and consumption. For consumers that experience abrupt upward mobility, for instance, credit becomes a 
source of recognition; get over-excited and spend systematically beyond their means. This is what I called 
the “income-spike effect”, where a raise in wages leads to over-indebtedness.  
In the case of consumers with poor backgrounds, upward mobility turns into a sense of “euphoria” 
that leads people to display wealth as both the expression of a sense of pride regarding one´s achievement, 
as well as a way of erasing the markers of social origins. In this sense, being impulsive or “not denying 
oneself anything” stems to a great extent from previous experiences of poverty and material constraints, 
while becoming a subject of credit stands as a source of recognition and self-esteem (in these cases over-
indebtedness might also take place because people lack the practical skills to handle the new magnitudes 
of money). Ultimately, this is a subtle manifestation of latent aspirations and claims for recognition, which 
explains why being in debt does not have moral connotations.  
For consumers with middle-class backgrounds, on the other hand, upward mobility can lead to 
over-indebtedness in more subtle ways. Credit-stories showed in this sense that new houses can lead to 
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over-indebtedness when older goods do not fit the new “standards” of a new neighborhood or the size of 
the house, something known in consumption studies as “Diderot effect”. By the same token, families that 
experience upward mobility (for example by making career in a company) and become exposed to new 
reference groups and circuits at the work place, have pressures to over-consume in order to perform a 
“match” between their new class identity and expected consumption standards (taste and wealth).  
This means that beyond the structural determinants of debt levels sketched in chapter 5, there are 
clear processes through which people a) acquire debts in contexts of improvement, and b) become over-
indebted without the mediation of income shocks. In this sense, I also depicted in the last part of the 
dissertation the practice of “turning debts into capital” as a dangerous way to cope with “status anxiety” 
that leads to over-indebtedness, and the practice of “pedaling” debts as a dangerous way to cope with the 
“risk of debt” itself.  
 
“Status Anxiety” and the Culture of Credit 
 
The qualitative analysis also revealed some widespread practices among Chilean families that are 
invisible to surveys, but represent important and subtle ways in which credit becomes part of the available 
repertoire of economic practices and shapes the expectations of participation in the Chilean modernization 
process.  
In this sense, practices such as buying gifts to the loved ones and oneself on credit indicate that 
credit has become an important means for Chilean families to participate in rituals, manage social 
commitments and regulate interpersonal relations, proving that debts are embedded in the social relations 
of the household. Broadly speaking, once people learn how to “live in debt”, credits are used as a way of 
handling overlapping temporal orders, such as the “life-world” time of social obligations, the institutional 
time of the official calendar, and the normative time of life-cycle transitions. In all these cases, the 
practice of buying gifts with credit serves for materializing the cultural categories of society, such as 
becoming a good father or aunt, taking care of the loved ones, and managing interpersonal relations and 
obligations. 
Insofar these practices are informed by normative expectations about what gifts are appropriate, 
when to carry out life transitions, what things one is entitled to have at a particular moment, they reflect 
broader standards of “appropriateness”, belonging, decency and status. In this sense, the practice of 
making gifts with credit cards stands as a subtle way to perform one´s belonging to the “imaginary middle 
class” and comply with existing and shared consumption standards. Thus, for example, the economic 
independence implicit in the practice of darse gustos or making gifts to oneself with credit, is nowhere 
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better represented than in the practice of “doing shopping”. In this context, darse gustos, which means 
walking around the shopping mall without any particular purpose and spending (credit) money on 
something unusual or simply unplanned, such as a haircut, shoes, or a restaurant meal, is at the core of the 
imagination of the middle class away from material restrictions and with some sense of independence. 
This means that what one usually considers as an individualistic and hedonistic consumer/debtor that gets 
overexcited about products displayed at the shopping mall is rather giving him/herself the possibility of 
participating in the collective ritual of “breezy consumption” that is characteristic of the imagined middle 
class. 
According to this line of reasoning, credit in the case of housewives represents a way of gaining 
economic independence in a context where gender relations and unequal opportunities on labor markets 
prevent them to become full members of the economic life of the Chilean society (that is why most 
housewives that learn how to handle the monthly installments of department stores credit cards acquire 
debts without telling their husbands). Likewise, the very fact of being recognized as a “subject of credit” 
when passing through a department store, is a source of recognition and esteem not only for consumers 
that experience upward mobility, but also for those that lack purchasing power but can be anyway 
recognized as potential consumers.  
By gifting “enhanced goods”, people implicitly recognize that these “better objects” are valuable 
for society and themselves, revealing the latent aspirations of Chilean consumers by ultimately giving the 
possibility of taking part in the benefits of growth and participating in the affluence of the Chilean society.  
Finally, the qualitative analysis also shows that credit is not only a legitimate means of acquisition 
and materialization of existing aspirations, but in many cases it becomes a catalyzer and creator of 
possible courses of action that shape these aspirations. This is clearly seen in the fact that people do not 
purchase goods on credit but “grab” things (sacar cosas) from the department store; think of their social 
commitment and of honoring them with credit (making and enhancing gifts); plan major transformations 
at home and life-transitions with their “available balance”; and trace of strategies to improve their position 
with consumer debts (turning debts into capital). In this way the “imaginary middle class” that people 
perform with their material practices is also a projection opened by the availability of credit, and reflects 
the fact that people “think with credit”. 
   
The Consumption of Credit: Emulating or Protecting Lifestyles?  
 
Most studies addressing the rising indebtedness of households tend to depict an ideal typical notion 
of consumers/debtors: either as victims of commodification processes (as in the “defensive consumption” 
hypothesis), or as emulators and status seekers that succumb to the pressures of consumption society 
(“trickle down consumption hypothesis”). But as showed in this dissertation, the “status anxiety” 
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hypothesis suggests that these consumption logics might be two sides of the same coin: under certain 
conditions (growth and inequality in the case under study), societies set higher and more demanding 
consumption standard with which people try to comply. These standards materialize in the “desire to 
participate in the benefits of growth”, but in a context of insecurity and uncertainty regarding one´s 
success, more demanding standard of living stand hand in hand with the “fear of falling or being left 
behind”.  These two sources of “status anxiety” are similar and empirically intertwined, but analytically 
speaking they can be clearly distinguished from each other. While the former manifests in the form of 
legitimate entitlements (having the standard package of durable goods or reaching economic 
independence), the latter expresses itself in the position taking strategies of families (like paying for a 
better education or starting a small business). 
According to this perspective, the “status anxiety” hypothesis provides elements to think of the 
relation between standards of living and the politics of debt without conflating consumption dynamics into 
a single dominant logic, “conspicuous” or “defensive” consumption. More specifically, by attending to the 
role played by consumption standards in the everyday making of the middle classes, many practices that 
cannot be considered either as entirely “conspicuous” or “defensive”, prove to be crucial in driving the 
financialization of consumption. In this sense, following studies on consumption, social mobility and 
material culture in Chile, I argued that for many families the rising standards of living seem to materialize 
in an “imaginary middle-class”, and that belonging to this imagined community is materialized through a 
wide range material practices that take place in both public and private spaces, such as going to the 
shopping mall, starting a small business or sending one´s children to college, and buying, improving and 
decorating the home, managing social relations and honoring social commitments. Ultimately, these 
consumption practices and imaginaries represent the grounds on which finances work as a policy tool, 
showing the intertwinement of the politics of debt and the life-world of consumers upon which the social 
integration of society ultimately rests. In the end, both the will to participate in the benefits of growth and 
the fear of falling behind that prompt people to acquire debts are nothing more than claims upon legitimate 
entitlements and participation in the socially constructed standards of living. 
 
Where to go now 
 
There are many issues that remain unsolved and require further research. To some extent, this 
stems from the fact that the main goal of this dissertation was not directed to the refinement of its methods 
but in the attempt for integrating the everyday life of debts with broader social dynamics. Ultimately, the 
main contribution of this work is to provide a sociological, empirically informed, and more nuanced 
account of how credit works as a policy tool when it is not necessarily replacing stagnant wages, i.e. 
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Chile´s Privatized Keynesianism. That being said, I see at least four important venues that are worth 
deepening and further investigating in the future.  
From a quantitative point of view, there are no estimates in Chile of the effect that expenditures of 
the richest 20% have on the patterns of expenditures and debts in the middle of the income distribution. 
This would require panel data showing the effects of higher expenditures unfolding over time, as well as 
the role played by different patterns of social mobility.152  
In a different vein, future inquiry into the relation between consumption and debts should deepen 
the idea of an “imaginary middle-class” as an imagined community, putting an emphasis on how 
consumers in Chile codify and de-codify class differences, markers of status and belonging. Qualitative 
studies should also address the process of bankruptcy and recovery in a context where protective 
institutions are almost non-existent, as well as characterize the financialization of specific populations 
such as high income professionals, housewives, youth, retired workers and over-indebted families. This 
dissertation provides some insights into the financialization of these groups, but characterizing them in a 
detailed fashion is still a pendent task. In this sense, many issues were left aside because a systematic 
treatment would divers too much from the main goal, such as the counter politics of debts carried out by 
debtors on an individual basis  (practices of sabotage and resistance), or a deep understanding of the 
morality of consumer debts. By the same token, more research is required to unravel the intricate 
relationship between savings, debts and insurances that, as previously showed, seem to challenge 
conventional wisdom on the matter.   
At the level of market sociology, the consolidation of side industries that emerged along with the 
indebtedness of households deserves more attention. The market for “debt collection” is arguably one of 
the most important emerging industries, but we still know too little about the way in which this profitable 
industry works, how consumers are pooled, sorted and remade in the laboratories of data miners; and how 
lenders and collectors regulate long-lasting credit relations with consumers.153  
Finally, the most important research agenda for future inquiry relates to the politics of debts, which 
demands further integration of the perspectives of political economy and economic sociology. As this 
dissertation showed, debts operate at different levels, binding individual obligations with larger networks 
of organizations, markets with social policies, and politics with financial businesses. At the micro level of 
analysis, understanding the everyday making of the politics of debt demands from economic sociologists 
more research on how techniques, devices and organizational features developed within and for financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 In any case, from a cross sectional perspective it is still a valid point that the lifestyles of wealthier consumers become 
available for individuals at the middle and bottom of the income distribution, and that this induces “status anxiety”.  
153 Likewise, this work detected the emergence of a side business carried by lawyers that although help people struggling 
against powerful lenders, benefited from a lack of protective institutions and financial literacy. 
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markets are constantly transported and re-translated into the domains of policy making, and what the 
unintended consequences are.  
With the consolidation of financial capital, it becomes clearer that the government is no longer the 
only actor with the capacity and symbolic power to determine who has “too much” or “too little” debts, 
and what debts can be forgiven, renegotiated or paid at any costs. But as long as financialization policies 
re-distribute power, and the pragmatics of credit/debt relations reveals the moral foundations of any 
political order, the legitimacy of debts will always stand as a contested issue. This will demand further 
research on the concrete politics and counter-politics of debt and forgiveness mobilized by governments, 
lenders, corporate actors and social movements alike, showing its relation with the landscape of power 
relations and broader institutional changes (in the age of financialization, these are all lenders and 
borrowers!). Furthermore, as I showed, if financialization runs in parallel to the creation of new markets 
and stands as a taken-for-granted corollary of commodification processes, one can expect that the 
embracement of fiscal austerity, privatizations and cuts in social spending will be followed by a counter-
movement that will increasingly take the form of the politics of debt. 
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APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX A: ESOMAR Classification of Socioeconomic Groups  
The index is traditionally constructed by crossing the educational level of the head of household 
with the total number of available goods. Currently, there are more sophisticated actualization of the 
classification system that account for the penetration of new consumer goods into the standard package of 
Chilean households, such as computers and smartphones.154 Nevertheless, the ESOMAR classification 
here presented was updated according to the National Census of 2002, and has been used by the works and 
marketing researches referred in this dissertation.  
 
Number of goods (Shower, washing machine, refrigerator, color TV, water heating 
system, microwave, cable TV, computer, internet, vehicle) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   
Without 
education 
E E E E E D D D D C3 C3 5,3 
Primary 
Incomplete 
E E E E E D D D C3 C3 C3 25,5 
Primary 
Complete 
E E D D D D D C3 C3 C3 C3 8,5 
Secondary 
Incomplete 
D D D D D D D C3 C3 C3 C2 17,9 
Secondary 
Complete 
D D D D C3 C3 C3 C3 C2 C2 C2 21,9 
Technical 
Incomplete 
C3 C3 C3 C3 C3 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 ABC1 5,2 
Technical 
Complete or 
Higer Education 
C3 C3 C3 C3 C3 C2 C2 C2 C2 ABC1 ABC1 7,0 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 To see how the index was actualized in 2008 see: http://www.aimchile.cl/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/Grupos_Socioeconomicos_AIM-2008.pdf 
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Incomplete 
Higher 
Education or 
more 
C3 C3 C3 C3 C3 C2 C2 C2 ABC1 ABC1 ABC1 8,0 
% Households 
by number of 
goods 
3,8 5,7 5,6 9,1 15,2 18,9 15,0 10,3 7,2 5,1 4,2 100,0 
Source: Calculated from data taken from ADIMARK. 
  
Santiago National 
Level 
ABC1 Upper 11,3% 7,2 
C2 Middle-Upper 20,1% 15,4 
C3 Middle 25,6% 22,4 
D Middle-low 34,5% 34,8 
E Low 8,5% 20,3 
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APPENDIX B: Interviewees, first stage fieldwork 
Category Interviewed Current organization Relevant previous experience 
Risk Management 
and Data 
Surveillance 
Villaroel, A. Ripley (financial retail) Banking industry 
Rivas, C. La Polar (financial retail) Banking Industry 
Barría, E. 
Scotiabank (bank, 
consumer division) Retail Companies and Banks 
Navarrete, F. 
BCI (bank, consumer 
division) Retail Companies and Banks 
Luco, J. Presto (financial retail) Retail Companies and Banks 
Olivarí, P. Banco Estado (bank) Retail Companies and Banks 
Reyes, P. 
Caja de Compensación los 
Héroes (Compensation 
fund) Retail Companies and Banks 
Borquez, C. 
Scotiabank (commercial 
bank) Retail Companies and Banks 
De la Fuente, T. 
Cencosud (financial retail, 
retail bank) Retail Companies and Banks 
Marketing Agencies 
 
OMD (marketing agency) 
 Munhóz, N. OMD (marketing agency)  
Morales, P. OMD (marketing agency)   
Caviéres, A. 
Megatime (Market 
research company)   
Rivas, S. 
Batanga Media (media 
agency)   
Ulloa, D. OMD (marketing agency)   
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Department Stores 
Patinho, C. (*) 
Cencosud (retail 
department store)   
Patinho, C (**) 
Cencosud (retail 
department store)   
Álvarez, A. Ripley (department store)   
Cavagnola, P. Ripley (department store)   
Zamora, A. Ripley (department store)   
Regulatory 
Agencies 
Matus, J. Central Bank   
Budnevich, C. 
Superintendence of Banks 
and Financial Institutions  
Scholar, consultant in the 
financial industry 
(*) Interview conducted in Cencosud´s Offices. 
(**) Guided visit to one of Cencosud´s department stores, Shopping Mall “Alto las Condes”. 
 
APPENDIX C: Questionnaire second fieldwork 
Name 
 Address 
 Date 
 Time beginning 
 Time ending 
  
1) What is your current marital status? 
2) How many persons live in this household? 
3) How many persons depend on yourself or other adult in this household?  
4) How many persons study in this household? 
5) What type of school? 
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a. Municipal b. Private/subsidized c. Private d. Junji e. Integra f. Kindergarten 
 
6) Do you know the associated costs? How much is it? 
7) How do you finance education? (scholarships, loans, income, etc.)  
8) What is your current occupational status? What do you do in your job? Do you have a work 
contract?  
9) Do you save for retirement through a Pension Fund? 
10) Do you have unemployment insurance? 
11) What is the health plan of you and your family? How much do you pay? 
12) What is your main source of income? 
13) Do you receive income from: 
a. Alimentary pension 
b. Relatives living abroad 
c. Solidary Pension for retired workers 
d. Handicap Pension 
e. Familiar Subsidy 
f. Water Subsidy 
g. Social Protection System 
h. Family Allowance 
i. Another state´s subsidy 
 
14) What is the type of your home? 
a. House  
b. Housing cité 
c. Condo 
d. Department 
e. A room in a house or department 
f. A room in an old house 
g. Social dwelling 
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15) Are you homeowner? 
16) What do you think is the current value of this house?  
17) How big is this house? (square meters)  
18) How did you acquire this house?  
19) Are you currently paying a mortgage? How much? 
20) Have you renegotiated your mortgage?  
21) Do you or any other member of this household have another real state property? 
22) Do you or any other member of this household have any of these financial instruments? 
 
 
Member 1 Member 2 Member 3 Member 4 Member 5 Member 6 
 
            
Bank credit card and 
overdraft line             
Department store 
credit card             
 
1) Do you or any other member of this household have any of these financial instruments? 
 
Member 1 Member 2 Member 3 Member 4 Member 5 Member 6 
Bank Loan             
Loan with financial 
institution       
Loan with a 
department store       
Car Loan       
Social Loan       
Educational Loan       
 
	   	  
297 
Others       
 
2) How much do you spend in a normal month on the following items? 
 
Member 1 
Member 
2 
Member 
3 
Member 
4 
Member 
5 
Member 
6 
Food and Beverages             
Clothing and footwear             
Bills (water, 
electricity, gas, 
internet, etc.)             
Transportation             
Domestic service             
Recreation             
Health 
      Other 
 
APPENDIX D: Interview with heads of Household 
• These questions served to start conversations and worked as a guide to reconstruct the credit-
stories of families. Many other questions were raised in the course of the interviews. 
• Most questions were asked in a colloquial language. 
• Local expressions are omitted in this translation. 
Dimensions Variables Questions 
Social 
Trajectories 
Education Educational story and current level 
Work Could you tell me about your labor trajectory? When 
did you start working? Have you suffered 
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unemployment? How many jobs had you? What is 
your current occupation?  
Family (When did you get married? How long have you been 
living together? How many children do you have? 
How old are they and with whom do they live?) 
Economically speaking, do you think your situation 
has changed with time? Tell me about the good and 
bad times.  
Health  Someone in your family has suffered any health 
problem that represented an unexpected or major 
economic burden? 
 
Intergenerational How do you see your economic situation with regards 
to the situation of your parents in general? And with 
regards to your life-course? 
 
Income Income trajectories 
(identifying shocks, 
turning points, crises, 
recovery, etc.) 
Looking backwards, would you say that you and your 
family had economic stability? Can you recall any 
“turning points”? 
Strategies to improve 
incomes or cope with 
emergencies 
How do you manage your budget during the “bad 
times”? (acquire debts, restrain consumption, work 
longer hours, etc.) If you have to save money, what do 
you do? 
Current Income How do you arrange your monthly budget with other 
family members? Do you feel it is enough for you and 
your family?  
Transferences Do you assist any other person out of this household? 
Do you and your family receive assistance from 
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someone else? 
 
 Evaluation of 
Consumption and 
Expenditures 
If you look at your trajectory in the last twenty years, 
would you say that your expenditures and 
consumption patterns have changed? 
 
Expenditures 
and 
consumption 
Budgeting  Are you aware of how much do you spend each 
month? How do you organize your expenditures? Do 
assign money specific purposes? How much do you 
spend on what items? 
Decision making How do you decide what things should be bought in a 
normal month? How do you arrive at such decisions? 
 
Timing  How do you organize your expenditures in a normal 
week/month/year? How many times do you buy 
groceries in a normal month? 
 
Consumption 
practices 
Where do you carry these purchases? Do you go 
“shopping”? When you do shopping, do you buy stuff 
or look around? Do you plan these purchases? 
Indebtedness Types of debts You told me you had consumer debts. Could you tell 
your story with these credits? 
 
Context of 
indebtedness 
What was your first credit? Why did you acquire such 
debt? 
Process of evaluation 
and acquisition 
Did you assess the most convenient options in the 
market? 
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Utilization How did you use these credits? 
 
Payments How do you handle your debts? Do you make 
minimum payments? Have you acquired more debts 
than necessary? 
 
Counterfactual What would have happened if you did not have access 
to those credits? 
Attitudes Peers Do you have friends, relatives or people you know that 
use credits? 
Values What do you think about using these credits? Do you 
think they are essential for Chileans? Do you think 
they helped you? 
Credit and courses of 
action 
Do you think that you can do more things with your 
credit card? 
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Odds Rations, Having a Bank Loan Debt 
Independent 
Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Gender Female - - - -  
 Male 1.223 1.228 1.110 1.108 1.120 
  (0.162) (0.164) (0.148) (0.148) (0.150) 
Age Group Less than 35 - - - -  
 35-49 0.909 0.880 0.868 0.844 0.811 
  (0.164) (0.157) (0.155) (0.152) (0.145) 
 50-64 0.948 0.950 1.005 0.862 0.863 
  (0.178) (0.178) (0.187) (0.164) (0.164) 
 Over 65 0.397*** 0.412*** 0.560** 0.439*** 0.455*** 
  (0.107) (0.115) (0.158) (0.126) (0.135) 
Educational Level Primary - - - -  
 Secondary 1.416* 1.389 1.351 1.109 1.107 
  (0.289) (0.283) (0.276) (0.235) (0.235) 
 Graduate 2.227*** 2.152*** 2.069*** 1.307 1.314 
  (0.478) (0.470) (0.453) (0.310) (0.312) 
 Postgraduate 2.692*** 2.584*** 2.434*** 1.179 1.154 
  (0.542) (0.530) (0.500) (0.271) (0.266) 
Number of household 
members 
 
 
1.164*** 1.125*** 1.124** 1.034 1.040 
  (0.0401) (0.0505) (0.0510) (0.0490) (0.0497) 
Members generating 
expenditures on 
education 
 
None  - - -  
One  1.134 1.114 1.233 1.200 
  (0.210) (0.207) (0.230) (0.227) 
 More than 
two 
 1.267 1.281 1.486* 1.433* 
  (0.259) (0.260) (0.304) (0.293) 
      
Occupational Status Unemployed   - - - 
Employed   1.863*** 1.549** 1.558** 
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   (0.380) (0.323) (0.325) 
Income Group 1-5 deciles    - - 
6-8 deciles    2.232*** 2.116*** 
    (0.438) (0.433) 
9-10 deciles    3.225*** 2.975*** 
    (0.620) (0.604) 
Homeownership Other     - 
Own Paid     1.094 
     (0.171) 
Own Paying     1.601*** 
     (0.290) 
 Constant 0.0569*** 0.0580*** 0.0369*** 0.0425*** 0.0385*** 
  (0.0163) (0.0173) (0.0119) (0.0140) (0.0125) 
 Observations 3,828 3,828 3,828 3,828  
Survey: Logistic regression 
Number of strata   =      1                  Number of obs     =     3828 
Number of PSUs     = 3828              Population size   =  3847952 
                                                Design df          =      3827 
                                                F(  15,   3813)    =      9.85 
                                                Prob > F           =    0.0000 
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Odds Ratios, Having a Bank Credit Card Debt 
Independent Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Gender Female - - - -  
 Male 1.419*** 1.438*** 1.378** 1.368** 1.391** 
  (0.191) (0.195) (0.200) (0.200) (0.206) 
Age Group Less than 35 - - - -  
 35-49 1.266 1.176 1.170 1.145 1.168 
  (0.209) (0.197) (0.196) (0.196) (0.203) 
 50-64 0.833 0.830 0.851 0.717* 0.817 
  (0.146) (0.145) (0.147) (0.126) (0.150) 
 Over 65 0.833 0.830 0.851 0.717* 0.817 
  (0.146) (0.145) (0.147) (0.126) (0.150) 
Educational Level Primary - - - -  
 Secondary 2.563*** 2.481*** 2.454*** 1.998*** 1.964** 
  (0.662) (0.644) (0.641) (0.533) (0.522) 
 Graduate 4.740*** 4.424*** 4.354*** 2.611*** 2.497*** 
  (1.234) (1.176) (1.161) (0.719) (0.696) 
 Postgraduate 9.989*** 9.201*** 8.976*** 3.817*** 3.543*** 
  (2.541) (2.401) (2.351) (1.067) (1.003) 
Number of household 
members 
 
 
1.086** 1.010 1.008 0.916* 0.933 
  (0.0420) (0.0505) (0.0505) (0.0487) (0.0495) 
Members generating 
expenditures on 
education 
 
None  - - -  
One  1.107 1.099 1.237 1.179 
  (0.191) (0.191) (0.218) (0.213) 
 More than two  1.575** 1.583** 1.881*** 1.780*** 
  (0.318) (0.319) (0.383) (0.370) 
      
Occupational Status Unemployed   - - - 
Employed   1.310 1.039 1.018 
   (0.324) (0.251) (0.243) 
Income Group 1-5 deciles    - - 
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6-8 deciles    1.854*** 1.821*** 
    (0.375) (0.377) 
9-10 deciles    3.865*** 3.698*** 
    (0.739) (0.738) 
Homeownership Other     - 
Own Paid     0.674** 
     (0.115) 
Own Paying     1.479** 
     (0.290) 
 Constant 0.0324*** 0.0363*** 0.0299*** 0.0393*** 0.0407*** 
  (0.0102) (0.0118) (0.0104) (0.0139) (0.0145) 
 Observations 3,828 3,828 3,828 3,828  
 
Number of strata   =         1                  Number of obs     =    3828 
Number of PSUs   =      3828             Population size    =   3847952 
                                                Design df          =      3827 
                                                F(  15,   3813)    =     22.03 
                                                Prob > F           =    0.0000 
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Odds Rations, having Department Store Debt 
Independent Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Gender Female - - - -  
 Male 0.952 0.952 0.921 0.924 0.922 
  (0.0961) (0.0961) (0.0955) (0.0960) (0.0958) 
Age Group Less than 35 - - - -  
 35-49 0.899 0.918 0.914 0.916 0.863 
  (0.130) (0.134) (0.134) (0.135) (0.131) 
 50-64 0.740** 0.760* 0.775* 0.782 0.735* 
  (0.111) (0.115) (0.117) (0.120) (0.117) 
 Over 65 0.419*** 0.460*** 0.503*** 0.505*** 0.470*** 
  (0.0725) (0.0806) (0.0959) (0.0974) (0.0944) 
Educational Level Primary - - - -  
 Secondary 1.297** 1.288* 1.278* 1.264* 1.277* 
  (0.167) (0.167) (0.166) (0.168) (0.170) 
 Graduate 1.460** 1.467** 1.449** 1.461** 1.505** 
  (0.218) (0.222) (0.220) (0.241) (0.248) 
 Postgraduate 0.793 0.801 0.785 0.851 0.869 
  (0.116) (0.119) (0.118) (0.151) (0.152) 
Number of household 
members 
 
 
 
1.236*** 1.215*** 1.215*** 1.213*** 1.211*** 
  (0.0405) (0.0480) (0.0480) (0.0502) (0.0497) 
      
Members generating 
expenditures on 
education 
Occupational Status 
None  - - -  
One  1.472*** 1.460*** 1.475*** 1.459*** 
  (0.193) (0.193) (0.196) (0.193) 
More than 
two 
 1.116 1.117 1.133 1.121 
  (0.171) (0.171) (0.176) (0.174) 
Unemployed   - - - 
 Employed   1.189 1.174 1.199 
    (0.165) (0.165) (0.167) 
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Income Group 1-5 deciles    - - 
Income Group 
 
6-8 deciles    1.226* 1.165 
    (0.148) (0.142) 
9-10 deciles    0.887 0.826 
    (0.113) (0.107) 
Homeownership Other     - 
      1.285** 
 Own Paid     (0.153) 
 Own Paying     1.458** 
      (0.221) 
 Constant 0.0443*** 0.0475*** 0.0370*** 0.0364***  
  (0.00956) (0.0105) (0.00897) (0.00940)  
 Observations 3,828 3,828 3,828 3,828  
Number of strata   =       1                  Number of obs     =      3828 
Number of PSUs   =     3828              Population size    =   3847952 
                                                Design df          =      3827 
                                                F(  15,   3813)    =     10.09 
                                                Prob > F           =    0.0000 
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